737 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:46

“All these were said on a holiday, so much more on the Sabbath..” Are these it? Are there no others? There is stoning on the Sabbath, there is no stoning on a holiday. There is extirpation on the Sabbath, there is no extirpation on a holiday. There is flogging on a holiday, there is no flogging on the Sabbath. If you would say, we are coming to state cases connected with food, did we not state: “one lowers produce through a skylight on the holiday but not on the Sabbath”? In addition from the following, one grinds aromatic wood for a circumcision on a holiday but not on the Sabbath. Rebbi Yose said, only if he circumcised. In addition from what was stated, “The Sages agree with Rebbi Meïr about seals in the ground that one pushes aside, and removes, and unties, and cuts. On the Sabbath one pushes aside but one does not remove nor untie nor cut. For implements on the Sabbath it is permitted; it is not necessary to mention on a holiday.”

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:83

And from where that he was asked in eight? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants in his stead. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For greatness after him. And from where that he officiated in eight? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For greatness after him. Rebbi Jonah said to him, I was with you; he did not say “officiated” but “was asked”. Rav Hoshaia brought a Mishnah of Bar Qappara from the South which stated: But the Sages are saying that he is qualified neither in the four of a common priest nor in the eight of a High Priest. Rebbi Abba said, it would be logical that he officiate in four. Why did they say that he does not officiate? Lest people say, we saw a High Priest, sometimes he officiates in four, sometimes he officiates in eight. Rebbi Jonah said, would he not officiate inside and would he not be asked outside? Does one err between inside and outside? But did Rebbi Tarphon, the father of all of Israel, not err between blowing for assembly and the blowing for a sacrifice? As it is stated: The descendants of Aaron, the priests, shall blow the trumpets, blameless ones, not with bodily defects, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons if I did not see Simeon, my mother’s brother, lame in one of his legs, standing in the Temple court with his trumpet in his hand and blowing! Rebbi Aqiba answered him, maybe you saw him only at the time of assembly; but I was saying, at the time of sacrifices. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons but you did not deviate right or left. I am the one who saw the act and forgot. You derive it and agree with tradition. Therefore, anybody who separates from you is as if he separated himself from his life.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:30

MISHNAH: If Pentecost falls on a Friday, the House of Shammai are saying that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, but the House of Hillel are saying that it has no slaughter-day. They agree that if it falls on the Sabbath that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath; the High Priest does not wear his garments, and one is permitted eulogies and fasting, in order not to support the words of those who are saying that Pentecost is on Sunday.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:33

“They agree that if it falls on the Sabbath that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath.” So the House of Hillel are saying, its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath. Whose are the hides? Rebbi Tabi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, of all watches. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, of this watch. And you are saying, its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath; whose are the hides? The disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Pentecost has all of seven days as make-up. Rav Hoshaia objected: was it not stated, just as the New Moon is one day after its count, to Pentecost is one day after its count? Rebbi La said, if he did not bring his holiday sacrifice on the first day, he may bring it all seven days.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Sancta are more stringent than heave,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, because eaters of heave are vigilant but eaters of sancta are not vigilant. Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana, is that eminence? If it were a thing equal for both but impure for one and pure for the other, that would be eminence. He said to him, explain it if it is connected to sancta. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if the impure was [heavy] a lb. one does not immerse it. Abba Shaul said, also for heave one immerses only a basked or a willow-basket. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Abba Shaul and Rebbi Simeon said the same, as we have stated there, “if one holds a human or vessels and immerses them, they are impure, but if he had rinsed his hands in water they are pure. Rebbi Simeon said, he should hold them loosely so the water may come into them.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is reasonable that Rebbi Joḥanan would agree with Abba Shaul but Abba Shaul not with Rebbi Simeon. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Abba Shaul. It was stated thus: Practice follows his words. Rebbi Jonah said, the Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s, but the words of the Sages are that one acts thus even for sancta, since finger-holes are no interior; for vessels of sancta all is interior.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:23

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “A white spot in the size of a grit and it spread in the size of a grit [and in the spread appeared a healthy spot or a white hair] but the original disappeared. Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure, but the Sages are saying, it should be seen as a new case.” Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case as absolutely {impure}. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, holiday eve is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And this is “not to restrict” that you should not deal with the second case neither to alleviate nor to restrict. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, it turns out that the single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there and the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here. The single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there: Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. And the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here: The rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And we have stated here, “Rebbi Meïr says, one inspects skin-disease to alleviate but not to restrict” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Either following the single opinion here or the rabbis here the rabbis there agree to alleviate but not to restrict. There, if the original disappeared, but here, if the indications {of impurity} disappeared and the original remains. “Rebbi said, the opinion of Rebbi Yose is reasonable for one in quarantine and the opinion of Rebbi Meïr if he is absolutely {impure}.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, they disagree about the holiday itself. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case; could he enter the Temple courtyard? But the rabbis are saying, this is a new case; could he not enter the Temple courtyard? Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case to become absolute. What is between them? (It will be sweet for him to hear a temporary release from the mouth of the Cohen.) Samuel said, they disagree about expansion. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. One said in Samuel’s name, expansion and treatment-resistant scabies is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. Because it is another case. Therefore otherwise it would be pure. It parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said when they differed, if it developed treatment-resistant scabies, Rebbi Joḥanan said pure, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:17

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:49

Rebbi Eleazar said, even though the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai disagreed about co-wives, they agree that the child is not a bastard, since a bastard is only from a woman which is forbidden to [a man] by an incest prohibition and one is subject to extirpation for [sinning with] her. Rebbi Tarphon said, I would love to have a daughter’s co-wife to marry her into priesthood. They asked Rebbi Joshua, what are children of a daughter’s co-wife? He said to them, you bring my head between two large mountains, between the words of the House of Shammai and those of the House of Hillel, that they should smash my brain. But I testify about the family ‘Anubai from Bet Ṣeba‘im and the family Neqipai from Bet Meqošeš that they were sons of co-wives and their grandchildren were High Priests officiating on top of the altar.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:6

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:19

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case. For the rabbis, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” acquired [in the widow] is forbidden. Also, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” did not acquire [in the widow] is [still] forbidden. Therefore, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Following Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first is forbidden but the second permitted. Because of the doubt, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:24

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:14

MISHNAH: If property came to a woman waiting for her levir, the House of Shammai agree with the House of Hillel that she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah and property that enters and leaves with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs. But the House of Hillel say that all property remains where it is; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and property that enters and leaves with her in the hands of her father’s heirs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:24

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:40

Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:49

MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:54

Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female that she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah [says] in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:9

In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:14

“He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult.” They agree that he shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? The hymen of an adult dissolved in her body. The hymen of one injured by a piece of wood came outside. Some switch: He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable one injured by a piece of wood.” They agree that he shall not marry an adult. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? An adult is no longer young. The one injured by a piece of wood is still young.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:14

“He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult.” They agree that he shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? The hymen of an adult dissolved in her body. The hymen of one injured by a piece of wood came outside. Some switch: He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable one injured by a piece of wood.” They agree that he shall not marry an adult. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? An adult is no longer young. The one injured by a piece of wood is still young.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:19

Also the House of Shammai agree, also Rebbi Simeon agrees but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:5

The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:7

Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman also said: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi was in Laodicea and met there Rebbi Jehudah the Patriarch. He wanted to leave early, when he said to him wait for us tomorrow to immerse this woman convert. Rebbi Zera asked Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Was that to honor the old man or because one does not immerse a woman convert at night? He said to him, because one does not immerse a woman convert at night. A case came before Rebbi Yose whether one may immerse converts at night. They could not agree.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:16

It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar. This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:16

It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar. This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:16

It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar. This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:32

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:32

HALAKHAH: “If the mixed-up children became adults,” after it happened. Does that mean, not from the start? So is the Mishnah: It is permitted from the start to manumit. Even Rebbi Yose the Galilean, who said that one is forbidden to manumit, will agree here that it is permitted for the benefit of children. What means “appropriate”? Not disabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:38

It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel says, any human who lives for thirty days is not a still birth, “all redeemed you shall redeem at the age of one month;” and an animal which lives for eight days is not a still birth, “from the eighth day and further it will be welcome as a sacrifice, a gift to the Eternal.” There, they say that practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Abba said, where do they disagree? If he was not born in his months. But if he was born in his months, even Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will agree.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:5

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:6

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:20

“A wooden sandal.” The colleagues in the name of Rav: If only the edges are wooden. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If only the bottom of the sole is wooden. There, they say in the name of Rav: If only the loops are wooden. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if it is entirely of wood it is valid. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ A straw sandal becomes impure by being stepped on and a woman may use it for ḥalîṣah, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages do not agree about impurity by being stepped on.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:32

HALAKHAH: “The Sages agree,” etc. What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? That she was forbidden to him for an hour. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer about the underage girl who was married off by her father and divorced, that she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. Her betrothal and divorce were by biblical standards; her remarriage was not by biblical standards.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:32

HALAKHAH: “The Sages agree,” etc. What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? That she was forbidden to him for an hour. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer about the underage girl who was married off by her father and divorced, that she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. Her betrothal and divorce were by biblical standards; her remarriage was not by biblical standards.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:23

MISHNAH: One [wife] says, he died, the other one says, he did not die. The one who said that he died can remarry and collect her ketubah; the one who said that he did not die cannot remarry nor collect her ketubah. If one said that he died, while the other one said he was killed; Rebbi Meïr says, since they contradict one another, they cannot remarry. Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:35

“He robbed one of five people.” Rebbi Assi said, there is a Mishnah which follows Rebbi Aqiba against Rebbi Tarphon. As we have stated there: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know who of you it was; I received a deposit of a mina from the father of one of you but I do not know who of you it was; he gives to each of them a mina because he confessed himself.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is everybody’s opinion. One says, to be clean before Heaven. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Here, if witnesses know; there, if no witnesses know. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Here if they are silent; there if they are talking. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore, he should have appointed an officer of the court and hand it over to him. Rebbi Joḥanan seems to say, a court which determined that one was a robber, not a court which determined that one was robbed. Rav said, a court which determined that one was robbed, not a court which determined that one was a robber. The strength of Rav is from the following, that Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, a court which determined that one was robbed, not a court which determined that one was a robber. Otherwise he should have kept silent. Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not confessed. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not have sworn. Rebbi Yudan said, even following those who say that there is no difference between keeping silent and talking in matters of a robbery, for a deposit they agree that he who keeps silent is rewarded and he who talks loses. He who keeps silent is rewarded from the following: “Two people deposited with the same person, one a mina and one 200 [tetradrachmas]. This one says, the 200 belong to me, and that one says, the 200 belong to me. He gives each one a mina and the rest shall lie with him until Elijah comes.” He who talks loses, from this: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know which one of you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:28

Rebbi Zevadiah, the son-in-law of Rebbi Levi, reported the following happening. Rebbi Meïr used to preach in the synagogue of Ḥamata every Friday evening. There was a woman who used to hear him. Once he extended his sermon. She went and wanted to come to her house but found the light had gone out. Her husband asked her, where have you been? She said to him, to hear the preacher’s voice. He said to her, so and so, that this woman will not enter here into her house unless she went and spat into the preacher’s face. Rebbi Meïr saw this in the holy spirit and faked pain in his eyes. He said, any woman who knows charms for the eye should come and do the charm. Her neighbors said to her, this answers your needs. Go to your house, represent yourself as a sorceress and spit in his eye. She came to him; he asked her, do you know to make a charm for the eye? In her fear of him, she said no. He said to her, if you spit into it seven times, he will feel better. After she had spat, he said to her: Go, and tell your husband, you said to me once, but she spat seven times! His students said to him, so does one denigrate the Torah? If you had ordered about him, would we not have brought him, whipped him on the footstool, and make him agree to make up with his wife? He said to them, the honor of Meïr should not be greater than that of his Maker. Since the verse says that the Holy Name, written in holiness, should be erased by the water in order to make peace between husband and wife, the honor of Meïr not so much more?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:15

If he used it to sprinkle on the sufferer from skin disease, is it acceptable to use it for another sufferer from skin disease? If somebody said it is acceptable, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar will agree with him. But with him who said, it is disqualified, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar will disagree. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, it was my Sabbath and I followed Rebbi Tarphon to his house. He said to me, Jehudah, my son, give me my sandals. I gave them to him. He reached with his hand to the window and gave me a stick from there. He said to me, Jehudah, my son, with this one I cleansed three sufferers from skin disease and I taught with it seven practices. That it is yabrut, on its head is a leaf, it is one cubit long, its width is about one fourth that of a bed’s leg (split one into two and two into four), and one sprinkles and repeats and does it a third time, and one purifies when there is a Temple and when there is no Temple, and one purifies in the countryside.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:22

HALAKHAH: “Then he starts writing the scroll,” etc. Rebbi Crispus said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, he administers the oath and then he writes; the other one said, he writes and then he administers the oath. They wanted to say that he who says, he administers the oath and then he writes, follows what is written in the verse but he who says, he writes and then he administers the oath, to join the oath to the drinking. There are Tannaїm who state: The conditions and the oaths impede; there are Tannaїm who state: The oaths impede, the conditions do not impede. They wanted to say that he who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, holds that “law” and “teaching” impedes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, does not agree. Certainly he does agree but they are not [written] in order. It turns out that this disagreement is like the previous disagreement. He who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, agrees with him who says, he administers the oath and then he writes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, agrees with him who says, he writes and then he administers the oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:22

HALAKHAH: “Then he starts writing the scroll,” etc. Rebbi Crispus said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, he administers the oath and then he writes; the other one said, he writes and then he administers the oath. They wanted to say that he who says, he administers the oath and then he writes, follows what is written in the verse but he who says, he writes and then he administers the oath, to join the oath to the drinking. There are Tannaїm who state: The conditions and the oaths impede; there are Tannaїm who state: The oaths impede, the conditions do not impede. They wanted to say that he who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, holds that “law” and “teaching” impedes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, does not agree. Certainly he does agree but they are not [written] in order. It turns out that this disagreement is like the previous disagreement. He who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, agrees with him who says, he administers the oath and then he writes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, agrees with him who says, he writes and then he administers the oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:7

HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:12

“If she said ‘I shall not drink’ after the scroll was erased, one makes her gargle and forces her to drink against her will.” How many letters have to be erased? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: The House of Shammai say, one; the House of Hillel say, two. Rebbi Hilai said, the reason of the House of Hillel: That he could have written Yah. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: But why does one make her drink? If it is to check her out, she already is completely checked out! But Rebbi Aqiba must hold that the one who says “I shall not drink” is as the one who says “I am impure for you”. But does Rebbi Aqiba not agree that “one makes her gargle until her face turned yellow and forces her to drink against her will”? He does, if she started to drink.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:16

“An offering of remembrance,” a general statement; “referring to sin”, a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a specific one, the general does not mean more than the specific. If you say so, do you not find the argument disadvantaged? If punishment, which is given out sparingly, can refer, then reward, which is given out in abundance, should do so much more! But, “an offering of remembrance,” if she has merit, “referring to sin”, if she has no merit. It was stated: Rebbi Tarphon said, all statements of “remembrance” in the Torah have a good meaning except this one which is for punishment. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: If it only said, “referring to sin”, and then was silent, I would agree with your statement. But since it says “an offering of remembrance,” this must be for a good [purpose].

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:12

The Sages agree with Rebbi Eleazar that if he had [another] wife and children, she drinks and collects her ketubah. If he had [another] wife and children but they died between the declaration of jealousy and her secret rendez-vous, she already was eligible to drink. If he did not have [another] wife and children but they died between the declaration of jealousy and her secret rendez-vous, she already was barred from drinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:39

HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:42

HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:45

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:4

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:10

“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:22

Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:50

“In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what he saw in his minority,” etc. They are only trustworthy as adults about what they saw as minors; therefore, not as minors! There, we have stated: “A woman or a minor are trustworthy when they said, from there a swarm of bees left. He then can enter another’s field and take his swarm.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said this only about a swarm of bees because taking it is not robbery by biblical standards. Rav Oshaiah stated, only if it is swarming. But not if it clings to a branch. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Is that not reasonable only when it happens, but not after some time? He said to him, I agree. And we have stated: When is this said? When they testified to what they said. But if they left and came back, I am saying that they speak out of fear or were seduced.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:12

Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:54

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:56

HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:7

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:1

MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:1

MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:5

MISHNAH: If she inherited property after she was definitively married, both agree that if she sold or gave away the husband retrieves from the hand of the buyers. [If she interited] before she was definitively married and [sold] after she was definitively married, Rabban Gamliel said if she sold or gave away it is valid. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, they said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, did he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties], and you want to burden us with the old ones?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:6

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:19

MISHNAH: If a woman waiting for her levir inherited property, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that if she sells or gives away it is valid. If she died, what shall be done with her ketubah and the properties which enter and leave with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s and the father’s heirs shall split it. But the House of Hillel say, the properties are in the hands of the holders; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and the properties which enter and leave with her in the hands of the father’s heirs.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:4

Ben Azay says, the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar. But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas that both parties split evenly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:16

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:25

HALAKHAH: “If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law,” etc. The Mishnah [deals with the case] that he obligated himself in her presence. But if he obligated himself not in her presence, even the rabbis will agree.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:35

HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:31

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says sacrifice, elevation offering, or flour offering,” etc. Everybody agrees this sacrifice is permitted, like a sacrifice is forbidden. Where do they disagree? Sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah says, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘this sacrifice’ and is permitted; but the rabbis say, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘like a sacrifice’ and is forbidden. Rebbi Jehudah said to them: Do you not agree that one who said “oath” is like one who said “this oath” and is forbidden? And here he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘this sacrifice’ and is permitted! But the rabbis throw restrictions on it. One who said “oath” is like one who said “this oath” and is forbidden. But here, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘like a sacrifice’ and is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:28

MISHNAH: One who makes a vow away from those who keep the Sabbath is forbidden Jews and Samaritans, from garlic eaters is forbidden Jews and Samaritans, from those who make pilgrimage to Jerusalem is forbidden Jews but permitted Samaritans. A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Noah; he is permitted Jews and forbidden Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Abraham; he is forbidden Jews and permitted Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from Jews; he buys higher and sells lower. That Jews shall not enjoy from me; he buys lower and sells higher, if they agree. That I shall not enjoy from them nor they from me; he should deal with Gentiles.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:2

HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:23

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to eat dates,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? The name of its descendant is called over it. It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:23

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to eat dates,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? The name of its descendant is called over it. It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:23

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to eat dates,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? The name of its descendant is called over it. It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:23

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to eat dates,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? The name of its descendant is called over it. It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:31

Six things did Ezekiah, the king of Judea, do. With three they agreed, with three they did not agree. He dragged his father’s bones and they agreed. He smashed the bronze snake and they agreed. He hid the table of medicines and they agreed. With three they disagreed. He closed the upper Giḥon spring and they disagreed. He cut down the Temple doors and they disagreed. He intercalated Nisan in Nisan and they disagreed.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:1

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, one opens for a man by the honor of his father and mother, but the Sages forbid it. Rebbi Ṣadoq said, before one opens by the honor of his father and mother one should open by the honor of the Omnipresent; then there are no vows. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that if was a matter between a man and his father and mother, that one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:13

MISHNAH: Rebbi Meïr says, there are things like changed circumstances which are not really changed circumstances, and the Sagesagree with him. How is this? He said, a qônām that I shall not marry this woman for her father is evil, and they told him that he died or that he repented; a qônām that I shall not enter this house because it has a bad dog inside, or a snake; they said to him the dog died, the snake was killed; these there are things like changed circumstances which are not changed circumstances, and the Sages agree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:18

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:20

HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:20

HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:20

HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:14

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:34

What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? “His offering to the Eternal for his vow”, that (his sacrifice precede his vow) but not (that his vow precede his sacrifice). They wanted to say that Rebbi Jehudah would agree with Rebbi Yose. It was found said that neither of them agrees with the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:4

There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:4

There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:13

MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:13

MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.