act
781 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
So is the Mishnah: Or she should repudiate him and marry. Therefore, she cannot get herself betrothed. That means, if she transgresses and repudiated after marriage, the House of Shammai recognize her act of repudiation. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: A rumor spreads for a married woman but not for a betrothed one. A woman might hide herself and say, I was not betrothed, but she will not be able to hide herself and say, I did not marry.
One verse says: “For swelling of the belly and shrinking of the genitals,” another verse says “her belly will swell and her genitals shrink”, and another verse says “when the Eternal will make your genitals shrink and your belly swell.” Does one verse weigh more than two verses? Rebbi Mana said, here for the act, there conditional. Rebbi Abin said, you may even say in both cases for the act, in both cases as a condition. “For swelling of the belly and shrinking of the genitals” for the adulterer. “Her belly will swell and her genitals shrink”, for the woman. Reason decides, “the genitals were first in sin and after that the belly; the genitals should be punished first and then the belly, while the remainder of the body does not escape.” Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Pappeus used this as conclusion of a sermon: Since for [heavenly] punishment, which is meted out sparingly, one limb is smitten and all limbs hurt, in the case of [heavenly] benefices, which are given out in abundance, [may we] not [expect] so much more!
One verse says: “For swelling of the belly and shrinking of the genitals,” another verse says “her belly will swell and her genitals shrink”, and another verse says “when the Eternal will make your genitals shrink and your belly swell.” Does one verse weigh more than two verses? Rebbi Mana said, here for the act, there conditional. Rebbi Abin said, you may even say in both cases for the act, in both cases as a condition. “For swelling of the belly and shrinking of the genitals” for the adulterer. “Her belly will swell and her genitals shrink”, for the woman. Reason decides, “the genitals were first in sin and after that the belly; the genitals should be punished first and then the belly, while the remainder of the body does not escape.” Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Pappeus used this as conclusion of a sermon: Since for [heavenly] punishment, which is meted out sparingly, one limb is smitten and all limbs hurt, in the case of [heavenly] benefices, which are given out in abundance, [may we] not [expect] so much more!
“And because he stole three steals, his father’s opinion, the court’s opinion, and Israel’s opinion.” His father’s opinion, as it is written: “It was after forty years.” David himself did not rule more than forty years, and here, it says so? But it is from the time that Israel demanded a king. “For your servant made a vow.” He said to him, what else do you want? He said to him, write me a tablet that two men should go with me. He said to him, tell me whom you want and I shall write. He said to him, write it to open and I shall take whom I want. He wrote it open. He went and added two people each until he had added 200 people. That is what is written, “with Absalom went 200 invited people from Jerusalem, going in their simplicity.” Invited, from David. Going in their simplicity, of Absalom. “They did not know anything,” of Aḥitophel’s counsel. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: They all were presiding judges. Then they saw the things. They went to change sides. They said: Master of all universes: Let us fall in David’s hand and do not let fall David in our hands! For if we fall in David’s hand, he will have mercy on us. But if, Heaven forbid, David would fall in our hands, we would not have mercy on him. That is what David said, “He saved me in peace from my confidant, for the majority were with me!” “The court’s opinion”. “And Absalom said, who would make me the judge of the land.” “So Absalom would act.” “And Israel’s opinion.” Absalom insinuated himself with the men of Israel.”
HALAKHAH: “Joseph had the merit to bury his father and none of his brothers was greater than he,” etc. Rebbi Isaac said: The glory of the Lifegiver of the Worlds was with them. It is written: “They came to the threshing place of the brambles.” Since when does the bramble-bush have a threshing place? Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman said, we checked in all of Scripture and did not find a place called “brambles”. What are “brambles”? These are the Canaanites who should have been threshed like brambles. By which merit were they saved? By the merit of: “The inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites, saw the mourning at the threshing place of the brambles.” What act of kindness did they do for him? Rebbi Eleazar said, they unbelted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they undid the knots on their shoulders. The rabbis said, they stood up. Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, they pointed with their fingers and said, “a heavy mourning is that for Egypt”. Now these who did no act of kindness with their hands or feet; look what the Holy One, praise to Him, did reward them with; Israel who are used to do acts of kindness with their hands or feet for their great and their little ones, [they deserve] so much more!
HALAKHAH: “Joseph had the merit to bury his father and none of his brothers was greater than he,” etc. Rebbi Isaac said: The glory of the Lifegiver of the Worlds was with them. It is written: “They came to the threshing place of the brambles.” Since when does the bramble-bush have a threshing place? Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman said, we checked in all of Scripture and did not find a place called “brambles”. What are “brambles”? These are the Canaanites who should have been threshed like brambles. By which merit were they saved? By the merit of: “The inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites, saw the mourning at the threshing place of the brambles.” What act of kindness did they do for him? Rebbi Eleazar said, they unbelted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they undid the knots on their shoulders. The rabbis said, they stood up. Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, they pointed with their fingers and said, “a heavy mourning is that for Egypt”. Now these who did no act of kindness with their hands or feet; look what the Holy One, praise to Him, did reward them with; Israel who are used to do acts of kindness with their hands or feet for their great and their little ones, [they deserve] so much more!
One verse says, “you shall love the Eternal, your God,” and another verse says, “fear the Eternal, your God, and Him you should serve.” Act from love and act from fear. Act from love, because if you are tempted to hate, know that you must love and a lover is no hater. Act from fear, because if you are tempted to rebel, know that you must fear and one who fears does not rebel.
One verse says, “you shall love the Eternal, your God,” and another verse says, “fear the Eternal, your God, and Him you should serve.” Act from love and act from fear. Act from love, because if you are tempted to hate, know that you must love and a lover is no hater. Act from fear, because if you are tempted to rebel, know that you must fear and one who fears does not rebel.
One verse says, “you shall love the Eternal, your God,” and another verse says, “fear the Eternal, your God, and Him you should serve.” Act from love and act from fear. Act from love, because if you are tempted to hate, know that you must love and a lover is no hater. Act from fear, because if you are tempted to rebel, know that you must fear and one who fears does not rebel.
One verse says, “you shall love the Eternal, your God,” and another verse says, “fear the Eternal, your God, and Him you should serve.” Act from love and act from fear. Act from love, because if you are tempted to hate, know that you must love and a lover is no hater. Act from fear, because if you are tempted to rebel, know that you must fear and one who fears does not rebel.
Both Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba, say in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Yose who said in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act in a practical case? He said to him, following Rebbi Yose who spoke in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.
May one act in money matters on their testimony? How is that? If everybody knew that the Sabbath boundary was at Reuben’s field; they came and said, this far we came on the Sabbath, and it turns out that this field is in Simeon’s hand. May one take it from Simeon and return it to Reuben?
HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.
If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.
MISHNAH: If somebody gives money in trust for his daughter and she says, I am trusting my husband, the trustee should execute what he was entrusted with, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, is it not only about a field? If she wants to sell it, can she not sell it now? When has this been said? If she is an adult. But about a minor, no legal act of a minor is valid.
There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: At the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. Why should they sell for the sustenance of 12 months? Not to disadvantage the woman. Why do they give her sustenance for 30 days? If you said otherwise, you would act in detriment of the orphans, as it was stated: If a widow took possession even of 1’000 zuz for her sustenance, one does not take it away from her. What could one say to her? “Show what is in your hands!” The students of Rebbi Mana said to her, “show what is in your hands.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, since in the end she will have to swear about anything in her hands, one says to her, let it be so.
Ḥananiah bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, who wanted to act following the rabbis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, said to him: Did you not teach us in your old man’s name, “except if they offered public tender”? He accepted it; Rebbi changed his mind and acted following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
It happened that Rebbi Ismael allotted sustenance to a woman in the markets of Sepphoris. What means “in the markets”? From the markets. Rebbi heard this and said, who told him that he did not send her? Who told me that he did not leave for her? Do the passers-by know? Rebbi Hila said, this is what Rebbi asked: Rebbi is of the opinion that the Mishnah does not speak of a married woman but of a widow. He said, Samuel and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the Mishnah deals with a widow. It was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: “If somebody left for overseas and his wife demands sustenance.” They wanted to say, for him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a married woman, “in the beginning” that he did not send her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. For him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a widow, “in the beginning” that he did not leave for her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said, that she did not renounce her ketubah in the orphans’ favor.
It happened that Rebbi Ismael allotted sustenance to a woman in the markets of Sepphoris. What means “in the markets”? From the markets. Rebbi heard this and said, who told him that he did not send her? Who told me that he did not leave for her? Do the passers-by know? Rebbi Hila said, this is what Rebbi asked: Rebbi is of the opinion that the Mishnah does not speak of a married woman but of a widow. He said, Samuel and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the Mishnah deals with a widow. It was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: “If somebody left for overseas and his wife demands sustenance.” They wanted to say, for him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a married woman, “in the beginning” that he did not send her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. For him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a widow, “in the beginning” that he did not leave for her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said, that she did not renounce her ketubah in the orphans’ favor.
HALAKHAH: “He should not eat,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is forbidden to teach him a trade. In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is forbidden to act in his defense.
MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.
MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.
MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.
Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Can one collect dowry from encumbered property? Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me,” etc. Two say that she appointed in their presence and two say that in their presence he received and tore it. But if he agrees, the agent should be able to be added. Explain it, it he was a relative. This implies that a relative can act as agent.
The colleagues said, they disagree about courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has both courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, she has neither courtyard nor four cubits. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree about the courtyard but she has no four cubits. What did Rebbi Joḥanan say about outstretched hands? Rebbi Eleazar asked, does an agent’s courtyard act as his hand?
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.
HALAKHAH: “Everybody who keeps one commandment they treat well,” etc. “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandment,” and you say so? But we hold with one who is 50–50. If he keeps one commandment, they treat him well and prolong his life; he will inherit the Land. But if he commits one sin, they do not treat him well, do not prolong his life, and he does not inherit the Land. There, we have stated: “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandement.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one who had occasion to commit a possible sin and did not act. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one who chose one commandment which he never violated in his lifetime. What kind? Mar Uqban said, for example the honor of father and mother. Rebbi Mana said, “Happy are those on a straight path, who walk in the Eternal’s Torah,” as if they did walk in the Eternal’s Torah. Rebbi Abun said, “Also they did no evil, in His path they went,” as if they went in His path. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, what is written? “ Happy the man who did not walk in the council of the wicked;” since he did not walk in the council of the wicked it is as if he walked in the council of the just.
Ben Azai preached: “A dead fly will permanently spoil perfumer’s oil.” Does not one dead fly spoil perfumer’s oil? And this person by one sin spoiled all merits he had. Rebbi Aqiba preached: “ So the abyss opened wide and its mouth swallowed the one without law.” It does not say “without laws”, but “without law”, him who has not a single merit that should help him on the scale of merit. That is, for the Future World. But in this world, even if 999 angels plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? “If there is for him one angel out of a thousand, to tell a man his straightness. He will act with him in grace and say, let him be redeemed, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if you find a saying of Rebbi Eliezer, son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, bend your ear like this funnel and listen, since Rebbi Joḥanan reported that Rebbi Eliezer, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, said: Even if 999 angles plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. Not only this entire angel, but if 999 aspects of that angel plead for conviction and one aspect for acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? It does not say, “if there is for him one angel of a thousand,” but “one out of a thousand”, one aspect out of a thousand aspects of that angel. What is written afterwards? “He will act with him in grace and say, let him be hurt, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” “Let him be hurt,” by suffering. “I found weregilt,” he found means to redeem himself. That is, in this world. But in the Future World, if he has a majority of merits, he inherits paradise; a majority of sins, he inherits hell. If he was 50–50. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “he carries his iniquity.” Rebbi Abbahu said, it is written: “He carries.” What does the Holy One, praise to Him, do? He grabs one of his demerits, and the merits decide. Rebbi Eleazar said: “You, Eternal, are acting in grace, for You will complete for everybody according to his deeds.” And if he has none, You will give him from Yours. That is Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, for Rebbi Eleazar said, “You, Eternal, are acting in grace,” this teaches that He turns to the aspect of grace.
Ben Azai preached: “A dead fly will permanently spoil perfumer’s oil.” Does not one dead fly spoil perfumer’s oil? And this person by one sin spoiled all merits he had. Rebbi Aqiba preached: “ So the abyss opened wide and its mouth swallowed the one without law.” It does not say “without laws”, but “without law”, him who has not a single merit that should help him on the scale of merit. That is, for the Future World. But in this world, even if 999 angels plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? “If there is for him one angel out of a thousand, to tell a man his straightness. He will act with him in grace and say, let him be redeemed, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if you find a saying of Rebbi Eliezer, son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, bend your ear like this funnel and listen, since Rebbi Joḥanan reported that Rebbi Eliezer, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, said: Even if 999 angles plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. Not only this entire angel, but if 999 aspects of that angel plead for conviction and one aspect for acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? It does not say, “if there is for him one angel of a thousand,” but “one out of a thousand”, one aspect out of a thousand aspects of that angel. What is written afterwards? “He will act with him in grace and say, let him be hurt, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” “Let him be hurt,” by suffering. “I found weregilt,” he found means to redeem himself. That is, in this world. But in the Future World, if he has a majority of merits, he inherits paradise; a majority of sins, he inherits hell. If he was 50–50. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “he carries his iniquity.” Rebbi Abbahu said, it is written: “He carries.” What does the Holy One, praise to Him, do? He grabs one of his demerits, and the merits decide. Rebbi Eleazar said: “You, Eternal, are acting in grace, for You will complete for everybody according to his deeds.” And if he has none, You will give him from Yours. That is Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, for Rebbi Eleazar said, “You, Eternal, are acting in grace,” this teaches that He turns to the aspect of grace.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries a woman and her daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, one understands from this five rules: One understands that five women can be preliminarily married simultaneously. That a woman may receive her own wedding gift and that of her companion. And one may use the spoils of robbery for a preliminary marriage. And one may preliminarily marry using produce acquired by a prohibited act. And preliminary marriage is impossible in incest situations.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
If he performed a preliminary marriage during the validity of the symphōn, this is unconditional preliminary marriage. If he divorced, the students of Rebbi Jonah said, divorce touched her; Rebbi Jonah said, divorce did not touch her. When Rebbi Jonah died, his students acted following him. They said, since after 30 [days] she would leave without a bill of divorce, how can you say that divorce touched her? But divorce did not touch her. If he died during the time stipulated in the symphōn, Rebbi Abbahu said, she is permitted to marry; Rebbi Abba said, she is not permitted to marry. Rebbi Mana asked the family of Rebbi Yose’s father: How did your master usually act? He said to him, when it was a long time, he said that she should go and marry immediately. If the time was short, he said, what is the hurt if she waits? If he sent things during the validity of the symphōn, Rebbi Mana said, [it follows the rules of] symphōn; Rebbi Abba said, [it follows the rules of] preliminary marriage. The rabbis take note of Rebbi Mana’s opinion.
Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for the colleagues when they were slandered. They asked but were not given anything. Then they came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other. If somebody forgave a bond to another person: Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mamal: one said it is forgiven; the other said it is not forgiven unless he handed over the bond.
HALAKHAH: “One who comes to marry a woman from a priestly family,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, as we have stated: “What is qualified dough? Anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated one, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with any of these is qualified for the priesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.” Rav said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he checks from which family one marries into the priesthood and marries. Through whom does he check? Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Josia: He checks through his female relatives. To Rebbi Ḥama came an old man; he asked him: Does one marry into the priesthood from this family? He answered: yes, and he was making a match based on this information. Rav said to his son Ḥiyya: Descend a degree to marry a wife. Rebbi Idi said, the following is a frequent saying of the rabbis: “If the woman was not impure but she is pure.” If she was not impure, she is pure. Not like Pappos ben Jehudah who locks the door before his wife. One said to him, did your forefathers act like this? A Cohen came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him: I acted on the Mishnah when I married a woman from a priestly family and checked after her four mothers which are eight. He said to him, if the origin was defective, who would inform you?
It happened that the [Roman] government sent two officials to study Torah with Rabban Gamliel. They learned from him Bible, Mishnah, Talmud, practice, and homilies. At the end, they told him: All of your teachings are beautiful and commendable except two things which you say: “A Jewish woman shall not act as midwife to a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may act as midwife for a Jewish woman; a Jewish woman shall not nurse the child of a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may nurse for a Jewish woman with her consent; what was robbed from a Jew is forbidden but from a Gentile it is permitted.” At that moment did Rabban Gamliel decide that what was robbed from a Gentile be forbidden because of desecration of the Name. “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable,” etc. But we shall not inform the government of this. Nevertheless, by the time they reached the Tyrian ladder they had forgotten everything.
It happened that the [Roman] government sent two officials to study Torah with Rabban Gamliel. They learned from him Bible, Mishnah, Talmud, practice, and homilies. At the end, they told him: All of your teachings are beautiful and commendable except two things which you say: “A Jewish woman shall not act as midwife to a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may act as midwife for a Jewish woman; a Jewish woman shall not nurse the child of a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may nurse for a Jewish woman with her consent; what was robbed from a Jew is forbidden but from a Gentile it is permitted.” At that moment did Rabban Gamliel decide that what was robbed from a Gentile be forbidden because of desecration of the Name. “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable,” etc. But we shall not inform the government of this. Nevertheless, by the time they reached the Tyrian ladder they had forgotten everything.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
HALAKHAH: “If one found behind a temporary fence”, etc. Rav Jehudah said: Only pigeon chicks tied together at their wings. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda found a ring covered in a box and took it. He came and asked Rav, who told him, you did not act correctly. He said, shall I return it? He answered, no, for we might say that his owner came, looked for it, did not find it and gave up hope for it.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “or buying from your neighbor’s hand”, from you neighbor’s hand you need an act of acquisition; you do not need an act of acquisition from the Gentile’s hand. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, why does one deliver a person to “Him Who exacted retribution”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it follows the Tanna who stated: “Nobody dealing in words only may one deliver to “Him Who exacted retribution”.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “or buying from your neighbor’s hand”, from you neighbor’s hand you need an act of acquisition; you do not need an act of acquisition from the Gentile’s hand. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, why does one deliver a person to “Him Who exacted retribution”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it follows the Tanna who stated: “Nobody dealing in words only may one deliver to “Him Who exacted retribution”.
Rebbi Zachariah asked before Rebbi Immi: Does one act following that Tanna, as it was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says, sometimes you are empowered to propose a compromise, sometimes you are not empowered to propose a compromise. How is this? Two come before a judge; before he heard their arguments, or after he heard their arguments but does not know how to correctly apply the law, he may tell them, go and work out a compromise. After you heard their arguments and know how to correctly apply the law, you may not propose a compromise, as it is said: One may remove the beginning of a quarrel like water; before it becomes manifest, the quarrel may be abandoned. Before the quarrel became manifest, you are permitted to abandon it; after the quarrel became manifest, you are not permitted to abandon it.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, even compromise needs intelligent decision.
It is written: With all his heart he prepared himself to seek God, to act, and to teach law and justice in Israel. Rebbi Simon bar Zavdi and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman. One said, with all he did for the purity of the Temple, he did not fully establish the purity of the Temple. One said, with all the good works he did, he did not fully do his duty for the purity of the Temple. It is written: They started on the first of the first month, and on the eighth day they entered the Eternal’s Hall and sanctified the Eternal’s House for three days; on the sixteenth of the month they finished. Could they not have eliminated all idolatry from there in one day? Rebbi Idi said, because of Chaldean idols which were engraved in vermilion.
It was stated: One does not make public tender for slaves, securities, and movables. [What is public tender?] Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, announcement. Ulla bar Ismael said, slaves lest they flee, securities and movables lest they be stolen. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Does this not imply that a slave be redeemed in front of three people? He answered him, yes. But did we not state: “Real estate nine and a Cohen. The same holds for humans”? He answered him, but the human here is a free person. Ḥanania bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi who wanted to act following the rabbis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, said to him: Rebbi, did you not teach us in your grandfather’s name, “except if he offered public tender”? He answered, yes, changed his mind, and acted following Rabban Gamliel.
HALAKHAH: “Both civil suits,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, to protect Israel’s money they said, “tell why you know that this person owes the other.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yasa: What does one do in practice? He answered, following Rebbi Joḥanan, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, to protect Israel’s money they said, “tell why you know that this person owes the other.” Ze‘ir bar Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina and Rav Jehudah, one said: You shall cross-examine, investigate, and inquire well. The other said, equity, equity you shall pursue. How is that? If you see that the verdict will be the truth, investigate it; otherwise, act in equity.
Do not worship them. Should I say, not unless he worshipped every single strange worship in the world? The verse says, do not prostrate yourself before them. Prostration was included; why is it mentioned separately? To tie to it: Prostration is special in that it is the act of a single person and is punishable separately, so I am adding any single act that one is liable for separately. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.
Do not worship them. Should I say, not unless he worshipped every single strange worship in the world? The verse says, do not prostrate yourself before them. Prostration was included; why is it mentioned separately? To tie to it: Prostration is special in that it is the act of a single person and is punishable separately, so I am adding any single act that one is liable for separately. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.
“One who copulates with a Gentile woman,” etc. Rebbi Ismael stated: This is one who marries a Gentile woman, sires children, and from her raises enemies of the Omnipresent. It is written: Phineas ben Eleazar ben Aharon the priest saw. What did he see? He understood what happened and remembered practice: “One who copulates with a Gentile woman, zealots strike him.” It was stated: not with the agreement of the Sages. Would Phineas act against the Sages? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, they wanted to excommunicate him had not the Holy Spirit jumped on him and declared that an eternal covenant of priesthood shall be for him and his descendants after him, etc.
MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.
MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.
MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.
MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.
A rebellious Elder who instructed to act and acted is punishable. If he instructed but did not act, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed not for application, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed for application, even if he himself did not act, he is punishable. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Ismael stated thus: Who would act, even in he did not act himself. Rav Huna said, if he was instructing for practice and later a case came up, one acts on his instruction. If he taught it on the occasion of a case, one acts on it for others but not for himself.
A rebellious Elder who instructed to act and acted is punishable. If he instructed but did not act, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed not for application, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed for application, even if he himself did not act, he is punishable. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Ismael stated thus: Who would act, even in he did not act himself. Rav Huna said, if he was instructing for practice and later a case came up, one acts on his instruction. If he taught it on the occasion of a case, one acts on it for others but not for himself.
A rebellious Elder who instructed to act and acted is punishable. If he instructed but did not act, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed not for application, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed for application, even if he himself did not act, he is punishable. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Ismael stated thus: Who would act, even in he did not act himself. Rav Huna said, if he was instructing for practice and later a case came up, one acts on his instruction. If he taught it on the occasion of a case, one acts on it for others but not for himself.
A rebellious Elder who instructed to act and acted is punishable. If he instructed but did not act, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed not for application, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed for application, even if he himself did not act, he is punishable. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Ismael stated thus: Who would act, even in he did not act himself. Rav Huna said, if he was instructing for practice and later a case came up, one acts on his instruction. If he taught it on the occasion of a case, one acts on it for others but not for himself.
A rebellious Elder who instructed to act and acted is punishable. If he instructed but did not act, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed not for application, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed for application, even if he himself did not act, he is punishable. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Ismael stated thus: Who would act, even in he did not act himself. Rav Huna said, if he was instructing for practice and later a case came up, one acts on his instruction. If he taught it on the occasion of a case, one acts on it for others but not for himself.
“He shall atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the Children of Israel, etc. In this aspect I have three impurities. The impurity of foreign worship as it is said, to defile My Sanctuary. Sexual offenses as it is said, not to act in the rules of abominations. Spilling of blood as it is said, do not defile the Land. I could think that this he-goat atones for all these impurities, the verse says, from the impurities, not all impurities. We find that the verse treated the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta separately; also here we treat only the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta separately, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, from its place it is decided, as it is said, he shall atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the Children of Israel, any impurity in the Sanctuary. I could think that this he-goat atones for these impurities, the verse says, and their crimes. These are the rebellions, for so it says, the king of Moab rebelled against me.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way; we have the heralds announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in a distant place. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away (nor) announce.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way; we have the heralds announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in a distant place. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away (nor) announce.
MISHNAH: If he threw the stone into his own courtyard and it killed, if the person damaged had the right to enter there, he is exiled, but if not, he is not exiled, as it is said, if somebody goes with another to a forest. Since the forest is a place where the person injured and the one causing the injury both may enter, this excludes a private courtyard where the person injured and the one causing the injury may not enter together. Abba Shaul says, since cutting down trees is a voluntary act, this excludes a father who hits his son, a teacher who disciplines his student, and the court bailiff.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
The Babylonian Talmud
R. Joshua b. Levi said : Although a man has read the Shema' in the Synagogue, it is a pious act to read it again upon his bed. R. Assi said : What is the Scriptural authority for this ? "Tremble and sin not ; commune with your own heart upon your bed, and [[fol. 5a.]] be still. Selah " (Ps. iv. 5).
Since [the Shekinah is] even with two, why mention three? Thou mightest argue that since the act of judging is merely for the sake of peace, the Shekinah does not come [in their midst], therefore he informs us that the administration of justice is equal to being occupied with Torah.