700 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:38

HALAKHAH: For what reason were the times of wood by the priests and the people to be counted? Only that at the time when Israel returned from the Diaspora and did not find wood in the chamber, those came forward and volunteered wood from their own and donated it to the public. It was used to offer public sacrifices. The prophets among them stipulated that even if the chamber was full of wood [they would bring of their own]. If those came and offered and volunteered wood from their own, that the sacrifice should only be brought first from theirs. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering. It was stated, a woman who made a coat for her son has to surrender it to the public. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “Those days are observed at the time of sacrifices and not at the time of sacrifices; Rebbi Yose says, they are observed only at the time of sacrifices.” Also from the following: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, we were of the descendants of Senaah ben Benjamin. When the Ninth of Av fell on a Sabbath, we postponed it to the end of the Sabbath and they were fasting but not completing.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:38

HALAKHAH: For what reason were the times of wood by the priests and the people to be counted? Only that at the time when Israel returned from the Diaspora and did not find wood in the chamber, those came forward and volunteered wood from their own and donated it to the public. It was used to offer public sacrifices. The prophets among them stipulated that even if the chamber was full of wood [they would bring of their own]. If those came and offered and volunteered wood from their own, that the sacrifice should only be brought first from theirs. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering. It was stated, a woman who made a coat for her son has to surrender it to the public. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “Those days are observed at the time of sacrifices and not at the time of sacrifices; Rebbi Yose says, they are observed only at the time of sacrifices.” Also from the following: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, we were of the descendants of Senaah ben Benjamin. When the Ninth of Av fell on a Sabbath, we postponed it to the end of the Sabbath and they were fasting but not completing.”

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:24

“But for the times of offering of wood by the priests.” For what reason were the times of wood by the priests and the people to be counted? Only that at the time when Israel returned from the Diaspora and did not find wood in the chamber, those came forward and volunteered wood from their own and donated it to the public. It was used to offer public sacrifices. The prophets among them stipulated for them that even if the chamber was full of wood, if those came and offered and volunteered wood from their own, that the sacrifice should only be brought first from theirs. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering. It was stated, a woman who made a coat for her son has to surrender it to the public. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering.. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “Those days are observed at the time of sacrifices and not at the time of sacrifices; Rebbi Yose says, they are observed only at the time of sacrifices.” Also from the following: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Sadoq said, we were of the descendants of Senaah ben Benjamin. When the Ninth of Av fell on a Sabbath, we postponed it to the end of the Sabbath and we were fasting but not completing.”

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:24

“But for the times of offering of wood by the priests.” For what reason were the times of wood by the priests and the people to be counted? Only that at the time when Israel returned from the Diaspora and did not find wood in the chamber, those came forward and volunteered wood from their own and donated it to the public. It was used to offer public sacrifices. The prophets among them stipulated for them that even if the chamber was full of wood, if those came and offered and volunteered wood from their own, that the sacrifice should only be brought first from theirs. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering. It was stated, a woman who made a coat for her son has to surrender it to the public. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, also he may volunteer as unpaid trustee. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila, it is the opinion of everybody. Where do they disagree? About the body of the offering. But for enablers of the offering everybody agrees that a private offering can be turned into public offering.. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “Those days are observed at the time of sacrifices and not at the time of sacrifices; Rebbi Yose says, they are observed only at the time of sacrifices.” Also from the following: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Sadoq said, we were of the descendants of Senaah ben Benjamin. When the Ninth of Av fell on a Sabbath, we postponed it to the end of the Sabbath and we were fasting but not completing.”

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:55

If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:9

“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:10

“The hermaphrodite.” All your males, to exclude the hermaphrodite. There, we have stated: “One does not desecrate the Sabbath for a case of doubt {or} for a hermaphrodite; Rebbi Jehudah permits for the hermaphrodite.” What does Rebbi Jehudah say in this case? Let us hear from the following: Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, neither does the blind one. Nobody says “neither” unless he agrees with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except, but here he says including. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. The rabbis explain uncircumcised. Why does the verse say, an uncircumcised male? Only if he be totally male. Rebbi Jehudah explains male. Why does the verse say, uncircumcised? Even if he is only partially uncircumcised. But here, all your males, to exclude the hermaphrodite.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:54

Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Samuel: One makes no inferences from a ruling. Everybody agrees that one makes no inferences from an action. Rebbi Mana said to him, that means somebody who does not understand, but he who understands may act. He said to him, whether one understands or one does not understand, if there is a disagreement. But if there is no disagreement, whether one understands or one does not understand one acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:26

HALAKHAH: The House of Shammai say, irregular leaning-on was permitted. But the House of Hillel say, irregular leaning-on was not permitted. What is irregular leaning-on? From the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira said, everybody agrees that he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before; he fulfilled his obligation with voluntary well-being offerings for which he leaned on the day before. Where do they disagree? The festival well-being offerings. The House of Shammai treat them like voluntary well-being offerings; the House of Hillel treat them like the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease. Rebbi Yasa said, that what you are saying, he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before, {only} on time. If its time has passed it becomes like holiday well-being offerings.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:42

There, we have stated: “A staff which is full of impure fluids, when it touched the miqweh it is pure, the words of Rebbi Joshua. But the Sages are saying, only if he immerses it completely.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, where do they disagree? For easy impurity; but for severe impurity even Rebbi Joshua agrees. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they even disagree for severe impurity. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “As long as his feet are in the water, he may consider himself pure for any stage he chooses.” Explain it about one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the body of one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks is pure without special intention? From the moment he intended elevated purity he (needs) [does not need] intention. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “A miqweh containing exactly 40 seah into two persons descended, [both are pure]. One after the other, the first one is pure, the second impure. Rebbi Jehudah says, if the feet of the first touched the water, the second one also is pure.” Still this is about one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A woman in her period may rinse a radish in a cave and it is pure. If she lifted it in any way out of the water it is impure. And we have stated thereto: Rebbi Jehudah declares it pure in the name of Rebbi Joshua. And represents a menstruating woman not a severe impurity? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and it has no standing.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:18

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they only stated “the other”, not a stranger’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even a stranger’s. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a loaf. They said, Rebbi Joḥanan retracted this; when he said so it was before he changed his mind. He only said to make a loaf impure, because of “anything which disqualifies heave makes hands impure in the second degree.” Therefore to make a loaf impure everybody agrees that it does not make impure, since “no second degree creates second degree.”

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:43

Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? About a wine barrel. But about an oil barrel everybody agrees that he does not finish. What does he do? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, he pours it out. Bar Qappara stated, he breaks it. However Rebbi Ḥalaphta ben Shaul stated, he leaves it for the next holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:7

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids unless he raises or lowers by three {hand-breadths} or puts it on a rock.” One may give two explanations. If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah parallels Rebbi Yose. Just as Rebbi Yose says, manure is not easily found, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, manure is not easily found. One may give another explanation: If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. Is it not already fertilized from before the Sabbatical? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression, unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care about bad impressions? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun applied these traditions from here, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, one does not make new water canals on the holiday or in the Sabbatical year.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, because he would prepare its banks to be sown. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression. They wanted to say, the one who says there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says there “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, what would you have here? The only answer would be, “maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place.” What is the difference between them? If he dug a water canal for a building. They wanted to say that the one who said there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says here “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, clearly here its banks will not be prepared to be sown. Everybody agrees that if he assembled there stones, pebbles, lime, or cement it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:15

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel. They disagree anonymously. Where are we holding? If they are widely spaced everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If they are tightly planted everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we deal with the case that they are planted ten to a bet seah. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob treats it as widely spaced, the rabbis treat it as tightly planted. So the rabbis said, if widely spaced it is forbidden to irrigate; may one continue? Let us learn the opinion of the rabbis from that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Just as Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue, so the rabbis say that it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue. Did we not think that according to everybody if they are widely spaced it is forbidden; but is white dust not as if widely spaced? But here it is the Sabbatical, there the holiday. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden. It was found stated: “One may sprinkle with water on white dust during the Sabbatical year but not during the holiday, <the words of Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Eliezer Ben Jacob forbids.>”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:15

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel. They disagree anonymously. Where are we holding? If they are widely spaced everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If they are tightly planted everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we deal with the case that they are planted ten to a bet seah. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob treats it as widely spaced, the rabbis treat it as tightly planted. So the rabbis said, if widely spaced it is forbidden to irrigate; may one continue? Let us learn the opinion of the rabbis from that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Just as Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue, so the rabbis say that it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue. Did we not think that according to everybody if they are widely spaced it is forbidden; but is white dust not as if widely spaced? But here it is the Sabbatical, there the holiday. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden. It was found stated: “One may sprinkle with water on white dust during the Sabbatical year but not during the holiday, <the words of Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Eliezer Ben Jacob forbids.>”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:30

“And a coffin for the deceased in the courtyard;” this is what you are saying about a deceased who is not famous. But for a famous deceased one makes a coffin even in public. When Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis expired they made him a coffin in public. Everybody agrees that one may not cut down cedars for him, and similarly not quarry stones for him. If they had been quarried, the disagreement between Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:36

“Rebbi Jehudah says, she may not use lime because it disfigures her.” Two Amoraim, Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday everybody agrees that it is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday everybody agrees that it is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent: just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary pain is pain, so he says here, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:36

“Rebbi Jehudah says, she may not use lime because it disfigures her.” Two Amoraim, Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday everybody agrees that it is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday everybody agrees that it is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent: just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary pain is pain, so he says here, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:39

“One tightens.” Rebbi Yasa said, Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. Ḥisqiah said: making a lattice, warp and woof; tightening, either warp or woof. Rebbi Joḥanan said: making a lattice, either warp or woof; tightening, if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, everybody agrees that making a lattice means warp and woof. Where do they disagree? About tightening. Ḥisqiah said: either warp or woof; Rebbi Joḥanan said: if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Yasa instructed Samuel bar Ḥanina that “making a lattice” means warp and woof. We do not know whether this follows Ḥizqiah or it follows Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: a Mishnah says so that making a lattice means warp and woof, as we have stated there, “when is the rope connected to the bed? If he plaited three boxes.” Could you say warp without woof or woof without warp? Could one pitch woof and make a lattice?

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:3

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:3

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:3

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:3

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:18

Isaac, the son of the isatis grower, said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, should we state sixteen women? Ḥalîṣah frees her co-wife! Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, why was this not stated? Because of Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba said there is a bastard from a woman who got ḥalîṣah. One should have stated it for the rabbis! We came to state only things everybody agreed to. It turns out that Isaac, the son of the isatis grower, holds with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah, but the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah. Both he and the brothers are guilty for the co-wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, neither he nor the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah or for the co-wife. Rebbi Immi switches the attributions. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, does not Rebbi Immi switch the attributions? But Rebbi Joḥanan had several opinions. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish have several opinions? The statement of Isaac, the son of the isatis grower, supports Rebbi Immi and the statements of the rabbis support Rebbi Yasa, as both Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba, said in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Everybody agrees about the co-wife that one is guilty. Where do they disagree? About the woman who got ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah, but the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:21

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says that everybody agrees about the co-wife that he is guilty, if somebody from the market gave qiddushin to one of them and then the levir came and performed ḥalîṣah with her or had intercourse with her, did the qiddushin become invalid? If he performed ḥalîṣah with her companion but then had intercourse with her, were qiddushin validated retroactively? Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! But there is one sister-in-law, here are two sisters-in-law. The prohibition of a single sister-in-law is different from that of two sisters-in-law!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:28

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:34

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. A case came before Rebbi Yasa; he said, go to Rebbi Abbahu since he has learned that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah; we did not learn that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said to the Sepphoreans, you say in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah, but it is not so. How is it? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if she had intercourse after she grew two hairs, she cannot repudiate. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if she received qiddushin after she grew two hairs, she cannot repudiate. According to Rebbi Ze‘ira who said “she received qiddushin after she grew two hairs”, it follows that if she received qiddushin before she grew two hairs and had intercourse after she grew two hairs, she can repudiate. That fits. According to the colleagues who say “she had intercourse after she grew two hairs”, it follows that if she had intercourse before she grew two hairs, she can repudiate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:34

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. A case came before Rebbi Yasa; he said, go to Rebbi Abbahu since he has learned that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah; we did not learn that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said to the Sepphoreans, you say in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah, but it is not so. How is it? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if she had intercourse after she grew two hairs, she cannot repudiate. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if she received qiddushin after she grew two hairs, she cannot repudiate. According to Rebbi Ze‘ira who said “she received qiddushin after she grew two hairs”, it follows that if she received qiddushin before she grew two hairs and had intercourse after she grew two hairs, she can repudiate. That fits. According to the colleagues who say “she had intercourse after she grew two hairs”, it follows that if she had intercourse before she grew two hairs, she can repudiate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:29

Rebbi Yudan said, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. Because, if somebody had children but they died before he died, is his widow not a candidate for levirate? There, if he had children at the moment of death. Here, if they were co-wives after his death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:6

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:6

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:13

It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:24

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:54

Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female that she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah [says] in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:54

Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female that she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah [says] in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:6

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:6

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:19

Also the House of Shammai agree, also Rebbi Simeon agrees but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:28

If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:15

There, we have stated: “Everybody is required to be seen except the deaf-and-dumb, the insane, the minor, the sexless, and the hermaphrodite.” What says Rebbi Jehudah in this respect? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, “also the blind one.” Nobody says “also” unless he agrees with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There he says to exclude, but here he says to include. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. The rabbis explain “uncircumcised”, why does the verse add “male”? Only if he is totally male. Rebbi Jehudah explains “male”, why does the verse add “uncircumcised”? Even if he is partially male. But here, “all your maleness”, that excludes the hermaphrodite.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:19

“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:27

There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month’s child of the first [brother] or a seven-month’s of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:45

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua said, I heard,” etc. “That the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah” etc. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram,” etc. What is a sun-castrate? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, anybody whom the sun did not see qualified even for one hour. If somebody stretched out his hand and castrated [the not yet born baby] in the womb, everybody agrees that [when born] he is prohibited from marrying into the congregation and he cannot perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. One imposes upon him the restrictions of both castrate by human action and sun-castrate in this disagreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:17

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about upkeep. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand upkeep. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to [him], divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say so, they differ about the conditions attached to a Ketubah. Everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about upkeep it follows that they do not differ about the conditions attached to a Ketubah. They fined her but not her heirs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:12

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:16

It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar. This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:4

There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:12

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:12

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:12

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:12

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:15

HALAKHAH: “A female convert who converted,” etc. Is not the convert guilty for his mother but not for his father following Rebbi Yose the Galilean? Rebbi Aqiba says, “his father and mother he cursed.” Anybody potentially guilty for his mother is potentially guilty for his father but nobody who cannot be guilty for his mother can be guilty for his father. Rebbi Aqiba agrees that the “silenced” one is potentially guilty for his mother but not for his father. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? About a convert not conceived in holiness but born in holiness. But about a convert conceived and born in holiness even Rebbi Yose the Galilean agrees.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:15

HALAKHAH: “A female convert who converted,” etc. Is not the convert guilty for his mother but not for his father following Rebbi Yose the Galilean? Rebbi Aqiba says, “his father and mother he cursed.” Anybody potentially guilty for his mother is potentially guilty for his father but nobody who cannot be guilty for his mother can be guilty for his father. Rebbi Aqiba agrees that the “silenced” one is potentially guilty for his mother but not for his father. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? About a convert not conceived in holiness but born in holiness. But about a convert conceived and born in holiness even Rebbi Yose the Galilean agrees.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:16

Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:40

“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:12

Rav said, the essence of ḥalîṣah is the untying of the shoelace. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rav Jehudah, Rebbi Zeriqan turns to it in the name of Rav: The words of the Sages: If she slips off but did not spit, or spat but did not take off, nothing was done unless she slips off and spits. Even though Rav said “unless she slips off and spits” he agrees that the essence of slipping off is untying the shoelaces.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:13

Rav said, the main point in acquiring squatters’ rights is the bringing in of the yield. Did not Rav say, only if one saw him hoeing and weeding? Even though Rav said, only if one saw him hoeing and weeding, Rav agrees that the main point in acquiring squatters’ rights is the bringing in of the yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:19

HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:19

HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:36

Does the recitation prevent [validity]? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, for anybody able to recite, the recitation does not prevent [validity] but for anybody unable to recite, the recitation does prevent. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, the recitation does not prevent [validity], he agrees that if one recites, he recites in due order; in particular that it should not be said: “My levir refuses to erect, my levir does not want;” “I do not desire to take her”, but “my levir refuses to erect a name in Israel for his brother, my levir does not want;” “I do not desire to take her.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:5

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:38

Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira, Menaḥem in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Eliezer, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him, and you say so? Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Joshua, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! And you say so? Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel. Rebbi Joshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age. If not, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:24

HALAKHAH: “A woman who went overseas with her husband,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Meïr agrees in the first case. It was found stated: That is also in dispute. What is the difference between the second and the first cases? In the first case, did they not consider her word as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:25

There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses testified about him, one group testifying that he vowed two periods of nezirut, the other group testifying that he vowed five periods of nezirut.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:25

There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses testified about him, one group testifying that he vowed two periods of nezirut, the other group testifying that he vowed five periods of nezirut.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:34

HALAKHAH: [(He robbed one of five people). Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah deals with the case that she was betrothed by a document. But if he was betrothed by money, everybody agrees that he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:37

HALAKHAH: “I had a son overseas.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked before Rebbi Hila: Who is the one who stated that one takes her words into account and she performs ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Tarphon, but not Rebbi Aqibah! He said to him, it is the opinion of everybody and even Rebbi Aqiba agrees to it. What is the difference betweeen this statement and the first one? There, you say that she is not to be believed. But here, you say that she is believed! (When she left as included in the permission of levirate. But) where you say that she is not believed, when she left and was not included in the permission of levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:20

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:12

HALAKHAH: “He brought a bowl,” etc. It was stated: “A new one.” Our Mishnah follows Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “He brought a new earthenware bowl.” Who stated “a new one”? Rebbi Eliezer! Since he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water.” Just as the water had no prior use, so the earthenware vessel should not have had any prior use. It is understandable there because he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water;” but what may one say here? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he agrees with Rebbi Ismael. It was stated: From the wash basin. Rebbi Ismael says, water from a fountain. But the Sages approve of all kinds of water. Therefore, Rebbi Eliezer holds with Rebbi Ismael about the water and Rebbi Ismael with Rebbi Eliezer about the earthenware vessel. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, into a new earthenware vessel. Some Tannaїm state: Into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah. Some Tannaїm state: Even into a maqqēdah. They wanted to say, he who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, is Rebbi Eliezer but those who say, even into a maqqēdah, are the rabbis. It all is the rabbis’. He who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, if most of it was removed but a small part was left; he who says, even into a maqqēdah, if a small part was removed but most of it was left.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:22

HALAKHAH: “Then he starts writing the scroll,” etc. Rebbi Crispus said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, he administers the oath and then he writes; the other one said, he writes and then he administers the oath. They wanted to say that he who says, he administers the oath and then he writes, follows what is written in the verse but he who says, he writes and then he administers the oath, to join the oath to the drinking. There are Tannaїm who state: The conditions and the oaths impede; there are Tannaїm who state: The oaths impede, the conditions do not impede. They wanted to say that he who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, holds that “law” and “teaching” impedes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, does not agree. Certainly he does agree but they are not [written] in order. It turns out that this disagreement is like the previous disagreement. He who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, agrees with him who says, he administers the oath and then he writes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, agrees with him who says, he writes and then he administers the oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:22

HALAKHAH: “Then he starts writing the scroll,” etc. Rebbi Crispus said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, he administers the oath and then he writes; the other one said, he writes and then he administers the oath. They wanted to say that he who says, he administers the oath and then he writes, follows what is written in the verse but he who says, he writes and then he administers the oath, to join the oath to the drinking. There are Tannaїm who state: The conditions and the oaths impede; there are Tannaїm who state: The oaths impede, the conditions do not impede. They wanted to say that he who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, holds that “law” and “teaching” impedes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, does not agree. Certainly he does agree but they are not [written] in order. It turns out that this disagreement is like the previous disagreement. He who says, the conditions and the oaths impede, agrees with him who says, he administers the oath and then he writes; but he who says, the oaths impede, the conditions do not impede, agrees with him who says, he writes and then he administers the oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:38

MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:39

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:7

HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:8

The rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices [the flour offering]. Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. Everybody agrees that erasing immediately precedes drinking; only that the rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices, while Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. It was stated: “She may always change her mind as long as her offering was not sacrificed. If her offering was sacrificed and she said I do not want to drink’ one makes her gargle and forces her to drink”. Following Rebbi Simeon. But following the rabbis she already drank. We have stated: “She did not finish drinking”. Some Tannaïm state: She did not move from there. He who says, she did not finish drinking, Rebbi Simeon. He who says, she did not move from there, the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:23

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree about burial. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: When do they disagree? If the head was higher but the body lower. But if the head was lower and the body higher everybody agrees that one brings the head to the body. If there was an incline on both sides, do I say that the head fell to one side and the body to the other or does this head have no body and that body no head? If it was level, any distance it is usual to chop it off is one body; otherwise, the head has no body and the body no head.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:6

One agrees that she should not be married either Friday or Saturday night. Not on Friday, for the honor of the Sabbath. Not Saturday night: The colleagues say, because of the exertion; Rebbi Yose says, for the honor of the Sabbath. A baraita supports the colleagues: Why did they say, a virgin is married on Wednesday? That a man should prepare for his needs three consecutive days.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:42

HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:47

HALAKHAH: “If she was pregnant,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that the child is of unknown paternity. It was stated thus: “Where was this said, for the testimony of the woman in her own behalf. But everybody agrees that the child is of unknown paternity.” Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, simply of unknown paternity! We find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest. How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:47

HALAKHAH: “If she was pregnant,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that the child is of unknown paternity. It was stated thus: “Where was this said, for the testimony of the woman in her own behalf. But everybody agrees that the child is of unknown paternity.” Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, simply of unknown paternity! We find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest. How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:53

Both Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba, say in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Yose who said in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act in a practical case? He said to him, following Rebbi Yose who spoke in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:53

Both Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba, say in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Yose who said in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act in a practical case? He said to him, following Rebbi Yose who spoke in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:4

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:4

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:8

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua agrees that if somebody says to another: “This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him,” that he is trustworthy since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that it did belong to [the second man’s] father and [the first] said, I bought it, he is not trustworthy.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:9

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua agrees,” etc. Rebbi Joshua agrees, but he does not disagree? In the former.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:9

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua agrees,” etc. Rebbi Joshua agrees, but he does not disagree? In the former.