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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:38

Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:38

Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:22

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:47

“If he did not allot her, he must let her be redeemed.” This teaches that he cannot allot her for himself unless there is time for her handywork to be worth a peruṭah and that a peruṭah be left to be deducted, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, he allots any time until sundown. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, everybody agrees that for a Hebrew slave only if a peruṭah’s worth is left. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says it correctly, what is the rabbis’ reason? There is no money left, there is no handiwork left? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he allots her by speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:49

If he was married to her sister who died. For him who says, he gives money for the allotment at the end, she needs additional money. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she does not need additional money. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she needs additional money. Why? Everybody agrees that preliminary marriage is impossible in an incestuous relationship.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:57

If he sold her to one and gave her in preliminary marriage to another, the father played with the master, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; but the Sages say that the father did not play with the master. It is as if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily (after) 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to the second man? “From now after 30 days.” Since if somebody said to a woman, “you are preliminarily married to me from now after 30 days,” and another came and married her preliminarily within the 30 days, is she not preliminarily married to both of them? From then when he wants. Everybody agrees that if he definitively married her off, the father played with the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:71

This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires, as it was stated: If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked to, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land in length and breadth, for I shall give it to you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:100

This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires. If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land, etc.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:102

“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:102

“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:6

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:6

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:18

“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married. After delivery, if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married. If one denar was bad, she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.] It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:18

“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married. After delivery, if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married. If one denar was bad, she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.] It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:19

A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:22

“Rebbi Simeon said, if he tricked her by understatement she is preliminarily married.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees that she is not preliminarily married if he tricked her by misstating his personal status. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “ ‘On condition that I be a Cohen,’ and he turned out to be a Levite.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:26

“She is preliminarily married,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:47

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:23

There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his‘eruvin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall, if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place. And here, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand and he wanted to take it away from them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:46

So is the Mishnah: “If somebody said when dying, I have children, he is believed; I have brothers, he is not believed;” Rav said, since it is in his hand to divorce, he is to be believed. The word of Samuel agrees with this. A Persian when dying said to them: Give this man’s wife a bill of divorce. They asked him, why? Because of your wretched brother? After he died, the case came before Samuel who said, since it was in his hand to divorce, he is to be believed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not to be believed. Ulla descended there and said this in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; they ganged up on him. Think of it, if he was a Cohen?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:50

There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:62

Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable; they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female she would be blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if it was a female, she would be blemished for the priesthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:62

Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable; they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female she would be blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if it was a female, she would be blemished for the priesthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:25

There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:46

HALAKHAH: “If somebody empowered his agent,” etc. It was stated: “If a man and a woman come from overseas; he says, she is my wife, and she says, he is my husband. One will not execute anybody because of her being a married woman. If they become generally known, one will execute because of her being a married woman.” How long does it take to be generally known? Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Up to thirty days. There, we have stated: “A toddler who is found near cake-dough with a piece of dough in his hand, Rebbi Meïr declares pure but the Sages declare it impure, for toddlers will slap their hands on cake-dough.” Does one burn because of general knowledge? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not execute because of general knowledge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Everybody agrees that one executes because of general knowledge. Where do they disagree? About burning. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge but one does not burn because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one executes because of general knowledge, one also burns because of general knowledge. And from where that one executes because of general knowledge? Rebbi Samuel, the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is written: “He who hits his father or his mother shall be put to death.” But is it certain that this one is his father? Is it not only general knowledge that he is his father? But it says, one executes. So here also one executes.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:11

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and I am saying that even for the borrower one does not estimate, and Abba agrees with me. Who is Abba? Rebbi or Rabba bar Abuha. Rav Ḥisda said, this treats the main event as an accessory. There came Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and watchmen fall under the rules of damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:18

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:10

HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:10

HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:30

HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:30

HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:11

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Practice follows Rebbi. Rav Ze‘ira said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Jeremiah said, everybody agrees that in a house, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and I shall watch it.” Everybody agrees that on a field, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and you watch it.” Where do they disagree? In a courtyard. Rebbi says, a courtyard is like a field, but the Sages say, a courtyard is like a house. There, we have stated: If somebody assembles sheaves in another person’s field without permission.” [R. Isaac said,] sheaves on a field are like vessels in a house? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by one which has a lock.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:11

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Practice follows Rebbi. Rav Ze‘ira said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Jeremiah said, everybody agrees that in a house, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and I shall watch it.” Everybody agrees that on a field, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and you watch it.” Where do they disagree? In a courtyard. Rebbi says, a courtyard is like a field, but the Sages say, a courtyard is like a house. There, we have stated: If somebody assembles sheaves in another person’s field without permission.” [R. Isaac said,] sheaves on a field are like vessels in a house? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by one which has a lock.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:20

“If it crossed a wall four cubits high, or a public road, or a brook, he is not liable.” Rebbi Abba said, the Mishnah speaks of burning fire. But if it is wind-whipped everybody agrees that he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah speaks of wind-whipped fire, but if it is burning he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:24

HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:11

Ḥilfai said, if he swore to him before Passover, then after Passover he pays him for fully useable leavened matter. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and asked Rebbi Ḥizqiah, who quoted this in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is there anybody who disagrees with Ḥilfai so that he would not have to pay for fully useable leavened matter? Everybody agrees about leavened matter that he has to pay for fully useable leavened matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:14

“If he was renting out to others, even what is inside the house belongs to him.” Rebbi Jeremiah says, they disagree about a hostelry, but in a courtyard everybody agrees that he is required to make it public. Rebbi Yose said, they disagree about a courtyard, but in a hostelry everybody agrees that it belongs to its finder.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:14

“If he was renting out to others, even what is inside the house belongs to him.” Rebbi Jeremiah says, they disagree about a hostelry, but in a courtyard everybody agrees that he is required to make it public. Rebbi Yose said, they disagree about a courtyard, but in a hostelry everybody agrees that it belongs to its finder.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:17

Simeon ben Shetaḥ was working with linen. His students said to him, Rabbi, in order to make it easier for you we want to buy a donkey, then you will not have to work so hard. They went and bought a donkey from a Saracen; a pearl was hanging on its neck. They came to him saying, because of this you will not have to work anymore. He said to them, why? They told him, we bought for you a donkey from a Saracen and a pearl is hanging on its neck. He asked them, does its owner know about this? They answered, no. He told them, go and return it. But did not Rav Huna, Bevay bar Gozlan, in the name of Rav say, they objected before Rebbi: Even according to him who says that an object robbed from a Gentile is forbidden, everybody agrees that what he lost is permitted. Do you think that Simeon ben Shetaḥ was a barbarian? Simeon ben Shetaḥ wanted to hear: Praised be the God of the Jews, more than any gain in this world.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:27

HALAKHAH: “Anything which works and eats,” etc. It was stated: There should not be given food in the value of a calf to calves, a foal to foals, or a chicken to chickens. It happened that a man found five calves; he was selling and feeding until only one was left. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Tarphon about objects with distinguishing marks. Rebbi Abba and Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: It happened that Rebbi instructed following Rebbi Tarphon in a case about objects with distinguishing marks. Rav Jehudah said, a scholar does not have to indicate a distinguishing mark. Rav Huna said, everybody agrees that if it was a bundle of coins he may not touch them.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 3:7

HALAKHAH: “If one says to two people, I robbed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Here if they complain, there if they are silent. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, if witnesses know; there, if no witnesses know. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear. There, they say in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear. Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not confessed. Rebbi Yasa wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not have sworn. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore, he should have appointed an officer of the court. Rebbi Joḥanan seems to say, an officer of the court determined that one was a robber, not a court which determined that one was robbed. Other Tannaїm stated, a court which determined that one was robbed, [as it was stated, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, a court which determined that one was robbed,] not a court which determined that one was a robber. Rebbi Ila said, we also have stated that the rules are identical for robbery, intercourse, and loan. Everbody agrees about the deposit mentioned in the Mishnah, from the following: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know which one of you it was.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 3:21

HALAKHAH: “If a person appropriates a deposit,” etc. So is the Mishnah: At the time of claim in court. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Aqiba. Even though the House of Hillel disagree with him? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: It happened that there was a case and Rebbi instructed following Rebbi Aqiba. Rav Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi Aqiba’s position. There came a case before Rebbi Nasa and he instructed following Rebbi Aqiba.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:8

Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rebbi Simeon, but we do not say this in all cases. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi and he instructed following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph gave a denar for salt. That one reneged. He said, does he not know that already a sickle is put on the thigh of that man, “He Who exacted retribution from the people of the Flood will in the future collect from him who does not keep his word”? A person paid for raw silk. He reneged. The case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi La said, it was a case of a pledge; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he had given him partial payment. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:2

HALAKHAH: “What is biting,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, this is interest which is taken away by the judges. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, can interest be taken away by the judges? He said, if it were so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that no document obligates another. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if the document exists one subtracts [the interest].

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:2

HALAKHAH: “What is biting,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, this is interest which is taken away by the judges. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, can interest be taken away by the judges? He said, if it were so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that no document obligates another. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if the document exists one subtracts [the interest].

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that a paid trustee who would be responsible for accidents is forbidden. But here you say that a paid trustee who is responsible for accidents is permitted. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee agrees to be like a borrower? Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that mortmain belongs to the first, but here you say to the second. Rebbi Yose said, there since the essence belongs to the first, the offspring are counted for the first. But here the essence belongs to the second since the offspring belong to the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:36

HALAKHAH: “One does not contract for produce,” etc. May one contract based on Saracens’ rates? Rebbi Joḥanan says, one may contract; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not contract. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Would it not be reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about rates of Saracens of Sepphoris, since that is uninterrupted? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, I am wondering about what the rabbis disagree? Whether contracting for produce, or contracting for money, or a loan on produce? Rebbi Jeremiah said, they disagree about a loan, but about (a hostelry) [a contract] everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, they disagree about a contract, but about a loan everybody agrees that it is permitted. In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, one contracts for cattle feed. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, also on honeycombs. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in all villages near Tiberias one contracts once the rate was established at Tiberias.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:36

HALAKHAH: “One does not contract for produce,” etc. May one contract based on Saracens’ rates? Rebbi Joḥanan says, one may contract; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not contract. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Would it not be reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about rates of Saracens of Sepphoris, since that is uninterrupted? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, I am wondering about what the rabbis disagree? Whether contracting for produce, or contracting for money, or a loan on produce? Rebbi Jeremiah said, they disagree about a loan, but about (a hostelry) [a contract] everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, they disagree about a contract, but about a loan everybody agrees that it is permitted. In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, one contracts for cattle feed. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, also on honeycombs. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in all villages near Tiberias one contracts once the rate was established at Tiberias.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 2:33

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that practice follows Rebbi Simeon.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 3:15

Rav said, the main confirmation of a claim of possession is storing the produce. Does Rav not agree about weeding and turning the soil? Rav agrees about weeding and turning the soil. What does it mean that Rav said, the main indication of a claim of possession is storing the produce? That if they saw him ploughing, and harvesting, and binding into sheaves, and threshing, and grading, but did not see him storing the produce, there is no claim of possession without storing the produce.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 3:16

Rav said, the essence of ḥalîṣah is the untying of the shoelace. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rav Jehudah, Rebbi Zeriqan turns to it in the name of Rav: The words of the Sages: If she slips off but did not spit, or spat but did not take off, the ḥaliṣah is invalid unless she slips off and spits. Rav agrees “unless she slips off and spits”; it is implied by what Rav said, the essence of slipping off is untying the shoelaces.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 3:19

HALAKHAH: “Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership,” etc. But it needs proof of undisturbed possession. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joshua agrees that if somebody says to anothet, ‘this field’, etc.” As the following. Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands it over to Simeon. Reuben went and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to him. Rav said, when you gave it to him, you gave it on the basis of a court decree. From there on the burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:4

MISHNAH: Neither the cistern nor the cellar even though he wrote over to him “its bottom and height,” and he has to buy himself access, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages say that he does not have to buy himself access. Rebbi Aqiba agrees that if he said “except these”, he does not have to buy himself access. If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:6

There, they said: Admon and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La said, they disagree when nothing was specified. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was specified. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he does have to buy access.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:6

There, they said: Admon and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La said, they disagree when nothing was specified. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was specified. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he does have to buy access.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:17

MISHNAH: He who sells a field sold the stones which are needed for it, and the posts in a vineyard which are needed for it, and grain standing on the ground, and a reed fence taking up less than a bet rova‘, and a watchman’s hut not made with mortar, and a carob tree not yet grafted, and a virgin sycamore tree. But he sold neither the stones which are not needed for it, nor the posts in a vineyard which are not needed for it, nor grain harvested from the ground. But if he said to him, “it and all it contains,” all is sold. In no case did he sell either a reed fence taking up more than a bet rova‘, or a watchman’s hut made with mortar, or a grafted carob tree, or an anvil sycamore tree. Neither the cistern, nor the wine press, nor a dovecote whether deserted or intact; and he has to buy himself access, the words of Rebbi Aqiba; but the Sages say that he does not not have to buy himself access. Rebbi Aqiba agrees that if he said “except these”, he does not not have to buy himself access. If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he does have to buy access. When has this been said? For the seller. But one who gives a gift, gives everything. Brothers who divided [an inheritance]: if one acquired a field he acquired everything. Somebody taking possession of a proselyte’s property: if he took possession of a field, he took possession of everything. If somebody dedicated a field to the Temple, he dedicated everything; Rebbi Simeon says that he who dedicated a field to the Temple only dedicated a grafted carob tree and an anvil sycamore tree.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 6:3

Here, he has to accept it, but there it should be diminished. Here only chaff, but there another kind. Here only the way he touched it, but there only the way he carried it. Here Rebbi Simeon agrees, but there, Rebbi Simeon says they are two kinds and do not count together.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:18

“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.” “Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:30

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:30

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:36

One who said, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, if Y died to Z. The one who was mentioned earlier receives the property earlier. If the second died during the first’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If the third died during the second’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If both the second and the third die during the first’s lifetime, the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he only has the usufruct. Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not even as a gift from a healthy person. As in the following: A woman wrote her properties over to a certain man. She needed money and sold it to her husband. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Madia brought the case before Rebbi Yose. Did not Rebbi Yannai say, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the gift of a healthy person? Since the husband of this woman is obligated to provide for her food, is that not like a death-bed will? So far, he is obligated to provide for her bread and legumes. Maybe eggs? Maybe chicken? Since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, that means that she may sell the property even in order to eat delicacies. Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said, it was stated there that her burial is part of her upkeep. If she did not have a burial site, since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, it means that he may sell the real estate and acquire a burial site.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:36

One who said, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, if Y died to Z. The one who was mentioned earlier receives the property earlier. If the second died during the first’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If the third died during the second’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If both the second and the third die during the first’s lifetime, the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he only has the usufruct. Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not even as a gift from a healthy person. As in the following: A woman wrote her properties over to a certain man. She needed money and sold it to her husband. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Madia brought the case before Rebbi Yose. Did not Rebbi Yannai say, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the gift of a healthy person? Since the husband of this woman is obligated to provide for her food, is that not like a death-bed will? So far, he is obligated to provide for her bread and legumes. Maybe eggs? Maybe chicken? Since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, that means that she may sell the property even in order to eat delicacies. Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said, it was stated there that her burial is part of her upkeep. If she did not have a burial site, since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate, it means that he may sell the real estate and acquire a burial site.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 9:26

Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: The holder of documents is disadvantaged. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the Mishnah: “If [in the document] it was not written ‘bedridden’ but he says, I was bedridden,” etc. Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” etc. A young man was selling his properties. The case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, the presumption is that they signed for a mentally capable person. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since he undertook to uproot the properties from the family, he has to bring proof. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the holder of documents is advantaged. Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, how about Rebbi, since Rebbi said, the holder of documents is disadvantaged? He told him, everybody agrees that the holder of documents is advantaged. But how could you say that a case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph who said, the presumption is that they signed for a mentally capable person. And you said, since he undertook to uproot the properties from the family to another family, he has to bring proof! He told him, I never said this. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, even if Rebbi Joḥanan wants to deny it, did not Rebbi Yannai say in the name of Rebbi: The holder of documents is disadvantaged. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the Mishnah? This is the opinion of the Sages who follow Rebbi.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 10:18

HALAKHAH: “One writes a document of indebtedness,” etc. It was stated, forfaits. Rebbi Abbahu collected, Rebbi Aḥa collected, Rebbi Immi collected. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose did not collect. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose did not collect forfaits, he agrees if one gave his son to artisans and they mutually agreed to forfaits, he collects.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:31

“The rapist and the seducer,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent female. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned in a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But in the case of the preliminarily married adolescent female, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. It turns out that Rebbi Mana follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Abbahu.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:31

“The rapist and the seducer,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent female. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned in a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But in the case of the preliminarily married adolescent female, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. It turns out that Rebbi Mana follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Abbahu.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 2:6

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “Deep sorrow” is only for the dead, for it is written: Its gates are in deep sorrow and mourning. Ḥiyya bar Ada objected: Is it not written: the fishermen are in deep sorrow? Rebbi Ḥanina said, so is the baraita: there is no deep sorrow in impurity except for the dead. It was stated: “What is deep sorrow? From the moment of death until the moment of burial, the word of Rebbi. But the Sages say, the entire day.” It turns out that one describes leniencies and stringencies following Rebbi, leniencies and stringencies following the rabbis. What is the difference between them? If he died and was buried within the hour. Following the rabbis, he is forbidden the entire day; following Rebbi he is forbidden only that hour. If he died and was buried after three days. Following the rabbis, he is forbidden the entire day; following Rebbi he is forbidden up to three days. There came Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rav Ḥisda, both of whom said that Rebbi agrees with the Sages that he is forbidden only during the first day, as it was stated: Rebbi said, you know that deep mourning in the night is not biblical, since they said, “the deep mourner immerses himself and eats his Passover sacrifice in the evening.” But they said, deep mourning [during daytime] is biblical. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Explain it that he was buried close to sundown [and one cannot infer anything.]

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:7

HALAKHAH: “Each of them disqualifies the other’s witnesses,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, so is the Mishnah: “His witness,” but not his witnesses. But Rebbi Joḥanan said, even his witnesses, as it was stated: “One always adds judges until judgment is rendered, and the judges may change their opinions. After judgment is rendered they may no longer change their opinions.” Rebbi Joḥanan agrees, that if these were the only ones, he cannot disqualify them. Zeˋira said, he and a person from the street can team up to disqualify this testimony. Rebbi Ḥanina asked, does not one witness force an oath everywhere? Rebbi Zeˋira said, by disqualification one can only be disqualified by a court. A relative does not have to be disqualified by the court. Rava bar Binah said in the name of Rav: Three are like final judgment.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:67

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:67

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:68

And the following. One does not listen to the witnesses unless they come together; Rebbi Nathan says, one listens to the first and when the second comes, one listens to what he has to say. Rebbi Jonathan was sitting and asking, maybe somebody is here who heard that practice follows Rebbi Nathan? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina told him, that is Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim. He said, may he come up. When he came up, he asked him, did you hear that practice follows Rebbi Nathan? He answered, I heard that Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa agrees with Rebbi Nathan. He said, do we need this? He said, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina only intended to elevate Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim because he was an important person.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:14

There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses were testifying against a person, one group say that he vowed nazir twice, the others say that he vowed nazir five times. The House of Shammai say, the testimony is split and there is no nezirut there. But the House of Hillel say, five contains two; he should be a nazir twice.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that the testimony is split. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that five contains two. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:14

There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses were testifying against a person, one group say that he vowed nazir twice, the others say that he vowed nazir five times. The House of Shammai say, the testimony is split and there is no nezirut there. But the House of Hillel say, five contains two; he should be a nazir twice.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that the testimony is split. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that five contains two. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:15

Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:15

Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:14

HALAKHAH: “The order of beheading,” etc. “Rebbi Jehudah agrees that there is no death uglier than this but the Torah said, in their statutes you shall not walk.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, also it was stated thus: One shall murder the murderer, the way he murdered. I could think that if he killed with a sword, one should kill him with a sword, with a rod one should kill him with a rod? Avenging is written here, and there it is written: I shall bring over you a sword which avenges the vengeance of the Covenant. Since avenging mentioned there is by the sword, also avenging mentioned here is by the sword. I could think that he should kill him between the arms? It is said here, you shall eliminate the evil from your midst, and it is said there, you shall eliminate the innocent blood from your midst. Elimination, elimination; breaking the neck, breaking the neck. Since elimination here is at the neck, also there it is at the neck. Since breaking the neck there implies chopping off the head, also here chopping off the head.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:49

Do not worship them. Should I say, not unless he worshipped every single strange worship in the world? The verse says, do not prostrate yourself before them. Prostration was included; why is it mentioned separately? To tie to it: Prostration is special in that it is the act of a single person and is punishable separately, so I am adding any single act that one is liable for separately. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:54

Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If one says to it, you are my god, there is disagreement between Rebbi and the Sages. If he (prostrated himself), what is the rule? Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees that if he lowered his body, he is guilty. What is the difference between raising and lowering his body, and raising and lowering his lips? Rebbi Joḥanan said, following disagreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, following the distinction. Rebbi Zeˋira said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One rule should be for you, for the one acting in error. This only refers to what represents an action. The one who embraces (and who prostrates himself), which are not action, from where?

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:59

Rebbi Tanḥum ben Yudan said, even though Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical to the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. From where that if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action? As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:59

Rebbi Tanḥum ben Yudan said, even though Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical to the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. From where that if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action? As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:5

Rebbi Eleazar said, Symmachos and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be liable because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. It was found stated: it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and (her daughter) [her son’s daughter] and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall the under same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:15

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? A man may not take his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s wing; that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which is in need of his father. Would he not anyhow be [criminally] liable for her because of “his father’s wife”? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning; if he was warned because of his father’s wife he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other men that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he marries her preliminarily that the preliminary marriage is legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:15

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? A man may not take his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s wing; that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which is in need of his father. Would he not anyhow be [criminally] liable for her because of “his father’s wife”? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning; if he was warned because of his father’s wife he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other men that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he marries her preliminarily that the preliminary marriage is legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:15

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? A man may not take his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s wing; that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which is in need of his father. Would he not anyhow be [criminally] liable for her because of “his father’s wife”? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning; if he was warned because of his father’s wife he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other men that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he marries her preliminarily that the preliminary marriage is legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:15

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? A man may not take his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s wing; that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which is in need of his father. Would he not anyhow be [criminally] liable for her because of “his father’s wife”? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning; if he was warned because of his father’s wife he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other men that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he marries her preliminarily that the preliminary marriage is legally valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:30

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said. not only to the bridal chamber but also to a house containing the bridal chamber. The following is problematic: Dining room and bedroom, bridal chamber and bedroom; if she entered the dining room, for which consequence? Rebbi Joḥanan said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Zeˋira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he cannot actually dissolve them before she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: to whore in her father’s house. This excludes the case where the father’s agents handed her over to the husband’s agents, that she could not be stoned, but is strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:4

One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:52

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:23

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:23

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:21

“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:22

Samuel said. the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah; the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated: “Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one;” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rebbi Ḥinena said, in Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.