witnesses
1244 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If other witnesses came, and they charged them [with perjury]: then [again] others came, and they [again] charged them [with perjury], even a hundred, they are all to be executed. Rabbi Judah says: “This is a conspiracy and the first set alone is [to be] executed.”
Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
Just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, their whole evidence is rendered void, so it is with three, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, the whole evidence is void. How do we know that this is the case even with a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Yose said: “When is this true? With regards to capital cases; but in monetary suits, the evidence may be established by the rest. Rabbi says: “It is one and the same rule, be it in monetary suits or capital cases.” This is the rule when both [disqualified] witnesses warned the transgressor, but when they did not warn him, what could two brothers do that saw someone killing a person?
Just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, their whole evidence is rendered void, so it is with three, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, the whole evidence is void. How do we know that this is the case even with a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Yose said: “When is this true? With regards to capital cases; but in monetary suits, the evidence may be established by the rest. Rabbi says: “It is one and the same rule, be it in monetary suits or capital cases.” This is the rule when both [disqualified] witnesses warned the transgressor, but when they did not warn him, what could two brothers do that saw someone killing a person?
Just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, their whole evidence is rendered void, so it is with three, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, the whole evidence is void. How do we know that this is the case even with a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Yose said: “When is this true? With regards to capital cases; but in monetary suits, the evidence may be established by the rest. Rabbi says: “It is one and the same rule, be it in monetary suits or capital cases.” This is the rule when both [disqualified] witnesses warned the transgressor, but when they did not warn him, what could two brothers do that saw someone killing a person?
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If one fled after having been convicted at a court and again comes up before the same court, the [first] judgment is not set aside. Wherever two witnesses stand up and declare, “We testify that so and so was tried and convicted at a certain court and that so and so were the witnesses” the accused is executed. [Trials before] a sanhedrin are customary both in the land [of Israel] and outside it. A sanhedrin that executes once in seven years, is called murderous. Rabbi Eliezer b. Azariah Says: once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: “Had we been members of a sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel remarked: “They would also multiply murderers in Israel.”
If one fled after having been convicted at a court and again comes up before the same court, the [first] judgment is not set aside. Wherever two witnesses stand up and declare, “We testify that so and so was tried and convicted at a certain court and that so and so were the witnesses” the accused is executed. [Trials before] a sanhedrin are customary both in the land [of Israel] and outside it. A sanhedrin that executes once in seven years, is called murderous. Rabbi Eliezer b. Azariah Says: once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: “Had we been members of a sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel remarked: “They would also multiply murderers in Israel.”
What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man. If he swore concerning a thing which is impossible, [for instance if he said,] “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air”, or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press”. If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me”, [and they replied,] “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you”. If he swore to annul a commandment, [for example] not to make a sukkah, or not to take a lulav, or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt.
If both [persons] denied [knowledge] together, they are both liable. If one after another, the first is liable, and the second exempt. If one denied, and the other admitted, the one who denied is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses, and the first denied, and then the second denied, they are both liable, because the testimony could be upheld by [either of] the two.
“You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me”, [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is exempt. [If he says,] “Nothing of yours is in my possession,” he is liable. “You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes”. [And then he said], “Do not give them to me except before witnesses.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me;” [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is liable, because he should have given them to him before witnesses.
“You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me”, [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is exempt. [If he says,] “Nothing of yours is in my possession,” he is liable. “You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes”. [And then he said], “Do not give them to me except before witnesses.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me;” [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is liable, because he should have given them to him before witnesses.
So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen”, he is exempt. [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was lost”; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you”, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he had consumed it, he pays the principal; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, a fifth, and brings a guilt-offering. [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was stolen;” [and the owner said,] “I adjure you, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he himself stole it, he pays double; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, fifth, and brings a guilt-offering.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen”, he is exempt. [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was lost”; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you”, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he had consumed it, he pays the principal; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, a fifth, and brings a guilt-offering. [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was stolen;” [and the owner said,] “I adjure you, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he himself stole it, he pays double; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, fifth, and brings a guilt-offering.
If a man said to one in the market, “Where is my ox which you have stolen?” and he replied, “I did not steal it,” and witnesses testified against him that he did steal it, he pays double. If he killed it or sold it, he pays four or five times its value. If he saw witnesses coming nearer and nearer, and he said, “I did steal it, but I did not kill or sell it,” he pays only the principal.
If a man said to one in the market, “Where is my ox which you have stolen?” and he replied, “I did not steal it,” and witnesses testified against him that he did steal it, he pays double. If he killed it or sold it, he pays four or five times its value. If he saw witnesses coming nearer and nearer, and he said, “I did steal it, but I did not kill or sell it,” he pays only the principal.
A female captive may eat of terumah, according to the words of Rabbi Dosa b. Harkinas. But the Sages say: “There is a female captive who may eat, and there is a female captive who may not eat. How is this so? The woman who said: ‘I was taken captive but [nonetheless] I am pure’, she may eat; because the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permit. But if there are witnesses [who declare] that she was made a captive, and she says: ‘[nonetheless] I am pure’, she may not eat.”
One who vowed [to keep] a longer naziriteship [than ordinary] and he completed his naziriteship and afterwards came to the [holy] land: Beth Shammai says: [he must be] a nazirite [only] thirty days, But Beth Hillel says: [he must be] a nazirite [the full time vowed as] in the beginning. One who has two groups of witnesses who testify about him, these testifying that he vowed two naziriteships and these testifying that he vowed five: Beth Shammai says: their testimony is divided, and there is no [obligation to perform] naziriteship. But Beth Hillel says: within the five, two are included, so that he must be a nazirite twice.
Rabbi Judah ben Baba and Rabbi Judah the priest testified concerning a minor, the daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah as soon as she entered the bridal chamber even though she had not engaged in marital intercourse. Rabbi Yose the priest and Rabbi Zechariah ben Hakatzav testified concerning a young girl who had been taken as collateral (by gentiles) in Ashkelon, and that her family had distanced her, even though her witnesses testified that she had not secluded herself [with any Man] and that she had not been defiled. The Sages said to them: if you believe that she had been taken as collateral, believe also that she did not seclude herself [with any man] and that she was not defiled; and if you do not believe that she did not seclude herself and that she was not defiled, neither believe that she had been taken as collateral.
Shimon ben Shetach used to say: be thorough in the interrogation of witnesses, and be careful with your words, lest from them they learn to lie.
If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat; If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt. If two [witnesses] say, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat: Rabbi Meir says he is liable. Rabbi Meir said: if two witnesses are capable of bringing upon him severe penalty of death, can they not impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice? They replied: suppose he said, I did it intentionally, would he not be exempted?
If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat; If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt. If two [witnesses] say, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat: Rabbi Meir says he is liable. Rabbi Meir said: if two witnesses are capable of bringing upon him severe penalty of death, can they not impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice? They replied: suppose he said, I did it intentionally, would he not be exempted?
If one witness says, "You have become unclean," but he says, "I have not become unclean," he is regarded as clean. If two witnesses say, "You have become unclean," and he says, "I have not become unclean," Rabbi Meir says: he is unclean. But the sages say: he may be believed on his own evidence. If one witness says, "You have become unclean," and two witnesses say, "He has not become unclean," whether in a private domain or in a public domain, he is regarded as clean. If two witnesses say, "He has become unclean’, and one witness says, ‘"He has not become unclean," whether in a private domain or in a public domain, he is regarded as unclean. If one witness says, "He has become unclean," and another says, "He has not become unclean," or if one woman says, "He has become unclean’, and another woman says, "He has not become unclean," he is regarded as unclean if in the private domain, but if in a public domain he is regarded as clean.
If one witness says, "You have become unclean," but he says, "I have not become unclean," he is regarded as clean. If two witnesses say, "You have become unclean," and he says, "I have not become unclean," Rabbi Meir says: he is unclean. But the sages say: he may be believed on his own evidence. If one witness says, "You have become unclean," and two witnesses say, "He has not become unclean," whether in a private domain or in a public domain, he is regarded as clean. If two witnesses say, "He has become unclean’, and one witness says, ‘"He has not become unclean," whether in a private domain or in a public domain, he is regarded as unclean. If one witness says, "He has become unclean," and another says, "He has not become unclean," or if one woman says, "He has become unclean’, and another woman says, "He has not become unclean," he is regarded as unclean if in the private domain, but if in a public domain he is regarded as clean.
If one witness says, "You have become unclean," but he says, "I have not become unclean," he is regarded as clean. If two witnesses say, "You have become unclean," and he says, "I have not become unclean," Rabbi Meir says: he is unclean. But the sages say: he may be believed on his own evidence. If one witness says, "You have become unclean," and two witnesses say, "He has not become unclean," whether in a private domain or in a public domain, he is regarded as clean. If two witnesses say, "He has become unclean’, and one witness says, ‘"He has not become unclean," whether in a private domain or in a public domain, he is regarded as unclean. If one witness says, "He has become unclean," and another says, "He has not become unclean," or if one woman says, "He has become unclean’, and another woman says, "He has not become unclean," he is regarded as unclean if in the private domain, but if in a public domain he is regarded as clean.
The Jerusalem Talmud
“One does not recite the benediction over a lamp unless one has profited from its light.” Rav says y’utu, and Samuel says y‘utu. He who says y’utu, (Gen. 34:15) “But with this we shall be agreeable (nē’ôt) to you.” He who says y‘utu, (Is. 50:4) “To know, to inform (lā‘ût) the weary of wisdom.” There (Mishnah Erubin 5:1) we have stated: How does one complete cities? Rav says m’abbrin, and Samuel says m‘abberin. He who says me’abberin, one adds a limb (אבר) to it. And he who says me‘abberin, like a pregnant (עוברה) woman. There (Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1:1) we have stated: Before the holidays of the Gentiles. Rav says ‘êdêhen and Samuel says ’êdêhen. He who says ’êdêhen, (Deut. 32:35) “For the day of their misfortune (אידם) is near.” He who says ‘êdêhen, (Is.44:9) “They are their witnesses (עידיהם), may they neither see nor know, so that they may come to naught.” How does Samuel deal with Rav’s reason? They are their witnesses, in the future they will bring to naught their worshippers on the day of judgment.
“One does not recite the benediction over a lamp unless one has profited from its light.” Rav says y’utu, and Samuel says y‘utu. He who says y’utu, (Gen. 34:15) “But with this we shall be agreeable (nē’ôt) to you.” He who says y‘utu, (Is. 50:4) “To know, to inform (lā‘ût) the weary of wisdom.” There (Mishnah Erubin 5:1) we have stated: How does one complete cities? Rav says m’abbrin, and Samuel says m‘abberin. He who says me’abberin, one adds a limb (אבר) to it. And he who says me‘abberin, like a pregnant (עוברה) woman. There (Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1:1) we have stated: Before the holidays of the Gentiles. Rav says ‘êdêhen and Samuel says ’êdêhen. He who says ’êdêhen, (Deut. 32:35) “For the day of their misfortune (אידם) is near.” He who says ‘êdêhen, (Is.44:9) “They are their witnesses (עידיהם), may they neither see nor know, so that they may come to naught.” How does Samuel deal with Rav’s reason? They are their witnesses, in the future they will bring to naught their worshippers on the day of judgment.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ammi, in the name of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: If they sanctified it and afterwards the witnesses turned out to be perjured, it still is sanctified. Rebbi Assi stayed with Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi and asked him: Did you hear this from your father? He said, yes. Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not cross-examine the witnesses of the New Moon.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ammi, in the name of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: If they sanctified it and afterwards the witnesses turned out to be perjured, it still is sanctified. Rebbi Assi stayed with Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi and asked him: Did you hear this from your father? He said, yes. Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not cross-examine the witnesses of the New Moon.
MISHNAH: A prozbol does not remit. This is one of the ordinances of Hillel the elder. When he saw that the people refrained from giving loans to one another and transgressed what is written in the Torah, as it is said (Deut. 15:9): “Guard yourself, lest there be in your heart an unworthy thought saying, etc.”, he instituted the prozbol. This is the essence of prozbol: I declare before you, judges X and Y at place Z, that I shall collect any debt due me any time I wish. The judges sign at the bottom or the witnesses.
Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: If three sat in judgment and one of them died, two sign and note: Even though we are two who sign, we were three in judging. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, our Mishnah implies this: “The judges sign at the bottom or the witnesses.” Does one learn court documents from prozbol? It was found stated: This about court documents was learned from the rules of prozbol.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others fulfill his written instructions? They upheld it, if he is illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or he told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the document] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, here also it is invalid. Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others fulfill his written instructions? They upheld it, if he is illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or he told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the document] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, here also it is invalid. Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about a girl, the other about an adult woman. The girl has a fine but cannot be sold, the adult has no fine, she cannot be sold; has she no claim for shame and blemish? The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or forgave him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays and is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one guilt but you may not sentence him for two guilts. Why should he pay and not have to be flogged? From perjured witnesses. Just as perjured witnesses pay and are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about a girl, the other about an adult woman. The girl has a fine but cannot be sold, the adult has no fine, she cannot be sold; has she no claim for shame and blemish? The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or forgave him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays and is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one guilt but you may not sentence him for two guilts. Why should he pay and not have to be flogged? From perjured witnesses. Just as perjured witnesses pay and are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings a blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not be the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana asked, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be (invalid). “If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing he is liable, if somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it he is not liable.” “Rebbi Eliezer told them, did not Ben Saṭda only in this way bring magic formulas from Egypt? They said to him, because of one insane person should we condemn several sane ones?”
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, if one did not bring the implement before the Sabbath he brings it openly on the Sabbath and in times of danger he brings it covered by the testimony of witnesses. In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one cuts down trees to make charcoal to make iron; Rebbi Aqiba stated a principle: Any work which he might have done on Friday does not push the Sabbath aside; circumcision which is impossible to perform on Friday pushes the Sabbath aside.
Rav says meˋabberin, and Samuel says me′abberin. He who says meˋabberin, one adds a limb (אבר) to it. And he who says me‘abberin, like a pregnant (עוברה) woman. There, we have stated: “One does not recite the benediction over a lamp unless one has profited from its light.” Rav says yeˋutu, and Samuel says ye‘utu. He who says ye′utu, but with this we shall be agreeable to you. He who says ye‘utu, to know, to inform the weary of wisdom. There we have stated: “Before the holidays of the Gentiles.” Rav stated ˋedehen and Samuel stated ‘edehen. He who says ˋedehen, for the day of their misfortune(אידם) is near. He who says ‘edehen, they are their witnesses (עידיהם), etc. How does Samuel deal with Rav's reason, they are their witnesses? In the future they will bring to naught their worshippers on the Day of Judgment.
Rav says meˋabberin, and Samuel says me′abberin. He who says meˋabberin, one adds a limb (אבר) to it. And he who says me‘abberin, like a pregnant (עוברה) woman. There, we have stated: “One does not recite the benediction over a lamp unless one has profited from its light.” Rav says yeˋutu, and Samuel says ye‘utu. He who says ye′utu, but with this we shall be agreeable to you. He who says ye‘utu, to know, to inform the weary of wisdom. There we have stated: “Before the holidays of the Gentiles.” Rav stated ˋedehen and Samuel stated ‘edehen. He who says ˋedehen, for the day of their misfortune(אידם) is near. He who says ‘edehen, they are their witnesses (עידיהם), etc. How does Samuel deal with Rav's reason, they are their witnesses? In the future they will bring to naught their worshippers on the Day of Judgment.
Rebbi Eleazar said, limbs and fat which were not consumed before the evening one builds into a pyre and burns them separately; for them one pushes aside the Sabbath. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba: The Mishnah implies this: “Every day there were four arrangements.” What does one understand from here? Rebbi Mana said, “and this day five”. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: May something which is not obstructive push aside? He answered him, there are the witnesses for the New Moon who are not obstructive and push aside, as we have stated there: “for a distance of a night and day one desecrates the Sabbath and comes for testimony of the New Moon.”
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Yose. It is said here two,[by the mouth of two witnesses], and it is said there two, two men remained in the camp. Since there two means men but not women nor underaged, also here two means men but not women nor underaged. Then why is it said (two) [and the two men shall stand]? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; [one is silent while the other talks], one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one the judge is friendly, to the other he is unfriendly, lets one sit and the other stand. [They said in the name of Rebbi Ismael, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.]
Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥuna: The witnesses have to stand while testifying. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Also the parties have to stand at the moment the testimony is delivered..
Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Two in the name of Rebbi Eliezer. A woman may go out with a city of gold, and participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is the entire statement in Sanhedrin Rebbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. What means “it is everybody’s opinion”? So said Rebbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rebbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rav Huna: It follows Rebbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: “A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, when? If he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is suspect in money matters and disqualified in money matters.” It turns out that Rebbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rebbi Meïr Rebbi Eliezer.
HALAKHAH: “If they do not know him,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, so should the Mishnah be stated: Originally one accepted testimony about the new moon from everybody. If they do not know him, one sends another one with him to testify about him. Rebbi Yose said, even as in the Mishnah it is acceptable: If they do not know him, one sends another one with him to testify about him. Why? Because originally one accepted testimony about the new moon from anybody. May a single witness be believed? They gave you from your own. It should be logical that no witnesses should be needed. But they said that witnesses were needed, and they said that a single witness may be believed.
HALAKHAH: “If they do not know him,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, so should the Mishnah be stated: Originally one accepted testimony about the new moon from everybody. If they do not know him, one sends another one with him to testify about him. Rebbi Yose said, even as in the Mishnah it is acceptable: If they do not know him, one sends another one with him to testify about him. Why? Because originally one accepted testimony about the new moon from anybody. May a single witness be believed? They gave you from your own. It should be logical that no witnesses should be needed. But they said that witnesses were needed, and they said that a single witness may be believed.
What spoiling was there? Because they were saying, Pentecost is after the Sabbath; one always was going out in the evening on the presumption that it would be sanctified. Then for Nisan they should not accept, for the other months they should accept. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the main spoiling was in Adar. Then if it conforms with ours they should accept, if it does not conform with ours they should not accept. One because of the other. “It happened that the Boethusian hired two false witnesses to testify on the new moon that it be sanctified. The first came, delivered his testimony, and left. The other one said, I was climbing Maaleh Adumim when I saw it lying down between two rocks, its head resembling a calf, its ears resembling a kid goat. Is saw it, was taken aback, and stepped backward, and there were 200 denar tied in my money belt. They told him, the 200 denar are given to you as a gift, but those who sent you should come and be flogged. Why did you put yourself in this questionable situation? He said to them, I saw them trying to trip up the Sages. I said, it is better that I should go and inform the Sages.”
MISHNAH: A large courtyard was in Jerusalem called Bet Ya`zeq; there all witnesses assembled and there the Court examined them. A big meal one prepared for them so they should get used to come. Originally they did not move from there the entire day. The Elder Rabban Gamliel instituted that they could walk 2’000 cubits in every direction. Not only these but also the midwife who comes to assist in a birth, and one who comes to save from a fire, and from the army, and from a collapse, are like the people of the town and have 2’000 cubits in every direction.
MISHNAH: How does one check the witnesses? The couple who comes first one checks first. One brings the more senior in and tells him to say, how did you see the moon? Before the sun or behind the sun? To its North or its South? How high was it, to where did it point, and how wide was it? If he said, before the sun, he did not say anything. One brings the second one in and examines him. If their words are found coherent, their testimony holds up. All other couples one asks main points, not that one needs them but that they should not leave dissatisfied so they would come in the future.
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel had pictures of the moon phases on a tablet and on the wall on his upper floor which he showed to the common people and asked, did you see it like this or like that? It happened that two came and said, we saw it in the morning in the East and in the evening in the West. Rebbi Joḥanan {ben Nuri} said, they are false witnesses. Rabban Gamliel accepted them when they came to Jabneh. Another time two came and said, we saw it on time, and in the night of the addition it was not seen, but Rabban Gamliel accepted them. Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos said, they are false witnesses. How can one testify about a woman that she gave birth and the next day she is in labor pains? Rebbi Joshua said to him, I am agreeing with your words.
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel had pictures of the moon phases on a tablet and on the wall on his upper floor which he showed to the common people and asked, did you see it like this or like that? It happened that two came and said, we saw it in the morning in the East and in the evening in the West. Rebbi Joḥanan {ben Nuri} said, they are false witnesses. Rabban Gamliel accepted them when they came to Jabneh. Another time two came and said, we saw it on time, and in the night of the addition it was not seen, but Rabban Gamliel accepted them. Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos said, they are false witnesses. How can one testify about a woman that she gave birth and the next day she is in labor pains? Rebbi Joshua said to him, I am agreeing with your words.
HALAKHAH: To whom did he send? Since it was stated, Rebbi Joshua said, it would have been better for me would I be sick in bed and Rabban Gamliel had not sent this, it implies that he sent to Rebbi Joshua. Through whom did he send? Since it was stated, in the following expression he said to him, Aqiba, you consoled me, it implies that he sent through Rebbi Aqiba. What should he have inferred? Rebbi Yose said, we know that if they sanctified it without witnesses it is sanctified. For what does he testify? “For if they sanctified it and then the witnesses were found perjured, it is sanctified.” But did we not state, “it happened that more than 40 couples passed by and Rebbi Aqiba held them back in Lydda”? Because they are 40 couples. But if it had been a single couple he would not have held them back.
HALAKHAH: To whom did he send? Since it was stated, Rebbi Joshua said, it would have been better for me would I be sick in bed and Rabban Gamliel had not sent this, it implies that he sent to Rebbi Joshua. Through whom did he send? Since it was stated, in the following expression he said to him, Aqiba, you consoled me, it implies that he sent through Rebbi Aqiba. What should he have inferred? Rebbi Yose said, we know that if they sanctified it without witnesses it is sanctified. For what does he testify? “For if they sanctified it and then the witnesses were found perjured, it is sanctified.” But did we not state, “it happened that more than 40 couples passed by and Rebbi Aqiba held them back in Lydda”? Because they are 40 couples. But if it had been a single couple he would not have held them back.
MISHNAH: If the Court and all of Israel saw it, the witnesses were interrogated but they did not manage to say “sanctified” before nightfall, it is prolonged. If the Court alone saw it, two of them shall stand and testify before them, and they shall say “sanctified, sanctified”. If three who form a court saw it, two of them shall stand up, let two of their colleagues sit with the single one, testify before them, so they can say “sanctified, sanctified”, since no single individual is empowered by himself.
Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One entangles one who was seen to prolong it; one does entangle one who was not seen to sanctify it. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One entangles one who was not seen to sanctify it, one does not entangle one who was seen to prolong it. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ze`ira: “If the Court and all of Israel saw it, the witnesses were interrogated but they did not manage to say “sanctified” before nightfall, it is sanctified.” Because of nightfall. Therefore not if there was no nightfall. This implies that one does not entangle one who was seen to prolong it. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “I could think that if two days were needed, one adds two days. The verse says, it. There is authorization only for one day.” This implies that one does not entangle one who was not seen to sanctify it. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “I could think that just as one intercalates a year according to necessity so one would sanctify the month according to necessity. The verse says, the new moon, one follows the new moon.” This implies that one does not entangle one which was not seen to sanctify it. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “I could think that if the moon was not seen for two days, they should sanctify the next month for two days. The verse says, they, there are, those would not be My festive seasons”. Because it was not seen; therefore not if it had been seen. This implies that one does not entangle one who was not seen to sanctify it. They wanted to say that they do not disagree. What Rebbi Ze`ira said, about all other months; what Rebbi Abba said, about Nisan and Tishre.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: “If they sanctified it and after this the witnesses were found perjured, it remains sanctified.” Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi. He asked him, did your hear this from your father? He answered him, so said my father in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one is not fussy with testimony of the new moon.
If the Court saw the killer; even if they said, if we saw him we would not recognize him, they would not break the neck, for it is written, our eyes did not see in any way, and they did see. And if the court saw the killer, some Tannaïm state: two of them become witnesses and testify before the rest of them. There are Tannaïm who state that they all are witnesses and have to go and testify before another place. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: As they differ here, so they differ about testimony for the New Moon.
If the Court saw the killer; even if they said, if we saw him we would not recognize him, they would not break the neck, for it is written, our eyes did not see in any way, and they did see. And if the court saw the killer, some Tannaïm state: two of them become witnesses and testify before the rest of them. There are Tannaïm who state that they all are witnesses and have to go and testify before another place. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: As they differ here, so they differ about testimony for the New Moon.
If a doubt was raised about the signature of the witnesses, about the signature of the judges. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to confirm by handwriting of the witnesses he may so confirm, by the handwriting of the judges he may so confirm; but I am saying, he may confirm even by one witness, even by one judge. In the days of Rebbi Abbahu they intended to say גּוֹאֲלֵינוּ but said גְּאוּלָּתֵינוּ, and he accepted them. In the days of Rebbi Berekhiah they became paralyzed. He asked them, did you hear that the New Moon was sanctified? They bowed their heads and he accepted them.
If a doubt was raised about the signature of the witnesses, about the signature of the judges. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to confirm by handwriting of the witnesses he may so confirm, by the handwriting of the judges he may so confirm; but I am saying, he may confirm even by one witness, even by one judge. In the days of Rebbi Abbahu they intended to say גּוֹאֲלֵינוּ but said גְּאוּלָּתֵינוּ, and he accepted them. In the days of Rebbi Berekhiah they became paralyzed. He asked them, did you hear that the New Moon was sanctified? They bowed their heads and he accepted them.
MISHNAH: Originally they were accepting testimony about the new moon during the entire day. Once the witnesses tarried to come and the Levites erred in the song. They instituted that one would accept only up to the afternoon prayers; if witnesses came after afternoon prayers one kept the day holy and the next day holy. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that one accepted testimony about the new moon during the entire day.
MISHNAH: Originally they were accepting testimony about the new moon during the entire day. Once the witnesses tarried to come and the Levites erred in the song. They instituted that one would accept only up to the afternoon prayers; if witnesses came after afternoon prayers one kept the day holy and the next day holy. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that one accepted testimony about the new moon during the entire day.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa said: In addition, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that even if the head of the court be anywhere, the witnesses should only go to the seat of the council.
It was stated. “Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, I heard that one punishes not according to practice and punishes not according to Torah.” How far? Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, up to a murmur. Rebbi Yose said, by witnesses, but without warning. It happened that one went on the road riding in his horse on the Sabbath. They brought him to court and stoned him. But was it not a rabbinic violation? But at the time it was needed. Also it happened that one went on the road together with his wife. He turned to behind a wall and satisfied his needs with her. They brought him to court and whipped him. But was it not his wife? But he behaved in a degrading way.
HALAKHAH: “If tax collectors entered a house, the house is impure. If they are accompanied by a Gentile they are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch.” One may explain this by two explanations. They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it. One may explain by another explanation: They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch. This is necessary {to be stated} even if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it.
HALAKHAH: “If tax collectors entered a house, the house is impure. If they are accompanied by a Gentile they are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch.” One may explain this by two explanations. They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it. One may explain by another explanation: They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch. This is necessary {to be stated} even if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it.
HALAKHAH: “If tax collectors entered a house, the house is impure. If they are accompanied by a Gentile they are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch.” One may explain this by two explanations. They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it. One may explain by another explanation: They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch. This is necessary {to be stated} even if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it.
HALAKHAH: “If tax collectors entered a house, the house is impure. If they are accompanied by a Gentile they are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch.” One may explain this by two explanations. They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it. One may explain by another explanation: They are trustworthy to say, we entered but we did not touch. This is necessary {to be stated} even if witnesses know of it. And in Jerusalem they are trustworthy about sancta even if witnesses know of it.
Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis said, merchandize is foreclosed from the property of orphans. They wanted to say, if there are witnesses; therefore not if there are no witnesses. The Rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi La: It is necessary that witnesses know since if there are no witnesses who know it is treated as a deposit. [So we are saying,] a deposit is not forclosed from the property of minor orphans. What is the difference from a loan? A loan is given to be spent, but this was not given to be spent.
Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis said, merchandize is foreclosed from the property of orphans. They wanted to say, if there are witnesses; therefore not if there are no witnesses. The Rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi La: It is necessary that witnesses know since if there are no witnesses who know it is treated as a deposit. [So we are saying,] a deposit is not forclosed from the property of minor orphans. What is the difference from a loan? A loan is given to be spent, but this was not given to be spent.
Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis said, merchandize is foreclosed from the property of orphans. They wanted to say, if there are witnesses; therefore not if there are no witnesses. The Rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi La: It is necessary that witnesses know since if there are no witnesses who know it is treated as a deposit. [So we are saying,] a deposit is not forclosed from the property of minor orphans. What is the difference from a loan? A loan is given to be spent, but this was not given to be spent.
Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis said, merchandize is foreclosed from the property of orphans. They wanted to say, if there are witnesses; therefore not if there are no witnesses. The Rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi La: It is necessary that witnesses know since if there are no witnesses who know it is treated as a deposit. [So we are saying,] a deposit is not forclosed from the property of minor orphans. What is the difference from a loan? A loan is given to be spent, but this was not given to be spent.
“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.
“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.
“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.
“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.
How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.