woman
3686 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.
HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.
“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.
“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.
“A Levitic woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but he is not in her house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “Similarly, the daughter of a Cohen [betrothed] to a Levite should eat neither heave nor tithe.” We understand that she should not eat heave. But tithe any way you take it, if she is a Cohen’s daughter she should eat, if she is a Levite’s wife she should eat. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: [It follows] him who says one does not give tithe to Cohanim. That means, he himself says one gives heave to Cohanim.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman married to a Cohen shall eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she shall eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat tithe. If [then] she marries an Israel, she may eat neither heave nor tithe.
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.
So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.
So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.
So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, the promiscuous levitic woman still eats tithe. One has stated thus: If a levitic woman was kidnapped or if any one barred for her copulated with her, he is not empowered to disable her. One does not suspect even a hint of disability for Levites who were compromised from their mother’s side. But did we not state: “the daughter of a Levite from tithe”? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that an Israel came upon her and she bore him a son.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, the promiscuous levitic woman still eats tithe. One has stated thus: If a levitic woman was kidnapped or if any one barred for her copulated with her, he is not empowered to disable her. One does not suspect even a hint of disability for Levites who were compromised from their mother’s side. But did we not state: “the daughter of a Levite from tithe”? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that an Israel came upon her and she bore him a son.
Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim. Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood.
Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood.
Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood.
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband and son went overseas and people came and told her, your husband died and after that your son died, and she remarried. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted. Then she must leave and the first and the last children are bastards.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.
MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.
From where that no betrothal is valid for a married woman? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s.” When she leaves his house she may be with another. And from where that no betrothal is valid for incestual relations? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Huna: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s.” Why does the verse say “another”? To exclude the list of incest relations.
HALAKHAH: “If a man’s wife went overseas,”, etc. It is written: “If a man slept with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her. There, it also says “replacing your husband,” that excludes rape cases.
Rebbi Mattaniah said, they made a fence about situations that occur frequently but not about rare situations. A man frequently travels overseas; it is infrequent that a woman travels overseas.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
“If they said to him “your wife died,” etc. How can that be? A man has a daughter and a stepdaughter, a woman has a daughter and a stepdaughter. They married and had a daughter. It starts with the woman’s stepdaughter.
“If they said to him “your wife died,” etc. How can that be? A man has a daughter and a stepdaughter, a woman has a daughter and a stepdaughter. They married and had a daughter. It starts with the woman’s stepdaughter.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
MISHNAH: One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman. He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty. A person may marry his father’s rape victim or seduced woman, his son’s rape victim or seduced woman. Rebbi Jehudah prohibits his father’s rape victim or seduced woman.
MISHNAH: One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman. He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty. A person may marry his father’s rape victim or seduced woman, his son’s rape victim or seduced woman. Rebbi Jehudah prohibits his father’s rape victim or seduced woman.
MISHNAH: One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman. He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty. A person may marry his father’s rape victim or seduced woman, his son’s rape victim or seduced woman. Rebbi Jehudah prohibits his father’s rape victim or seduced woman.
MISHNAH: One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman. He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty. A person may marry his father’s rape victim or seduced woman, his son’s rape victim or seduced woman. Rebbi Jehudah prohibits his father’s rape victim or seduced woman.
MISHNAH: One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman. He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty. A person may marry his father’s rape victim or seduced woman, his son’s rape victim or seduced woman. Rebbi Jehudah prohibits his father’s rape victim or seduced woman.
HALAKHAH: “One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One may marry after a rape victim or seduced woman. If he raped a woman, her mother is permitted; if he seduced a woman, her daughter is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One may marry after a rape victim or seduced woman. If he raped a woman, her mother is permitted; if he seduced a woman, her daughter is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One may marry after a rape victim or seduced woman. If he raped a woman, her mother is permitted; if he seduced a woman, her daughter is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “One may marry [relatives of] a rape victim or a seduced woman,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One may marry after a rape victim or seduced woman. If he raped a woman, her mother is permitted; if he seduced a woman, her daughter is permitted.
“He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one stated this for marriage. If he married a woman and then raped her mother, he is guilty. If he married a woman and then seduced her daughter, he is guilty.
“He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one stated this for marriage. If he married a woman and then raped her mother, he is guilty. If he married a woman and then seduced her daughter, he is guilty.
“He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is guilty.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one stated this for marriage. If he married a woman and then raped her mother, he is guilty. If he married a woman and then seduced her daughter, he is guilty.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.
It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.
It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.
Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.
They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: His daughter’s daughter from a marriage; his daughter’s daughter from a rape? He said to them, every “daughter’s daughter” falls under the same category. They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: If [a man] came to a woman, she had a daughter, and after that he came and copulated with her. Is he guilty about her because of a woman and her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter? He said to them, “they are relatives, it is taboo;” all because of taboo.
They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: His daughter’s daughter from a marriage; his daughter’s daughter from a rape? He said to them, every “daughter’s daughter” falls under the same category. They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: If [a man] came to a woman, she had a daughter, and after that he came and copulated with her. Is he guilty about her because of a woman and her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter? He said to them, “they are relatives, it is taboo;” all because of taboo.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Why do we not say, “your daughter you should not uncover, your daughter’s daughter you should not uncover”? He said to him, if it were written “the genitals of a woman and her daughter’s daughter you shall not uncover”, we would have said, “your daughter you should not uncover, your daughter’s daughter you should not uncover”.
Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.
Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.
Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.
A convert who converted while married to a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, marries one and separates from the other. When has this been said? If he did not live with either of them. But if he lived with one of them after he converted, the one he lived with is his wife. If he lived with both of them, since he lived with them, he lived with them.
A convert who converted while married to a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, marries one and separates from the other. When has this been said? If he did not live with either of them. But if he lived with one of them after he converted, the one he lived with is his wife. If he lived with both of them, since he lived with them, he lived with them.
A convert has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. If he married any other incest prohibited woman, he may keep her. It was only said, “if he married”. Therefore, not from the start.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s child was mixed up,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said: So is the Mishnah: The sister-in-law’s sons’ wives, the old woman’s sons’ wives. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, this implies that a man may marry a nephew’s ex-wife.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s child was mixed up,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said: So is the Mishnah: The sister-in-law’s sons’ wives, the old woman’s sons’ wives. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, this implies that a man may marry a nephew’s ex-wife.
MISHNAH: If the child of a priestly woman was mixed up with the child of her slave girl then both may eat heave; they together take one part from the threshing floor, they may not defile themselves by becoming impure for the dead, and they may not marry women enabled or disabled [for the priesthood].
HALAKHAH: “If the child of a priestly woman was mixed up,” etc. “Both may eat heave”, since slaves of Cohanim eat heave.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!
Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.
“A wooden sandal.” The colleagues in the name of Rav: If only the edges are wooden. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If only the bottom of the sole is wooden. There, they say in the name of Rav: If only the loops are wooden. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if it is entirely of wood it is valid. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ A straw sandal becomes impure by being stepped on and a woman may use it for ḥalîṣah, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages do not agree about impurity by being stepped on.”
MISHNAH: ḥalîṣah is invalid if performed for a deaf-mute man, or by a deaf-mute woman, or for an underage male. The underage woman who performed ḥalîṣah should repeat ḥalîṣah once she becomes of age but if she did not repeat it, the ḥalîṣah is valid.
MISHNAH: ḥalîṣah is invalid if performed for a deaf-mute man, or by a deaf-mute woman, or for an underage male. The underage woman who performed ḥalîṣah should repeat ḥalîṣah once she becomes of age but if she did not repeat it, the ḥalîṣah is valid.
There, we have stated: “Everybody is obligated for appearance except the deaf-mute, the insane, and the minor.” The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Eleazar (Deut. 31:12): “So they should hear and learn.” So far one who speaks but cannot hear; what about one who hears but cannot speak? Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar (Deut. 31:12): “So they should learn,” so they should teach. Rebbi Jonah said, this means that the principles of Rebbi are no principles, since we have stated: “A ḥereš who speaks but cannot hear should not give heave,” and we thought that one who speaks but does not hear is ḥereš, one who hears but does not speak isḥereš. But we have stated: “Ḥalîṣah is invalid if performed for a ḥereš man, or by a ḥereš woman, or for an underage male.” And Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they cannot say (Deut. 25:8): “he shall say”, (Deut. 25:7,9) “she shall say.” We also have stated: “A ḥereš mentioned anywhere by the Sages is a deaf-mute.” This supports Rebbi Jonah, for Rebbi Jonah said that the principles of Rebbi are no principles.
HALAKHAH: “The commandment of ḥalîṣah: He and his sister-in-law come,” etc. “They give him appropriate counsel”. What means, “they give him appropriate counsel”? If he is old, they tell her, what do you do with an old man like him? If she is old, they tell him, what do you do with that old woman? If she is a girl and he is an old man, they say to him, she is a girl and will bring you shame. If he is a boy and she an old woman, they say to her, he is a boy and will bring you shame. If he wants but she does not, one listens to her. If she wants but he does not, one listens to him. The principle: One listens to the one who wants to prevent. If both of them want, such a case came before Rebbi Yose and he said, throw her out.