2345 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:33

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai are saying, one may not bring ḥallah and priests’ parts to a Cohen on the holiday, whether they have been separated the day before or on the day itself, but the House of Hillel permit. The House of Shammai said to the House of Hillel, it is an equal cut. Ḥallah and priests’ parts are a gift to the Cohen, and heave is a gift to the Cohen. Just as one may not bring heave to the Cohen, so one may not bring these parts. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you mention heave where he has no right to separate, what can you say about the gifts which he may separate?

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:44

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, on a holiday one sends only portions, but the House of Hillel say one sends domestic animals, wild animals, and birds, whether alive or slaughtered. One sends wines, oils, and flour, and legumes, but no grains. Rebbi Simeon permits grains.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:45

HALAKHAH: It is difficult for the House of Shammai. A large thigh one is permitted to send, a small kid goat one is not permitted to send. Rebbi Yudan said, it only is understood if he carries it. But if he draws it and it walks, what is the difference if he draws it to deliver it or he draws it to let it drink? The Great Rebbi Hoshaia asked Rebbi Jehudah the Prince, did you hear from your father whether one is permitted to move a chicken? Certainly if it was ready for slaughter it is permitted, otherwise it is forbidden. But are not all chickens ready for slaughter? The question is, maybe even if it is not ready. He told him in a whisper. He asked him, why are you telling me in a whisper? He said to him, just I heard it in a whisper, so I am telling you in a whisper.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:47

MISHNAH: One may send garments whether sewn or not sewn, and even if they do not respond to a holiday need. But not a sandal with nails nor a shoe which is not sown. Rebbi Jehudah says, also no white shoe because it needs a craftsman. This is the principle: Anything which one may use on the holiday one may send.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 2:3

Rebbi Cahana the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, on condition that he not act craftily. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar as it was stated: “One does not make {food} on a holiday for use after the holiday.” Also, it was stated: “A woman may fill a pot with meat even if one eats only one piece from it, a kettle with hot water even if one drinks only one cup from it. But baking, she should bake only what she needs.” For it is stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, a woman may fill the entire oven with bread because the bread turns out well if the oven is filled.” Rav Ḥuna preached following Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan preached to the Tiberians following that of Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He preached this as practice but they took it as to act on. Some wanted to say that he preached to act on. They came and asked him and he preached as practice, and they preached again but we do not know whether as practice or to act on. Rebbi Abba bar Zavdi said, Rebbi Abbahu instructed following Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:6

Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav, they wanted to say, they are permitted the next day. Rebbi Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Uziel the son of Rebbi Onias of Barat Hauran: They are really permitted. They wanted to say, its doubt made it permitted. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Jonathan both say, if in doubt whether it was prepared it is forbidden. But Rebbi Joḥanan said, if in doubt whether it was prepared it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:6

Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav, they wanted to say, they are permitted the next day. Rebbi Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Uziel the son of Rebbi Onias of Barat Hauran: They are really permitted. They wanted to say, its doubt made it permitted. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Jonathan both say, if in doubt whether it was prepared it is forbidden. But Rebbi Joḥanan said, if in doubt whether it was prepared it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 5:11

It was stated: One does not climb on a tree whether moist or dried-up. One understands moist; dried-up? So we are saying, it is forbidden to step on a twig on the Sabbath? Or does it follow Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Meïr said, “a dried-up vine is forbidden but does not sanctify”? It is everybody’s opinion; they forbade the dried-up tree because of a moist tree. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi came running before Rav. He asked him, how did you come? He told him, [by] the warped date palm. He said to him, who permitted you?

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 5:28

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba said, for eruv they went according to the logical rule. You should know that this is so since they say there in the name of Rav Ḥisda, but they do not know whether from a tradition or a Mishnah, ‘even logs.’ Did we want to say that logs have no stability?

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 2:28

Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of (Rebbi) <rav> Jeremiah, a private person has to mention the occasion on a public fast day. Where does he say it? Between “Redeemer of Israel” and “Healer of the sick.” What does he say? “Answer us, Eternal, answer us in this time and season because we are in great trouble, do not hide Your presence from us, do not be oblivious to our supplications, because You, Eternal, will answer in time of trouble, redeem and save in any time of distress. They cried to the Eternal in their trouble, He led them out from their distress. Praise to You, Eternal, Answering in times of trouble.” Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael in the name <of the house of rebbi yannai says: in “he who hears prayer.”The Fifteenth benediction, place of all personal additions to the weekday prayers. <Rebbi Jonah> in the name of (Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish) <rav>: Even an individual who decreed a fast day on himself has to mention the occasion. Where does he say it? Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Ḥuna: Similar to Friday night and Sabbath day. Rebbi Mana said: I, who did not check whether one follows Rav Jeremiah or Rebbi Yannai the son of Rebbi Ismael, went to the study hall and I heard: “Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even an individual who decreed a fast day on himself has to mention the occasion.” Rebbi Yose objected that a baraita disagrees: Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the night after Sabbath and the nights after Yom Kippur and after Public Fasts. Since Rebbi Yose said, this baraita disagrees, it contradicts the statement: between “Redeemer of Israel” and “Healer of the sick.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 3:31

MISHNAH: One blows the shofar because of any danger which menaces the public except an overabundance of rain. It happened that they said to Onias the circle-drawer, pray for rain. He said to them, go and shelter the Passover ovens so they should not get softened. He prayed but no rain fell. What did he do? He drew a circle, stood inside it, and said: Master of the World! Your children trusted me since I am like a familiar before You. I am swearing by Your great Name that I shall not move from here until You show mercy for Your children. Rain started to drip. He said, that is not what I was asking for, but rain {to fill} cistern, ditches, and caves. It rained in a raging storm. He said, that is not what I was asking for, but rain of goodwill, blessing, and donation. It rained normally until Israel moved from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount because of the rain. They came and said to him, just as you prayed for them to come, so pray to remove them. He told them, go and check whether the losers’ stone was wiped away.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 3:38

“They said to him, just as you prayed for them to come, so pray to remove them. He told them, go and check whether the losers’ stone was wiped away.” What was the purpose of the losers’ stone. Only that anybody who lost something was taking it from there and anybody who found something was bringing it there. He told them that just as it is impossible for this stone to be wiped off from the world, so it is impossible to pray that the rains should stop. But go and bring me a bull as thanksgiving offering. They went and brought him a bull as thanksgiving offering. He leaned on it with both of his hands and said, my Master! You brought evil on Your children and they could not stand it; You brought benefit on Your children and they could not stand it, but may it be Your pleasure to bring relief. Immediately the wind blew, the clouds dissolved, the sun shone, and the earth dried. They went out and found the desert full of truffles.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:26

Rebbi Ḥanina said, I merited to live a long life. Whether because of this matter I do not know, or whether when I was climbing from Tiberias to Sepphoris I made a detour to ask about the well-being of Rebbi Simeon ben Ḥalfuta I do not know.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:26

Rebbi Ḥanina said, I merited to live a long life. Whether because of this matter I do not know, or whether when I was climbing from Tiberias to Sepphoris I made a detour to ask about the well-being of Rebbi Simeon ben Ḥalfuta I do not know.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:44

“And the city was breached.” It is written, on the Ninth of the month the city was breached, and you are saying so? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai said, here is an erroneous computation. That is what is written, it was in the eleventh year, on the first of the month, was the Eternal’s word to me, saying: Son of man, since Tyre said about Jerusalem hurrah. What “hurrah”? If you are saying on the first of Av, it still was not burned. If you are saying on the first of Ellul, cannot in one day and night the messenger leave Jerusalem and arrive at Tyre? But here is an erroneous computation. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Joḥanan said, {a parable} of a king who was sitting and computing computations. They came and told him, your son was kidnapped; his computations became erroneous. He said, let this be the beginning of computations. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, {a parable} of a king who was sitting and computing computations. They came and told him, your son was kidnapped and incapacitated; his computations became erroneous. He said, let this be the beginning of computations. Rebbi Mana asked, one understands this that they were erroneous for the past; maybe for the future? Whether one follows him who said on the ninth of the month, or the one who said on the seventeenth, [in what do they differ?] there are twenty-one days from the day the city was breached to the day the Temple was destroyed. Rebbi Abuna said, an indication, I am seeing an almond stick. Since this almond tree from sprouting its flower to finishing its fruit needs twenty-one days, so from the day the city was breached to the day the Temple was destroyed twenty-one days. He who says on the Ninth of the month, the Temple was destroyed on the first of Av. He who says on the Seventeenth, the Temple was destroyed on the Ninth of Av.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:71

All letters written with the Name as prefix are profane and may be erased, e. g., to the Eternal, by the Eternal, as the Eternal, that the Eternal, since we find that on the diadem it was separate from it, “holy to” at the bottom, “the Eternal” at the top. All letters written with the Name as suffix are holy and may not be erased, e. g., our God, your God. These are the Names which may not be erased: one who writes the Name of four letters, whether YH or AD. “El, Elohim, Elohei, Elohenu, Elohekhem, Shadday, Sabaoth, Ehye-Ašer-Ehye.” If one writes AD from Adonai, EH from Ehye, ŠD from Shadday, ṢB from Sabaoth, these may be erased and one erases their additions. “To Elohim” one erases “to”; “to the Eternal” one erases “to”. If he wrote YH of the four-letter Name, EL from Elohim, it may not be erased. This is the rule: Any which at another place is a permanent Name may not be erased.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 2:34

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, does cutting the `omer during daytime push aside the Sabbath? Rebbi Abbai objected, did we not state, “its obligation is to harvest during nighttime. If it was cut during daytime it is qualified and pushes the Sabbath aside.” But he did not accept it. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish changed his opinion because of this: “After nightfall he says to them, did the sun set? They say, yes. Did the sun set? They say, yes.” Where do we hold? If about nighttime, that already was said. But if it does not refer to nighttime, let it refer to daytime; it is a matter that pushes aside the Sabbath during daytime. Do the preparations push aside the Sabbath during nighttime? Did we not state, “they made the maker of pan-baked breads make pan-baked breads.” Explain it, on a weekday. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada stated, “this is the daily order of service of our God’s Temple,” whether on a weekday or a Sabbath. But did we not state, “they harvested it and put it in boxes, brought it to the Temple courtyard, and were parching it in fire to fulfill the commandment of roasting. Rebbi Yose said, since he started the meritorious work, one tells him to complete it.” Rebbi Judah from Kappadokia objected before Rebbi Yose: Think of it, if it came from storage. Since he did not start the meritorious work, there is no reason to tell him to complete it. Rebbi Jacob bar Sosai objected before Rebbi Yose, did we not state, “for on a distance of walking a night and a day one desecrates the Sabbath and goes for testimony of the new moon”? He said to them, since the daytime needs the nighttime and the nighttime needs the daytime, it is as if it were all daytime. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, is it not sanctified retroactively? Since it is sanctified retroactively there is no difference between day and night.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 3:10

One writes Torah and Prophets together, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages are saying, one does not write Torah and Prophets together, but one may write Torah, Prophets, and Hagiographs together. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Torah and Ḥumashim have the same sanctity. One does not split a Torah into Ḥumashim, but one turns Ḥumashim into a Torah. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that a Torah which was split into Ḥumashim remains in its sanctity. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One does not read in public from an incomplete Torah. But was it not stated: It is permitted to read in public in Genesis up to the deluge, in Leviticus up to it was on the eighth day, in Numbers up to it was when the Ark travelled? This Ursicinus set fire to the Torah of the Sennabarites. They came and asked Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose, whether one may read from the scroll in public. They told them, it is forbidden. Not that it is forbidden but since they will feel so badly they will buy another one.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:23

It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:54

Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Samuel: One makes no inferences from a ruling. Everybody agrees that one makes no inferences from an action. Rebbi Mana said to him, that means somebody who does not understand, but he who understands may act. He said to him, whether one understands or one does not understand, if there is a disagreement. But if there is no disagreement, whether one understands or one does not understand one acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:54

Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Samuel: One makes no inferences from a ruling. Everybody agrees that one makes no inferences from an action. Rebbi Mana said to him, that means somebody who does not understand, but he who understands may act. He said to him, whether one understands or one does not understand, if there is a disagreement. But if there is no disagreement, whether one understands or one does not understand one acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:55

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All forbidden things, if one added to them in error it is permitted, intentionally it is forbidden. Is that not the Mishnah, “if it was in error it is permitted, if intentional it is forbidden”? The Mishnah is about addition to heave, he comes to tell you about other things. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as one has a duty to instruct about actions that should be done so one has a duty to instruct negatively about actions that should not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure as pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure as impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to suspend or to burn, always try to burn rather than to suspend since there is nothing in the Torah more distinguished than burned bulls and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked, is it possible to infer from something whose commandment is thus for something whose commandment is not so?

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:4

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the finger-holes which they mentioned, whether inside or outside, in the manner in which cleanly people hold it. Rebbi Ze`ira said, “it is impossible to say, about one which is wiped dry, for hands are not made impure by anything wiped dry. In truth it is impossible to say, if it is full of fluid, for in the moment he touched it he made it impure. But we must hold that [it was dirtied] by fluid.” Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Banaiah: They treated fluid in a finger-hole like fluid at the slaughtering place. As you are saying there that fluids of the slaughtering place are pure at their proper place but impure at any other place, [so here, fluids in a finger-hole are pure at their proper place but impure at any other place.] Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: fluids of the slaughtering place which came outside {the Temple courtyards} become impure. But did we not state, fluids of the slaughtering place which came outside continue in their sanctity? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Simon explained it. Rebbi Ḥinena, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. If they came out and returned. If the upper fluid became impure and flowed down, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya. One said, at its place it is pure, if it flows down it is impure. The other one said, since it comes from purity it is pure.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:15

Rebbi Jonathan in the name of Rebbi: If somebody eats food which is third degree impure for heave, his body is disqualified from eating heave. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked, how? Rebbi follows Rebbi Eliezer? As we have stated there, “He who eats food impure in the first degree is impure in the first degree. He who eats food impure in the second degree is impure in the second degree. He who eats food impure in the third degree is impure in the third degree.” It is everybody’s opinion, so he should stay away from heave. And similarly, if somebody eats food which is second degree impure for tithe, is his body disqualified from eating tithe? Let us hear from the following: “But the Sages forbid for tithe.” They had not heard that Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, what means “but the Sages forbid for tithe”? His body is disqualified from eating tithe. And similarly, if somebody eats food which is fourth degree impure for sancta, is his body disqualified from eating sancta? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, they made him like one eating fourth degree impure food for sancta. This implies, if somebody eats food which is fourth degree impure for sancta, his body is disqualified from eating sancta. So far in Temple sancta which were sanctified. Or also for profane food prepared in the standards of sancta? Let us hear from the following, [as we stated there]: “If somebody slaughters domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, and no blood came out from them, they are qualified and may be eaten with unclean hands, since they were not prepared by blood. Rebbi Simeon says, they were prepared by slaughter.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The Mishnah is about profane food prepared in the standards of sancta following Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If somebody eats food which is third degree impure for heave, his body is disqualified from eating heave. Is that not a Mishnah that third degree impurity is second degree impurity for sancta? The Mishnah is about Temple sancta which were sanctified. He tells you in addition, even for profane food prepared in the standards of sancta. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: The Mishnah says so, “loaves of sancta bread; the water in their cavities is sanctified.” Does it displease you that it comes to tell you that he makes fluid by your pronouncement like sanctified fluid? Rebbi Ze`ira said, as you are saying there, one made one pure for the ashes of the Red Cow equal to the water for the ashes of the Red Cow and to the ashes of the Red Cow, and here one made fluid by your pronouncement like sanctified fluid. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Yannai, and it is unknown whether this is in the name of Rebbi: There is a Mishnah which is both confirmation and disproof. From it confirmation: “For third degree impurity is second degree impurity for sancta, but not second degree impurity for heave, if it was prepared by the standards of heave.” But if it was prepared in the standards of sancta, his body is second degree impure for sancta. From it disproof: For third degree impurity is second degree impurity for sancta, but not second degree impurity for heave, if it was prepared by the standards of sancta. But if it was prepared in the standards of heave, his body is second degree impure for heave and a fortiori for sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:16

“However, the Sages permit in both cases.” What means “in both cases”? Whether it was irrigated before the holiday or was not irrigated before the holiday? But both for tree and for vegetable.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:28

HALAKHAH: What is readying a grave? Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai said, one whitewashes it with lime. Rav Ḥisda said, if it was long he shortens it. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, he enlarges it at one side and widens it at another side. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “he enlarges and widens it whether on one side or at two sides.”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:39

“One tightens.” Rebbi Yasa said, Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. Ḥisqiah said: making a lattice, warp and woof; tightening, either warp or woof. Rebbi Joḥanan said: making a lattice, either warp or woof; tightening, if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, everybody agrees that making a lattice means warp and woof. Where do they disagree? About tightening. Ḥisqiah said: either warp or woof; Rebbi Joḥanan said: if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Yasa instructed Samuel bar Ḥanina that “making a lattice” means warp and woof. We do not know whether this follows Ḥizqiah or it follows Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: a Mishnah says so that making a lattice means warp and woof, as we have stated there, “when is the rope connected to the bed? If he plaited three boxes.” Could you say warp without woof or woof without warp? Could one pitch woof and make a lattice?

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:31

It was stated: These are the words of Abba Shaul. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Abba Shaul. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The word of Abba Shaul: both days and decrees are cancelled. But the words of the Sages: the days are cancelled but the decrees are not cancelled. What is the difference between them? Rav Ḥuna said, the eve of a holiday is between them. If he shaved before the holiday he may shave after the holiday. If he did not shave before the holiday he may not shave after the holiday. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he did not shave before the holiday he may shave after the holiday. Rebbi Eleazar instructed Rebbi Simeon bar Abba to shave after the holiday, but we do not know whether following Abba Shaul or following the consensus of the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:44

It was stated: The following are forbidden to the mourner all Seven {days}: Washing, anointing, wearing shoes, sexual relations, grooming, washing clothes, reading in the Torah, studying Midrash, practices, and homiletics, greeting, and working. Who stated that the mourner is forbidden to take a bath during the entire Seven? Rebbi Nathan. Something happened to Rebbi Immi; he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba who instructed him “all Seven days following Rebbi Nathan”. Something happened to Rebbi Yose; he sent to Rebbi Abba bar Cohen who said to him: Rebbi, did you not so teach us that something happened to Rebbi Immi, he asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who instructed him “all Seven following Rebbi Nathan”. He said to him, maybe these were two separate incidents, we say it in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, you say it in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. And also from the following: Something happened to Rebbi Ḥama, father of Rav Hoshaya, he asked the rabbis and they forbade it. Rebbi Yose asked, which rabbis? The rabbis here or the rabbis in the South? If you say the rabbis of here, it is fine. If you would say the rabbis from the South, would he have asked minor authorities when greater ones were available to him? If you say the rabbis of the South, we would allow and they would forbid, as we have stated: “At a place where it is customary to bathe after a funeral, one may bathe; in the South one bathes.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: He who permits that bath makes it like eating and drinking. That means, about a bath for pleasure. But a bath that is not for pleasure is permitted. Samuel bar Abba developed scab. They came and asked Rebbi Yasa, what is the rule, may he bathe? He said to them: If he does not bathe, would he not die? If he needs it, even on the Ninth of Av. If he needs it, even on Yom Kippur. They saw Rebbi Yose, son of Rebbi Ḥanina, immersing himself. They did not know whether it was for his emission, they did not know whether it was to cool down because bathing in cold water is not called bathing. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen instructed following this statement.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:44

It was stated: The following are forbidden to the mourner all Seven {days}: Washing, anointing, wearing shoes, sexual relations, grooming, washing clothes, reading in the Torah, studying Midrash, practices, and homiletics, greeting, and working. Who stated that the mourner is forbidden to take a bath during the entire Seven? Rebbi Nathan. Something happened to Rebbi Immi; he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba who instructed him “all Seven days following Rebbi Nathan”. Something happened to Rebbi Yose; he sent to Rebbi Abba bar Cohen who said to him: Rebbi, did you not so teach us that something happened to Rebbi Immi, he asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who instructed him “all Seven following Rebbi Nathan”. He said to him, maybe these were two separate incidents, we say it in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, you say it in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. And also from the following: Something happened to Rebbi Ḥama, father of Rav Hoshaya, he asked the rabbis and they forbade it. Rebbi Yose asked, which rabbis? The rabbis here or the rabbis in the South? If you say the rabbis of here, it is fine. If you would say the rabbis from the South, would he have asked minor authorities when greater ones were available to him? If you say the rabbis of the South, we would allow and they would forbid, as we have stated: “At a place where it is customary to bathe after a funeral, one may bathe; in the South one bathes.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: He who permits that bath makes it like eating and drinking. That means, about a bath for pleasure. But a bath that is not for pleasure is permitted. Samuel bar Abba developed scab. They came and asked Rebbi Yasa, what is the rule, may he bathe? He said to them: If he does not bathe, would he not die? If he needs it, even on the Ninth of Av. If he needs it, even on Yom Kippur. They saw Rebbi Yose, son of Rebbi Ḥanina, immersing himself. They did not know whether it was for his emission, they did not know whether it was to cool down because bathing in cold water is not called bathing. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen instructed following this statement.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:47

“Reading in the Torah.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, nobody was saying anything to him, not even a word from the Torah. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said to him, he himself would not have died if he had stated. What about it? As Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, because they were at a loss how to start with him, whether about his body, or his money, or the souls of his sons and daughters. A student of Rav Ḥisda became sick. He sent him two students to study with him. He turned before them into a kind of snake; they interrupted and he died. A student of Bar Pedaya became sick. He sent him two students to study with him. He turned before them into a kind of (oil cake) [a star]; they interrupted and he died. It was stated: But he may study a subject not familiar to him. As the following: Something happened to Rebbi Yasa. Rebbi Joḥanan sent him two students to study with him. If because it is permitted we do not know; or if because it was a subject not familiar to him we do not know. What was not familiar to Rebbi Yasa? But for example rabbinic decisions people are asked about and it is for him as if not familiar. Something happened to Rebbi Yose bar Petrus the first father-in-law of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. Bar Qappara sent him two students to study with him. If because it is permitted we do not know; or if because he was ardent for words of the Torah we do not know. And it was stated thus: If he was ardent for words of the Torah it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:7

It is written: “The genitals of your brother’s wife you may not uncover.” One understands both his paternal and his maternal brothers’ wives, both the wife of a brother who lived concurrently with him or onewho did not live concurrently with him, whether he had children or did not have children. She became permitted, excluded from this set, by levirate. Should I think unconditionally? It is said here: “When brothers live together”; and it is said there: “We, your servants, are twelve brothers.” Since the “brothers” mentioned there are paternal brothers, so the “brothers” mentioned here must be paternal brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:20

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says, neither he nor the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but are guilty for the co-wife. It is fine that he is not guilty about the woman who got ḥalîṣah since he was cleared to have her freely. He is guilty about the co-wife since he was never cleared to have her freely. What is the difference for one of the brothers between the woman who got ḥalîṣah and the co-wife? He turned around and said, you do not know under which head to declare him guilty, whether as wife of the one performing ḥalîṣah or wife of the deceased. Rebbi Yose said, do you think ḥalîṣah is acquisiton? But it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:36

There came a case before Rebbi Yose. He said: One should examine her breasts. How? Following Rebbi Jehudah! Since Rebbi Jehudah said, until the black covers most. Is not that what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, between maidenhood and adulthood thare are only six months, and Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one does not act on this? This means during that period. But after that period one acts. But in this case where there was a doubt whether the black covered most or the black did not cover most, I force him to give a bill of divorce. When the black covers most one does not touch a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:2

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:2

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:18

How can one prove secondary prohibitions? Rebbi Ḥuna said: “These”, the strong ones. This implies that there are weaker ones. The following are the secondary prohibitions: His paternal grandmother and his maternal grandmother, his paternal grandfather’s wife and his maternal grandfathers wife, his grandson’s wife whether from son or daughter, the wife of his mother’s brother and the wife of his father’s maternal brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:7

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:7

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:30

MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:31

HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:31

HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:38

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:41

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: A rape victim does not have to wait three months. But did we not state: “One separates them for three month to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have children one returns them at once.” That is different, it is for the benefit of the child.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:4

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:5

Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:7

MISHNAH: If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant and gave birth. If the child is alive, [the levir] has to divorce her and they must bring a sacrifice. If the child is not alive, he may keep her. If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated to bring a reparation offering for an uncertain case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:8

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, in any case where the true fact can be ascertained, one does not have to bring a reparation offering because of doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them and the other is locked up.He says, since I could determine the true fact if I would find the key, does one have to bring a reparation offering in this case of doubt? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant”, as long as it is not known whether the child lives or does not live, does he have to bring a reparation offering because of the doubt? This means that he does not bring.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:34

MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:23

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:24

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:25

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start’. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:25

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start’. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:1

MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:1

MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:12

MISHNAH: The High Priest shall not marry a widow, whether a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult. He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. If he gave qiddushin and afterwards was elected High Priest, he shall marry her; it happened that Joshua ben Gamla had given qiddushin to Martha bat Boetos when the king appointed him as High Priest and he married her. If a woman was waiting for her Cohen levir when he was elected High Priest, even though he “bespoke” her, he may not marry her. If the brother of a High Priest died, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:13

HALAKHAH: “The High Priest shall not marry a widow,” etc. “A widow he shall not take”, whether from betrothal or from marriage. “A divorcee he shall not take,” whether from betrothal or from marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:13

HALAKHAH: “The High Priest shall not marry a widow,” etc. “A widow he shall not take”, whether from betrothal or from marriage. “A divorcee he shall not take,” whether from betrothal or from marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:14

“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction. Females do not enable to eat since there are two doubts, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.) A doubt regarding their words forces leniency. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his. Female, she takes her part with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:14

“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction. Females do not enable to eat since there are two doubts, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.) A doubt regarding their words forces leniency. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his. Female, she takes her part with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:15

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:15

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:7

Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman also said: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi was in Laodicea and met there Rebbi Jehudah the Patriarch. He wanted to leave early, when he said to him wait for us tomorrow to immerse this woman convert. Rebbi Zera asked Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Was that to honor the old man or because one does not immerse a woman convert at night? He said to him, because one does not immerse a woman convert at night. A case came before Rebbi Yose whether one may immerse converts at night. They could not agree.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:27

There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month’s child of the first [brother] or a seven-month’s of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:20

“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:3

So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:3

So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:46

MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:47

HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:49

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:18

A convert has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. If he married any other incest prohibited woman, he may keep her. It was only said, “if he married”. Therefore, not from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:19

A Gentile has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. Rav Ḥanin said, he explained us the words of Rebbi Meïr simply: “Therefore, a man has to abandon his father and his mother.” What is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. Rebbi Vivian asked: Then his father’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his father! His mother’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his mother! Rebbi Simeon, the son of Rebbi Ayvo objected: “Amram took his aunt Yokhebed as wife.” Does that mean that the Israelites did not even behave as descendants of Noah? Rebbi Hila said, what is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. They objected to Rebbi Meïr: “And truly she is my sister, my father’s daughter, but not my mother’s.” He said to them: Is a proof from there? Not “she became my wife”?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:24

MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:24

MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:29

“They may not marry women, whether enabled or disabled [for the priesthood].” Not enabled ones because of the disabled one. Not disabled ones because of the enabled one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:34

MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:22

There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, the heave given by a minor who has not yet grown two pubic hairs is heave. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: His heave is never heave unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abin, Cahana in the name of the Rebbi Hila (Num.18:32): “You should not carry guilt because of it.” He who may carry guilt can give heave, he who cannot carry guilt cannot give heave. They objected: But a Gentile cannot incur guilt, and he may give heave! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila (Num. 18:27): “Your heave will be credited to you”, (v. 26) “and you shall lift”. Anybody for whom “thought” is written may give heave. But anybody for whom “thought” is not written cannot give heave. They objected: But “thought” is not written for Gentiles, and he may give heave! Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Gentiles have no “thought” whether for preparation or for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:54

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:54

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:5

What is the difference whether peace is in the world or war is in the world? If war is in the world, she might think that he died although he is not dead. So far if war was in the North and she came from the North, in the South and she came from the South. If there was war in the North and she came from the South; she says I am coming from the North, but I am arguing that you came from the South. If she says, I am coming from the South, it is because she thinks to free herself. If she says, he died on his bed, I am arguing that he went to war; it is because she thinks to free herself.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:8

MISHNAH: The House of Hillel say, we heard only about one who came from the grain harvest. The House of Shammai said to them, it makes no difference whether she comes from the grain harvest, or from the olive harvest, or from overseas. The Sages spoke about the grain harvest only because of what happened. The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.