wife
3636 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.
HALAKHAH: If he had intercourse with the second he is two times guilty, for the brother’s wife and for “a woman in addition to her sister”.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.
Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: The heirs of her ketubah are obliged to bury her. Rebbi Yose said, if Rebbi Hoshaia had not stated this, we would have had a problem. If she had no ketubah, do they not have to bury her? This is difficult. If a woman has no ketubah, does she not have to be buried? A wife, even if she has a ketubah, must be buried. This one, if she has a ketubah, is entitled to burial costs. But here, if she does not have a ketubah, she is not entitled to burial costs.
MISHNAH: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect except that her ketubah is a lien on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is forbidden her relatives and his relatives are forbidden to her. Forbidden to him are her mother and her mother’s mother, her father’s mother, her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter, and her sister as long as she is alive. The brothers are permitted. Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son. The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is forbidden her relatives and his relatives are forbidden to her. Forbidden to him are her mother and her mother’s mother, her father’s mother, her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter, and her sister as long as she is alive. The brothers are permitted. Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son. The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden.
So is the Mishnah: “The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden”. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman for whom he performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more?
So is the Mishnah: “The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden”. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman for whom he performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more?
So is the Mishnah: “The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden”. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman for whom he performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more?
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
“Except the widow because of her mourning.” How much does mourning last? Thirty days. That is, for women. But for men, three holidays. If he has children; but if he does not have children immediately. If he has somebody to serve him; but if he has nobody to serve him, immediately. If he does not have small children; but if he has small children, immediately, as in the following: It happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon’s wife died. While he still was in the cemetery, he said to her sister: Come into my house and raise your sister’s children. Even though he married her, he did not know her until 30 days had passed.
MISHNAH: If four brothers were married to four women and died, if their oldest [brother] wants to marry all of them in levirate, he is permitted to do so. If somebody was married to two women and he died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah with one of them frees the co-wife. If one was acceptable and the other blemished, if he performs ḥalîṣah, he performs it with the blemished; if he takes in levirate, he takes the acceptable one.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, this means that there is an obligation first to give qiddushin and only after that to cohabit. Since here, where qiddushin are not written, you say “that is as it is commanded”, for a wife, where it is written, not so much more!
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.
“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.
MISHNAH: A private priest should not marry a she-ram unless he has a wife and children. Rebbi Jehudah says, even one who has a wife and children should not marry a she-ram since she is the harlot mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages say, a harlot is only a convert, a freedwoman, and one who copulated in harlotry.
MISHNAH: A private priest should not marry a she-ram unless he has a wife and children. Rebbi Jehudah says, even one who has a wife and children should not marry a she-ram since she is the harlot mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages say, a harlot is only a convert, a freedwoman, and one who copulated in harlotry.
HALAKHAH: “A private priest should not marry a she-ram,” etc. Does that mean that an Israel without wife and children may marry her? Still he is forbidden. But since we stated afterwards that “a harlot mentioned in the Torah is only a convert, a freedwoman, and one who copulated in harlotry,” all of which refer only to priests, for this reason it was not stated.
MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.
HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property.
HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!
The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!
The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose stated in the name of his father: If there was a daughter, she enables to eat. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because she is able to take her upkeep away from them. Is a wife not also able to take her upkeep away from them? She might request her ketubah be paid or lose her ketubah. This is difficult! The ketubah is a biblical institution, the upkeep of the daughters is rabbinical; do their institutions uproot a word of the Torah? It follows him who said that they accepted tithes voluntarily.
MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
“The deaf-and-dumb disables.” Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats”? Rebbi Abba Mari and Rebbi Mattaniah, one said, a disqualified deaf-and-dumb, the other said, a deaf-and-dumb levir.
“When the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” Why do we come here to state doubts? Since we had stated [the rules for] co-wives, we now state for doubts concerning co-wives.
This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats, against Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, also if an unmarried man had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the purpose of marriage it is copulation of harlotry.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.
It is written: “Shaḥaraim fathered children in the fields of Moab, after he had sent them, Ḥushim and Ba‘arah his wives.” “Shaḥaraim,” that is Boaz who was freed from sins. “He fathered children in the fields of Moab” because he married Ruth the Moabite. “After he had sent them,” he was from the tribe of Judah, of whom it is written, “he sent Jehudah before him”. “Ḥushim and Ba‘arah his wives,” can anybody father his wives? But it means that he was quick as a panther and explained the practice. “He fathered from New Moon his wife,” should it not have been: he fathered from Baarah, one of his wives? But through her, practice was newly defined: “Ammonite,” and but female Ammonite. “Moabite,” but not female Moabite.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
The argument of Rebbi Eliezer is inverted. There, he says “it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife,” and you say so? Rebbi Iniah said, Rebbi Eliezer referred only to criminal responsibility.
Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: These are the words of Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Aqiba, and Rebbi Joshua. But the words of the Sages are that neither the castrate by human action nor the congenital castrate is able to perform ḥalîṣah nor does one perform ḥalîṣah for his wife. He cannot perform levirate, nor does one marry his wife in levirate. That is the Mishnah: “The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous.” The hermaphrodite who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her, they disabled her because it is incestuous.”
Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: These are the words of Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Aqiba, and Rebbi Joshua. But the words of the Sages are that neither the castrate by human action nor the congenital castrate is able to perform ḥalîṣah nor does one perform ḥalîṣah for his wife. He cannot perform levirate, nor does one marry his wife in levirate. That is the Mishnah: “The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous.” The hermaphrodite who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her, they disabled her because it is incestuous.”
Is there nobody who disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah? Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Hila, one marries his wife in levirate, that means that nobody disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah. If he betrothed, his betrothal is not problematic. If he was betrothed, his betrothal is problematic. If he was copulated with, he becomes disabled from heave like a woman. That is difficult. Rebbi Niḥa bar Rebbi Sava, Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Even with his own kind in any case. That is difficult, if he is a male, no male disables a male. If she is a female, no female disables a female. The male aspect of one disables the female aspect of the other. He enables his wives to eat but does not enable his slaves. He enables his wives to eat by his male aspect. But he does not enable his slaves because of his double aspect; his female aspect was desecrated.
HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.
HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.
Rebbi Yose said: All the time Rebbi Hila told me, state in your baraita that he inherits from her and defiles himself for her. We have also stated so: A man defiles himself for his qualified wife but does not become defiled for his disqualified wife.
Rebbi Yose said: All the time Rebbi Hila told me, state in your baraita that he inherits from her and defiles himself for her. We have also stated so: A man defiles himself for his qualified wife but does not become defiled for his disqualified wife.
Rebbi Abun asked before Rebbi Mana: May the slaves of a secondarily forbidden [wife] eat heave? He said to him, be quiet, it is better for you. She eats but her slaves do not eat.