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398 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
MISHNAH: “Bring my bill of divorce”, she may eat heave until the bill is delivered to her. “Receive my bill of divorce,” she is immediately forbidden to eat heave. “Receive my bill of divorce at place X,” she may eat heave until the bill arrives at that place; Rebbi Eleazar forbids immediately.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed. He said, One should give money to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya. They did not give him; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.
HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.
HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
If somebody contests the signature of the witnesses or the signature of the judges. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to certify it from the handwriting of the witnesses it is certified, from the handwriting of the judges it is certified; I am saying that even from one witness and one judge it is certified. If he gave permission to the scribe to write and to the witnesses to sign, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah: The witnesses have to write: “This loan is from the first of Nisan but we wrote at a later date.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The confirmation of the judges is valid even if it is at some distance. Rebbi Mana said, is that correct? Could he then not certify from one handwriting? Rav said: The judges have to write: We certified this in the presence of X and Y. Why? So they can be convicted of perjury. But then also on which date, at which time, at which place? A judgment was given before Rav and this was not written. Rebbi Ḥaggai said: The judges have to know the parties. It happened that they falsified.
MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.
MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.
MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
Then they changed it to clipping. What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he brought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. When he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.
Then they changed it to clipping. What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he brought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. When he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.
Then they changed it to clipping. What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he brought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. When he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.
Then they changed it to clipping. What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he brought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. When he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.
“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
MISHNAH: Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X at place Y”; if he went and married him preliminarily at another place, she is not preliminarily married. “She is at place Y;” if he married him preliminarily at another place, she is preliminarily married.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is preliminarily married unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not preliminarily marry me to her except at place X and he went and executed the preliminary marriage at another place.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is preliminarily married unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not preliminarily marry me to her except at place X and he went and executed the preliminary marriage at another place.
MISHNAH: If somebody said to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X, and [the agent] went and married her preliminarily himself, she is preliminarily married. Also, if somebody said to a woman, you are preliminarily married to me after thirty days and another man married her preliminarily within these thirty days, she is preliminarily married to the second man; as a daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave. From today and after thirty days, and another man married her preliminarily within these thirty days, she is and is not preliminarily married. As a daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen or daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel she may not eat heave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. He looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. The same holds for monetary transactions. If somebody says to another: go and buy for me goods X, and [the agent] went and bought [the merchandise] for himself, he looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. Rebbi Ze‘ira cursed those who saw another person trying to buy certain goods and outbid him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Also about one who organizes a group against another, the rabbis quote: “A person who prevents a good thing coming to his neighbor abandons the fear of the Almighty.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. He looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. The same holds for monetary transactions. If somebody says to another: go and buy for me goods X, and [the agent] went and bought [the merchandise] for himself, he looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. Rebbi Ze‘ira cursed those who saw another person trying to buy certain goods and outbid him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Also about one who organizes a group against another, the rabbis quote: “A person who prevents a good thing coming to his neighbor abandons the fear of the Almighty.”
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
MISHNAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” she is preliminarily married if he owns it. “On condition that I possess it at place X”, she is preliminarily married if he owns it at place X, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. “On condition that I shall show you a bet kor of arable land,” she is preliminarily married and he has to show her, but if he showed it in the valley she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, any condition which is not formulated in the manner of the condition imposed on the tribes of Gad and Reuben is invalid, as it is said: “Moses said to them, if the tribes of Gad and Reuben cross over … but if they will not in arms cross over with you, etc.” Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said, that formulation was necessary for otherwise one would have understood that even in the Land of Canaan they should not inherit.
MISHNAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” she is preliminarily married if he owns it. “On condition that I possess it at place X”, she is preliminarily married if he owns it at place X, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. “On condition that I shall show you a bet kor of arable land,” she is preliminarily married and he has to show her, but if he showed it in the valley she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, any condition which is not formulated in the manner of the condition imposed on the tribes of Gad and Reuben is invalid, as it is said: “Moses said to them, if the tribes of Gad and Reuben cross over … but if they will not in arms cross over with you, etc.” Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said, that formulation was necessary for otherwise one would have understood that even in the Land of Canaan they should not inherit.
HALAKHAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel asked: If somebody said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take. Or maybe it is a difference since it is written: “To give to Nine and a half tribes.” It is as if he said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take from here or from there.
HALAKHAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel asked: If somebody said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take. Or maybe it is a difference since it is written: “To give to Nine and a half tribes.” It is as if he said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take from here or from there.
Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “This is more severe regarding a human than an ox,” etc. “A person who hits his father or mother,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded both of his eyes simultanously, or that he knocked out two of his teeth simultaneously, he does not have to pay anything. One after the other, he gains his freedom by the first and he pays him damages for the second. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This implies that one estimates embarrassment for slaves. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a person dedicates his earnings, he dedicates everything. If he dedicates the earnings of his slave, he can take from there his upkeep and the remainder is dedicated. Here you say, the remainder is dedicated, but there you say, everything is holy. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support free people than slaves. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say: If somebody cuts off the hands of somebody else’s slave, his master collects damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earnings, and embarrassment, and that one should be supported by welfare. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support amputated slaves than unimpaired ones. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan also give to his slave when he ate meat? Give also to his slave when he drank wine? And recited for himself the verse: “Did not His maker make me in the womb”? They said, there a rule of law, here a rule of mercy.
HALAKHAH: “It is bad to meet a deaf-mute, an insane, or an underage person,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded the eye of his slave and broke his tooth, for that is what the master said, and they are found to be perjured, they pay to the slave. How can they say this about the case? Rebbi Nasa said, those might say the following: We testify about X that [the slave] came to his hand unimpaired and left with two injuries. Then he gains his freedom with the first and he has to pay him for the second.
HALAKHAH: “It is bad to meet a deaf-mute, an insane, or an underage person,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded the eye of his slave and broke his tooth, for that is what the master said, and they are found to be perjured, they pay to the slave. How can they say this about the case? Rebbi Nasa said, those might say the following: We testify about X that [the slave] came to his hand unimpaired and left with two injuries. Then he gains his freedom with the first and he has to pay him for the second.
Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “You killed my ox, you cut down my fruit trees,” and the other says, I do not know, he is liable. He said to him, certainly you state that to the rabble. He answered, it is my fault, they said the following: “We testify against X that he killed ox Y” and the other says, I do not know, he is liable. [He said, that was stated.]
HALAKHAH: “If one say: Blind my eye, cut off my hand,” etc. “If he says, blind my eye because it damages me, cut off my hand because it damages me, he is liable. On condition not to be liable, he is liable.” Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah deals with a “yes” which really means “no”. But for a “yes” which does mean “yes” he is not liable. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar is about the family’s loss of standing. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with a “yes” which means “yes”. But for a “yes” which means “no”, he is liable. The statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish imples that one estimates the relatives’ loss of standing. It was stated: “If Gentiles forced a Jew and took from him another person’s money in his presence, he is not liable. If he handed it over, he is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, that means if they simply demanded “money”. But “X’s money”, he is not liable even if he handed it over.
HALAKHAH: “Where is my deposit? He told him ‘it was lost’,” etc. It was stated: “One does not accept deposits from women, or slaves, or underage children. If one accepted from a woman, he should return it to her; if she died, he should return it to her husband. If one accepted from a slave, he should return it to him; if he died, he should return it to his master. From an underage child, he should return it to him, if he died he should return it to his father, and make it a safe investment. If any of these said at the moment of their death, it should be given to X because it is his property, one should follow his interpretation.” Rebbi Zebida in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Only before witnesses. As the following: When Rebbi Abba bar Ḥana’s wife was dying, she said, these rings belong to my daughter. But he said no, they are mine. The case came before Rav who said, people are not given to lying at the time of their death.
HALAKHAH: “If one recognizes his own vessels or books,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it would have been correct that they should not have to swear. Why did they say they have to swear? That homeowners should not be fences. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, only if it was a known fact that his books had been stolen. Rav said, he has to bring proof that he stayed there the night in question. Assi said, if he claims: “I bought them from X,” he is to be believed. A case came before Rebbi Nasa and he did not accept it. Does he disagree? They said, he was a known troublemaker; therefore he did not accept the case.
“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent. But did one not object to [Rav] Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate.
“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent. But did one not object to [Rav] Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate.
MISHNAH: A man may say to another, weed with me and I shall be weeding with you, hoe with me and I shall be hoeing with you, but he shall not tell him, weed with me and I shall be hoeing with you, hoe with me and I shall be weeding with you. All the dry season is one, all the wet season is not; one may not say to him, plough with me in the dry season and I shall be ploughing with you in the wet season. Rabban Gamliel says, there exists predated and postdated interest. How is this? If one indended to borrow from him and sent him [a gift] saying, so you should lend me; that is predated interest. If one had borrowed and returned the money when he sent him [a gift] saying, that is for your money which was not earning for you while it was with me; that is postdated interest. Rebbi Simeon says, there exists verbal interest. One should not say to him, you should know that X came from place Y. The following transgress prohibitions: The creditor, and the debtor, and the guarantor, and the witnesses; the Sages say, also the scribe. They transgress “do not give,” and “do not take from him,” and “do not be a creditor,” and “do not burden him with interest,” and “before a blind man do not put an obstacle; and fear your God, I am the Eternal.”
“If a caravan was attacked by soldiers and one of its members managed to save something from their hand, he saved equally [for all]; but if they gave him permission, he saved for himself. If donkey-drivers were attacked by robbers and one of theirs managed to save something from their hand, he saved equally [for all]; but if he stipulated with them in court, he saved for himself. If toll collectors forgave to partners, they forgave equally [for all]; but if they indicated, we forgave to Mr. X, what they forgave, they forgave him.”
Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A vegetable bed which is six by six [handbreadths] and has its own name is not sold. Rebbi Joḥanan said: There is disagreement between Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose and the rabbis about one who bought an anvil sycamore on another’s property. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose says, he acquired the land. The rabbis say, he did not acquire. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked: If somebody sold all trees but reserved for himself an anvil sycamore. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, he acquired the land. In the opinion of the rabbis, he did not acquire the land. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebelai asked: If somebody sold all trees and an olive tree at place X, are all olive trees at that place sold? Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael asked: If somebody bought three groups of reeds, did he buy the greatest cedar in the Land of Israel?
HALAKHAH: It was stated: If somebody says to another: I am selling you half a field, and X and Y and half of Z surround you. Rav Huna, and Rav Jehudah, and Rebbi Jeremiah. One said, he gives him [an area shaped] like a pandur. And one said, he gives him something like a strip of cloth. And one said, he gives him something like patches.
MISHNAH: One who says, “my firstborn X shall not take a double portion,” [or] “my son Y shall not inherit together with his brothers,” did not say anything since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah. One who distributes his property orally, if he increased for one, or diminished for another, or made the firstborn equal to the others, his words are upheld; except if, however, he formulated it in terms of inheritance, he did not say anything. But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his words are upheld.
HALAKHAH: “One who says, “my firstborn X shall not take a double portion,’ ” etc. Rebbi La made the right of the firstborn equal to that of the brothers. Rebbi Ḥaggai said to them: Is that not a verse, “he shall not be able to declare as firstborn.” Rebbi Eliezer said, by the Temple Service! He is able, but he is not permitted. Except that he is able designating it as a gift.
“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.” “Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death.
“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.” “Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death.
“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.” “Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death.
“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.” “Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death.
MISHNAH: One who says, Mr. X shall inherit from me while he has a daughter, or, my daughter shall inherit from me while he has a son, did not say anything since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqah said, if he said that about anybody who can be his heir, his words stand; about anybody who cannot be his heir, his words do not stand.
HALAKHAH: “One who says, Mr. X shall inherit from me,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said only this about a son among sons or a daughter among daughters, but not a daughter among brothers or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi asked Rebbi Nathan; bar Abba said, so was the question: What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa’s reason? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, so was the question: What did they see to say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? He told him, did you not teach us so: “they shall inherit”? So is the Mishnah: “they shall take.” [Rebbi] La said, even following him who said “inherit”, is not the power of the court strengthened? As you say, nobody can transfer property using the language of gift; here he may do it. Similarly, nobody can transfer property using the language of inheritance; here he may do it.
“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.
If someone said, field X I gave to Y, it is given to him, it should be his, Y should inherit my property, Y should take possession of my property, he did not say anything. It should be given to him as a gift, Rebbi says, he acquired, but the Sages say, he did not acquire; but one forces the heirs to fulfill the deceased’s words. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel says, also if one writes διέθεμεν in Greek it is a gift. Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: I turned to all linguists to know what is διέθεμεν and nobody told me anything.
One who said, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, if Y died to Z. The one who was mentioned earlier receives the property earlier. If the second died during the first’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If the third died during the second’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If both the second and the third die during the first’s lifetime, the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he only has the usufruct. Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not even as a gift from a healthy person. As in the following: A woman wrote her properties over to a certain man. She needed money and sold it to her husband. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Madia brought the case before Rebbi Yose. Did not Rebbi Yannai say, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the gift of a healthy person? Since the husband of this woman is obligated to provide for her food, is that not like a death-bed will? So far, he is obligated to provide for her bread and legumes. Maybe eggs? Maybe chicken? Since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, that means that she may sell the property even in order to eat delicacies. Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said, it was stated there that her burial is part of her upkeep. If she did not have a burial site, since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, it means that he may sell the real estate and acquire a burial site.
One who said, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, if Y died to Z. The one who was mentioned earlier receives the property earlier. If the second died during the first’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If the third died during the second’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If both the second and the third die during the first’s lifetime, the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he only has the usufruct. Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not even as a gift from a healthy person. As in the following: A woman wrote her properties over to a certain man. She needed money and sold it to her husband. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Madia brought the case before Rebbi Yose. Did not Rebbi Yannai say, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the gift of a healthy person? Since the husband of this woman is obligated to provide for her food, is that not like a death-bed will? So far, he is obligated to provide for her bread and legumes. Maybe eggs? Maybe chicken? Since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, that means that she may sell the property even in order to eat delicacies. Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said, it was stated there that her burial is part of her upkeep. If she did not have a burial site, since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, it means that he may sell the real estate and acquire a burial site.
HALAKHAH: So far if real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred sheep and a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages, who upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Would the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer be like the healthy person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
Rebbi Idi in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The practice for a knotted one is the following. One writes the lender’s name, and the borrower’s name, the witnesses’ names, and the time. Then one knots it and repeats the text below. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read in the text above: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.”
“Rebbi answered to confirm the words of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The main text of the document proves whether it is simple or not simple.” What is the main text of a document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said: witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” And did we not state: this is the formula for documents of indebtedness? Rebbi Mani said, this is the formula for knotted documents of indebtedness. Rebbi Abbin said, even if you say, it is the same for simple and knotted, for a simple document it is indispensable, for a knotted one it is not indispensable. Rebbi Jehudah says, if one adds to the practice. A simple document has two [winesses], a knotted one three, but they do it with three. A simple document inside, a knotted one on its back, but they do it inside and on its back.
HALAKHAH: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man,” etc. Rebbi Abba said: He has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for his bill of divorce and the woman for her receipt. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, for the public good.” But even with Rebbi [La] it does not disagree: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.”
MISHNAH: If somebody paid off part of his debt, deposited his bond with a third party, and told him, if I have not paid him by date x, return the bond to him. If the time has passed while he did not pay, Rebbi Yose says, he shall return it; Rebbi Jehudah says, he shall not return it. If somebody’s bond became illegible, he presents witnesses about it to the court and they confirm for him: The bond of Mr. X, son of Mr. Y, dated from day Z became illegible; U and V were his witnesses.
MISHNAH: If somebody paid off part of his debt, deposited his bond with a third party, and told him, if I have not paid him by date x, return the bond to him. If the time has passed while he did not pay, Rebbi Yose says, he shall return it; Rebbi Jehudah says, he shall not return it. If somebody’s bond became illegible, he presents witnesses about it to the court and they confirm for him: The bond of Mr. X, son of Mr. Y, dated from day Z became illegible; U and V were his witnesses.
“If two people lived in the same town,” etc. “They cannot write a bond one on the other.” As one formulates, “I, X ben Y, am taking a loan from you, Z, and U is guarantor.”
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who lent to another by a document,” etc. Rav Huna said, predating is invalid but the document is valid. But did we not state: “A predated prozbol is valid, postdated it is invalid”? That means, Rav Huna, Rebbi Eleazar, and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim. Rav Huna, quoted here. “Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it if only he delivered it in the presence of witnesses; and she can use it to collect from encumbered property. For the witnesses sign on the bill of divorce only for the public good.” How? If about those who denied their testimony, the denied testimony is as if nonexistent, and the document should be valid? If about those who did not deny their testimony, did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? What about it: As one formulates, “I, X ben Y, am taking a loan from you, Z, and U is guarantor.”
It was stated: From earlier times, one was writing documents of ḥalîṣah: Before X and V did Z daughter of U perform ḥalîṣah for V son of W, by coming before us, removing his shoe from his right foot, spitting before us visible spittle on the ground, and saying: So shall be done to the man unwilling to build his brother’s house.
It was stated: From earlier times one was writing documents of repudiation: Before X and Y did Z daughter of U repudiate V son of W, by coming before us: I do not like him, I do not want to stay with him, I do not agree to be married to him.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
MISHNAH: When they have come to a decision, they bring the parties in. The chief judge says, Mr. X, you are not guilty, Mr. X, you are guilty. From where that afterwards, one may not say, I had found for you but my colleagues found you guilty, but what can I do since they were a majority against me? On such a one it was said: The gossip uncovers secrets.
MISHNAH: When they have come to a decision, they bring the parties in. The chief judge says, Mr. X, you are not guilty, Mr. X, you are guilty. From where that afterwards, one may not say, I had found for you but my colleagues found you guilty, but what can I do since they were a majority against me? On such a one it was said: The gossip uncovers secrets.
HALAKHAH: “When they have come to a decision,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one forces the one who finds guilty to write “not guilty.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the one who finds guilty, writes “guilty”; the one who finds not guilty, writes “not guilty”. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “From where that afterwards, one may not say, I had found for you but my colleagues found you guilty.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? That nobody could say, I really wanted to justify X in his suit but they did not let me do it. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That no other person should come, reason as he did, and say, also that one was there and he erred.
MISHNAH: If they told him, produce witnesses; he said, I have no witness; produce proofs; he said, I have no proofs. If later he found a proof, or he found witnesses, this is irrelevant. Rabban Gamliel said, what should he do who did not know that he had witnesses but found witnesses; he did not know that he had proof, but he found proof? If they told him, produce witnesses; he said, I have no witness; produce proofs; he said, I have no proofs; when he saw that the decision would go against him he said, X and Y shall come and testify for me, or he produced proof from his money belt, this is irrelevant.
HALAKHAH: “In civil suits, one who argued for credit,” etc. Rebbi said, if they only miss saying, Mr. X, you are acquitted, or you are convicted; it does not apply to the discussion. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it also applies to the discussion.
HALAKHAH: They brought in the second,” etc. It was stated: “If they found him innocent, they freed him; otherwise they hold his case over, split into groups of two, eat little and refrain from wine, and discuss during the entire night. The next morning they start early, the beadles of the synagogues come for them. They ask, Mr. X [ben Mr. Y. He says, present.] I was for conviction and I still am for conviction; or I was for acquittal and I still am for acquittal; I was for conviction and now I am for acquittal; one accepts his vote. I was for acquittal and now I am for conviction; argue as before.” It was stated: If one of the judges erred, the clerks of court remind him. If he was for conviction, they tell him, argue as before.
MISHNAH: If they found him innocent, they free him, otherwise he is led to be stoned. The herald goes before him: “X ben Y is led to be stoned because he committed crime Z; U and V testified against him. Anybody who knows of his innocence shall come and argue.”
MISHNAH: A man who had sexual relations with a male or an animal, or a woman who brings an animal [upon herself]. If a human sinned, what did the animal sin? But because it caused a mishap to a human, therefore the verse decreed that it should be stoned. Another explanation: Lest the animal be seen in public and people say, this is the one because of which X was stoned.