26141 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:13

If you say, by Jewish rules, he is guilty if he converted. If you say, by their rules, he cannot be prosecuted if he converted, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a descendant of Noah who blasphemed and then converted cannot be prosecuted since the law changed for him. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The descendants of Noah are warned about nakedness as Jews are; the verse says, “he shall cling to his wife”, not to somebody else’s wife. “He shall cling to his wife”, not to a male, nor to an animal. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A descendant of Noah who had perverse intercourse with his wife is killed. What is the reason? “He shall cling to his wife so they become one flesh,” at the place where they together create one flesh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:13

If you say, by Jewish rules, he is guilty if he converted. If you say, by their rules, he cannot be prosecuted if he converted, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a descendant of Noah who blasphemed and then converted cannot be prosecuted since the law changed for him. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The descendants of Noah are warned about nakedness as Jews are; the verse says, “he shall cling to his wife”, not to somebody else’s wife. “He shall cling to his wife”, not to a male, nor to an animal. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A descendant of Noah who had perverse intercourse with his wife is killed. What is the reason? “He shall cling to his wife so they become one flesh,” at the place where they together create one flesh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:15

So we have established that Gentiles have no preliminary marriage. Do they have divorce? Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi and Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of the great Rebbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris: Either they have no divorce, or either of them may divorce the other. Rebbi Joḥanan from Sepphoris, Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena, in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: “For the divorcer is hateful, says the Eternal, Israel’s God.” In Israel I gave divorce, I did not give divorce among the nations of the world. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas: In the entire paragraph it is written “the Eternal, Sabaot”; only here it is written “Israel’s God.” To teach you that the Holy One, praise to Him, did lend his name only to Jewish divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:30

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as a wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for the preliminary marriage of a woman. Just as preliminary marriage acquires completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:32

Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:32

Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:36

“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:36

“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:39

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:39

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:45

Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: There it is written “he computes” and here it is written “he computes”. Here you compute months and years so he may leave, there you do not compute months and years so he may leave. He said to him, the difference is that the Torah compared him to the hireling. Since the latter computes months and years and leaves, so this one computes months and years and leaves.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:45

Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: There it is written “he computes” and here it is written “he computes”. Here you compute months and years so he may leave, there you do not compute months and years so he may leave. He said to him, the difference is that the Torah compared him to the hireling. Since the latter computes months and years and leaves, so this one computes months and years and leaves.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:53

“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:64

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, why at the door? Because by the door they went from servitude to freedom. The students asked Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai: Why should the slave be pierced in his ear rather than in any of his other body parts? He said to them, the ear which heard at Mount Sinai: “You shall have no other powers besides Me,” and removed from himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven but accepted the yoke of flesh and blood; the ear which heard before Mount Sinai: “For the Children of Israel are My servants,” and went and acquired another master; therefore the ear should come and be pierced for he did not follow what his ear heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:65

“His ear.” Since “his ear” mentioned there means the right ear, also here the right ear. “If the slave says saying”, two sayings, one at the end of the sixth year and one at the start of the seventh year. One at the end of the sixth year, while he still is in his servitude and one at the start of the seventh year, “I will not go free.” “I love my master, my wife, and my children.” This teaches that he cannot be pierced unless he have a wife and children, unless he love his master and his master love him; unless the property be blessed because of him as it is said: “For he feels well with you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:66

“He regains his autonomy in the Jubilee,” as it is written: “He leaves in the Jubilee together with his children.” “Or at the master’s death,” as it is written: “He shall be for you a perpetual slave,” all the days of his master’s lifetime.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:68

HALAKHAH: “A Canaanite slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “They shall be inherited by your children after you, to be possessed as inheritance” This brackets slaves with landed property. Since real estate can be acquired by money, or contract, or possession, so a Canaanite slave can be acquired by money, or contract, or possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:70

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Mana; Rebbi Tanḥum, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Real estate cannot be bought for less than a peruṭah. What is the reason? “Fields will be bought by money.” This disagrees with what Rebbi Ḥanina said: Any šeqalim mentioned in the Torah are tetradrachmas, in the Prophets pounds, and in the Hagiographs centenarii. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, except for the šeqalim paid to Ephron, which were centenarii. What is the reason? “For full money he shall give it to me.” There is no comparison since here it is written “money” but there “šeqalim”. They objected, is there not the rapist, for whom “money” is written and you say “šeqalim”?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:71

This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires, as it was stated: If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked to, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land in length and breadth, for I shall give it to you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:72

A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:72

A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:73

“By money.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, from another person to his master, therefore not from his master to another person. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even from his master to another person. What brings this? From his master to himself. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Here you have money that your field shall be unencumbered.” He answered, it is unencumbered. “That it be ownerless”? He answered, it is not ownerless. What is the difference between the cases? Here he advantaged a thinking person, there he did not advantage any thinking person. Think of it, if he was deaf-mute? He said to him, “a man.” Think of it, if he was underage? He said to him, one usually grows up. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Even with a contract through others, not by himself. Does not his master deliver a document to others that his slave regain his freedom? Here also, his master gives money to others that his field become ownerless.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:78

Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:78

Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:78

Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:79

“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:80

“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:83

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:87

“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:92

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Brothers who split? He answered, they divide what they are wearing but not what their sons and daughters are wearing. Rebbi Immi said, if one makes an appraisal for his wife, this is counted for himself and becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. If one makes a necklace for his wife, this is not of the common estate to be distributed if it is to be used on weekdays. But if it is made to be used on holidays, it becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. Rebbi Mana said, holiday dresses are distributed. Sabbath dresses are problematic. It is obvious for Rebbi Abin that both holiday and Sabbath dresses become part of the common estate and are distributed. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What about spherules? He answered, you understand this since you own many spherules. He said to him, they become part of the common estate to be distributed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:92

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Brothers who split? He answered, they divide what they are wearing but not what their sons and daughters are wearing. Rebbi Immi said, if one makes an appraisal for his wife, this is counted for himself and becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. If one makes a necklace for his wife, this is not of the common estate to be distributed if it is to be used on weekdays. But if it is made to be used on holidays, it becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. Rebbi Mana said, holiday dresses are distributed. Sabbath dresses are problematic. It is obvious for Rebbi Abin that both holiday and Sabbath dresses become part of the common estate and are distributed. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What about spherules? He answered, you understand this since you own many spherules. He said to him, they become part of the common estate to be distributed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:99

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Real estate cannot be bought for less than a peruṭah. What is the reason? “Fields will be bought by money.” This disagrees with what Rebbi Ḥanina said: All šeqalim mentioned in the Torah are tetradrachmas, in the Prophets pounds, and in the Hagiographs centenarii, except for the šeqalim paid to Ephron. What is the reason? “For full money he shall give it to me.” There is no comparison since here it is written “money” but there “šeqalim”. They objected, is there not the rapist, for whom “money” is written and you say “šeqalim”.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:101

By document. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, by a contract without obligating money, but with a contract obligating money he did not acquire until he paid. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, he acquired even if he did not pay. A baraita supports Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose: “If he sold him ten fields together, when he took possession of one of them, he took possession of all of them. But if he only paid the amount for one or wrote the deed only for one of them he acquired only the one which was sold to him.” Does there exist a deed without money? If you say, we hold that he paid for all of them, did it not say: “the amount of one”? It must be one or the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:103

From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:103

From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:108

Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:108

Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:112

Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:112

Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:112

Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:112

Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:117

There, we have stated: “The father bestows on his son beauty, strength, riches, wisdom, and years.” From where beauty? “May Your deeds appear on Your servants, and Your glory on their sons.” Strength, “strong on earth will be his descendants.” Riches, “I was young and became old, but never saw a just man abandoned and his descendants in need of bread.” Wisdom, “you shall teach your sons to argue about them.” Years, “that your and your sons’ days be many.” And just as he inherits five qualities, so he owes him the following five things. He feeds him, he gives him to drink, he clothes him, he puts on his shoes, he leads him. That is what is written: “This should fall on Joab’s head: sufferer from flux and from skin disease, holding the distaff, falling by the sword, and senseless.” Sufferer from flux, weak. From skin disease, abandoned. Holding the distaff, uneducated. Falling by the sword, short lived. Without bread, poor. When Solomon came to kill Joab, he said to him: Your father gave me five sentences; accept them and I can be killed. He accepted them and all of them came to pass on the House of David. Sufferer from flux was Rehabeam: “King Rehabeam with difficulty climbed on his chariot to flee to Jerusalem;” some say, he suffered from flux; some say, he was weak. Suffering from skin disease was Uziahu: “King Uziahu suffered from skin disease until the day of his death.” Holding the distaff was Joash: “They punished Joash.” Rebbi Ismael stated: This teaches that they gave him over to hardened hoodlums who had never known a woman and they raped him the way women are raped. That is what is written: “Israel’s pride will testify against it,” Israel’s pride will be raped in its face. Falling by the sword, this is Josiah, as is written: “The archers shot at king Josia,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, this teaches that they made his body like a sieve. Rebbi Ismael stated: 300 arrows were shot at the Eternal’s anointed. Without bread, that is Jehoiachin: “And his meal, a permanent meal was given to him,.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.