3686 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:29

It is written: “The unwell woman in her separation and the sufferer from flux in his flux.” Since the menstruating woman may become impure also by accident, so the sufferer from flux may become impure also by accident. Then even at his first episode? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from the moment he becomes like a menstruating woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:5

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:18

Rebbi was in Acco when he saw a man on the rock. He said to him, “are you not the son of the Cohen X, was your father not a Cohen?” He said to him, “the eyes of my father were high, but he married a woman unfit for him and profaned this man.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:26

Why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they are lions’ proselytes. But if somebody converted not for Heaven’s sake and then converted for Heaven’s sake, does one not accept him? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Because the child is a bastard if a Gentile or a slave have intercourse with a Jewish woman. But did not Rebbi Aqiba say, they are genuine proselytes? Because they require levirate marriage from the preliminarily married and free the definitively married. But do not the rabbis say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law? Because they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce. But does not Rabban Gamliel accept their bills of divorce? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because they intermingled with the priests of the High Places: “He chose priests from the borderline of the people,”. Rebbi Ila said, from the “thorns” of the people, i. e., from the disqualified of the people.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:29

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:13

If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:26

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:26

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:27

HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:7

MISHNAH: If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time. For bonds, he has to leave space for the lender, the borrower, the sum, and the time. For commercial deeds, he has to leave space for the buyer, the seller, the sum, the field, and the time, because of good order. Rebbi Jehudah invalidates all of these. Rebbi Eleazar validates all of them except women’s bills of divorce, for it is said: “He shall write for her”, in her name.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:8

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:16

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Jabne: About [people in] a city which was surrounded by palisades.”What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For example if bells, chains, and dogs, and geese, and chickens, and soldiers surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saved all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:12

Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:16

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Yossi ben Shaul said in the name of Rebbi: A person who had given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly. Did they not infer the rules of a bill of manumission from women? Just as a woman is not freed if [the husband] has given up hope, but she needs a bill of divorce from him, so a slave is not freed if [the master] has given up hope, but he needs a bill of manumission.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:21

MISHNAH: A person who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of the House of Hillel. The House of Shammai say, you provided for his master but you did not provide for him. He can marry neither a slave woman nor a free woman: shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase, as it is said: “He did not create it to be empty, He formed it to be settled.” For the public good one forces his master to manumit him and he writes a bond for half his value. The House of Hillel changed and instructed following the House of Shammai.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:21

MISHNAH: A person who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of the House of Hillel. The House of Shammai say, you provided for his master but you did not provide for him. He can marry neither a slave woman nor a free woman: shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase, as it is said: “He did not create it to be empty, He formed it to be settled.” For the public good one forces his master to manumit him and he writes a bond for half his value. The House of Hillel changed and instructed following the House of Shammai.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:23

There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:1

MISHNAH: For tort victims one estimates with best quality land, for a creditor with average quality, and for a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, also for a woman’s ketubah with average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:1

MISHNAH: For tort victims one estimates with best quality land, for a creditor with average quality, and for a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, also for a woman’s ketubah with average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:10

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:10

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:10

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:11

“For a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, they taught only for a ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects from average quality. Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects only from lowest quality. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement: “While she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she loses her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he sells through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:13

HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:13

HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:33

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:33

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:57

MISHNAH: A woman may lend to her neighbor, whom she suspects in matters of the Sabbatical, a coarse sieve, a fine sieve, grindstones, or an oven, but she should neither cull nor grind with her. The wife of a Fellow may lend to the wife of a vulgar a coarse sieve and a fine sieve, she may cull, grind, and sift with her, but she may not touch hers once water has been put in because one does not support transgressors. All this has only been said for communal peace. One encourages Gentiles in the Sabbatical year but not Jews. One greets them for communal peace.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:58

HALAKHAH: “A woman may lend to her neighbor,” etc. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does our Mishnah deal with the implicit case, rather than the explicit? He said to him, is the implicit case not explicit? He said to him, I can say a coarse sieve to count coins, a sieve to sift sand, grindstones to grind spices, a stove to put in flax bundles.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1

MISHNAH: Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife, or bring this bill of divorce to my wife, may retract if he wants to retract. If a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract. Therefore, if the husband said, it is not possible for me that you accept for her but bring and deliver it to her, he may retract if he wants to retract. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even if she says, take my the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife,” etc. Everywhere you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “obtain,” but here you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “bring”? There is a difference, for one can obtain something for a person without him being present. Rebbi Shammai objected: Think of it, if she was shouting to obtain a divorce? I say, maybe she changed her mind. But did we not state: “A woman herself may bring her bill of divorce”? Could you say that she may have changed her mind? There, she is damaging herself; here it is to her detriment.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:4

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent. Samuel heard this from him and repeated after him forty times.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:9

Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Does he disagree? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:9

Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Does he disagree? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:10

MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me,” etc. Two say that she appointed in their presence and two say that in their presence he received and tore it. But if he agrees, the agent should be able to be added. Explain it, it he was a relative. This implies that a relative can act as agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:12

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:12

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:15

MISHNAH: If somebody says, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife at place X and he delivered it at another place, it is invalid. But if he said, she is at place X, and he delivered it at another place, it is valid. If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce at place X, and he accepted it at another place, it is invalid, but Rebbi Eleazar declares it valid. Bring my bill of divorce from place X and he brought it from another place, it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:18

HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:22

Rebbi Mana said, not only a neck-iron of mortal danger but also a neck-iron of money. For every neck-iron is a mortal danger. Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jacob the Armenian: That which is a problem for Rebbi Simeon is obvious for Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina, as we have stated there: “One may have use for the hair of a woman who was executed but an animal which was executed is forbidden for all use.” Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if she said, my bonnet should be given to my daughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:18

There, we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts. Rebbi Ila said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body to himself. Rebbi Bibon bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:20

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market, fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:25

For what? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her, as we have stated there: “He has a claim on what she finds and on her earnings, to dissolve her vows.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is what is implied by “she is a married woman in all respects.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:25

MISHNAH: If the scribe wrote and then in error handed the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man and they exchanged them, then later the bill of divorce is found with the man and the receipt with the woman, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Rebbi Eliezer says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:25

MISHNAH: If the scribe wrote and then in error handed the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man and they exchanged them, then later the bill of divorce is found with the man and the receipt with the woman, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Rebbi Eliezer says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:30

“A woman who engages in sex play with her son, the House of Shammai disqualify, the House of Hillel qualify.” Two women who mutually engage in sex play, the House of Shammai disqualify, the House of Hillel qualify.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:3

By money, from where? “After he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money. By marital relations, from where? “And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. I would say, by both together. Money without intercourse and intercourse without money, from where? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is written: “If a man is found lying with a woman having had intercourse with her husband.” Think of it, even if he did only acquire her by intercourse, the one coming after him is [executed] by strangulation. Not only regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated there: “If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:10

So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:14

Rebbi Yose asked: What is the legal status of “touching” a male? What is the legal status of “touching” an animal? Were not all incest prohibitions inferred from the menstruating woman? The male is included; the animal is included. So far, for Israel. For Gentiles? Rebbi Mana said, not from this: “He shall cling to his wife”? Not in any way to somebody else’s wife, not in any way to a male or an animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:17

By a document. This means, by a document which is not worth a peruṭah, but a document which is worth a peruṭah is money’s worth. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this respect: “Not only a document which is worth a peruṭah since a woman can have herself preliminarily married by anything which is worth a peruṭah. But even if he wrote it on an ostrakon or on papyrus and gave it to her, she is preliminarily married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:30

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as a wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for the preliminary marriage of a woman. Just as preliminary marriage acquires completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:33

Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:97

Then they changed it to clipping. What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he brought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. When he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:117

There, we have stated: “The father bestows on his son beauty, strength, riches, wisdom, and years.” From where beauty? “May Your deeds appear on Your servants, and Your glory on their sons.” Strength, “strong on earth will be his descendants.” Riches, “I was young and became old, but never saw a just man abandoned and his descendants in need of bread.” Wisdom, “you shall teach your sons to argue about them.” Years, “that your and your sons’ days be many.” And just as he inherits five qualities, so he owes him the following five things. He feeds him, he gives him to drink, he clothes him, he puts on his shoes, he leads him. That is what is written: “This should fall on Joab’s head: sufferer from flux and from skin disease, holding the distaff, falling by the sword, and senseless.” Sufferer from flux, weak. From skin disease, abandoned. Holding the distaff, uneducated. Falling by the sword, short lived. Without bread, poor. When Solomon came to kill Joab, he said to him: Your father gave me five sentences; accept them and I can be killed. He accepted them and all of them came to pass on the House of David. Sufferer from flux was Rehabeam: “King Rehabeam with difficulty climbed on his chariot to flee to Jerusalem;” some say, he suffered from flux; some say, he was weak. Suffering from skin disease was Uziahu: “King Uziahu suffered from skin disease until the day of his death.” Holding the distaff was Joash: “They punished Joash.” Rebbi Ismael stated: This teaches that they gave him over to hardened hoodlums who had never known a woman and they raped him the way women are raped. That is what is written: “Israel’s pride will testify against it,” Israel’s pride will be raped in its face. Falling by the sword, this is Josiah, as is written: “The archers shot at king Josia,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, this teaches that they made his body like a sieve. Rebbi Ismael stated: 300 arrows were shot at the Eternal’s anointed. Without bread, that is Jehoiachin: “And his meal, a permanent meal was given to him,.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:132

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:132

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:132

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:132

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:1

MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent, and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah, but if she was eating immediately what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:1

MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent, and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah, but if she was eating immediately what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:19

A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:24

MISHNAH: Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X at place Y”; if he went and married him preliminarily at another place, she is not preliminarily married. “She is at place Y;” if he married him preliminarily at another place, she is preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is preliminarily married unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not preliminarily marry me to her except at place X and he went and executed the preliminary marriage at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:27

MISHNAH: If somebody performed preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turns out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. For all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman.