agree
737 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
A Cohen and a Levite, the Levite shall defile himself. A Levite and an Israel, the Israel shall defile himself. No, is not the Levite like the Israel? Rebbi Abin said, it was taught in the time of the platform. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Rebbi Eliezer agrees with the Sages that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Think of it, if his father sanctified him from birth. The one is from the Torah, the other is not from the Torah. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Joseph: Rebbi Eliezer parallels the House of Shammai. As the House of Shammai say, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence, so Rebbi Eliezer says, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence. A nazir for 30 days and a nazir for 100, the nazir for 30 days shall defile himself. A nazir for 100 days and a nazir forever, the nazir for 100 days shall defile himself. A nazir forever, and a nazir of neziriot, some Tannaïm state, the nazir forever shall defile himself; but some Tannaïm state, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself. He who says, the nazir forever shall defile himself but not the nazir of neziriot, since he shaves more frequently. He who says, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself but not the nazir forever, since he brings more sacrifices. If he switched, it should be as Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” Here it is the same.
Rebbi Simeon said: On the next day, he brings his reparation sacrifice and a log of oil with it and says: If I was impure, this is my obligatory offering, otherwise it is my doubtful offering. He slaughters in the North, it needs giving on the thumbs, and it is eaten by male Cohanim at any place during the day and the following night until midnight. But the Sages did [not] agree with Rebbi Simeon because he causes sacrifices to become invalid.
There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.
If his master forced him in one respect, did he force him in all respects? We came to the disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meїr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.” Where do we hold? If he told him, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence, even Rebbi Meїr will agree. If he told him, drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence, even Rebbi Yose will agree. But we hold in the case that he tells him: “drink!” Rebbi Meїr says, [it means] drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence. Rebbi Yose says, [it is] as if he said, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence.
If his master forced him in one respect, did he force him in all respects? We came to the disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meїr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.” Where do we hold? If he told him, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence, even Rebbi Meїr will agree. If he told him, drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence, even Rebbi Yose will agree. But we hold in the case that he tells him: “drink!” Rebbi Meїr says, [it means] drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence. Rebbi Yose says, [it is] as if he said, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence.
There, we have stated: “If a vineyard is planted with less that four cubits of space, Rebbi Simeon says that it is no vineyard. But the Sages say that it is a vineyard and one disregards the plants in the middle as if nonexistent.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they disagree here, they disagree about a graveyard. Rebbi Jonah said, one cannot compare these. There, they form a graveyard; here, they do not form a graveyard. Rebbi Yose said, one cannot compare these. There, if they were spaced apart and one moved them closer together, that is the disagreement. If they were close and one moved them apart, everybody would agree. But here, what is their disagreement? When one found them close together. Rebbi Simeon said, a landslide fell on them and compressed them. But the Sages say, were they spaced apart and somebody brought them close together?”
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.
“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.
“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.
“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.
“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.
Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.
Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
The Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi: “This is your bill of divorce after the holiday.” He said to him, all of 30 days after the holiday are called “after the holiday”. Rebbi Bivon bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “This is your bill of divorce on Passover eve”? Even a person who says that all of 30 days after the holiday are called “after the holiday” will agree that 30 days before Passover are not like “after Passover”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If somebody said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine at the end of the Sabbath? He said to him, after the end of the Sabbath he is forbidden, Sabbath eve he is permitted, the days in between are problematic. And so it is here, after the end of the Sabbath it is a bill of divorce, Sabbath eve it is no bill of divorce, but the days in between are problematic.
HALAKHAH: “If the scribe wrote,” etc. Where do we hold? If he made a mistake, even Rebbi Eleazar agrees. If he made no error, even the rabbis agree. But we must hold that it was unexplained. Rebbi Eleazar suspects that possibly he made no mistake; the rabbis suspect that possibly he did make a mistake.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
“What is a positive commandment that is activated by time? For example sukkah, and shofar, and lulab, and tefillin. What is a positive commandment that is not activated by time? For example lost articles, sending away the [mother from the] nest, railing, and ẓiẓit. Rebbi Simeon exempts women from ẓiẓit because it is a positive commandment activated by time.” Rebbi Simeon said to them: Do you not agree with me that it is a positive commandment activated by time? Because a nightgown is exempt from ẓiẓit. Rebbi Hila said: The reason of the rebbis is that, if a garment is designated both for daytime and for night, it needs ẓiẓit.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married. After delivery, if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married. If one denar was bad, she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.] It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.
“She is preliminarily married,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
The following is the way of contracting: One witness for the groom and one witness for the bride; these two together select a third in order to have two witnesses for each side. That is, if not both of them agree. But if both of them agree, both may invalidate the preliminary marriage. As, e. g., “if he said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed his story and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption.” If there was one witness for the groom, one witness for the bride, and the groom signed personally: Rebbi Abbahu said, it is a symphōn, Rebbi Abba said, it is preliminary marriage, for I am saying that he did not really intend a symphōn but thought that it would permit her sister to him.
The following is the way of contracting: One witness for the groom and one witness for the bride; these two together select a third in order to have two witnesses for each side. That is, if not both of them agree. But if both of them agree, both may invalidate the preliminary marriage. As, e. g., “if he said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed his story and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption.” If there was one witness for the groom, one witness for the bride, and the groom signed personally: Rebbi Abbahu said, it is a symphōn, Rebbi Abba said, it is preliminary marriage, for I am saying that he did not really intend a symphōn but thought that it would permit her sister to him.
A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.
MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me on condition that I speak for you to the government, or work for you as a worker, she is preliminarily married if he did speak for her to the government or did work for her as a worker; otherwise she is not preliminarily married. On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If the father died, she is preliminarily married; if the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree.
MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me on condition that I speak for you to the government, or work for you as a worker, she is preliminarily married if he did speak for her to the government or did work for her as a worker; otherwise she is not preliminarily married. On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If the father died, she is preliminarily married; if the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.
Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable; they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female she would be blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if it was a female, she would be blemished for the priesthood.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said: There, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Pappus sent and asked Rebbi Yose about two cases from Alexandria, one involving an unmarried woman, the other a married woman. About the married woman, he wrote him: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” About the unmarried woman he wrote, be inventive, for your are not forewarned about the holy daughters of Israel. He said to Rebbi Mana, take and sign; he signed. He said to Rebbi Berekhiah, take and sign, but he did not agree. After they ended the session Rebbi Mana was standing with Rebbi Berekhiah and asked him, why did you not sign? He answered, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say that there, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman? He said, praised be the Merciful that I had not heard this doctrine, for if I had heard this doctrine I would not have signed and people would have said that the student disagrees with his teacher. Mar Uqban said, here, you say that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies from an unmarried woman, but about a married woman, nothing was said. The next morning he came and wanted to sign. He said to him, there is no space.
MISHNAH: If somebody empowered his agent to contract preliminary marriage for his daughter and then went himself and contracted for her, ifhe was first, his preliminary marriage is valid, but if his agent was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively. Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself, if she was first, her preliminary marriage is valid, but if her agent’s was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively.
MISHNAH: If somebody empowered his agent to contract preliminary marriage for his daughter and then went himself and contracted for her, ifhe was first, his preliminary marriage is valid, but if his agent was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively. Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself, if she was first, her preliminary marriage is valid, but if her agent’s was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively.
HALAKHAH: “One man should not be alone with two women,” etc. Rebbi Abun said, when has this been said? With decent men. But with profligates she should not be alone even with a hundred men. It was stated: A one day old child who died is for his father, his mother, and all his relatives like one fully grown. Not only if he died when one day old but even if he was alive when his head and most of his body were born. He is carried out at the bosom and buried by one woman and two men; Abba Shaul says even one man and two women. It is obvious that Rebbi Simeon will agree with Abba Shaul but Abba Shaul does not need to agree with Rebbi Simeon since there is no sexual desire in the cemetery.
HALAKHAH: “One man should not be alone with two women,” etc. Rebbi Abun said, when has this been said? With decent men. But with profligates she should not be alone even with a hundred men. It was stated: A one day old child who died is for his father, his mother, and all his relatives like one fully grown. Not only if he died when one day old but even if he was alive when his head and most of his body were born. He is carried out at the bosom and buried by one woman and two men; Abba Shaul says even one man and two women. It is obvious that Rebbi Simeon will agree with Abba Shaul but Abba Shaul does not need to agree with Rebbi Simeon since there is no sexual desire in the cemetery.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones each a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mani said, I asked this before Rebbi Yudan. He said to me: does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said this before Rebbi Yose, who answered him, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.
If a bull of orphans and guardians went out and did damage, what is the rule? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the damage is paid] from the orphan’s property. For if you say from the guardians’, nobody ever will agree to become a guardian. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the guardians’. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina follows Abba Shaul and Rebbi Joḥanan the rabbis, as it was stated there: “A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear; if he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear,” for the court will check him out. “Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around,” a guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall not be made to swear; it would be as if he would take a pledge from him. If he was appointed by the court he shall be made to swear, since a person will do much to be called trustworthy.
HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.
HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.
MISHNAH: He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves which contains implements, Rebbi Jehudah says, he has to pay everything contained in it but the Sages say, he pays only for a stack of wheat sheaves or a stack of barley sheaves. If a goat was tied to it, and a slave was nearby, and they were burned, he is liable. If a slave was tied to it, and a goat was nearby, and they were burned, he is not liable. But the Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that one who sets fire to a building has to pay everything contained in it since people regularly store things in houses.
HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.
HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.
If he robbed a stole and gave it to another person. Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya, one takes away from the first one but not from the second. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai said, one takes away even from the second. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, even Rebbi Ḥiyya will agree with this since Rebbi Ḥiyya said, one takes away even from the second.
MISHNAH: If two persons were riding on an animal or one was riding and one was walking, each of them says “it wholly belongs to me”, each of them has to swear that he owns no less than half of it and they shall divide it evenly. If they agree or if they have witnesses, they divide without an oath.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had a fracture, the donkey’s owner had to bring proof that his donkey was well at the moment he took the cow. Anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree, I do not know anything about civil law. There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she was in her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose to sharpen wits. They quoted the statement and he told them, look at the next statement: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove? But you are saying that the husband has to prove; here also, the owner has to prove.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had a fracture, the donkey’s owner had to bring proof that his donkey was well at the moment he took the cow. Anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree, I do not know anything about civil law. There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she was in her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose to sharpen wits. They quoted the statement and he told them, look at the next statement: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove? But you are saying that the husband has to prove; here also, the owner has to prove.
(Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged them.) The donkey’s owner took the cow; he did not acquire it. Would the donkey be acquired? Rebbi Abba said, he acquired. Rebby Yasa said, he did not acquire. Rebbi Mana said, there is a situation in which Rebbi Yose would agree: A man said to another, I want to sell my cow. He asked him, for how much? He answered, for eight denars. He went and gave him a draft on his banker. In the morning he went and found him open for business. He asked him, what are you doing here? He answered, I want to collect the denars in the draft I have on you. He asked him, what do you want to buy with them? He answered, a donkey. He told him, your donkey is with me. If either of them took possession, the other did not acquire but each animal separately has to be taken in possession.
MISHNAH: Just as there is cheating in trade so there is cheating by words. One should not say to another: how much for this object, if he is not interested in buying. If somebody was a repentant sinner, one should not say to him: remember your earlier deeds. If somebody was the son of a proselyte, one may not say to him: remember the deeds of your forefathers, for it is written: “A sojourner you may neither cheat nor oppress, for you were sojourners in the Land of Egypt.” One does not mix produce, not even new with new; no need to say new with old. In truth they permitted to mix strong wine with weak since it improves it. One does not mix wine lees with wine but one delivers the lees with the wine. If water became mixed with somebody’s wine, he should not sell it in the store unless he declares it, and not to a trader for that one would only use it to trick people; at a place where they usually put water into the wine they may do so. The trader may buy from five threshing floors and put into one chest, wine from five wine presses and put into one barrel, on condition that he not intend to mix. Rebbi Jehudah says, a store owner should not distribute roasted kernels and nuts to children because he induces them to come to him, but the Sages permit. He should not reduce the price, but the Sages say, may he be remembered as a benefactor. He should not clean the groats following Abba Shaul, but the Sages permit it. However, they agree that he may not clean the upper layer of the chest since that gives a dishonest impression. One may not put makeup on humans, animals, or vessels.
HALAKHAH: “One does not contract for produce,” etc. May one contract based on Saracens’ rates? Rebbi Joḥanan says, one may contract; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not contract. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Would it not be reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about rates of Saracens of Sepphoris, since that is uninterrupted? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, I am wondering about what the rabbis disagree? Whether contracting for produce, or contracting for money, or a loan on produce? Rebbi Jeremiah said, they disagree about a loan, but about (a hostelry) [a contract] everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, they disagree about a contract, but about a loan everybody agrees that it is permitted. In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, one contracts for cattle feed. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, also on honeycombs. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in all villages near Tiberias one contracts once the rate was established at Tiberias.
Abba bar Zamina gave a denar to the food merchant and took from him at the cheapest rate of the entire year. Rav did not agree. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder had flax. The donkey drivers wanted to buy from him. He told them, it is not my intention to sell this before Purim. They said to him, sell it to us now at the price which you would sell it for at Purim. He went to ask Rebbi, who told him, it is forbidden. He went out, formulated this in a baraita, and stated the following: “If one was owing money and the other wanted to take from him on the threshing floor, when he told him, credit it to my account by the market rate and I shall provide you all twelve months; this is forbidden for it is not as if the assarion came to his hand.” Rav said, my uncle Rebbi Ḥiyya will agree that if they paid him and he immediately acquired, then it is permitted. If he paid beforehand and acquired afterwards, it is permitted; if he acquired earlier and paid afterwards, it is forbidden.
Abba bar Zamina gave a denar to the food merchant and took from him at the cheapest rate of the entire year. Rav did not agree. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder had flax. The donkey drivers wanted to buy from him. He told them, it is not my intention to sell this before Purim. They said to him, sell it to us now at the price which you would sell it for at Purim. He went to ask Rebbi, who told him, it is forbidden. He went out, formulated this in a baraita, and stated the following: “If one was owing money and the other wanted to take from him on the threshing floor, when he told him, credit it to my account by the market rate and I shall provide you all twelve months; this is forbidden for it is not as if the assarion came to his hand.” Rav said, my uncle Rebbi Ḥiyya will agree that if they paid him and he immediately acquired, then it is permitted. If he paid beforehand and acquired afterwards, it is permitted; if he acquired earlier and paid afterwards, it is forbidden.
“Rebbi Yose says, the lower one contributes the roofing and the upper one the roof covering,” etc. Rebbi Justus in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish:: The bottom dweller contributes the logs and the planks; the dweller on the upper floor contributes the roof covering. Which kind of roof covering? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: heavy roof covering. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: medium roof covering, since they only spoke about rinsing cups. But if he wanted to wash clothing, also Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar will agree that the roof covering has to be heavy. Rebbi Ḥanina instructed those of Sepphoris that both of them should contribute the logs and the plates since they expect to bring up there their wine and their produce.
HALAKHAH: “Condominium owners who want to make a separation,” etc. As we have stated there: “One does not subdivide a courtyard unless each party has four cubits.” They said, there if the two parties do not agree. But here if both parties agree. And you may even say, here if the two parties do not agree. If this one wishes, one forces the other; if the other one wishes, one forces this one. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one forces for courtyards; one does not force for roofs. Rebbi Nasa wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one forces. Rebbi Joḥanan wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof one forces. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one does not force.
HALAKHAH: “Condominium owners who want to make a separation,” etc. As we have stated there: “One does not subdivide a courtyard unless each party has four cubits.” They said, there if the two parties do not agree. But here if both parties agree. And you may even say, here if the two parties do not agree. If this one wishes, one forces the other; if the other one wishes, one forces this one. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one forces for courtyards; one does not force for roofs. Rebbi Nasa wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one forces. Rebbi Joḥanan wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof one forces. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one does not force.
HALAKHAH: “Condominium owners who want to make a separation,” etc. As we have stated there: “One does not subdivide a courtyard unless each party has four cubits.” They said, there if the two parties do not agree. But here if both parties agree. And you may even say, here if the two parties do not agree. If this one wishes, one forces the other; if the other one wishes, one forces this one. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one forces for courtyards; one does not force for roofs. Rebbi Nasa wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one forces. Rebbi Joḥanan wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof one forces. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one does not force.
MISHNAH: One does not divide the courtyard unless there be four cubits for each one, nor the field unless there be nine qab for each one; Rebbi Jehudah says, nine half qabbim for each one. Not the vegetable garden unless there be half a qab for each one; Rebbi Aqiba says, the area of a quarter [qab]. Not the dining hall, nor the storage room, nor the dovecote, nor the stole, nor the bathhouse, nor the olive press unless there is one for each of them. This is the principle: Anything which is divided and retains its name one divides, otherwise one does not divide. When is that? If the two of them do not agree. However, if both of them want it, they may divide even if it is less. But Holy Scripture they should not divide even if both of them want it.
Rav said, the main confirmation of a claim of possession is storing the produce. Does Rav not agree about weeding and turning the soil? Rav agrees about weeding and turning the soil. What does it mean that Rav said, the main indication of a claim of possession is storing the produce? That if they saw him ploughing, and harvesting, and binding into sheaves, and threshing, and grading, but did not see him storing the produce, there is no claim of possession without storing the produce.
MISHNAH: Somebody sent his son to a grocer who measured him oil for an assarius and he gave him the assarius; if he broke the flask and lost the assarius, the grocer is liable. Rebbi Jehudah holds him not liable since for that he sent him. The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that if the flask was in the child’s hand and the grocer measured into the flask, the grocer is not liable. The wolesaler cleans his measuring vessels once every thirty days, the householder every twelve months. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it is the other way around. The retail grocer cleans his measuring vessels twice a week, wipes his weights clean once a week, and cleans his scales after each weighing. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when has this been said? For fluids, but for dry matter it is not necessary; he has to let [the scales] bend down a handbreadth. If he weighed strictly by eyesight he has to give him surplus, one tenth for fluids and one twentieth for dry products. At a place where one is used to small measures he should not use large ones, to large measures he should not use small ones, to level one must not heap, to heap one must not level.
HALAKHAH: “Some inherit and bequeath,” etc. It is written: “If a man die without a son, you shall transfer his estate to his daughter.” Rebbi Ismael stated: The verse distinguished this inheritance from all other inheritances mentioned in the Torah, since for all of them it is written “you shall give,” but here is written: “you shall transfer.” It is an extension of the law that the daughter shall inherit. The Gentile Sages say, son and daughter are equal, for they explain “if he have no son;” therefore, if he has one both are equal. One objected, is it not written “if he have no daughter;” therefore, if he has one are both equal? And you agree, if there is no child, here also, if there is no son. The Sadducees say, the son’s daughter and the daughter are equal, for they explain: Since my son’s daughter who comes by force of her father does inherit from me, would it not be logical that my daughter who comes by force of myself should inherit from me? One told them, no. If you mention the son’s daughter who only inherits by the power of the brothers, what could you say about the daughter who only inherits by the power of the old man? The verse says, “any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes.” How is it possible for a daughter to inherit from two tribes? But explain it if her father was from one tribe and her mother from another.
They preferred an old man to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish for intercalation but had to remove him by the other door. He said, this is their reward. Did he not hear what Rebbi Crispus said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It happened that the year was intercalated by three cow hands. One said, in Adar, early and late grain sprout together. One said, in Adar the ox will die naked and try to strip off his hide under the fig tree. One said, if in Adar the East wind blows, open your jaws and go towards it. And we see that this year nothing of these applies. They intercalated the year on their word. Rebbi Ḥelbo said, because the Court agreed with them. Rebbi Zeˋira said, but they all have to agree to the same reason. But since they all agree with one another it was that they all agreed as to the reason.
They preferred an old man to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish for intercalation but had to remove him by the other door. He said, this is their reward. Did he not hear what Rebbi Crispus said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It happened that the year was intercalated by three cow hands. One said, in Adar, early and late grain sprout together. One said, in Adar the ox will die naked and try to strip off his hide under the fig tree. One said, if in Adar the East wind blows, open your jaws and go towards it. And we see that this year nothing of these applies. They intercalated the year on their word. Rebbi Ḥelbo said, because the Court agreed with them. Rebbi Zeˋira said, but they all have to agree to the same reason. But since they all agree with one another it was that they all agreed as to the reason.
Six things did Hezekiah do; with three they agreed, with three they did not agree. He dragged his father’s bones on a bier of ropes, he smashed the bronze snake, and he hid the table of medicines; they agreed. He closed the upper Giḥon spring, and he cut down the Temple doors, and he intercalated Nisan in Nisan; they disagreed.
It was stated: From earlier times one was writing documents of repudiation: Before X and Y did Z daughter of U repudiate V son of W, by coming before us: I do not like him, I do not want to stay with him, I do not agree to be married to him.
Similarly. the Eternal said to Moses, assemble for Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel. Moses said, if I am taking six per tribe, there will be 72, ten of six each and two of five, which tribe will agree to be discriminated against? What did he do? He took 70 tickets and wrote on them “Elder”, two he left blank, and put them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Elder” he said, from Heaven they appointed you. To anybody who drew a blank slip he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven; Rebbi Jehudah. But Rebbi Nehemiah the Tanna objected to the colleagues: If you had given me the possibility of an Elder, it would have come up for me. But the following is what he did. He took 72 tickets and wrote on them “Elder” and two blank ones and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Elder” he said, from Heaven they appointed you. The anybody who drew a blank slip he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven. The Tanna objected to the colleagues: Think of it, if all came up as “Elder”? They told him, it was miraculous and they came up alternatingly. Rebbi Samuel said, I objected before Rebbi Abbahu: in the opinion of the second Tanna, it was a miracle. In the opinion of the first Tanna, it was not a miracle. He told him, it was a miracle in any case since they came up alternatingly.
HALAKHAH: “I am accepting my father,” etc. If somebody said, I am accepting your father, if he accepted in the presence of two others, he may retract; in the presence of three, he may not retract. Samuel said, as long as he did not take from one and give to the other; but if he took from one and gave to the other, he may retract. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say even if he took from one and gave to the other, he may retract. “If he hit him with a mace that he should agree; if he accepted he may renege.”
Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that statement in Sanhedrin Rebbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. So said Rebbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “This is the principle: Any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified for.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rebbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Huna said: It follows Rebbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? When he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is disqualified only from that particular testimony. It turns out that Rebbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rebbi Meïr Rebbi Eliezer.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
“One who has sexual relations with a preliminarily married maiden.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: This is Rebbi Meïr’s. But for the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “Lad” is written defectively in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written a young woman; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, a lad is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned? What do the rabbis do with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it that he came to her as a male. Rebbi Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law of him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law of him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading an adolescent, not an adult. Read an adolescent, not a minor! Do you not agree with me that she has the right to a fine? He answered, because he mistreated her, that includes a minor for a fine. Read because he mistreated her, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Rebbi Jacob bar Abba won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abun in the name of (Rebbi) Samuel. Why? He understood it from the following: The man who had lain with her alone shall die. Do we not know that the girl has not committed a capital crime? Why does the verse say, do not do anything to the girl; the girl has not committed a capital crime? That includes him who has sexual relations with a [preliminarily married] underage girl; he is stoned and she is free.
Example. Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Joshua, and Rebbi Aqiba went to bathe at the public baths of Tiberias. A Minean saw them, said what he said, and the cupola caught them. Rebbi Eliezer said to Rebbi Joshua: Joshua ben Ḥanania, look what you can do. When this Minean was leaving, Rebbi Joshua said what he said and the door trapped him. Anybody who entered hit him with his fist, anybody leaving hit him when forcing the door open. He told them, undo what you did; they told him, you undo, then we shall undo. They mutually undid. When they left, Rebbi Joshua said to this Minean, is that all you are wise to? He answered, let us go down to the sea. When they had descended to the sea, this Minean said what he said and the sea was split. He told them, is that not what your teacher Moses did to the sea? They answered, do you not agree that our teacher Moses walked through it? He said to them, yes. They told him, enter it. He entered it. Rebbi Joshua commanded the prince of the sea who swallowed him.
It is written The rage of the Eternal was kindled against Israel. The Eternal said to Moses: Take all the heads of the people and hang them for the Eternal before the sun. What he told him was, install their heads as judges over them and let them execute the sinners at daytime. That is what is written: Moses told the judges of Israel: each one should kill his men who cling to the Baˋal Peˋor. How many were the judges of Israel? 78’600. Heads of thousands, 600. Heads of hundreds, 6'000. Heads of fifties, 12’000. heads of tens, 60’000. It turns out that the judges of Israel were 78’600. He told them, each of you should execute two. It turns out that the number of the killed was 157’200. Behold, a man from the Children of Israel came and introduced to his brothers the Midianite woman, to the eyes of Moses. What means to the eyes of Moses? Like a man who says, that is in your eyes, Moses. He told him, is not Ẓippora a Midianite, and are not her hooves split? This one is pure, that one is impure? There, Phineas was present. He said, is there nobody who would kill him or be killed? Where are the lions? A lion whelp is Jehudah; Dan is a lion whelp; Benjamin a rapacious wolf. When Phineas saw that nobody of Israel did anything, he immediately rose from his court, took the spear in his hand, and put its iron under his belt. He was leaning on its wood until he arrived at his door. When he arrived at his door, they asked him, where to, Phineas? He said to them, do you not agree that everywhere the tribe of Levi is with the tribe of Simeon? They said, let him, maybe the Pharisees permitted the matter. When he entered, the Holy One, praise to Him, performed six wonders for him. The first miracle: usually they would separate, but the angel glued the one to the other. The second miracle: He directed the spear into her belly to that his penis should be seen inside her belly because of the fault-finders, lest they say that he muscled himself in with them and satisfied himself. The third miracle: the angel closed their mouths, so they could not cry. The fourth miracle: they did not slip from the weapon but stayed in place. The fifth miracle: The angel lifted the lintel so that both of them were carried out between his shoulders. The sixth miracle: When the plague started to destroy the people, what did he do? He threw them on the ground and prayed. That is what is written: Phineas stood and prayed; the plague was arrested.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).