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HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

MISHNAH: If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you, X and Y, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me, but they knew from another witness, or one of them was a relative or disqualified. These are not liable.

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If one said, “an oath wheat and wheat I am not holding;” what? Let us hear from the following: “Not from place X, not from place Y,” he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, they considered a multiplicity of places like a multiplicity of kinds. If he had said, not from this place, not from this place; it would have been useful.

“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”

“You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X were Y are standing there.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rebbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, and he said, let X and Y come.

“You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X were Y are standing there.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rebbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, and he said, let X and Y come.

“You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X were Y are standing there.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rebbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, and he said, let X and Y come.

“You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X were Y are standing there.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rebbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, and he said, let X and Y come.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, this means if he trades without account; it does not apply if there are accounts. Also the family member trades without accounts. Rebbi Ze`ira agrees with Rebbi Yose. A man came for judgment before Rebbi Ze`ira who required him to swear for two denars. He told him, do I not owe you two denars? Here they are thrown to you. He answered him, and cloth of fine wool X and Y. Rebbi Ze`ira said, either you give him everything he claims from you or you swear to him everything which he rolls over to you. How far does one roll over? Rebbi Joḥanan said, until he say to him, you are my slave. Think of it, could he be Cohen and Hebrew slave? Is there such a slave today?

MISHNAH: If somebody escaped after sentence was passed, if he is returned to the same court, his case is not reopened. Anywhere two [people] will come forward and say, we testify against this man that he was condemned in court X on the testimony of Y and Z, he shall be executed. Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land. A criminal court which hands out a death sentence once in a Sabbatical period is called terrorist. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said, once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarphon and Rebbi Aqiba say, if we had been members of a criminal court, nobody ever would have been condemned to death there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, they would have increased the number of murderers in Israel.

It was stated: One does not call male or female slaves “little father X” or “little mother Y”. In the house of Rabban Gamliel they used to call their male and female slaves “little father Tabi” and “little mother Tabitha”.

R. Ḥiyya and R. Simeon b. Rabbi disagree with regard to this matter. One reads yēsar (he bound himself by a vow), the other reads yĕ'ĕsar (is forbidden). If we read yēsar we must understand it in the way we explained it above, but if we read yĕ'ĕsar, we must understand it in accordance with the following Baraita: "'People for whom the time of fasting has arrived because of previous resolutions are required to fast only in case they bound themselves by a vow during prayer.' This means that if an individual has taken upon himself to fast on Mondays and Thursdays of the whole year, and it happens that those days conflict with some of the holidays recorded in the Scroll of Fasts, the following rule is to be observed. If his vow preceded our proclamation of the holidays, our proclamation must be disregarded on account of his vow, but if our proclamation preceded his vow, his vow must be disregarded on account of our proclamation."

R. Ḥiyya and R. Simeon b. Rabbi disagree with regard to this matter. One reads yēsar (he bound himself by a vow), the other reads yĕ'ĕsar (is forbidden). If we read yēsar we must understand it in the way we explained it above, but if we read yĕ'ĕsar, we must understand it in accordance with the following Baraita: "'People for whom the time of fasting has arrived because of previous resolutions are required to fast only in case they bound themselves by a vow during prayer.' This means that if an individual has taken upon himself to fast on Mondays and Thursdays of the whole year, and it happens that those days conflict with some of the holidays recorded in the Scroll of Fasts, the following rule is to be observed. If his vow preceded our proclamation of the holidays, our proclamation must be disregarded on account of his vow, but if our proclamation preceded his vow, his vow must be disregarded on account of our proclamation."

R. Ḥiyya and R. Simeon b. Rabbi disagree with regard to this matter. One reads yēsar (he bound himself by a vow), the other reads yĕ'ĕsar (is forbidden). If we read yēsar we must understand it in the way we explained it above, but if we read yĕ'ĕsar, we must understand it in accordance with the following Baraita: "'People for whom the time of fasting has arrived because of previous resolutions are required to fast only in case they bound themselves by a vow during prayer.' This means that if an individual has taken upon himself to fast on Mondays and Thursdays of the whole year, and it happens that those days conflict with some of the holidays recorded in the Scroll of Fasts, the following rule is to be observed. If his vow preceded our proclamation of the holidays, our proclamation must be disregarded on account of his vow, but if our proclamation preceded his vow, his vow must be disregarded on account of our proclamation."

R. Ḥiyya and R. Simeon b. Rabbi disagree with regard to this matter. One reads yēsar (he bound himself by a vow), the other reads yĕ'ĕsar (is forbidden). If we read yēsar we must understand it in the way we explained it above, but if we read yĕ'ĕsar, we must understand it in accordance with the following Baraita: "'People for whom the time of fasting has arrived because of previous resolutions are required to fast only in case they bound themselves by a vow during prayer.' This means that if an individual has taken upon himself to fast on Mondays and Thursdays of the whole year, and it happens that those days conflict with some of the holidays recorded in the Scroll of Fasts, the following rule is to be observed. If his vow preceded our proclamation of the holidays, our proclamation must be disregarded on account of his vow, but if our proclamation preceded his vow, his vow must be disregarded on account of our proclamation."

A mnemonic: SHNAB"Y SHNA"Z: