arguing

How forcible are right words! but what doth your arguing reprove?

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

When Rav Huna, the Head of the Diaspora, died they brought him here. They said, where shall we put him? They said, let us put him next to Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder for he is one of them. They said, who might want to bring him there? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I shall go up to put him there. They said to him, you are looking for a pretext, for you are an old man and you want to go to rest there yourself. He said to them, put some string on my feet and when I shall be weak you pull. He went in and found the three arguing. “Jehudah my son, after you, and no more. Ḥizqiah my son, after you, and no more. Joseph ben Israel, after you, and no more.” He [R. Ḥaggai] lifted his eyes to look, it was said to him turn around, turn around. He heard the voice of Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder who said to his son Rav Jehudah, make space for Rav Ḥuna that he may rest there. But [Rav Ḥuna] did not accept this. They said, since he did not accept that one made space for him, so his descendants will never end. He [R. Ḥaggai] exited from there and his years were doubled.

Rebbi Zeˋira, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Since Rebbi Joshua and Rebbi Aqiba wanted to be strict with themselves, this implies that practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: also for a sheep-pen, or a sheep corral, practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Joshua’s brother says, the entire day they were arguing one with the other until my father’s brother came, decided between then, and instituted that practice follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah for a ship and Rebbi Joshua and Rebbi Aqiba for a sheep-pen, or a sheep corral. What is the difference between a sheep corral and a ship? The colleagues say, for a ship because its walls are part of itself; Rebbi Zeˋira said, because one removes it from these four cubits and puts it into those four cubits. What difference results between them? If it was a covered walkway, according to the colleagues it is permitted, according to Rebbi Zeˋira it is forbidden. If the sea was calm, according to the colleagues it is forbidden, according to Rebbi Zeˋira it is permitted. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the Mishnah says that the four cubits which they mentioned are not a domain.

The rabbis of Caesarea asked: I could think that the one who receives or carries [the blood] on leavened matter be liable. The verse says, sacrifice. Since slaughtering for sacrifice is particular in that one is liable for it outside [the Sanctuary], this excludes the one who receives or carries on leavened matter for which one is not liable outside. I could think that one who burns parts on leavened matter be liable. The verse says, and he atones. Since pouring is particular in that it is indispensable for atonement, this excludes burning of the parts, which is not indispensable for atonement. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Yose. Instead of arguing for absence of liability, argue for liability. I could think that the one who receives or carries [the blood] on leavened matter not be liable. The verse says, sacrifice. Since slaughtering for sacrifice is particular in that for it one is liable outside [the Sanctuary], I also am adding burning of the parts for which one is liable outside. I could think that one who burns parts on leavened matter not be liable. The verse says, and he atones. Since pouring is particular in that it is indispensable for atonement, I also am adding the one who receives or carries who is indispensable for atonement. He said to him, anything equal in both respects instructs; anything not equal in both respects does not instruct. Sacrifice. Since slaughtering for sacrifice is particular in that it is indispensable for atonement and for it one is liable outside [the Sanctuary], this excludes the one who receives or carries on leavened matter for which one is not liable outside; it excludes burning of the parts, which is not indispensable for atonement.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Aqiba answered, sprinkling is a counter example, for it is a commandment and because of Sabbath rest does not push aside the Sabbath. So you should not wonder about these, even though they are commandments and because of Sabbath rest but shall not push aside the Sabbath. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, about this I am arguing. Since slaughter, which is work, pushes the Sabbath aside, sprinkling, which is because of Sabbath rest, shall push aside the Sabbath. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, or the other way. Since sprinkling, which is because of Sabbath rest, does not push aside the Sabbath, slaughter, which is work, shall not push the Sabbath aside. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, Aqiba! You uprooted what is written in the Torah, between the evenings, at its fixed time, whether on weekdays or on the Sabbath. He answered him, Rabbi, bring me a fixed time for these similar to the fixed time for slaughter. Rebbi Aqiba formulated a principle: Anything which can be done on Friday does not push the Sabbath aside. Slaughter which cannot be done on Friday pushes the Sabbath aside.

“He shall sprinkle it, [in front of the cover], this teaches that he gives a single one upwards. In front of the cover, I do not know how many. So I am arguing: It mentions giving the bull’s blood downwards, and it mentions giving the he-goat’s blood downwards. Since giving the bull’s blood downwards as mentioned is seven times, so giving the he-goat’s blood downwards as mentioned must be seven times. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned upwards and blood is mentioned downwards. Since the blood mentioned upwards is once, so the blood mentioned downwards must be once. Let us see to what it is comparable. One argues downwards from downwards; one does not argue downwards from upwards. Or go in the following way: One argues he-goat’s blood from he-goat’s blood; but one does not argue he-goat’s blood from bull’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood. Since the bull’s blood is downwards seven times, also the he-goat’s blood is downwards seven times. But I do not know how many times to give the bull’s blood upwards. Giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the he-goat and giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the bull. Since giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the he-goat is once, so giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the bull is once. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned downwards; blood is mentioned upwards. Since the blood mentioned downwards is seven, so the blood mentioned upwards must be seven. Let us see to what it is similar. One argues upwards from upwards; one does not argue upwards from downwards. Or go in the following way: One argues bull’s blood from bull’s blood; but one does not argue bull’s blood from he-goat’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood, that all its works be the same. Since the bull’s blood is seven times downwards, also the he-goat’s blood is seven times downwards. Since the he-goat’s blood is once upwards, also the bull’s blood is once upwards.”

HALAKHAH: “From when does one mention the Power of rains,” etc. The reason of Rebbi Eliezer, because these four kinds grow on water, they become attorneys for water. Another explanation, when the slave serves all his master’s needs he asks for his reward from him. Rebbi Joshua said to him, is it not that when the slave has served all his master’s needs and his master is satisfied with him that he asks his [sustenance] from him? Another explanation. The slave asks for his reward only close to the time when his reward is due. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer says, from the time one takes the lulav; Rebbi Joshua says, from the time he puts it down. In the opinion of the latter Tanna, the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer in the first is his opinion in the latter. The argument of Rebbi Joshua is inverted. There, he says from the concluding holiday, but here he says, from the time he puts it down. Rebbi Mana says, because the entire day is qualified to take the lulav. Should he not mention in the evening? Not everybody is there. Then he should mention it in the morning. He would think that maybe they mentioned in the evening and he will mention. Since he sees that they do not mention in the first {prayer} but mention in the later {prayer}, he understands that they did not mention in the evening. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius said to him, so was your father Rebbi Jonah arguing it.

Rav Ḥuna said, when the slain of Bettar were permitted to be buried, “the good and the benefactor” was fixed. “The good” that they did not decompose, “the benefactor” that they were permitted for burial. It was stated, Rebbi Yose said, 52 years Bettar existed after the destruction of the Temple. And why was it destroyed? For they lit lights after the destruction of the Temple. Why did they light lights? Because the council members of Jerusalem were dominating the center of the city. When they were seeing a person moving to Jerusalem they said to him, since we heard about you that you are aspiring to be made judge or councillor; he would say to them, that is not my intention. Because we heard about you that you intend to sell your property; he would say to them, that is not my intention. His colleague would say to him, what are you arguing with this one, write and I shall sign. He would write and his colleague would sign. They would send the sale document to his house companion and told him, if X comes to enter his property, do not let him, because it is sold to us. When he heard this from them he said, if only this man’s leg had been broken before he came to Jerusalem. That is what is written, they caught our steps, not to walk in our streets. They caught our steps, destroy the way to that House, our end is near, the end of this House is near, our days are fulfilled, the days of this House are fulfilled. They also did not come out well, he who enjoys disaster will not be acquitted.

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

What is the difference whether peace is in the world or war is in the world? If war is in the world, she might think that he died although he is not dead. So far if war was in the North and she came from the North, in the South and she came from the South. If there was war in the North and she came from the South; she says I am coming from the North, but I am arguing that you came from the South. If she says, I am coming from the South, it is because she thinks to free herself. If she says, he died on his bed, I am arguing that he went to war; it is because she thinks to free herself.

What is the difference whether peace is in the world or war is in the world? If war is in the world, she might think that he died although he is not dead. So far if war was in the North and she came from the North, in the South and she came from the South. If there was war in the North and she came from the South; she says I am coming from the North, but I am arguing that you came from the South. If she says, I am coming from the South, it is because she thinks to free herself. If she says, he died on his bed, I am arguing that he went to war; it is because she thinks to free herself.

When Rav Huna, the Head of the Diaspora, died they brought him here. They said, where shall we put him? They said, let us put him next to Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder for he is one of them. They said, who might want to bring him there? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I shall go up to put him there. They said to him, you are looking for a pretext, for you are an old man and you want to go to rest there yourself. He said to them, put some string on my feet and when I shall be weak you pull. He went in and found the three arguing. “Jehudah my son, after you, and no more. Ḥizqiah my son, after you, and no more. Joseph ben Israel, after you, and no more.” He [R. Ḥaggai] lifted his eyes to look, it was said to him lower [your eyes], turn around. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder [who said to] his son Jehudah, make space for Rav Ḥuna that he may rest there. But [Rav Ḥuna] did not accept this. They said, since he did not accept that one made space for him, so his descendants will never end. He [R. Ḥaggai] exited from there eighty years old and his years were doubled.

Alexander the Macedonian went to the king of Cassia. He saw that he had much gold, much silver. He told him, I do not need your gold nor your silver; I came only so see your practice, how you are dealing, how you are judging. While he was still discussing with him, there came a man having a dispute with another, for he bought (a plot, entered it) [a garbage heap, dug in it] and found a treasure trove of denars. The buyer said, I bought a garbage heap, I did not buy a treasure. The seller said, I sold a garbage heap and all it contains. While they still were arguing with one another, the king asked one of them, do you have a male son? He answered, yes. He asked the other one, do you have a female daughter? He answered, yes. He told them, marry them to each other and the treasure should belong to both. He started to laugh. He asked him, why are you laughing? Did I not judge correctly? He asked him, if the case came before you, how would you have judged? He told him, one kills both of them and the treasure falls to the king. He told him, do you love gold so much? He made him a meal and brought before him golden meat, golden chicken. He asked him, can I eat gold? He told him, the spirit of this person should be wiped out. You cannot eat gold, why do you love gold so much? He asked him, does the sun shine upon you? He answered, yes. Does rain fall on you? He answered, yes. He asked him, do you have small animals? He answered, yes. The spirit of this person should be wiped out; you live only by the merit of the small animals, as it is written: “Man and animal You are saving, o Eternal!”

Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who cannot argue for the crawling animal to make it pure a hundred times cannot start arguing for acquittal. How does one argue about a crawling animal? Rebbi Joḥanan said, since a snake which kills is pure, a rat which does not kill logically should be pure. Since a rat which does not kill is impure, a snake which kills logically should be impure. Rebbi Phineas objected: Is there not the scorpion which kills and is pure? It was found that a Tanna said, snake and scorpion both follow the same rules.

Rebbi said, Rebbi [ ] had a self-confident student who was arguing for purity or impurity of the crawling animal a hundred times. They said, this student never could instruct. Rebbi Jacob bar Dositheos said, this student was cut-off from Mount Sinai.

MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.

MISHNAH: They brought in the second [witness] and examined him. If their testimonies were coherent, one starts with arguing for acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, I have an argument for his acquittal, or one of the students said, I have an argument for his conviction, one forces them to be silent. If one of the students said, I have an argument for his acquittal, one brings him up and lets him sit among them. He was not demoted from there the entire day; if his argument has substance, one listens to him. Even if he said, I have to argue for my acquittal, one listens to him if there is substance to his words.

What principle are they arguing about?... The rabbis hold that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, while R. Shimon holds that the traditional reading is authoritative.

Let us say that they are arguing the same dispute as Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua. That we learned in a mishna, If he [the priest] was standing and sacrificing upon the alter, acc it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, Rebbi Eliezer says, All of the sacrifices that he ever brought are [retroactively] disqualified. And Rebbi Yehoshua validates then.

In what aspect are they [Rebbi Yochanon and Reish lakash] arguing in? They are arguing in [the validity of] an uncertain warning. One opinion holds that an uncertain warning is a valid warning. And the other opinion holds that

In what aspect are they [Rebbi Yochanon and Reish lakash] arguing in? They are arguing in [the validity of] an uncertain warning. One opinion holds that an uncertain warning is a valid warning. And the other opinion holds that

is it not that in this facet they are arguing, that one holds [produce is still] considered tevel [i.e. untithed, until maser ani is removed as well]. And the other one holds [maser ani] does not render the produce tevel. Abaye said to him. If so [that they argue about whether maser ani can render the produce tevel], then rather than arguing in a case of questionable produce [demai] they should argue in a case where it was known [that maser ani] was not separated.

is it not that in this facet they are arguing, that one holds [produce is still] considered tevel [i.e. untithed, until maser ani is removed as well]. And the other one holds [maser ani] does not render the produce tevel. Abaye said to him. If so [that they argue about whether maser ani can render the produce tevel], then rather than arguing in a case of questionable produce [demai] they should argue in a case where it was known [that maser ani] was not separated.