510 occurrences across the corpus

Sefer haYashar (Book of Jasher)

The Book of Jasher 8:11

And thy servants were astonished at the sight which we saw, and were greatly terrified, and we made our judgment upon the sight, and knew by our wisdom the proper interpretation thereof, that this thing applies to the child that is born to Terah, who will grow up and multiply greatly, and become powerful, and kill all the kings of the earth, and inherit all their lands, he and his seed forever.

The Works of Flavius Josephus

Against Apion, Book I 1:33

This is the account Cheremon gives us. Now I take it for granted that what I have said already hath plainly proved the falsity of both these narrations; for had there been any real truth at the bottom, it was impossible they should so greatly disagree about the particulars. But for those that invent lies, what they write will easily give us very different accounts, while they forge what they please out of their own heads. Now Manetho says that the king's desire of seeing the gods was the origin of the ejection of the polluted people; but Cheremon feigns that it was a dream of his own, sent upon him by Isis, that was the occasion of it. Manetho says that the person who foreshowed this purgation of Egypt to the king was Amenophis; but this man says it was Phritiphantes. As to the numbers of the multitude that were expelled, they agree exceedingly well the former reckoning them eighty thousand, and the latter about two hundred and fifty thousand! Now, for Manetho, he describes those polluted persons as sent first to work in the quarries, and says that the city Avaris was given them for their habitation. As also he relates that it was not till after they had made war with the rest of the Egyptians, that they invited the people of Jerusalem to come to their assistance; while Cheremon says only that they were gone out of Egypt, and lighted upon three hundred and eighty thousand men about Pelusium, who had been left there by Amenophis, and so they invaded Egypt with them again; that thereupon Amenophis fled into Ethiopia. But then this Cheremon commits a most ridiculous blunder in not informing us who this army of so many ten thousands were, or whence they came; whether they were native Egyptians, or whether they came from a foreign country. Nor indeed has this man, who forged a dream from Isis about the leprous people, assigned the reason why the king would not bring them into Egypt. Moreover, Cheremon sets down Joseph as driven away at the same time with Moses, who yet died four generations before Moses, which four generations make almost one hundred and seventy years. Besides all this, Ramesses, the son of Amenophis, by Manetho's account, was a young man, and assisted his father in his war, and left the country at the same time with him, and fled into Ethiopia. But Cheremon makes him to have been born in a certain cave, after his father was dead, and that he then overcame the Jews in battle, and drove them into Syria, being in number about two hundred thousand. O the levity of the man! for he had neither told us who these three hundred and eighty thousand were, nor how the four hundred and thirty thousand perished; whether they fell in war, or went over to Ramesses. And, what is the strangest of all, it is not possible to learn out of him who they were whom he calls Jews, or to which of these two parties he applies that denomination, whether to the two hundred and fifty thousand leprous people, or to the three hundred and eighty thousand that were about Pelusium. But perhaps it will be looked upon as a silly thing in me to make any larger confutation of such writers as sufficiently confute themselves; for had they been only confuted by other men, it had been more tolerable.

The Writings of Origen

De Principiis, Book II 5:3

And now, what we have drawn from the authority of Scripture ought to be sufficient to refute the arguments of the heretics. It will not, however, appear improper if we discuss the matter with them shortly, on the grounds of reason itself. We ask them, then, if they know what is regarded among men as the ground of virtue and wickedness, and if it appears to follow that we can speak of virtues in God, or, as they think, in these two Gods. Let them give an answer also to the question, whether they consider goodness to be a virtue; and as they will undoubtedly admit it to be so, what will they say of injustice? They will never certainly, in my opinion, be so foolish as to deny that justice is a virtue. Accordingly, if virtue is a blessing, and justice is a virtue, then without doubt justice is goodness. But if they say that justice is not a blessing, it must either be an evil or an indifferent thing. Now I think it folly to return any answer to those who say that justice is an evil, for I shall have the appearance of replying either to senseless words, or to men out of their minds. How can that appear an evil which is able to reward the good with blessings, as they themselves also admit? But if they say that it is a thing of indifference, it follows that since justice is so, sobriety also, and prudence, and all the other virtues, are things of indifference. And what answer shall we make to Paul, when he says, “If there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things, which ye have learned, and received, and heard, and seen in me?” Let them learn, therefore, by searching the holy Scriptures, what are the individual virtues, and not deceive themselves by saying that that God who rewards every one according to his merits, does, through hatred of evil, recompense the wicked with evil, and not because those who have sinned need to be treated with severer remedies, and because He applies to them those measures which, with the prospect of improvement, seem nevertheless, for the present, to produce a feeling of pain. They do not read what is written respecting the hope of those who were destroyed in the deluge; of which hope Peter himself thus speaks in his first epistle: “That Christ, indeed, was put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit, by which He went and preached to the spirits who were kept in prison, who once were unbelievers, when they awaited the long-suffering of God in the days of Noah, when the ark was preparing, in which a few, i.e. eight souls, were saved by water. Whereunto also baptism by a like figure now saves you.” And with regard to Sodom and Gomorrha, let them tell us whether they believe the prophetic words to be those of the Creator God—of Him, viz., who is related to have rained upon them a shower of fire and brimstone. What does Ezekiel the prophet say of them? “Sodom,” he says, “shall be restored to her former condition.” But why, in afflicting those who are deserving of punishment, does He not afflict them for their good?—who also says to Chaldea, “Thou hast coals of fire, sit upon them; they will be a help to thee.” And of those also who fell in the desert, let them hear what is related in the seventy-eighth Psalm, which bears the superscription of Asaph; for he says, “When He slew them, then they sought Him.” He does not say that some sought Him after others had been slain, but he says that the destruction of those who were killed was of such a nature that, when put to death, they sought God. By all which it is established, that the God of the law and the Gospels is one and the same, a just and good God, and that He confers benefits justly, and punishes with kindness; since neither goodness without justice, nor justice without goodness, can display the [real] dignity of the divine nature. We shall add the following remarks, to which we are driven by their subtleties. If justice is a different thing from goodness, then, since evil is the opposite of good, and injustice of justice, injustice will doubtless be something else than an evil; and as, in your opinion, the just man is not good, so neither will the unjust man be wicked; and again, as the good man is not just, so the wicked man also will not be unjust. But who does not see the absurdity, that to a good God one should be opposed that is evil; while to a just God, whom they allege to be inferior to the good, no one should be opposed! For there is none who can be called unjust, as there is a Satan who is called wicked. What, then, are we to do? Let us give up the position which we defend, for they will not be able to maintain that a bad man is not also unjust, and an unjust man wicked. And if these qualities be indissolubly inherent in these opposites, viz. injustice in wickedness, or wickedness in injustice, then unquestionably the good man will be inseparable from the just man, and the just from the good; so that, as we speak of one and the same wickedness in malice and injustice, we may also hold the virtue of goodness and justice to be one and the same.

De Principiis, Book III 2:21

Nay, that very declaration, that from the same lump a vessel is formed both to honour and to dishonour, will not push us hard; for we assert that the nature of all rational souls is the same, as one lump of clay is described as being under the treatment of the potter. Seeing, then, the nature of rational creatures is one, God, according to the previous grounds of merit, created and formed out of it, as the potter out of the one lump, some persons to honour and others to dishonour. Now, as regards the language of the apostle, which he utters as if in a tone of censure, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” he means, I think, to point out that such a censure does not refer to any believer who lives rightly and justly, and who has confidence in God, i.e. to such an one as Moses was, of whom Scripture says that “Moses spake, and God answered him by a voice;” and as God answered Moses, so also does every saint answer God. But he who is an unbeliever, and loses confidence in answering before God owing to the unworthiness of his life and conversation, and who, in relation to these matters, does not seek to learn and make progress, but to oppose and resist, and who, to speak more plainly, is such an one as to be able to say those words which the apostle indicates, when he says, “Why, then, does He yet find fault? for who will resist His will?”—to such an one may the censure of the apostle rightly be directed, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” This censure accordingly applies not to believers and saints, but to unbelievers and wicked men. Now, to those who introduce souls of different natures, and who turn this declaration of the apostle to the support of their own opinion, we have to reply as follows: If even they are agreed as to what the apostle says, that out of the one lump are formed both those who are made to honour and those who are made to dishonour, whom they term of a nature that is to be saved and destroyed, there will then be no longer souls of different natures, but one nature for all. And if they admit that one and the same potter may undoubtedly denote one Creator, there will not be different creators either of those who are saved, or of those who perish. Now, truly, let them choose whether they will have a good Creator to be intended who creates bad and ruined men, or one who is not good, who creates good men and those who are prepared to honour. For the necessity of returning an answer will extort from them one of these two alternatives. But according to our declaration, whereby we say that it is owing to preceding causes that God makes vessels either to honour or to dishonour, the approval of God’s justice is in no respect limited. For it is possible that this vessel, which owing to previous causes was made in this world to honour, may, if it behave negligently, be converted in another world, according to the deserts of its conduct, into a vessel unto dishonour: as again, if any one, owing to preceding causes, was formed by his Creator in this life a vessel unto dishonour, and shall mend his ways and cleanse himself from all filth and vice, he may, in the new world, be made a vessel to honour, sanctified and useful, and prepared unto every good work. Finally, those who were formed by God in this world to be Israelites, and who have lived a life unworthy of the nobility of their race, and have fallen away from the grandeur of their descent, will, in the world to come, in a certain degree be converted, on account of their unbelief, from vessels of honour into vessels of dishonour; while, on the other hand, many who in this life were reckoned among Egyptian or Idumean vessels, having adopted the faith and practice of Israelites, when they shall have done the works of Israelites, and shall have entered the church of the Lord, will exist as vessels of honour in the revelation of the sons of God. From which it is more agreeable to the rule of piety to believe that every rational being, according to his purpose and manner of life, is converted, sometimes from bad to good, and falls away sometimes from good to bad: that some abide in good, and others advance to a better condition, and always ascend to higher things, until they reach the highest grade of all; while others, again, remain in evil, or, if the wickedness within them begin to spread itself further, they descend to a worse condition, and sink into the lowest depth of wickedness. Whence also we must suppose that it is possible there may be some who began at first indeed with small offences, but who have poured out wickedness to such a degree, and attained such proficiency in evil, that in the measure of their wickedness they are equal even to the opposing powers: and again, if, by means of many severe administrations of punishment, they are able at some future time to recover their senses, and gradually attempt to find healing for their wounds, they may, on ceasing from their wickedness, be restored to a state of goodness. Whence we are of opinion that, seeing the soul, as we have frequently said, is immortal and eternal, it is possible that, in the many and endless periods of duration in the immeasurable and different worlds, it may descend from the highest good to the lowest evil, or be restored from the lowest evil to the highest good.

Against Celsus, Book I 12:1

In the next place, when Celsus says in express words, “If they would answer me, not as if I were asking for information, for I am acquainted with all their opinions, but because I take an equal interest in them all, it would be well. And if they will not, but will keep reiterating, as they generally do, ‘Do not investigate,’ etc., they must, he continues, explain to me at least of what nature these things are of which they speak, and whence they are derived,” etc. Now, with regard to his statement that he “is acquainted with all our doctrines,” we have to say that this is a boastful and daring assertion; for if he had read the prophets in particular, which are full of acknowledged difficulties, and of declarations that are obscure to the multitude, and if he had perused the parables of the Gospels, and the other writings of the law and of the Jewish history, and the utterances of the apostles, and had read them candidly, with a desire to enter into their meaning, he would not have expressed himself with such boldness, nor said that he “was acquainted with all their doctrines.” Even we ourselves, who have devoted much study to these writings, would not say that “we were acquainted with everything,” for we have a regard for truth. Not one of us will assert, “I know all the doctrines of Epicurus,” or will be confident that he knows all those of Plato, in the knowledge of the fact that so many differences of opinion exist among the expositors of these systems. For who is so daring as to say that he knows all the opinions of the Stoics or of the Peripatetics? Unless, indeed, it should be the case that he has heard this boast, “I know them all,” from some ignorant and senseless individuals, who do not perceive their own ignorance, and should thus imagine, from having had such persons as his teachers, that he was acquainted with them all. Such an one appears to me to act very much as a person would do who had visited Egypt (where the Egyptian savans, learned in their country’s literature, are greatly given to philosophizing about those things which are regarded among them as divine, but where the vulgar, hearing certain myths, the reasons of which they do not understand, are greatly elated because of their fancied knowledge), and who should imagine that he is acquainted with the whole circle of Egyptian knowledge, after having been a disciple of the ignorant alone, and without having associated with any of the priests, or having learned the mysteries of the Egyptians from any other source. And what I have said regarding the learned and ignorant among the Egyptians, I might have said also of the Persians; among whom there are mysteries, conducted on rational principles by the learned among them, but understood in a symbolical sense by the more superficial of the multitude. And the same remark applies to the Syrians, and Indians, and to all those who have a literature and a mythology.

Against Celsus, Book I 14:1

Celsus, being of opinion that there is to be found among many nations a general relationship of doctrine, enumerates all the nations which gave rise to such and such opinions; but for some reason, unknown to me, he casts a slight upon the Jews, not including them amongst the others, as having either laboured along with them, and arrived at the same conclusions, or as having entertained similar opinions on many subjects. It is proper, therefore, to ask him why he gives credence to the histories of barbarians and Greeks respecting the antiquity of those nations of whom he speaks, but stamps the histories of this nation alone as false. For if the respective writers related the events which are found in these works in the spirit of truth, why should we distrust the prophets of the Jews alone? And if Moses and the prophets have recorded many things in their history from a desire to favour their own system, why should we not say the same of the historians of other countries? Or, when the Egyptians or their histories speak evil of the Jews, are they to be believed on that point; but the Jews, when saying the same things of the Egyptians, and declaring that they had suffered great injustice at their hands, and that on this account they had been persecuted by God, are to be charged with falsehood? And this applies not to the Egyptians alone, but to others; for we shall find that there was a connection between the Assyrians and the Jews, and that this is recorded in the ancient histories of the Assyrians. And so also the Jewish historians (I avoid using the word “prophets,” that I may not appear to prejudge the case) have related that the Assyrians were enemies of the Jews. Observe at once, then, the arbitrary procedure of this individual, who believes the histories of these nations on the ground of their being learned, and condemns others as being wholly ignorant. For listen to the statement of Celsus: “There is,” he says, “an authoritative account from the very beginning, respecting which there is a constant agreement among all the most learned nations, and cities, and men.” And yet will not call the Jews a learned nation in the same way in which he does the Egyptians, and Assyrians, and Indians, and Persians, and Odrysians, and Samothracians, and Eleusinians.

Against Celsus, Book I 22:1

After this, Celsus, without condemning circumcision as practised by the Jews, asserts that this usage was derived from the Egyptians; thus believing the Egyptians rather than Moses, who says that Abraham was the first among men who practised the rite. And it is not Moses alone who mentions the name of Abraham, assigning to him great intimacy with God; but many also of those who give themselves to the practice of the conjuration of evil spirits, employ in their spells the expression “God of Abraham,” pointing out by the very name the friendship [that existed] between that just man and God. And yet, while making use of the phrase “God of Abraham,” they do not know who Abraham is! And the same remark applies to Isaac, and Jacob, and Israel; which names, although confessedly Hebrew, are frequently introduced by those Egyptians who profess to produce some wonderful result by means of their knowledge. The rite of circumcision, however, which began with Abraham, and was discontinued by Jesus, who desired that His disciples should not practise it, is not before us for explanation; for the present occasion does not lead us to speak of such things, but to make an effort to refute the charges brought against the doctrine of the Jews by Celsus, who thinks that he will be able the more easily to establish the falsity of Christianity, if, by assailing its origin in Judaism, he can show that the latter also is untrue.

Against Celsus, Book I 25:1

And perhaps there is a danger as great as that which degrades the name of “God,” or of “the Good,” to improper objects, in changing the name of God according to a secret system, and applying those which belong to inferior beings to greater, and vice versa. And I do not dwell on this, that when the name of Zeus is uttered, there is heard at the same time that of the son of Kronos and Rhea, and the husband of Hera, and brother of Poseidon, and father of Athene, and Artemis, who was guilty of incest with his own daughter Persephone; or that Apollo immediately suggests the son of Leto and Zeus, and the brother of Artemis, and half-brother of Hermes; and so with all the other names invented by these wise men of Celsus, who are the parents of these opinions, and the ancient theologians of the Greeks. For what are the grounds for deciding that he should on the one hand be properly called Zeus, and yet on the other should not have Kronos for his father and Rhea for his mother? And the same argument applies to all the others that are called gods. But this charge does not at all apply to those who, for some mysterious reason, refer the word Sabaoth, or Adonai, or any of the other names to the [true] God. And when one is able to philosophize about the mystery of names, he will find much to say respecting the titles of the angels of God, of whom one is called Michael, and another Gabriel, and another Raphael, appropriately to the duties which they discharge in the world, according to the will of the God of all things. And a similar philosophy of names applies also to our Jesus, whose name has already been seen, in an unmistakeable manner, to have expelled myriads of evil spirits from the souls and bodies [of men], so great was the power which it exerted upon those from whom the spirits were driven out. And while still upon the subject of names, we have to mention that those who are skilled in the use of incantations, relate that the utterance of the same incantation in its proper language can accomplish what the spell professes to do; but when translated into any other tongue, it is observed to become inefficacious and feeble. And thus it is not the things signified, but the qualities and peculiarities of words, which possess a certain power for this or that purpose. And so on such grounds as these we defend the conduct of the Christians, when they struggle even to death to avoid calling God by the name of Zeus, or to give Him a name from any other language. For they either use the common name—God—indefinitely, or with some such addition as that of the “Maker of all things,” “the Creator of heaven and earth”—He who sent down to the human race those good men, to whose names that of God being added, certain mighty works are wrought among men. And much more besides might be said on the subject of names, against those who think that we ought to be indifferent as to our use of them. And if the remark of Plato in the Philebus should surprise us, when he says, “My fear, O Protagoras, about the names of the gods is no small one,” seeing Philebus in his discussion with Socrates had called pleasure a “god,” how shall we not rather approve the piety of the Christians, who apply none of the names used in the mythologies to the Creator of the world? And now enough on this subject for the present.

Against Celsus, Book I 25:1

And perhaps there is a danger as great as that which degrades the name of “God,” or of “the Good,” to improper objects, in changing the name of God according to a secret system, and applying those which belong to inferior beings to greater, and vice versa. And I do not dwell on this, that when the name of Zeus is uttered, there is heard at the same time that of the son of Kronos and Rhea, and the husband of Hera, and brother of Poseidon, and father of Athene, and Artemis, who was guilty of incest with his own daughter Persephone; or that Apollo immediately suggests the son of Leto and Zeus, and the brother of Artemis, and half-brother of Hermes; and so with all the other names invented by these wise men of Celsus, who are the parents of these opinions, and the ancient theologians of the Greeks. For what are the grounds for deciding that he should on the one hand be properly called Zeus, and yet on the other should not have Kronos for his father and Rhea for his mother? And the same argument applies to all the others that are called gods. But this charge does not at all apply to those who, for some mysterious reason, refer the word Sabaoth, or Adonai, or any of the other names to the [true] God. And when one is able to philosophize about the mystery of names, he will find much to say respecting the titles of the angels of God, of whom one is called Michael, and another Gabriel, and another Raphael, appropriately to the duties which they discharge in the world, according to the will of the God of all things. And a similar philosophy of names applies also to our Jesus, whose name has already been seen, in an unmistakeable manner, to have expelled myriads of evil spirits from the souls and bodies [of men], so great was the power which it exerted upon those from whom the spirits were driven out. And while still upon the subject of names, we have to mention that those who are skilled in the use of incantations, relate that the utterance of the same incantation in its proper language can accomplish what the spell professes to do; but when translated into any other tongue, it is observed to become inefficacious and feeble. And thus it is not the things signified, but the qualities and peculiarities of words, which possess a certain power for this or that purpose. And so on such grounds as these we defend the conduct of the Christians, when they struggle even to death to avoid calling God by the name of Zeus, or to give Him a name from any other language. For they either use the common name—God—indefinitely, or with some such addition as that of the “Maker of all things,” “the Creator of heaven and earth”—He who sent down to the human race those good men, to whose names that of God being added, certain mighty works are wrought among men. And much more besides might be said on the subject of names, against those who think that we ought to be indifferent as to our use of them. And if the remark of Plato in the Philebus should surprise us, when he says, “My fear, O Protagoras, about the names of the gods is no small one,” seeing Philebus in his discussion with Socrates had called pleasure a “god,” how shall we not rather approve the piety of the Christians, who apply none of the names used in the mythologies to the Creator of the world? And now enough on this subject for the present.

Against Celsus, Book II 20:1

Let us see how he continues after this: “These events,” he says, “he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass. God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men. Now, of a truth, he who shared a man’s table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator. And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains!” Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous, the following is our reply to such statements. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz. that one or other of these things will take place. For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this: “This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise.” And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks. Now, what is called by logicians an “idle argument,” which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism. And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument. Now, in Ps. cix., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus: “Hold not Thy peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me.” Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy. For let him suffer these things, “because,” says the psalmist, “he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man.” Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute. But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy.

Against Celsus, Book II 59:1

He imagines also that both the earthquake and the darkness were an invention; but regarding these, we have in the preceding pages made our defence, according to our ability, adducing the testimony of Phlegon, who relates that these events took place at the time when our Saviour suffered. And he goes on to say, that “Jesus, while alive, was of no assistance to himself, but that he arose after death, and exhibited the marks of his punishment, and showed how his hands had been pierced by nails.” We ask him what he means by the expression, “was of no assistance to himself?” For if he means it to refer to want of virtue, we reply that He was of very great assistance. For He neither uttered nor committed anything that was improper, but was truly “led as a sheep to the slaughter, and was dumb as a lamb before the shearer;” and the Gospel testifies that He opened not His mouth. But if Celsus applies the expression to things indifferent and corporeal, [meaning that in such Jesus could render no help to Himself,] we say that we have proved from the Gospels that He went voluntarily to encounter His sufferings. Speaking next of the statements in the Gospels, that after His resurrection He showed the marks of His punishment, and how His hands had been pierced, he asks, “Who beheld this?” And discrediting the narrative of Mary Magdalene, who is related to have seen Him, he replies, “A half-frantic woman, as ye state.” And because she is not the only one who is recorded to have seen the Saviour after His resurrection, but others also are mentioned, this Jew of Celsus calumniates these statements also in adding, “And some one else of those engaged in the same system of deception!”

Against Celsus, Book IV 50:1

Moreover, if the law of Moses had contained nothing which was to be understood as having a secret meaning, the prophet would not have said in his prayer to God, “Open Thou mine eyes, and I will behold wondrous things out of Thy law;” whereas he knew that there was a veil of ignorance lying upon the heart of those who read but do not understand the figurative meaning, which veil is taken away by the gift of God, when He hears him who has done all that he can, and who by reason of habit has his senses exercised to distinguish between good and evil, and who continually utters the prayer, “Open Thou mine eyes, and I will behold wondrous things out of Thy law.” And who is there that, on reading of the dragon that lives in the Egyptian river, and of the fishes which lurk in his scales, or of the excrement of Pharaoh which fills the mountains of Egypt, is not led at once to inquire who he is that fills the Egyptian mountains with his stinking excrement, and what the Egyptian mountains are; and what the rivers in Egypt are, of which the aforesaid Pharaoh boastfully says, “The rivers are mine, and I have made them;” and who the dragon is, and the fishes in its scales,—and this so as to harmonize with the interpretation to be given of the rivers? But why establish at greater length what needs no demonstration? For to these things applies the saying: “Who is wise, and he shall understand these things? or who is prudent, and he shall know them?” Now I have gone at some length into the subject, because I wished to show the unsoundness of the assertion of Celsus, that “the more modest among the Jews and Christians endeavour somehow to give these stories an allegorical signification, although some of them do not admit of this, but on the contrary are exceedingly silly inventions.” Much rather are the stories of the Greeks not only very silly, but very impious inventions. For our narratives keep expressly in view the multitude of simpler believers, which was not done by those who invented the Grecian fables. And therefore not without propriety does Plato expel from his state all fables and poems of such a nature as those of which we have been speaking.

Against Celsus, Book IV 51:1

Celsus appears to me to have heard that there are treatises in existence which contain allegorical explanations of the law of Moses. These, however, he could not have read; for if he had, he would not have said: “The allegorical explanations, however, which have been devised, are much more shameful and absurd than the fables themselves, inasmuch as they endeavour to unite with marvellous and altogether insensate folly things which cannot at all be made to harmonize.” He seems to refer in these words to the works of Philo, or to those of still older writers, such as Aristobulus. But I conjecture that Celsus has not read their books, since it appears to me that in many passages they have so successfully hit the meaning [of the sacred writers], that even Grecian philosophers would have been captivated by their explanations; for in their writings we find not only a polished style, but exquisite thoughts and doctrines, and a rational use of what Celsus imagines to be fables in the sacred writings. I know, moreover, that Numenius the Pythagorean—a surpassingly excellent expounder of Plato, and who held a foremost place as a teacher of the doctrines of Pythagoras—in many of his works quotes from the writings of Moses and the prophets, and applies to the passages in question a not improbable allegorical meaning, as in his work called Epops, and in those which treat of “Numbers” and of “Place.” And in the third book of his dissertation on The Good, he quotes also a narrative regarding Jesus—without, however, mentioning His name—and gives it an allegorical signification, whether successfully or the reverse I may state on another occasion. He relates also the account respecting Moses, and Jannes, and Jambres. But we are not elated on account of this instance, though we express our approval of Numenius, rather than of Celsus and other Greeks, because he was willing to investigate our histories from a desire to acquire knowledge, and was [duly] affected by them as narratives which were to be allegorically understood, and which did not belong to the category of foolish compositions.

Against Celsus, Book VII 21:1

When, then, the letter of the law promises riches to the just, Celsus may follow the letter which killeth, and understand it of worldly riches, which blind men; but we say that it refers to those riches which enlighten the eyes, and which enrich a man “in all utterance and in all knowledge.” And in this sense we “charge them that are rich in this world, that they be not high-minded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who giveth us richly all things to enjoy; that they do good, that they be rich in good works, ready to distribute, willing to communicate.” For, as Solomon says, “riches” are the true good, which “are the ransom of the life of a man;” but the poverty which is the opposite of these riches is destructive, for by it “the poor cannot bear rebuke.” And what has been said of riches applies to dominion, in regard to which it is said, “The just man shall chase a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight.” Now if riches are to be taken in the sense we have just explained, consider if it is not according to God’s promise that he who is rich in all utterance, in all knowledge, in all wisdom, in all good works, may not out of these treasures of utterance, of wisdom, and of knowledge, lend to many nations. It was thus that Paul lent to all the nations that he visited, “carrying the gospel of Christ from Jerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum.” And as the divine knowledge was given to him by revelation, and his mind was illumined by the Divine Word, he himself therefore needed to borrow from no one, and required not the ministry of any man to teach him the word of truth. Thus, as it had been written, “Thou shalt have dominion over many nations, and they shall not have dominion over thee,” he ruled over the Gentiles whom he brought under the teaching of Jesus Christ; and he never “gave place by subjection to men, no, not for an hour,” as being himself mightier than they. And thus also he “filled the earth.”

Against Celsus, Book VII 39:1

Now let us hear what it is that he invites us to learn, that we may ascertain from him how we are to know God, although he thinks that his words are beyond the capacity of all Christians. “Let them hear,” says he, “if they are able to do so.” We have then to consider what the philosopher wishes us to hear from him. But instead of instructing us as he ought, he abuses us; and while he should have shown his goodwill to those whom he addresses at the outset of his discourse, he stigmatizes as “a cowardly race” men who would rather die than abjure Christianity even by a word, and who are ready to suffer every form of torture, or any kind of death. He also applies to us the epithet “carnal” or “flesh-indulging,” “although,” as we are wont to say, “we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth we know Him no more,” and although we are so ready to lay down our lives for the cause of religion, that no philosopher could lay aside his robes more readily. He then addresses to us these words: “If, instead of exercising your senses, you look upwards with the soul; if, turning away the eye of the body, you open the eye of the mind, thus and thus only you will be able to see God.” He is not aware that this reference to the two eyes, the eye of the body and the eye of the mind, which he has borrowed from the Greeks, was in use among our own writers; for Moses, in his account of the creation of the world, introduces man before his transgression as both seeing and not seeing: seeing, when it is said of the woman, “The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise;” and again not seeing, as when he introduces the serpent saying to the woman, as if she and her husband had been blind, “God knows that on the day that ye eat thereof your eyes shall be opened;” and also when it is said, “They did eat, and the eyes of both of them were opened.” The eyes of sense were then opened, which they had done well to keep shut, that they might not be distracted, and hindered from seeing with the eyes of the mind; and it was those eyes of the mind which in consequence of sin, as I imagine, were then closed, with which they had up to that time enjoyed the delight of beholding God and His paradise. This twofold kind of vision in us was familiar to our Saviour, who says, “For judgment I am come into this world, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind,”—meaning by the eyes that see not the eyes of the mind, which are enlightened by His teaching; and the eyes which see are the eyes of sense, which His words do render blind, in order that the soul may look without distraction upon proper objects. All true Christians therefore have the eye of the mind sharpened, and the eye of sense closed; so that each one, according to the degree in which his better eye is quickened, and the eye of sense darkened, sees and knows the Supreme God, and His Son, who is the Word, Wisdom, and so forth.

Against Celsus, Book VII 66:1

And the charge of folly applies not only to those who offer prayers to images, but also to such as pretend to do so in compliance with the example of the multitude: and to this class belong the Peripatetic philosophers and the followers of Epicurus and Democritus. For there is no falsehood or pretence in the soul which is possessed with true piety towards God. Another reason also why we abstain from doing honour to images, is that we may give no support to the notion that the images are gods. It is on this ground that we condemn Celsus, and all others who, while admitting that they are not gods, yet, with the reputation of being wise men, render to them what passes for homage. In this way they lead into sin the multitude who follow their example, and who worship these images not simply out of deference to custom, but from a belief into which they have fallen that they are true gods, and that those are not to be listened to who hold that the objects of their worship are not true gods. Celsus, indeed, says that “they do not take them for gods, but only as offerings dedicated to the gods.” But he does not prove that they are not rather dedicated to men than, as he says, to the honour of the gods themselves; for it is clear that they are the offerings of men who were in error in their views of the Divine Being. Moreover, we do not imagine that these images are representations of God, for they cannot represent a being who is invisible and incorporeal. But as Celsus supposes that we fall into a contradiction, whilst on the one hand we say that God has not a human form, and on the other we profess to believe that God made man the image of Himself, and created man the image of God; our answer is the same as has been given already, that we hold the resemblance to God to be preserved in the reasonable soul, which is formed to virtue, although Celsus, who does not see the difference between “being the image of God,” and “being created after the image of God,” pretends that we said, “God made man His own image, and gave him a form like to His own.” But this also has been examined before.

Against Celsus, Book VIII 20:1

There are, then, among the righteous some who are carbuncles, others sapphires, others jaspers, and others crystal, and thus there is among the righteous every kind of choice and precious stone. As to the spiritual meaning of the different stones,—what is their nature, and to what kind of soul the name of each precious stone especially applies,—we cannot at present stay to examine. We have only felt it necessary to show thus briefly what we understand by temples, and what the one Temple of God built of precious stones truly means. For as if in some cities a dispute should arise as to which had the finest temples, those who thought their own were the best would do their utmost to show the excellence of their own temples and the inferiority of the others,—in like manner, when they reproach us for not deeming it necessary to worship the Divine Being by raising lifeless temples, we set before them our temples, and show to such at least as are not blind and senseless, like their senseless gods, that there is no comparison between our statues and the statues of the heathen, nor between our altars, with what we may call the incense ascending from them, and the heathen altars, with the fat and blood of the victims; nor, finally, between the temples of senseless gods, admired by senseless men, who have no divine faculty for perceiving God, and the temples, statues, and altars which are worthy of God. It is not therefore true that we object to building altars, statues, and temples, because we have agreed to make this the badge of a secret and forbidden society; but we do so, because we have learnt from Jesus Christ the true way of serving God, and we shrink from whatever, under a pretence of piety, leads to utter impiety those who abandon the way marked out for us by Jesus Christ. For it is He who alone is the way of piety, as He truly said, “I am the way, the truth, the life.”

Against Celsus, Book VIII 37:1

In the next place, Celsus forgets that he is addressing Christians, who pray to God alone through Jesus; and mixing up other notions with theirs, he absurdly attributes them all to Christians. “If,” says he, “they who are addressed are called upon by barbarous names, they will have power, but no longer will they have any if they are addressed in Greek or Latin.” Let him, then, state plainly whom we call upon for help by barbarous names. Any one will be convinced that this is a false charge which Celsus brings against us, when he considers that Christians in prayer do not even use the precise names which divine Scripture applies to God; but the Greeks use Greek names, the Romans Latin names, and every one prays and sings praises to God as he best can, in his mother tongue. For the Lord of all the languages of the earth hears those who pray to Him in each different tongue, hearing, if I may so say, but one voice, expressing itself in various dialects. For the Most High is not as one of those who select one language, barbarian or Greek, knowing nothing of any other, and caring nothing for those who speak in other tongues.

Against Celsus, Book VIII 72:1

Afterwards he says: “If it were possible,” implying at the same time that he thought it most desirable, “that all the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, Greeks and barbarians, all to the uttermost ends of the earth, were to come under one law;” but judging this quite impossible, he adds, “Any one who thinks this possible, knows nothing.” It would require careful consideration and lengthened argument to prove that it is not only possible, but that it will surely come to pass, that all who are endowed with reason shall come under one law. However, if we must refer to this subject, it will be with great brevity. The Stoics, indeed, hold that, when the strongest of the elements prevails, all things shall be turned into fire. But our belief is, that the Word shall prevail over the entire rational creation, and change every soul into His own perfection; in which state every one, by the mere exercise of his power, will choose what he desires, and obtain what he chooses. For although, in the diseases and wounds of the body, there are some which no medical skill can cure, yet we hold that in the mind there is no evil so strong that it may not be overcome by the Supreme Word and God. For stronger than all the evils in the soul is the Word, and the healing power that dwells in Him; and this healing He applies, according to the will of God, to every man. The consummation of all things is the destruction of evil, although as to the question whether it shall be so destroyed that it can never anywhere arise again, it is beyond our present purpose to say. Many things are said obscurely in the prophecies on the total destruction of evil, and the restoration to righteousness of every soul; but it will be enough for our present purpose to quote the following passage from Zephaniah: “Prepare and rise early; all the gleanings of their vineyards are destroyed. Therefore wait ye upon me, saith the Lord, on the day that I rise up for a testimony; for my determination is to gather the nations, that I may assemble the kings, to pour upon them mine indignation, even all my fierce anger: for all the earth shall be devoured with the fire of my jealousy. For then will I turn to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent. From beyond the rivers of Ethiopia my suppliants, even the daughter of my dispersed, shall bring my offering. In that day shalt thou not be ashamed for all thy doings, wherein thou hast transgressed against me: for then I will take away out of the midst of thee them that rejoice in thy pride; and thou shalt no more be haughty because of my holy mountain. I will also leave in the midst of thee an afflicted and poor people, and they shall trust in the name of the Lord. The remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity, nor speak lies; neither shall a deceitful tongue be found in their mouth: for they shall feed and lie down, and none shall make them afraid.” I leave it to those who are able, after a careful study of the whole subject, to unfold the meaning of this prophecy, and especially to inquire into the signification of the words, “When the whole earth is destroyed, there will be turned upon the peoples a language according to their race,” as things were before the confusion of tongues. Let them also carefully consider the promise, that all shall call upon the name of the Lord, and serve Him with one consent; also that all contemptuous reproach shall be taken away, and there shall be no longer any injustice, or vain speech, or a deceitful tongue. And thus much it seemed needful for me to say briefly, and without entering into elaborate details, in answer to the remark of Celsus, that he considered any agreement between the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, as well Greeks as barbarians, was impossible. And perhaps such a result would indeed be impossible to those who are still in the body, but not to those who are released from it.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Peah 3:3

One who clears [his field] of fresh onions for the market and leaves the dry ones [in the ground] for the [time of the] threshing floor, must give peah from these on their own and these on their own. The same applies to beans and to a vineyard. If he, however, he only thins it out, then he gives [peah] from the remainder according to the quantity of that which he left. But if he clears [three from one place] at one time, he gives from the remainder according to the entire quantity.

Mishnah Peah 4:1

Peah is given from [the crop] while it is still connected with the soil. But in the case of hanging vine-branches and the date-palm, the owner brings down [the fruit] and distributes it among the poor. Rabbi Shimon says: the same applies to smooth nut trees. Even if ninety-nine [of the poor] say [to the owner] to distribute it and one says to leave it in the field, this latter is listened to, since he spoke in accordance with the halakhah.

Mishnah Peah 4:3

If [a poor man] took some of the peah [already collected] and threw it onto the remainder [not yet collected], he gets none of it. If he fell down upon it, or spread his cloak over it, they take the peah away from him. The same applies to gleanings and the forgotten sheaf.

Mishnah Peah 6:11

One who harvests by night and binds sheaves [by night] or one who is blind [that which he leaves] is subject to the law of the “forgotten.” If he intends to remove large leaves first, then the law of “forgotten” does not apply. If he said: “Behold, I am reaping on the condition that I take afterwards that which I have forgotten,” the law of “forgotten” still applies.

Mishnah Peah 7:2

An olive tree found standing between three rows [of olive trees] which have two plots separating them, and he forgot it, it is not deemed, “forgotten.” An olive tree containing two seahs and he forgot it, it is not deemed forgotten. To what does this apply? Only when he [the owner] had not yet begun [to harvest the tree], but if he had begun, even if it were like the olive tree of Netofah in its time, and he forgot it, it is deemed forgotten. As long as the owner has some of the olives belonging to him at the foot of the tree, he has [possession] of those on top of the tree. Rabbi Meir says: [forgotten applies only] after [those with] the beating-rod have gone.

Mishnah Kilayim 7:2

One who has bent [and conducted underground] three vines, and their [original] stems are visible, Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: if there is between them from four to eight cubits, they combine, if not, they do not combine. A vine which has dried up, it is forbidden [to sow near it], but it does not prohibit [the seed as kilayim]. Rabbi Meir said: the same applies to a cotton plant, it is forbidden [to sow near it], but it does not prohibit [the seed as kilayim]. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said in his name: above the vine too, it is forbidden [to sow near it], but it does not prohibit [the seed as kilayim].

Mishnah Kilayim 9:1

Nothing is forbidden on account of kilayim except [a mixture of] wool and linen. No [clothing material] is subject to uncleanness by scale disease except wool or linen. Priests do not wear any materials to serve in the Temple except for wool and linen. Camel’s wool with sheep’s wool, that have been mixed together: if the greater part is camel’s wool, it is permitted [to mix it with linen], but if the greater part is sheep’s wool, it is forbidden; if it is half and half, it is forbidden. The same applies to hemp and linen mixed together.

Mishnah Sheviit 4:4

One who thins out his olive-trees [in the seventh year]: Bet Shammai says: he cuts them down to the ground. Bet Hillel says: he may completely uproot them. They agree that if one levels his field, he can only cut them down to the ground. What is considered “thinning out”? One or two plants. And what is considered “leveling”? Three plants next to each other. This applies to his own property only, but from the property of another, even he that levels may uproot.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:1

They said an important general principle with regard to the sabbatical year: anything that is food for man or beast, or a species [of plants] used for dyeing, and cannot be left growing in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year is applied both to it and to its money substitute and the law of removal applies both to it and to its money substitute. Which are they? The leaves of the wild luf, the leaf of ceterach, endives, leeks, portulaca, and netz hahalav. What is the food for cattle? Thorns and thistles. What is species of dyeing matter? Aftergrowths of woad and madder. The law of the seventh year applies both to them and to their money-substitutes and the law of removal applies both to them and to their money substitute.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:1

They said an important general principle with regard to the sabbatical year: anything that is food for man or beast, or a species [of plants] used for dyeing, and cannot be left growing in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year is applied both to it and to its money substitute and the law of removal applies both to it and to its money substitute. Which are they? The leaves of the wild luf, the leaf of ceterach, endives, leeks, portulaca, and netz hahalav. What is the food for cattle? Thorns and thistles. What is species of dyeing matter? Aftergrowths of woad and madder. The law of the seventh year applies both to them and to their money-substitutes and the law of removal applies both to them and to their money substitute.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:1

They said an important general principle with regard to the sabbatical year: anything that is food for man or beast, or a species [of plants] used for dyeing, and cannot be left growing in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year is applied both to it and to its money substitute and the law of removal applies both to it and to its money substitute. Which are they? The leaves of the wild luf, the leaf of ceterach, endives, leeks, portulaca, and netz hahalav. What is the food for cattle? Thorns and thistles. What is species of dyeing matter? Aftergrowths of woad and madder. The law of the seventh year applies both to them and to their money-substitutes and the law of removal applies both to them and to their money substitute.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:2

And they said yet another general principle: Anything that is not food for man or beast, or is used for dyeing, but can be left in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year applies both to it and to its money substitute but the law of removal does not apply to it or to its money substitute. Which are these? The root of wild luf, the root of ceterach, scolopendrium, the root of netz hahalav and buchreyah. What is the species of dyeing matter? Puah (madder) and reseda. The law of the sabbatical year applies both to them and to their money substitute but the law of removal does not apply to them or to their money substitute. Rabbi Meir says: their money substitutes must be removed by Rosh Hashanah. They said to him: since this law does not apply to the plants themselves, all the more so it does not apply to their money-substitute.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:2

And they said yet another general principle: Anything that is not food for man or beast, or is used for dyeing, but can be left in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year applies both to it and to its money substitute but the law of removal does not apply to it or to its money substitute. Which are these? The root of wild luf, the root of ceterach, scolopendrium, the root of netz hahalav and buchreyah. What is the species of dyeing matter? Puah (madder) and reseda. The law of the sabbatical year applies both to them and to their money substitute but the law of removal does not apply to them or to their money substitute. Rabbi Meir says: their money substitutes must be removed by Rosh Hashanah. They said to him: since this law does not apply to the plants themselves, all the more so it does not apply to their money-substitute.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:5

The lulavim of hawthorn trees and carobs the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes, the law of removal applies to them and to their money substitutes. The lulavim of the terebinth, the pistachio tree and the white thorn, the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes, but the law of removal does not apply to them and to their money substitutes. But as for the leaves the law of removal applies, since they fall from their stem.

Mishnah Sheviit 7:5

The lulavim of hawthorn trees and carobs the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes, the law of removal applies to them and to their money substitutes. The lulavim of the terebinth, the pistachio tree and the white thorn, the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes, but the law of removal does not apply to them and to their money substitutes. But as for the leaves the law of removal applies, since they fall from their stem.

Mishnah Terumot 2:1

They may not give terumah from pure [produce] for impure [produce], but if they did give, the terumah is terumah. In truth they said: If a cake of pressed figs had become partly defiled, one may give terumah from the clean part for that part which had become defiled. The same applies to a bunch of vegetables, or a stack of grain. If there were two cakes [of figs], two bunches [of vegetables], two stacks [of grain], one pure and one impure, one should not give terumah from one for the other. Rabbi Eliezer says: one can give terumah from that which is pure for that which is impure.

Mishnah Orlah 3:7

For Rabbi Meir used to say: anything that is normally [sold] by counting causes [a mixture] to become consecrated [in even the smallest amount]. But the sages say only six things consecrate [a mixture in even the smallest amount], and Rabbi Akiba says seven [things]. And these are they: Nuts with soft shells; badan pomegranates; stopped-up casks; beet shoots; cabbage-heads; Greek pumpkins. Rabbi Akiba says: also loaves [baked by] a householder. To those to which orlah applies [they prohibit the mixture] as orlah, [to those of which] kilayim of the vineyard apply [they prohibit the mixture as] kilayim of the vineyard.

Mishnah Bikkurim 1:5

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: a woman who is a daughter of a convert may not marry a priest unless her mother was herself an Israelite. [This law applies equally to the offspring] whether of proselytes or freed slaves, even to ten generations, unless their mother is an Israelite. A guardian, an agent, a slave, a woman, one of doubtful sex, or a hermaphrodite bring the bikkurim, but do not recite, since they cannot say: “Which you, O Lord, have given to me” (Deuteronomy 26:10).

Mishnah Bikkurim 2:11

And how is [a koy] neither like a behemah nor like a hayyah? It is forbidden because of kilayim [to yoke it] with either a behemah or a hayyah. One who deeds his son his behemah and his hayyah he has not [thereby] given him the koy. If one says, “I will become a nazirite if this is [not] a hayyah or a behemah”, he is a nazirite. In all other ways it is like a behemah and a hayyah: It requires slaughtering (shehitah) like them both; It carries carrion impurity; And to it applies the law relating to a limb of a living being like them both.

Mishnah Eruvin 4:9

This is what [the rabbis] have said: “a poor man makes his eruv with his feet.” Rabbi Meir said: we can apply this law to a poor man only. Rabbi Judah says: it applies to both rich and poor; they only said that an eruv is prepared with bread in order to make it easier for the rich man, so that he does not have to go out and make the eruv with his feet.

Mishnah Pesachim 9:6

Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed, and that the substitute of a pesah is not sacrificed, and I cannot explain. Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: The pesah which was found before the slaughtering of the pesah must be left to graze until it becomes unfit, and then it may be sold, and one brings a peace-offering with the money; and the same applies to its substitute. [If found] after the slaughtering of the pesah, it is offered as a wellbeing offering, and the same applies to it substitute.

Mishnah Pesachim 9:6

Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed, and that the substitute of a pesah is not sacrificed, and I cannot explain. Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: The pesah which was found before the slaughtering of the pesah must be left to graze until it becomes unfit, and then it may be sold, and one brings a peace-offering with the money; and the same applies to its substitute. [If found] after the slaughtering of the pesah, it is offered as a wellbeing offering, and the same applies to it substitute.

Mishnah Beitzah 4:5

One may not break up a potsherd or cut paper in order to roast on it a salty fish. And one may not rake out an oven or a range, but one may press [the ashes] down. And one may not place two jars side by side in order to balance upon them saucepan. And one may not prop up a pot with a wooden wedge and the same applies to a door. And one may not drive cattle with a staff on a festival. But Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon permits it.

Mishnah Ta'anit 2:10

They do not ordain upon the community a fast on Rosh Hodesh, on Hanukkah, or on Purim, but if they had already begun [a series of fasts and one of these days intervened] they do not interrupt [their fasts], the words of Rabban Gamaliel. Rabbi Meir said: even though Rabban Gamaliel said that the [fasts] should not be interrupted he agrees that they should not complete their fasts. And the same applies to the Ninth of Av should it fall on Friday.

Mishnah Megillah 3:1

Townspeople who sold the town square, they may buy with the proceeds a synagogue. [If they sold] a synagogue, they may buy with the proceeds an ark. [If they sold] an ark they may buy covers [for scrolls]. [If they sold] covers, they may buy scrolls [of the Tanakh]. [If they sold] scrolls they may buy a Torah. But if they sold a Torah they may not buy with the proceeds scrolls [of the Tanakh]. If [they sold] scrolls they may not buy covers. If [they sold] covers they may not buy an ark. If [they sold] an ark they may not buy a synagogue. If [they sold] a synagogue they may not buy a town square. The same applies to any money left over. They may not sell [something] belonging to a community to an individual because this lowers its sanctity, the words of Rabbi Meir. They said to him: if so, it should not be allowed to sell from a larger town to a smaller one.

Mishnah Chagigah 1:7

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is “a twisted thing that cannot be made straight?” He who has intercourse with a forbidden relation and bears by her a mamzer. Should you say that it applies to a thief or robber, he is able to restore [the stolen object] and make straight. Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai says: They only call something “twisted” if it was straight at first and then became twisted. And who is this? A disciple of the sages who forsakes the Torah.

Mishnah Chagigah 3:1

Greater stringency applies to sacred things than to terumah, that they may immerse vessels within vessels [together] for terumah, but not for sacred things. The outside and inside and handle [of a vessel are regarded as separate] for terumah, but not for sacred things. One that carries anything possessing midras-uncleanness may carry [at the same time] terumah, but not sacred things. The garments of those who eat terumah posses midras-uncleanness for [those who eat] sacred things. The rule [for the immersion of garments] for [those who would eat terumah is not the same as the rule for [those who would eat] sacred things: for in the case of sacred things, he must [first] untie [any knots in the unclean garment], dry it [if it is wet, then] immerse it, and afterwards retie it; but in case of terumah, it may [first] be tied and afterwards immersed.

Mishnah Chagigah 3:4

Greater stringency applies to terumah [than to sacred things], for in Judah [the people of the land (amei haaretz)] are trusted in regard to the purity of [sacred] wine and oil throughout the year; and at the season of the wine-presses and olive-presses even in regard to terumah. If [the season of] the wine-presses and olive-presses passed, and they brought to him a jar of wine of terumah, he [the priest] should not accept it from him, but [the am ha-aretz] may leave it for the coming [season] of the wine-press. But if he said to him, “I have set apart a quarter log [of wine] as a sacred thing,” he is believed [in regard to the purity of the whole jug]. [When it comes to] jugs of wine and jugs of oil that are meant for terumah, they are believed during the season of the wine-presses and the olive-presses and prior to [the season of] the wine-presses seventy days.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:9

If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum. Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman]. [The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.

Mishnah Ketubot 5:9

He must also give her [every week] a silver ma'ah for her [other] needs and she is to eat with him every Friday eve. If he does not give her a silver ma'ah for her other needs, her handiwork belongs to her. And what [is the quantity of work that] she must do for him? The weight of five sela’s of warp in Judea, which amounts to ten sela's in Galilee, or the weight of ten sela's of woof in Judea, which amounts to twenty sela's in Galilee. If she was nursing, her handiwork is reduced and her maintenance is increased. All this applies to a poor person in Israel, but in the case of a more respectable [husband] all is fixed according to his dignity.

Mishnah Ketubot 10:6

If a man who was married to two wives sold his field, and the first wife wrote to the buyer, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you”, the second wife may take [the field] away from the buyer, and the first wife from the second, and the buyer from the first wife; and so they go on in turn until they arrange a compromise between them. The same law applies also to a creditor and to a woman creditor.

Mishnah Kiddushin 4:7

Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if an Israelite marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood, and if a male convert marries the daughter of an Israelite, his daughter is fit for the priesthood. But if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is unfit for the priesthood. [The same law applies to] a convert as to freed slaves, even for ten generations, [his daughter is unfit] unless his mother is of Israelite stock. Rabbi Yose says: even if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:2

How is the tooth [of a beast] an attested danger to eat that which it is fit to consume? A beast is an attested danger to eat fruit and vegetables. [If however] it ate clothing or utensils [the owner] pays only half damages. When does this apply? [This applies] in the domain of the damaged party But if it was within the public domain, the owner is not liable. If [the beast] benefited, [the owner] pays what it benefited. How does [the owner] pay what [the animal] benefited? [If it ate] from the middle of the marketplace, [the owner] pays what [the animal] benefited. [If it ate] from the sides of the marketplace, [the owner] pays for the damage [the animal] did. [If it ate] from in front of the store [the owner] pays for what [the animal] benefited. [If it ate] from inside the store [the owner] pays for the damage [the animal] did.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 7:1

More encompassing in use is the rule of twofold restitution than the rule of fourfold or fivefold restitution; For the rule of twofold restitution applies both to what has life and what does not have life, while the rule of fourfold and fivefold restitution applies only to an ox or a sheep, for it is written, “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill it, or sell it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Ex. 21:37). One who steals from a thief does not pay twofold restitution; And the one who slaughters or sells what is [already] stolen does not make fourfold or fivefold restitution.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 7:1

More encompassing in use is the rule of twofold restitution than the rule of fourfold or fivefold restitution; For the rule of twofold restitution applies both to what has life and what does not have life, while the rule of fourfold and fivefold restitution applies only to an ox or a sheep, for it is written, “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill it, or sell it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Ex. 21:37). One who steals from a thief does not pay twofold restitution; And the one who slaughters or sells what is [already] stolen does not make fourfold or fivefold restitution.

Mishnah Bava Metzia 7:2

These may eat [of the fruits among which they work] by the law of the Torah: one who works on that which is still connected to the ground [may eat of it] when the work is finished [at the time of harvest]; and one who works on that which is already detached from the ground [may eat of it] before the work is completely finished. This applies only to that which grows from the ground. These are they that may not eat; one that works on what is still growing while the work is still unfinished; and one that works on what is already detached from the ground after the work is finished, and [one may not eat] of what does not grow from the soil.

Mishnah Bava Metzia 9:12

The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.

Mishnah Bava Batra 8:8

If he left elder daughters and younger daughters, the elder daughters may not care for themselves at the cost of the younger daughters, nor may the younger daughters claim maintenance at the cost of the elder daughters, rather they all share alike. If the elder daughters married [and took each her dowry from the common inheritance] so too the younger daughters may marry [and take each a dowry from the common inheritance]. If the younger daughters said, “We will marry in the way you married”, they do not listen to them, for what their father gave them, he has given. A greater stringency applies to daughters than to sons, since daughters can claim maintenance at the cost of the sons, but they cannot claim maintenance at the cost of the [other daughters].

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:3

And these are they which are not qualified [to be witnesses or judges]: A dice player, a usurer, pigeon racers, or traffickers in Seventh Year produce. Rabbi Shimon said: “In the beginning they called them ‘gatherers’ of Seventh Year produce, but after the oppressors grew many they changed this and called them ‘traffickers’ of Seventh Year produce.” Rabbi Judah said: “This applies only if they have no other trade, but if they have some other trade other than that, they are not disqualified.”

Mishnah Shevuot 3:10

The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:11

A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. [In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:1

The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”

Mishnah Shevuot 4:1

The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”

Mishnah Shevuot 5:1

The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.

Mishnah Eduyot 6:3

1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1:3

These are the festivities of the idolaters: Kalenda, Saturnalia, Kratesis, the anniversary of accession to the throne and birthdays and anniversaries of deaths, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: a death at which burning [of articles of the dead] takes place is attended by idolatry, but where there is not such burning there is no idolatry. But the day of shaving ones beard and lock of hair, or the day of landing after a sea voyage, or the day of release from prison, or if an idolater holds a banquet for his son the prohibition only applies to that day and that particular person.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:7

The following are permitted to be eaten [by an israelite]:milk which a non-Jew milked with a Jew watching him; honey, grape-clusters even though these secrete moisture the law which renders food susceptible to defilement by a liquid does not apply to them preserves into which they are not accustomed to put wine or vinegar, pickled herring which has not been minced, brine containing fish, a leaf of asafoetida, and rolled olive-cakes. Rabbi Yose says: those olives having pits ready to drop out are prohibited. Locusts which come out of [a shopkeeper’s] basket are prohibited, but if from storage they are permitted. The same rule applies to terumah.

Mishnah Zevachim 5:8

The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar]. They differ in the [rules governing] their eating: The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night. The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.

Mishnah Zevachim 8:10

[If blood] which requires one application [was mixed] with blood [also] requiring one application, it [the mixture] should be presented with one application. [If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood requiring four applications, they should be presented with four applications. [If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood which requires one application: Rabbi Eliezer says: it [the mixture] should be presented with four applications. Rabbi Joshua says: it should be presented with one application. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, he transgresses the [injunction] not to diminish [from God’s commandment]! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Behold, he transgresses the injunction not to add [to God’s commandments]. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The injunction not to add applies only where it is by itself. Rabbi Joshua said to him: The injunction not to diminish applies only where it is by itself. Moreover, Rabbi Joshua said: when you make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to add, and perform an action with your own hands; whereas when you do not make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to diminish, but do not perform an action with your own hands.

Mishnah Zevachim 8:10

[If blood] which requires one application [was mixed] with blood [also] requiring one application, it [the mixture] should be presented with one application. [If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood requiring four applications, they should be presented with four applications. [If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood which requires one application: Rabbi Eliezer says: it [the mixture] should be presented with four applications. Rabbi Joshua says: it should be presented with one application. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, he transgresses the [injunction] not to diminish [from God’s commandment]! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Behold, he transgresses the injunction not to add [to God’s commandments]. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The injunction not to add applies only where it is by itself. Rabbi Joshua said to him: The injunction not to diminish applies only where it is by itself. Moreover, Rabbi Joshua said: when you make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to add, and perform an action with your own hands; whereas when you do not make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to diminish, but do not perform an action with your own hands.

Mishnah Zevachim 14:3

“Before time” applies both to [the animal] itself and to its owner. What is “before time” as applied to its owner? If a zav or a zavah, a woman after childbirth, or a metzora, offered their hatat or their asham outside [before the time in which they were obligated], they are exempt; [If they offered] their olah or their shelamims outside [before their time], they are liable. One who offers up flesh of a hatat, or flesh of an asham, or flesh of most holy sacrifices, or flesh of less holy sacrifices; or the remainder of the omer, or the two loaves, or the showbread, or the remainder of meal-offerings; Or if he pours [the oil on to the meal-offering], or mingles [it with flour], or breaks up [the meal-offering cakes], or salts [the meal-offering], or waves it, or presents it; or sets the table [with the showbread], or trims the lamps, or takes out the fistful, or receives the blood; [If he does any of these] outside, he is exempt. One is also not liable for any of these acts on account of not being a priest, or uncleanness, or lack of [priestly] vestments, or the non-washing of hands and feet.

Mishnah Menachot 12:1

If menahot and libation-offerings became unclean before they were sanctified in a vessel, they may be redeemed. If [they became unclean] after they were sanctified in a vessel, they may not be redeemed. Bird-offerings, the wood, the frankincense, and the ministering vessels, may not be redeemed, for the rule of redemption applies only to [offerings of] beasts.

Mishnah Chullin 5:1

[The law of] “It and its young” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated animals. How so? If a person slaughtered an animal and its young, both animals being unconsecrated, [and they slaughtered them] outside [the sanctuary], they are both valid, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, both animals are invalid, and each incurs forty lashes. If both animals were unconsecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], both animals are invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not culpable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes, and it is invalid.

Mishnah Chullin 6:1

[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, It applies to unconsecrated animals but not to consecrated animals. It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood.

Mishnah Chullin 6:1

[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, It applies to unconsecrated animals but not to consecrated animals. It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood.

Mishnah Chullin 6:1

[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, It applies to unconsecrated animals but not to consecrated animals. It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood.

Mishnah Chullin 6:1

[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, It applies to unconsecrated animals but not to consecrated animals. It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood.

Mishnah Chullin 7:1

[The prohibition of] the sciatic nerve is in force both within the land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated [animals]. It applies to cattle and to wild animals, to the right and left hip. But it does not apply to a bird because it does not have a socket [on its hip]. It applies to a fetus. Rabbi Judah says: it does not apply to a fetus. And its [forbidden] fat is permitted. Butchers are not trustworthy with regard to the [removal of the] sciatic nerve, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: they are trustworthy with regard to it as well as with regard to the [forbidden] fat.

Mishnah Chullin 7:1

[The prohibition of] the sciatic nerve is in force both within the land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated [animals]. It applies to cattle and to wild animals, to the right and left hip. But it does not apply to a bird because it does not have a socket [on its hip]. It applies to a fetus. Rabbi Judah says: it does not apply to a fetus. And its [forbidden] fat is permitted. Butchers are not trustworthy with regard to the [removal of the] sciatic nerve, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: they are trustworthy with regard to it as well as with regard to the [forbidden] fat.

Mishnah Chullin 7:6

It applies to clean animals but not to unclean. Rabbi Judah says, even to unclean animals. Rabbi Judah said: was not the sciatic nerve prohibited from the time of the sons of Jacob, and at that time unclean animals were still permitted to them? They replied, this law was ordained at Sinai but was written in its proper place.

Mishnah Chullin 8:6

In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat. The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood. And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only.

Mishnah Chullin 8:6

In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat. The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood. And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only.

Mishnah Chullin 11:1

The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many.

Mishnah Chullin 11:1

The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many.

Mishnah Chullin 12:1

The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go.

Mishnah Chullin 12:1

The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go.

Mishnah Bekhorot 9:1

The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, [It applies] to hullin (non-sacred) animals only but not to consecrated animals. It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing].

Mishnah Bekhorot 9:1

The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, [It applies] to hullin (non-sacred) animals only but not to consecrated animals. It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing].

Mishnah Arakhin 4:2

But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.

Mishnah Arakhin 8:6

Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things.

Mishnah Arakhin 9:4

If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession]. This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30). In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession]. Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.

Mishnah Temurah 1:1

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

Mishnah Temurah 2:3

In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. [The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred.

Mishnah Temurah 7:2

There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which don’t apply to dedications to the altar. Unspecified dedications go to the repairs of the Temple. Dedication for the repairs of the temple can have an effect on all things, The law of sacrilege applies to things that grow from them. And there is no benefit to be derived from them for the priest.

Mishnah Keritot 1:4

The following bring an offering which is not eaten: A woman who miscarries but does not know what the miscarriage was, Or if two women who have a miscarriage, one of a kind which did not render her liable [to an offering], and the other of a kind that does render her liable [to an offering]. Rabbi Yose said: When is this so? This applies only if one went towards the east and the other towards the west, but if both remained together they bring [together] one offering which is eaten.

Mishnah Keritot 2:1

There are four persons who require a ceremony of atonement, and there are four who bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgression. The following are those who require a ceremony of atonement: the zav, the zavah, the woman who gave birth and the metzora. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: also a convert is regarded as a person who still requires a ceremony of atonement until the blood has been sprinkled for him; the same applies to the nazirite with reference to wine, haircutting and uncleanness.

Mishnah Keritot 3:9

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Mishnah Keritot 3:10

Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.

Mishnah Meilah 1:1

Most holy sacrifices which were slaughtered on the south side [of the altar], the law of sacrilege [still] applies to them. If they were slaughtered on the south side and their blood received on the north or [slaughtered] on the north side and their blood received on the south, or if they were slaughtered by day and [their blood] sprinkled during the night or [slaughtered] during the night and [their blood] sprinkled by day, or if they were slaughtered [with the intention of eating the flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, the law of sacrilege still applies to them. Rabbi Joshua stated a general rule: whatever has at some time been permitted to the priests is not subject to the law of sacrilege, and whatever has at no time been permitted to the priests is subject to the law of sacrilege. Which is that which has at some time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] which remained overnight or became defiled or were taken out [of the Temple Court]. Which is that which has at no time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] that were slaughtered [with the intention of eating its flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, or [the blood of which] was received by the unfit and they sprinkled it.

Mishnah Meilah 1:1

Most holy sacrifices which were slaughtered on the south side [of the altar], the law of sacrilege [still] applies to them. If they were slaughtered on the south side and their blood received on the north or [slaughtered] on the north side and their blood received on the south, or if they were slaughtered by day and [their blood] sprinkled during the night or [slaughtered] during the night and [their blood] sprinkled by day, or if they were slaughtered [with the intention of eating the flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, the law of sacrilege still applies to them. Rabbi Joshua stated a general rule: whatever has at some time been permitted to the priests is not subject to the law of sacrilege, and whatever has at no time been permitted to the priests is subject to the law of sacrilege. Which is that which has at some time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] which remained overnight or became defiled or were taken out [of the Temple Court]. Which is that which has at no time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] that were slaughtered [with the intention of eating its flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, or [the blood of which] was received by the unfit and they sprinkled it.

Mishnah Meilah 1:4

The act of [sprinkling the] blood of most holy sacrifices may have either a lenient or a stringent effect, but with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. How so? With most holy sacrifices, before the sprinkling, the law of sacrilege applies both to the innards and to the flesh; after the sprinkling it applies to the innards but not to the flesh; In respect of both one is guilty of [transgressing the laws of] notar, iggul and defilement. It is thus found that with most holy sacrifices the act of sprinkling has a lenient as well as a stringent effect. With sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. How so? With sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness, before the sprinkling the law of sacrilege does not apply to the innards or to the flesh; after the sprinkling it applies to the innards but not to the flesh; In respect of both one is guilty of transgressing the laws of notar, piggul and defilement. It is thus found that with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect.