agrees
700 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “If one says, this is my signature,” etc. Why was this necessary? For Rebbi. Even though Rebbi says, each of them needs another with him, here he agrees that they are trustworthy.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.
From where comes this? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: They have no right to the fines of the daughter nor to payments for seduction or injuries. When does the fine become due? Rebbi Jonah said, from the first moment; Rebbi Yose said, at the end. Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Jonah: Since you say, from the first moment, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings during her father’s lifetime, [the payments] are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’”? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “He shall give to the girl; he shall give to the girl’s father.” Rebbi Jonah objected to Rebbi Yose. In your opinion, since you say, at the end, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings before she became an adult, they are the father’s; after she became an adult they belong to herself.” Does an adult have a claim to a fine? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Because he mistreated her,” that includes if she was an adolescent and became an adult. Does it turn out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as we have stated there: “If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold, and afterwards [his father] died, …, he pays fourfold or fivefold”? Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Ḥaggai: In your opinion, since you say that it depends on the court proceedings, should one not state: If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold during his father’s lifetime but did not appear in court until after his father’s death, he pays twofold? But it says fourfold or fivefold! But here, everybody agrees that they belong to herself. The only problem is whether he has to pay to her or to her father.
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the father brought witnesses to prove the perjury of the husband’s witnesses; but the father’s witnesses were proven perjurers, is he flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? He said to him, if the father’s witnesses are not proven perjurers, is not the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? Rebbi Ze‘ira is of the opinion that there are two different proceedings. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is only one proceeding. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abbahu: “To the town’s Elders”, that is a court of three members; “to the gate”, that is a court of 23. He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says that he is flogged and pays. There, we have stated: “The seducer, the rapist, and the calumniator [are judged] by three [judges], the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, the calumniator by 23 since it is a potential capital case.” Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned by a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But by the case of the preliminarily married adolescent, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. [It turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Mana [follows] Rebbi Abbahu].
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the father brought witnesses to prove the perjury of the husband’s witnesses; but the father’s witnesses were proven perjurers, is he flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? He said to him, if the father’s witnesses are not proven perjurers, is not the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? Rebbi Ze‘ira is of the opinion that there are two different proceedings. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is only one proceeding. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abbahu: “To the town’s Elders”, that is a court of three members; “to the gate”, that is a court of 23. He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says that he is flogged and pays. There, we have stated: “The seducer, the rapist, and the calumniator [are judged] by three [judges], the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, the calumniator by 23 since it is a potential capital case.” Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned by a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But by the case of the preliminarily married adolescent, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. [It turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Mana [follows] Rebbi Abbahu].
HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.
HALAKHAH: “If he did not write her a ketubah,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said: “Anybody who writes for a virgin less that 200 [zuz] or a mina for a widow engages in immoral intercourse.” Who needs it? Rebbi Meïr! Even though Rebbi Meïr says that any contract which does not contain an alienation clause cannot be foreclosed, here he agrees that it can be foreclosed.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he wants he writes,” etc. Does Rebbi Jehudah think that the minimum for a virgin is a mina and for a widow 50 zuz? Should he not write so from the start? But it must be a diminution afterwards. Why can he not write that “I received from you such and such”? It was found that bar Kappara stated: “I received from you such and such”. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Rebbi Jehudah formulated this only for the end; but at the start, even Rebbi Jehudah agrees. What is the beginning and what is the end? The colleagues in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he had intercourse, and after he had intercourse. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he took her in, and after he took her in. If he did not have intercourse with her, divorced her, and took her in again; that is before and after.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?
For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody gives money in trust for his daughter and she says, I am trusting my husband,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of the case that he gave at the time of the preliminary marriage. But if he gave at the definitive marriage even Rebbi Meïr agrees If he established the trust after the definitive marriage, that is the disagreement.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders.
That widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not] remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.
Ben Azay says, the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar. But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas that both parties split evenly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split.
HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.
HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about sustenance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand sustenance. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to him, divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say, for him who says they differ about the conditions attached to a ketubah, Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has the ketubah stipulations. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about sustenance, it follows that they do not differ about the stipulations of a ketubah. They fined her, but did not fine her heirs.
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says sacrifice, elevation offering, or flour offering,” etc. Everybody agrees this sacrifice is permitted, like a sacrifice is forbidden. Where do they disagree? Sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah says, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘this sacrifice’ and is permitted; but the rabbis say, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘like a sacrifice’ and is forbidden. Rebbi Jehudah said to them: Do you not agree that one who said “oath” is like one who said “this oath” and is forbidden? And here he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘this sacrifice’ and is permitted! But the rabbis throw restrictions on it. One who said “oath” is like one who said “this oath” and is forbidden. But here, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘like a sacrifice’ and is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “Vows in connection with acts of God: His friend made him vow,” etc. because he fell ill. Therefore, if he did not fall ill, no. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, “he is forbidden until he gives.” Rebbi Yose said, why do we not explain it according to everybody? As my teacher said, they disagree when it was indeterminate. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. Rebbi Hila said, is it the way of people to say χαρίζεσθαι βίᾳ?
HALAKHAH: “Vows in connection with acts of God: His friend made him vow,” etc. because he fell ill. Therefore, if he did not fall ill, no. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, “he is forbidden until he gives.” Rebbi Yose said, why do we not explain it according to everybody? As my teacher said, they disagree when it was indeterminate. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. Rebbi Hila said, is it the way of people to say χαρίζεσθαι βίᾳ?
Rebbi Joḥanan explained the Mishnah: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat from the overhang. In the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field and eat of the fruits. If he vowed during the Sabbatical year, he enters and eats. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish explains the Mishnah: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat of its fruits. If he made the vow in the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter his field but he can eat of the fruits. If he vowed not to eat from the other before the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field but he cannot eat of its fruits. If he made the vow during the Sabbatical year he enters and eats. That statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Yose said, for his vow preceded his abandoning, his abandoning his vow. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose agrees that he is permitted in the case of biblical abandoning.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food,” etc. A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ” etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Everybody agrees that a person who vows to forbid gourd to himself is permitted vegetables, as it was stated: A person who makes a vow to abstain from a main object is forbidden the peripherals; if he vows from the peripherals, he is permitted the main object. One who vows to abstain from meat is forbidden sinews, he who vows to abstain from sinews is permitted meat. Where do they disagree? About Egyptian gourd. But everybody agrees that Greek gourds are vegetables. Rebbi Crispus in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All sorts of gourd and cabbage which we eat are Greek gourds. Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṣeradia says, qarmals are vegetables. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose asked, are qarmals subject to tithes? Bar Qappara stated, qarmals are free from tithes. That is, as long as they did not form gourds; but when they formed gourds they are like vegetables. Rebbi Yose instructed that it is forbidden to sip water from colocasia leaves because they are food for deer.
Everybody agrees that a person who vows to forbid gourd to himself is permitted vegetables, as it was stated: A person who makes a vow to abstain from a main object is forbidden the peripherals; if he vows from the peripherals, he is permitted the main object. One who vows to abstain from meat is forbidden sinews, he who vows to abstain from sinews is permitted meat. Where do they disagree? About Egyptian gourd. But everybody agrees that Greek gourds are vegetables. Rebbi Crispus in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All sorts of gourd and cabbage which we eat are Greek gourds. Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṣeradia says, qarmals are vegetables. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose asked, are qarmals subject to tithes? Bar Qappara stated, qarmals are free from tithes. That is, as long as they did not form gourds; but when they formed gourds they are like vegetables. Rebbi Yose instructed that it is forbidden to sip water from colocasia leaves because they are food for deer.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until Passover’, he is forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it comes, the other until it passed.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. But we hold if it is undetermined. Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. But we hold if it is undetermined. Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says, one opens for a man,” etc. The rabbis say, a man resists the honor of his father and mother. Rebbi Eliezer says, sometimes he resists, sometimes he does not resist. Rebbi Eliezer agrees that after their death he does not resist. Everybody agrees that nobody resists the honor of his teacher, as we stated: “And the fear of your teacher shall be like the fear of Heaven.”
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says, one opens for a man,” etc. The rabbis say, a man resists the honor of his father and mother. Rebbi Eliezer says, sometimes he resists, sometimes he does not resist. Rebbi Eliezer agrees that after their death he does not resist. Everybody agrees that nobody resists the honor of his teacher, as we stated: “And the fear of your teacher shall be like the fear of Heaven.”
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.
From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.
From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.
HALAKHAH: “I am taking upon myself to shave half a nazir,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav Ḥisda both say that they disagree if it was not spelled out. What are we dealing with? If he said, every half head, everybody agrees that he completely shaves a nazir. If he says, half of the obligation, everybody agrees that he shaves half a nazir. But we are dealing with the case that he says: “half”. Rebbi Meïr says, as if he said half a head, but the rabbis said, as if he said, half of the obligation. Rebbi Yudan said, it turns our that leniency is a restriction. In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr who said, as if he had said half a head, he brings one sacrifice since the nazir can shave on one sacrifice. In the opinion of the rabbis who said, half of the obligation, he has to pay for a sacrifice and a half, half of the obligation of a person.
HALAKHAH: “I am taking upon myself to shave half a nazir,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav Ḥisda both say that they disagree if it was not spelled out. What are we dealing with? If he said, every half head, everybody agrees that he completely shaves a nazir. If he says, half of the obligation, everybody agrees that he shaves half a nazir. But we are dealing with the case that he says: “half”. Rebbi Meïr says, as if he said half a head, but the rabbis said, as if he said, half of the obligation. Rebbi Yudan said, it turns our that leniency is a restriction. In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr who said, as if he had said half a head, he brings one sacrifice since the nazir can shave on one sacrifice. In the opinion of the rabbis who said, half of the obligation, he has to pay for a sacrifice and a half, half of the obligation of a person.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
Ulla bar Ismael said, what is his problem? Of an impure nazir. But for a pure nazir, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees if he has nothing to omit. Samuel bar Abba asked: May one day of his nezirut and one day of nezirut for his son be combined? Where do we hold? If his son was born today and tomorrow he enters, he has two days for his nezirut. If his son was born the next day and he enters the next day, he has two days for his son’s nezirut! Rebbi Mana said, explain it at twilight. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say in the middle of the day, did we not intend to say that the start of the day is counted for him, the end of the day is counted for his son?
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
A man can declare a nazir, and a man can shave. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Meïr: In 24 matters are the House of Shammai lenient but the House of Hillel stringent, and this is one of them: The House of Shammai say, a man cannot declare his son to be a nazir but the House of Hillel say, a man can declare his son to be a nazir. It was stated about those who are nazir from the womb. Some want to say, until he grows two pubic hairs. Some want to say, until he reaches the time of vows. Everybody agrees that he can no longer declare him a nazir once he reaches the time of vows.
What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? “His offering to the Eternal for his vow”, that (his sacrifice precede his vow) but not (that his vow precede his sacrifice). They wanted to say that Rebbi Jehudah would agree with Rebbi Yose. It was found said that neither of them agrees with the other.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that nobody can ask about his substitution. Where do they disagree? About his dedication; for the House of Shammai say, since a person cannot ask about his substitution, he cannot ask about his dedication, but the House of Hillel say, a person can ask about his dedication but not about his substitution.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut,” from the day he brings his sacrifices, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, from the time of his shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hoshaia, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? If he shaved on the seventh and brought his sacrifices on the eighth. But if he shaved on the eighth and brought his sacrifices on the same day, everybody agrees on the day he brings his sacrifices. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if he immersed himself on the seventh. But if he immersed himself on the eighth, the eighth takes the place of the seventh and the seventh of the eighth; he counts only from that “seventh”. If he became impure and impure again, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but following Rebbi this person still stays in impure nezirut. Rebbi Hila said, where do they disagree? To count nezirut in purity. “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut and bring.” Rebbi said, until he actually brought. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, even if he was enabled to bring the sacrifice for impurity. Everybody agrees that he brings a sacrifice for impurity. It was stated thus: If he became impure on the seventh, and again impure on the eighth, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. In Rebbi Ze‘ira’s opinion, following Rebbi the first sacrifice is superseded and he brings the second; following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah it was not superseded. In Rebbi Hila’s opinion, everybody agrees that nothing is superseded and he brings another.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut,” from the day he brings his sacrifices, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, from the time of his shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hoshaia, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? If he shaved on the seventh and brought his sacrifices on the eighth. But if he shaved on the eighth and brought his sacrifices on the same day, everybody agrees on the day he brings his sacrifices. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if he immersed himself on the seventh. But if he immersed himself on the eighth, the eighth takes the place of the seventh and the seventh of the eighth; he counts only from that “seventh”. If he became impure and impure again, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but following Rebbi this person still stays in impure nezirut. Rebbi Hila said, where do they disagree? To count nezirut in purity. “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut and bring.” Rebbi said, until he actually brought. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, even if he was enabled to bring the sacrifice for impurity. Everybody agrees that he brings a sacrifice for impurity. It was stated thus: If he became impure on the seventh, and again impure on the eighth, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. In Rebbi Ze‘ira’s opinion, following Rebbi the first sacrifice is superseded and he brings the second; following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah it was not superseded. In Rebbi Hila’s opinion, everybody agrees that nothing is superseded and he brings another.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut,” from the day he brings his sacrifices, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, from the time of his shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hoshaia, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? If he shaved on the seventh and brought his sacrifices on the eighth. But if he shaved on the eighth and brought his sacrifices on the same day, everybody agrees on the day he brings his sacrifices. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if he immersed himself on the seventh. But if he immersed himself on the eighth, the eighth takes the place of the seventh and the seventh of the eighth; he counts only from that “seventh”. If he became impure and impure again, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but following Rebbi this person still stays in impure nezirut. Rebbi Hila said, where do they disagree? To count nezirut in purity. “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut and bring.” Rebbi said, until he actually brought. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, even if he was enabled to bring the sacrifice for impurity. Everybody agrees that he brings a sacrifice for impurity. It was stated thus: If he became impure on the seventh, and again impure on the eighth, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. In Rebbi Ze‘ira’s opinion, following Rebbi the first sacrifice is superseded and he brings the second; following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah it was not superseded. In Rebbi Hila’s opinion, everybody agrees that nothing is superseded and he brings another.
HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
A Cohen and a Levite, the Levite shall defile himself. A Levite and an Israel, the Israel shall defile himself. No, is not the Levite like the Israel? Rebbi Abin said, it was taught in the time of the platform. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Rebbi Eliezer agrees with the Sages that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Think of it, if his father sanctified him from birth. The one is from the Torah, the other is not from the Torah. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Joseph: Rebbi Eliezer parallels the House of Shammai. As the House of Shammai say, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence, so Rebbi Eliezer says, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence. A nazir for 30 days and a nazir for 100, the nazir for 30 days shall defile himself. A nazir for 100 days and a nazir forever, the nazir for 100 days shall defile himself. A nazir forever, and a nazir of neziriot, some Tannaïm state, the nazir forever shall defile himself; but some Tannaïm state, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself. He who says, the nazir forever shall defile himself but not the nazir of neziriot, since he shaves more frequently. He who says, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself but not the nazir forever, since he brings more sacrifices. If he switched, it should be as Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” Here it is the same.
(The community) [A person] who became impure by a doubt relating to a private domain on Passover. Rebbi Hoshaia said, he should be pushed to the Second Passover. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one sends him on a far journey. This follows what Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he became impure by the impurity of the abyss, one sends him on a far journey. (A nazir) [The community] who became impure by a doubt relating to a private domain on Passover. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should be presented in their doubt; Rebbi Hoshaia said, it should be made in impurity. The great Rebbi Hoshaia also agrees that it should be presented in their doubt; what Rebbi Hoshaia said referrred only to restrictions.
What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted
What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted
What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted
A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
“Because of the public good.” They say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Some say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not remain anchored. He who said, that she should not remain anchored, [is afraid that] she turns out to be anchored if she thought that he annulled when he did not annul. He who said, that she should not risk bastardy, [is afraid that] her children will be bastards if she thought that he did not annul when he annulled, she goes and marries without a bill of divorce. If she thought that he annulled when he did not annul, another man comes and marries her preliminarily; the preliminary marriage is valid but she thinks it is invalid. She waits until her first husband dies, then she goes and marries [another man]; the result is that her children will be bastards. Rebbi Mana said, I went with a caravan and heard Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Rav Huna said, even the one who said that she should not remain anchored also agrees that she should not risk bastardy.
Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.
If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.
HALAKHAH: “Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes.” He hires and is hired. The artless, small children. Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of their livelihood. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose raises difficulties in collecting forfeits, he agrees that those who give their children to artisans that they collect forfeits because of the livelihood of people.
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me,” etc. Two say that she appointed in their presence and two say that in their presence he received and tore it. But if he agrees, the agent should be able to be added. Explain it, it he was a relative. This implies that a relative can act as agent.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.” Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married.
How close is “near”? Rav said, four cubits. Rebbi Ilai the heir said, four cubits. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Stretching out hands, and we have stated: “stretching out hands.” Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jeremiah, in the name of Rav: Stretching out hands. The argument of Rav is inverted; there, he says four cubits and here he says so? There in theory, here in practice. “Rebbi Eleazar stated: Even if it was closer to her than to him but a dog came and took it away, she is not divorced.” Samuel agrees with Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees. The clearest way is that he puts it into her hand. If there was room for stretching out hands between him and her, Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan [states]: If it was closer to her than to him she is divorced, closer to him than to her she is not divorced, half and half she is divorced and not divorced. Abba bar Rav Jeremiah said: In all cases in which we have stated “divorced and not divorced”, support is on him.
HALAKHAH: “If the scribe wrote,” etc. Where do we hold? If he made a mistake, even Rebbi Eleazar agrees. If he made no error, even the rabbis agree. But we must hold that it was unexplained. Rebbi Eleazar suspects that possibly he made no mistake; the rabbis suspect that possibly he did make a mistake.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.