536 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 3:21

How long does it have to be to jail? Rebbi Zeïra said, let us infer it from a vineyard. Just as you say in regard to a vineyard that there is no difference between length and separation, so here also there is no difference between length and separation. That is fine according to the opinion of Ḥizqiah; there eight and here also eight. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, with how much will it jail? If you say with eight, is there an argument a fortiori that a strip of melons among onions will jail only with twelve? But a melon strip, which you empowered among melon strips to save by a mere eight, will be jailed by eight, melon strips among onions, which you weakened to save only by twelve, certainly will be jailed only by eight. If you say that a melon strip among onions will be jailed only by twelve, then an argument a fortiori shows that a melon strip among melons should be jailed only by twelve.

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 3:21

How long does it have to be to jail? Rebbi Zeïra said, let us infer it from a vineyard. Just as you say in regard to a vineyard that there is no difference between length and separation, so here also there is no difference between length and separation. That is fine according to the opinion of Ḥizqiah; there eight and here also eight. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, with how much will it jail? If you say with eight, is there an argument a fortiori that a strip of melons among onions will jail only with twelve? But a melon strip, which you empowered among melon strips to save by a mere eight, will be jailed by eight, melon strips among onions, which you weakened to save only by twelve, certainly will be jailed only by eight. If you say that a melon strip among onions will be jailed only by twelve, then an argument a fortiori shows that a melon strip among melons should be jailed only by twelve.

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 8:14

Issi ben Aqabia says: It is forbidden to ride on a mule by an argument of analogy. If garments which you may wear one upon the other are forbidden in mixture, you are certainly forbidden to ride on [a mixture of] animals you may not lead together. But is it not written (2Sam. 13:29): “Each one rode on his mule and they fled”? One does not learn from a king’s family. But is it not written (1K. 1:33): “Let my son Solomon ride on my she-mule”? That was a creature from Creation.

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 4:37

“Unripe grapes when they contain fluid”, etc. What argument can you give for unripe grapes? Rebbi Abun said, because at that stage usually the owls eat it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 9:43

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah deals with permitted produce. For that we stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, it should be given to those who eat it. Since Rebbi Eliezer is a Shammaiite, did we state: One does eat Sabbatical produce in reciprocity and without reciprocity, following the House of Shammai? For that, the rabbis answer him that the sinner should not be rewarded? They answered him according to his argument: Against your argument, when you say that it should be given to those who eat it, a sinner should not be rewarded.

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 9:43

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah deals with permitted produce. For that we stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, it should be given to those who eat it. Since Rebbi Eliezer is a Shammaiite, did we state: One does eat Sabbatical produce in reciprocity and without reciprocity, following the House of Shammai? For that, the rabbis answer him that the sinner should not be rewarded? They answered him according to his argument: Against your argument, when you say that it should be given to those who eat it, a sinner should not be rewarded.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 1:27

Rebbi Ḥananiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The argument of the House of Shammai is that he is like one who says: This shall be heave for itself and what is below it. Rebbi Ḥananiah wanted to say, of its own kind. Rebbi Zeïra said to him, do not accept that. When he said “this shall be”, what is in his hand was freed and the rest becomes profane, may profane free ṭevel? Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel said, it is simultaneous. When he said “this shall be”, what is in his hand was freed together with the rest. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is convincing for the Great Heave where one must give heave from what is earmarked. But heave of the tithe must be defined by measure, weight, or count.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 8:23

Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules for being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules for being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simeon explains: The hot, spice wine. And the bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the possession of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules for being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Hoshaiah, Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis went to visit him. They saw that Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal was sitting [there]. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening; they went and asked him. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules for being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Zeïra said to him, maybe that statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told him no, it is for action and you can rely on me. When they came back, there was Rebbi Hila standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana. He told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is it not a baraita? Since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine. Why is vinegar of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “wine and vinegar of Gentiles which originally was wine.”

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 1:29

Rebbi Aqiba says an unripe cedrat is not a fruit, but the Sages say it is a fruit. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It follows that Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his teacher, Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said it is not a fruit, so Rebbi Simeon said it is not a fruit. Rebbi Yasa said, is everything usable for lulab subject to tithes and everything not usable for lulab not subject to tithes? Did they not object, there is the spotted one, there is one that grew in a form or one shaped like a ball; it is not usable for lulab but subject to tithes! It is reasonable [to hold that] Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba but Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba since it is written (Lev. 23:40) “fruit” and it is not a fruit. Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon, there is the spotted one, one that grew in a form, or one shaped like a ball; it is not usable for lulab but subject to tithes.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 2:23

The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: So did Rebbi Jehudah disprove Rebbi Meїr[’s argument]: Do you not concede to me that one who gives to his son is free? What is the difference between gathering and giving to his son or gathering and giving to another person? Rebbi Yudan asked: What did you see to say ‘if he gathers and delivers,’ can we not say ‘if he gathers and eats’? Rebbi Mana said, there cannot be “if he gathers and eats”, only “if he gathers and delivers,” because of that rose garden. Can you say the rose garden [is a case of] gathering and eating? No, gathering and delivering! There also, he gathers and delivers because he would say to him, if you enter you will damage its roses! A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Mana’s argument: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the orchard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.’ ”

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 2:23

The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: So did Rebbi Jehudah disprove Rebbi Meїr[’s argument]: Do you not concede to me that one who gives to his son is free? What is the difference between gathering and giving to his son or gathering and giving to another person? Rebbi Yudan asked: What did you see to say ‘if he gathers and delivers,’ can we not say ‘if he gathers and eats’? Rebbi Mana said, there cannot be “if he gathers and eats”, only “if he gathers and delivers,” because of that rose garden. Can you say the rose garden [is a case of] gathering and eating? No, gathering and delivering! There also, he gathers and delivers because he would say to him, if you enter you will damage its roses! A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Mana’s argument: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the orchard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.’ ”

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 5:14

It was stated: If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it from him, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is free. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also the Sages did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. It was stated: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose says, from where that grain one-third ripe before New Year’s day may be brought in during the Sabbatical? The verse says (Lev. 25:3): “You shall gather its yield,” [even] in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, you follow the first third, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose said, you follow the first third. Rebbi Zeїra said to Rebbi Abina, you say two things which contradict one another. Here you teach that the Sages also did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. There, you teach that Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba then just as Rebbi Aqiba says the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose must say, the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the Sabbatical, in the Sabbatical it is forbidden as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical did not fall on it since it was grass on which the sanctity of the Sabbatical cannot fall. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the eighth year, in the eighth year it is permitted as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical falls on it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that the Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the order of years; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 5:14

It was stated: If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it from him, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is free. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also the Sages did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. It was stated: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose says, from where that grain one-third ripe before New Year’s day may be brought in during the Sabbatical? The verse says (Lev. 25:3): “You shall gather its yield,” [even] in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, you follow the first third, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose said, you follow the first third. Rebbi Zeїra said to Rebbi Abina, you say two things which contradict one another. Here you teach that the Sages also did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. There, you teach that Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba then just as Rebbi Aqiba says the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose must say, the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the Sabbatical, in the Sabbatical it is forbidden as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical did not fall on it since it was grass on which the sanctity of the Sabbatical cannot fall. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the eighth year, in the eighth year it is permitted as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical falls on it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that the Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the order of years; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 5:14

It was stated: If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it from him, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is free. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also the Sages did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. It was stated: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose says, from where that grain one-third ripe before New Year’s day may be brought in during the Sabbatical? The verse says (Lev. 25:3): “You shall gather its yield,” [even] in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, you follow the first third, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose said, you follow the first third. Rebbi Zeїra said to Rebbi Abina, you say two things which contradict one another. Here you teach that the Sages also did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. There, you teach that Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba then just as Rebbi Aqiba says the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose must say, the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the Sabbatical, in the Sabbatical it is forbidden as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical did not fall on it since it was grass on which the sanctity of the Sabbatical cannot fall. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the eighth year, in the eighth year it is permitted as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical falls on it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that the Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the order of years; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 5:18

Rebbi Abun said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel goes with the argument of his ancestor Rabban Gamliel. As we stated there: “Jews who were sharecroppers for Gentiles in Syria, Rebbi Eliezer obligates their produce for tithes and the Sabbatical but Rabban Gamliel frees.”

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:3

Who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell heave which is forbidden to lay people, since Second Tithe is permitted to lay people, one should certainly be permitted to sell it. No, if you assert this for heave which does not need an enclosure, what can you imply for Second Tithe which needs an enclosure? First Fruits shall prove it which need an enclosure and one may sell them! No, if you assert this for First Fruits which do not implicate their monetary substitute, what can you imply for Second Heave which implicates its monetary substitute! The Sabbatical shall prove it which implicates its monetary substitute and it is permitted to sell it! Rebbi Yudan said, from this? The sale of Sabbatical produce is its redemption.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:4

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:4

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 3:33

HALAKHAH: What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? The first money, not second money. Only because they objected to him by an argument de minore ad majus, he answered in terms of an argument de minore ad majus.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 3:33

HALAKHAH: What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? The first money, not second money. Only because they objected to him by an argument de minore ad majus, he answered in terms of an argument de minore ad majus.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 5:28

It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, Israel did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they divided up the land. Rav Ḥisda said, it turns out that the argument of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah is identical with that of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that there is no Second Tithe in Syria, so there is no fourth-year orchard in Syria. Similarly, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that they did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years,, similarly there was no fourth-year orchard until after 14 years. Rebbi Yose said, he follows his son’s argument; Syria was inferred from “after 14 years;” “after 14 years” was not inferred from Syria.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 5:28

It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, Israel did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they divided up the land. Rav Ḥisda said, it turns out that the argument of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah is identical with that of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that there is no Second Tithe in Syria, so there is no fourth-year orchard in Syria. Similarly, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that they did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years,, similarly there was no fourth-year orchard until after 14 years. Rebbi Yose said, he follows his son’s argument; Syria was inferred from “after 14 years;” “after 14 years” was not inferred from Syria.

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 1:15

Can they whip because of their ḥallah as a biblical law? Rebbi Jonah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: one cannot whip because of their ḥallah as a biblical law. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish stays with his opinion, as they differed: If somebody ground and mixed piggul and leftover [sacrificial meat], Rebbi Joḥanan said they do not cancel one another, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said they do cancel one another. Rebbi Yose said, the cases are not similar. There, one says this is forbidden and that is forbidden. But here, two kinds are more than the third and cancel it; they cancelled it before it became forbidden. If one made five doughs from five different kinds and then mixed them, if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish would say that one cannot whip because of their ḥallah as a biblical law, then the argument would be correct.

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 1:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, this means that one whips because of their ḥallah as a word of the Torah. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, explain it if it contains the volume of an olive of any one of them. Rebbi Yose said, you might even say one volume of an olive of all of them. It is different since the category of “leavened” applies to all of them. The argument of Rebbi Yose seems inverted. There, he says two kinds are more than the third and cancel it; here, he says so! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, so is the Mishnah: “Either the volume of an olive from this one or from another.”

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 4:22

Rabban Gamliel the son of Rebbi wanted to institute demay in Syria but Rebbi Hoshaiah did not let him do it. He said to him, then Cohanim would have to worry about their ḥallah! The argument of Rebbi Hoshaiah seems inverted. There, he says the fear of sacred things is on him and he will not give to the Cohen anything that is not in order, and here he says so? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, I am saying that he gave him that of the fire. Rebbi Mana said to him, Rebbi Hoshaiah only stated: then Cohanim would have to worry about their ḥallah! “ He who buys from a baker and from a woman who bakes to sell on the market has to separate ḥallah of demay; from a private person and if he is a guest he does not have to separate ḥallah of demay.” Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis, if he is a guest for his dough. Rebbi Jonah said, only if they saw him kneading at another’s place. It is a standing assumption that from a private person in Syria one does not have to separate ḥallah of demay; but if he knows that most of what is in his storage is his own produce, he has to separate ḥallah of demay. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, does this not disagree with Rebbi Hoshaiah? Rebbi Mana said, here in the Land, there outside the Land.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 1:40

Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Roots do not count. Rebbi Zeïra said to Rebbi Assi, did you hear that explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan or from his argument? As Rebbi Joḥanan said, moreover it was stated: “If someone dedicated and then planted, it is exempt from ‘orlah; planted and then dedicated, it is subject to ‘orlah.” You wanted to say, dedicated is exempt from ‘orlah, old is exempt from ‘orlah. But this is not comparable! Dedicated things can be redeemed and become obligated since he might think about it to obligate; can you [say] about an old tree that one might think about it to obligate?

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:17

So far following Rebbi Aqiba, following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an argument a minore ad majus. If heave which is forbidden to outsiders can be lifted, ‘orlah which is permitted to outsiders, not so much more? No, if you said that about heave whose use is permitted, what can you say about ‘orlah whose use is prohibited! Rebbi Ḥinena: “Fruit, fruit” as equal decision.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:43

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Ḥama bar Yose objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: There is meat in milk, where he did not taste the forbidden thing itself and you say that he is whipped! He accepted that. What means, he accepted that? Like a person who listens to the argument of the opposing party he accepted it.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:57

Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows his father’s argument. What is his father’s argument? Just as Rebbi Simeon said anything which spoils the taste is permitted, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said anything which spoils the taste is permitted. Rebbi Abba Mari said, what is his father’s argument? Just as Rebbi Simeon said all aftergrowth is permitted, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said all aftergrowth is permitted. But Rebbi Simeon said that only about aftergrowth of vegetables; did he say that for aftergrowth of grains? He established that aftergrowth of vegetables and aftergrowth of grains are the same.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:57

Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows his father’s argument. What is his father’s argument? Just as Rebbi Simeon said anything which spoils the taste is permitted, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said anything which spoils the taste is permitted. Rebbi Abba Mari said, what is his father’s argument? Just as Rebbi Simeon said all aftergrowth is permitted, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said all aftergrowth is permitted. But Rebbi Simeon said that only about aftergrowth of vegetables; did he say that for aftergrowth of grains? He established that aftergrowth of vegetables and aftergrowth of grains are the same.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:57

Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows his father’s argument. What is his father’s argument? Just as Rebbi Simeon said anything which spoils the taste is permitted, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said anything which spoils the taste is permitted. Rebbi Abba Mari said, what is his father’s argument? Just as Rebbi Simeon said all aftergrowth is permitted, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said all aftergrowth is permitted. But Rebbi Simeon said that only about aftergrowth of vegetables; did he say that for aftergrowth of grains? He established that aftergrowth of vegetables and aftergrowth of grains are the same.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:58

The rabbis of Caesarea said, in one respect he follows his father’s argument, in one the argument of the Sages. His father’s argument, that anything which spoils the taste is permitted. The argument of the Sages, that [different] names combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:58

The rabbis of Caesarea said, in one respect he follows his father’s argument, in one the argument of the Sages. His father’s argument, that anything which spoils the taste is permitted. The argument of the Sages, that [different] names combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:58

The rabbis of Caesarea said, in one respect he follows his father’s argument, in one the argument of the Sages. His father’s argument, that anything which spoils the taste is permitted. The argument of the Sages, that [different] names combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:58

The rabbis of Caesarea said, in one respect he follows his father’s argument, in one the argument of the Sages. His father’s argument, that anything which spoils the taste is permitted. The argument of the Sages, that [different] names combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Bikkurim 2:25

Rebbi Joḥanan’s argument seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, it was quoted for the horns of a cadaver. He said to him, did the teacher not teach: “I saw” the size of two beans? Should he have said here also, “their growths”? In addition, from the following (Deut.12:17): “You may not eat your grain’s tithe in your gates.” About which tithe has this been said? About pure second tithe which entered Jerusalem and left. Also from the following which Rebbi Simeon stated. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “Tithe is special in that tithe forbids its money, mixtures, and vessels; the doubt of an admixture forbids in the most minute amount and one may not use it for lighting.” He should say, the same holds for growth! Rebbi Hila said, he who says growth is permitted, Rebbi Simeon. Those who say growth is forbidden, the rabbis. They said to him, did we not state: “Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe are profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” Why does he have to redeem? Not because of their inherent sanctity? Here also they should require walls because of their inherent sanctity! Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ammi, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When one says the growth is forbidden, the prohibition of walls. When one says the growth is permitted, the permission for unauthorized persons. “These rules apply to tithe and First Fruits but not to heave.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:8

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Meïr says, if it was a Sabbath and he carried it out. They told him, it is not the category.” Because this one is liable because of walking and that one is liable because of putting down. Who is “they said to him”? Rebbi Yose! The argument of Rebbi Yose is inverted. There, he does not consider the person walking equal to one who was putting down but here he is considering the person walking equal to one who was putting down! Rebbi Yudan said, explain it that he was laying on the threshold partially inside, his mouth outside, when he stretched out his hand, took it, and ate it. Then he did not walk.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:42

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: But one may investigate what is in the cup or the pot without worry. Some want to say, because it is for a short time; but some want to say because of cleanliness or danger. What is the difference between them? To separate lettuce leaves. For him who says, because it is for a short time, it is forbidden. For him who says, because of cleanliness or danger, it is permitted. Rav Jeremiah visited Rav Assi, who mixed a cup for him. He started inspecting it. His house companion said to him, look what he is doing! He told her, because he follows his teacher’s argument, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: But one may investigate what is in the cup or the pot without worry.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:78

A student of [Rebbi] Simai went to Antipatris; they brought him Morocco-plums and he ate. A student of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi went there; they brought him Morocco-plums and he did not eat. He came and told it to his teacher who said to him, this one follows the argument of Rebbi Simai, as Rebbi Simai said, a Gentile does not need preparation. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The red grapes in a vineyard are forbidden. Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The hard dates on palm leaves are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:12

May one light a fire under a pyre of leavened material? For him who infers it from remainder, it is forbidden. But for him who does not infer it from remainder, it is permitted. Rav Aḥa in the name of Rav Ḥisda: this implies that it is permitted to start a fire on a pyre of sancta so it should continuously burn on the Sabbath. But did we not state, “one does not kindle with oil to be burned on a holiday,” because of a holiday which falls on Friday. But then one should not light oil to be burned in the night since one does not burn sancta in the night! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they followed the argument of Rebbi Ismael. Just as Rebbi Ismael said, a baby whose time has passed can be circumcised either during the day or during the night, so when its time has passed the sanctum may be burned either during the day or during the night. Where do you have oil to be burned whose time has passed? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: Since it became impure it is as if its time had passed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:13

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 8:38

HALAKHAH: 6. “Bone to fill a spoonful; Rebbi Jehudah says to make a tooth of a key.” What is חָף? A key. There, we have stated: “If the teeth were taken, it is impure because of the holes. If the holes were covered, it is impure because of the teeth.” It seems that Rebbi Jehudah’s argument is inverted. There he calls חָף a protrusion and here he calls it a key.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 10:17

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Where do they differ? If he himself took them but if another took them they are disgusting. The words of the Sages, Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Naḥum in the name of Rav, he is never liable unless he take them with a grooming knife. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: The one who braids is liable because of building. This follows what Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Banaya: At our place they call builder one who is plaiting. Rebbi Zeˋira said, would it not be reasonable that it should be because of weaving? The argument of Rebbi Zeˋira is inverted, for there said Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one who plaits three hairs of a human is liable because of weaving; Rebbi Zeˋira said, is it not spinning rather than weaving? And here he says so! There if they are few, here for many. That is what you say about a human, but for an animal it is pure, as it was stated: One who makes a belt under the heart, to beautify, or to fasten the bags, to hang it around an animal’s neck, is pure. That is, for simple ones. But if the are folded, whether for human or for animal they are impure. The one who applies kohl is liable because of writing; the one who puts on make-up is liable because of dyeing.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 12:23

HALAKHAH: 5. “If he had to write the Name but intended to write Jehudah but forgot to write ד. Then the Name is at its proper place. He erases it and fixes it in holiness. Rebbi Jehudah says, he moves the pen over it and fixes it. They said to him, but this is not preferable.” Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, it is not writing. But here, he says, it is writing. They objected to him according to his opinion. According to your opinion, since you say that it is writing, but this is not preferable. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu did not say so, but that Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, it is not preferable, therefore the writing is writing; but here he says, writing on top of writing is not writing. What is writing on top of writing? One higher than the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 12:23

HALAKHAH: 5. “If he had to write the Name but intended to write Jehudah but forgot to write ד. Then the Name is at its proper place. He erases it and fixes it in holiness. Rebbi Jehudah says, he moves the pen over it and fixes it. They said to him, but this is not preferable.” Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, it is not writing. But here, he says, it is writing. They objected to him according to his opinion. According to your opinion, since you say that it is writing, but this is not preferable. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu did not say so, but that Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, it is not preferable, therefore the writing is writing; but here he says, writing on top of writing is not writing. What is writing on top of writing? One higher than the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 13:14

HALAKHAH: 5. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah dos not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated there: “one does not catch fish from vivaria, one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated there, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 13:14

HALAKHAH: 5. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah dos not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated there: “one does not catch fish from vivaria, one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated there, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 19:21

What does Rebbi Jehudah say in this case? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, neither does the blind one. Nobody says “neither” unless he agree with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There he says except, but here he says including. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. Rebbi Jehudah emphasizes male, the rabbis emphazise uncircumcised. Why does the verse add male? Only if he be totally male. But Rebbi Jehudah emphasizes male, why does the verse add uncircumcised? Even if he is only partially uncircumcised. But here, all your maleness, except the hermaphrodite.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 20:3

The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. Since there, where he qualifies it as an implement, you say that it is permitted, here, where he does not qualify it as an implement, not so much more? Rebbi Ḥinena said, Rebbi Eliezer parallels Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: Also they permitted preparations for making food. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba: Following him who permits, only from above. As the following: In the days of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi there was a festive meal in the House of Study. They spread a canopy the day before over four cubits; the next day they were extending it over everything. They were of the opinion that this followed the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi. They investigated and found that it was not according to Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi’s opinion unless it was spread over most of it. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who sets up tents on the Sabbath is liable because of building. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he only is spreading and folding it on the Sabbath. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose, what is the rule for a spread over a chest? He told him, since it was spread the day before he is like one who unlocks and locks on the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the roof as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they do not compare. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed stakes are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine or squash.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shadow it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rav Oshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:28

HALAKHAH: “The legitimization of an alley,” etc. What laths? Two laths and beam following the House of Shammai? Laths but no beam following the House of Hillel? Three [hand-breadths wide] following Rebbi Yose? Arbitrarily small following the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rebbi Eliezer went to his student Rebbi Yose ben Perora at Oblin. He showed him an alley where there was only one lath. He told him, make it two laths. He said to him, what? Are you telling me to close it off? He told him, let it be closed; there is an argument for the domains of the Sabbath in this respect?” This implies three following Rebbi Yose. If you would say, arbitrarily small following the rabbis, does arbitrarily small close off?

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:35

If two beams are one on top of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one looks at the lower one as if it were higher or the higher one as if it were lower, on condition that the upper one not be higher than twenty cubits and the lower not be lower than ten hand-breadths. It was found stated that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s argument and disagrees with him. He follows his fathers argument since he says, one looks at the lower one as if it were higher or the higher one as if it were lower. He disagrees with him since he says, on condition that the upper one not be higher than twenty cubits and the lower not be lower than ten hand-breadths. If you would say that he follows his father’s opinion it could be arbitrarily high. Rebbi Yose, Ḥinena bar Shelemiah, Rebbi Yudan; Ḥinena bar Shelemiah in the name of Rav: Only if the upper one be within three hand-breadths of the lower one.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:35

If two beams are one on top of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one looks at the lower one as if it were higher or the higher one as if it were lower, on condition that the upper one not be higher than twenty cubits and the lower not be lower than ten hand-breadths. It was found stated that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s argument and disagrees with him. He follows his fathers argument since he says, one looks at the lower one as if it were higher or the higher one as if it were lower. He disagrees with him since he says, on condition that the upper one not be higher than twenty cubits and the lower not be lower than ten hand-breadths. If you would say that he follows his father’s opinion it could be arbitrarily high. Rebbi Yose, Ḥinena bar Shelemiah, Rebbi Yudan; Ḥinena bar Shelemiah in the name of Rav: Only if the upper one be within three hand-breadths of the lower one.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:67

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav Ḥasdai: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows the argument of his father and disagrees with his father. The argument of his father, about an individual more than two bet se’ah. And disagrees with his father, about a caravan less than two bet se’ah Did we not hear that Rebbi Jehudah said, an individual for more than two bet se’ah needs woof and warp? Let us hear from the following, that Rebbi Aḥa the Tanna, Rebbi Ḥanin, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Sheshet: Just as they differ here so they are differing about kilaim. And in Kilaim not even if it is a bet rova?

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:67

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav Ḥasdai: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows the argument of his father and disagrees with his father. The argument of his father, about an individual more than two bet se’ah. And disagrees with his father, about a caravan less than two bet se’ah Did we not hear that Rebbi Jehudah said, an individual for more than two bet se’ah needs woof and warp? Let us hear from the following, that Rebbi Aḥa the Tanna, Rebbi Ḥanin, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Sheshet: Just as they differ here so they are differing about kilaim. And in Kilaim not even if it is a bet rova?

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 2:17

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Rebbi Jehudah says, up to two bet se’ah,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted, as we have stated there: “And similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it”. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not inverted. Rebbi Jeremiah said, for he is of Rav Jehudah’s opinion, as Rav Jehudah said, that is if it is open to a domain of difficult access. But if it was open to the public domain it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, everywhere Rebbi Eleazar seeks support from the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, how does one permit public domain? Rebbi Jehudah says, a lath on each side or a beam at each side but the Sages say a lath and a beam on one side and he shall make a door frame on the other side. And here he says so? Here about ten [cubits], there about thirteen. The words of the rabbis disagree. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rav Hoshaia asked my father, how large can the breach of an alley be in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah? And he told him, thirteen [cubits]. And here he says so? The Rabbis of Caesarea say, there what is standing is more than what is breached but here what is breached is more than what is standing.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 2:23

A corral which covers up to two bet se’ah. Rebbi Abbahu said, since it can be permitted by a caravan, if somebody threw from the public domain into it he is liable. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked, (not after it was permitted) [if it was chosen by] the caravan it becomes forbidden in a prohibition; therefore here is no liability for a purification sacrifice. By the same argument, an alley whose beam is higher than twenty cubits since it is qualified in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah (more than thirteen), if somebody threw from the public domain into it would he be liable? An alley which was breached more than ten [cubits], since a breach of an alley in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah is more than thirteen, if somebody threw from the public domain into it would he be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 3:26

There, we have stated: “If there is a doubt, it is pure; Rebbi Yose declares it impure.” Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose declared it impure only because of proof. And Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose declares impure even (one place) [one miqweh]. The argument of Rebbi Yose seems inverted, as we have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, Autolas testified in the name of five Elders that in case of a doubt an eruv is qualified.” And here you are saying so? There in his own name, but here in the name of five Elders. They wanted to say that he who says there “pure” says here “permitted”; he who says there “impure” says here “prohibited”. But even he who says there “impure” agrees here that it is permitted. Rebbi Ḥinena said, do they not only disagree about their words? And a doubt about their words is for leniency. But an eruv is a word of Torah; and a doubt about a word of the Torah is for restriction But is eruv a word of the Torah? Rebbi Jonathan said before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Yose ben Laqonia: One whips because of Sabbath domains as word of the Torah. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder said to him, but for Sabbath there is only stoning or extirpation? He said to him, is there not written, do not eat from it raw? He said to him, is there written לֹא? No, it is written אַל! He said to him, is there not written, stay everybody where he is, no person shall leave his place on the Seventh day? He said to him, is there written לֹא? No, it is written אַל. Rebbi ben Rebbi Abun said, nevertheless each one kept to his tradition. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarta said, they treated eruv as a doubt involving a deaf-mute person. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, so far if it exists, or even if it was burned? Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed this following what Rebbi Hoshaia said: You must conclude that the boundaries of Sabbath domains are not clear in the words of the Torah. Rebbi Mana asked, it is accepted that 2’000 cubits is not clear. Are 4’000 cubits not clear? Rebbi Simeon bar Carsana in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: The only clear case among all of them is the domain of twelve mil of the camp of Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 3:39

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Rebbi Jehudah said, if a person was afraid that the New Year’s Day might be complemented,” etc. Because they disagreed: May the remainders of a wick, a fire, or oil that burned out on the Sabbath be lit on the holiday? Rav and Rebbi Ḥanina both say it is forbidden, but Rebbi Joḥanan says, it is permitted. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan, is it the reverse regarding an egg? He said to him, since the rabbis compare it, it means that the two cases are identical. They said in the name of four Elders: If somebody’s eruv was eaten on the first [day] he is like the people of his town on the second [day]. Rav Ḥuna said in the name of Rav: Practice follows the four Elders. Rav Ḥisda asked: the argument of Rav seems to be inverted. There, he makes it two sanctities, but here he makes it one sanctity. Because they disagreed: May the remainders of a wick, a fire, or oil that burned out on the Sabbath be lit on the holiday? Rav and Rebbi Ḥanina both say it is forbidden, but Rebbi Joḥanan says, it is permitted. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan, is it the reverse regarding an egg? He said to him, since the rabbis compare it, it means that the two cases are identical.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 3:42

HALAKHAH: “And he says if today is holiday my words should be void but he gives a name to his tithes but does not eat from it. On the second [day] he gives a name to his tithes and eats from it.” Rav’s argument seems inverted. There he treats it as one sanctity but here he treats it as two sanctities. There it is one long sanctity but here one is holy, the other profane. The rabbis’ argument seems inverted. There they treat it as two sanctities, but here they make it one sanctity. There a holiday next to a Sabbath is like weekday next to Sabbath but here both are equal. The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about the two days of the New Year which are an institution of the early prophets

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 3:42

HALAKHAH: “And he says if today is holiday my words should be void but he gives a name to his tithes but does not eat from it. On the second [day] he gives a name to his tithes and eats from it.” Rav’s argument seems inverted. There he treats it as one sanctity but here he treats it as two sanctities. There it is one long sanctity but here one is holy, the other profane. The rabbis’ argument seems inverted. There they treat it as two sanctities, but here they make it one sanctity. There a holiday next to a Sabbath is like weekday next to Sabbath but here both are equal. The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about the two days of the New Year which are an institution of the early prophets

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 5:31

HALAKHAH: Paragraph: “A village which is the property of one person and becomes owned by many,” etc. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: One does not make an eruv in parts. Rebbi Jehudah’s argument is inverted since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: How does one permit public domain? Rebbi Jehudah says, a lath on each side or a beam on each side, but the Sages say, a lath and a beam on one side and he makes a door frame on the other side. And here he says so? It was not said about this but about the following: Even a big city like Antioch, if it has a single gate one may make an eruv. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: One does not make an eruv in parts. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if people in an alley put a beam (in) [at the entrance] of the alley then these are permitted and those are prohibited. If both of them put it up, both are prohibited. What does he do? He puts the beam at the entrance of the alley and permits the alley. If five alleys opened into one alley and they put their beam in the middle of the alley then these are permitted and those are prohibited. If both of them put it up, both are prohibited. What does he do? He puts the beam at the entrance of the alley and permits the alley. Rebbi Phineas immigrated here. He looked at the entrance of the market of the shearers and said to them, did you split your eruv? Rebbi Jehudah bar Shalom told him, it was made to reinforce the houses.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 6:44

Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: There is no rule of enclosure for a Gentile; there is no rule of stone partitions for a Gentile. There is no rule of enclosure for a Gentile; for if he dwelt on an upper floor you take him down to forbid. There is no rule of stone partitions for a Gentile for if he dwelt in the inner [courtyard] you would take him out to forbid. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is a rule of enclosure for a Gentile, for if an Israel and a Gentile were dwelling in the inner [courtyard] he never forbids unless there be two Israel. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: He who has a stone partition inside his house ten hand-breadths high, if an Israel he does not forbid, if a Gentile he forbids. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If a wall was surrounded by ladders on both sides one makes two eruvin but not one eruv. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there because of the ladders they have the status of doors, but here from the upper floors one is used to descend, from the lower one is not used to ascend.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 7:8

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “If a wall between two courtyards,” etc. Why does it have to be four [hand-breadths] wide? Even if it is not four [hand-breadths] wide? Because of what is stated later: “both sides may climb up and eat them.” If it is not four [hand-breadths] wide, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: it is forbidden for both sides. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav: it is permitted for both sides. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If he threw it and it came to rest on top of a partition he is liable. And here, he says so? There one considers it as if filled with dust and pebbles. Here, what do you have? You should know this since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Ledges and walls high ten [hand-breadths] and wide four are permitted for both sides, on condition that he may not exchange. Rebbi Joḥanan asked. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If he threw it and it came to rest on top of a partition he is liable. And here, he says so? You are saying there, one considers it as if filled with dust and pebbles; here it is the same.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 7:8

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “If a wall between two courtyards,” etc. Why does it have to be four [hand-breadths] wide? Even if it is not four [hand-breadths] wide? Because of what is stated later: “both sides may climb up and eat them.” If it is not four [hand-breadths] wide, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: it is forbidden for both sides. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav: it is permitted for both sides. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If he threw it and it came to rest on top of a partition he is liable. And here, he says so? There one considers it as if filled with dust and pebbles. Here, what do you have? You should know this since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Ledges and walls high ten [hand-breadths] and wide four are permitted for both sides, on condition that he may not exchange. Rebbi Joḥanan asked. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If he threw it and it came to rest on top of a partition he is liable. And here, he says so? You are saying there, one considers it as if filled with dust and pebbles; here it is the same.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 8:21

The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted. There he said, “Rebbi Jehudah does not apply this to water since it has no consistency.”

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 8:29

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Ḥanania ben Aqabia said it only for Lake Genezareth since mountains surround it. Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, if one threw from a circular road into public domain or from public domain into it? He said to him, in your opinion a public domain does not exist. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no public domain unless it be open from one end of the world to the other. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted since he said, there is no public domain in this world, only in the future as it is written, every valley will be lifted. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “What is a private domain? The paths of Bet-Gilgul. Private domain regarding the Sabbat but public domain for impurity.”

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 8:30

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Yose said it only for Tabernacles, but in the matter of the Sabbath even Rebbi Yose agrees. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is even for the Sabbath, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a ruler came to Sepphoris and they suspended quilts; Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose permitted carrying under them following his father’s argument. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina comes like Rebbi Ḥanania and both disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan’s argument, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Yose, and Ḥanania bar Aqabia all three said the same. Rebbi Jehudah of the open bridges, Rebbi Yose that of tabernacles, Rebbi Ḥanania ben Aqabia as it was stated: Rebbi Ḥanania permitted three things, he permitted a balcony, and seaweed, and bringing bathtowels.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 8:30

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Yose said it only for Tabernacles, but in the matter of the Sabbath even Rebbi Yose agrees. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is even for the Sabbath, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a ruler came to Sepphoris and they suspended quilts; Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose permitted carrying under them following his father’s argument. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina comes like Rebbi Ḥanania and both disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan’s argument, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Yose, and Ḥanania bar Aqabia all three said the same. Rebbi Jehudah of the open bridges, Rebbi Yose that of tabernacles, Rebbi Ḥanania ben Aqabia as it was stated: Rebbi Ḥanania permitted three things, he permitted a balcony, and seaweed, and bringing bathtowels.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 10:16

“Rebbi Jehudah says, even if it is removed from the ground only a thread’s width he rolls it back to himself..” The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted. There he says, it is forbidden to use the airspace within ten hand-breadths; and here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said, here there is no Rebbi Jehudah, only Rebbi Meïr, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only a scroll but even a belt.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 10:58

There, we have stated: “He enters his head and he puts on his ear’s cartilage, his hand and he gives on his thumb, his foot,” etc. Rebbi Jehudah’s argument is inverted. There he says, it is forbidden to act craftily, but here he says that it is permitted. There that he should not enter with his head and most of his body and be punishable by extirpation. But here it is because of bringing impure implements on the Sabbath. The argument of the rabbis is inverted. There they say, it is permitted to act craftily, but here they say, it is forbidden to act craftily. There that he should not defile himself three times, but here it is a known impurity inside; it is possible for it to be removed immediately. Without impurity? He told him, it is better to violate a prohibition that was not caused by him than a prohibition which will come before him.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 10:58

There, we have stated: “He enters his head and he puts on his ear’s cartilage, his hand and he gives on his thumb, his foot,” etc. Rebbi Jehudah’s argument is inverted. There he says, it is forbidden to act craftily, but here he says that it is permitted. There that he should not enter with his head and most of his body and be punishable by extirpation. But here it is because of bringing impure implements on the Sabbath. The argument of the rabbis is inverted. There they say, it is permitted to act craftily, but here they say, it is forbidden to act craftily. There that he should not defile himself three times, but here it is a known impurity inside; it is possible for it to be removed immediately. Without impurity? He told him, it is better to violate a prohibition that was not caused by him than a prohibition which will come before him.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 1:22

The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. As we have stated, “Rebbi Jehudah says, one checks at nightfall of the Fourteenth, and on the mourning of the Fourteenth, and at the time of elimination. But the Sages say, if he did not check at nightfall of the Fourteenth, he has to check on the Fourteenth.” Does he have to check three times? Since at a time before its term of elimination you are saying that he has to check three times, at the moment of the term of elimination not so much more? (No, it need not be so. If he did not check on the Fourteenth, he has to check on the holiday. Does he have to check three times? Since at a time before its term of elimination you are saying that he has to check three times, at the moment of the term of elimination not so much more?) No, it need not be so. If he did not check on the holiday, he has to check after the holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 1:25

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Meïr says, one eats all during the fifth [hour],” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, from noontime on it is from their words; Rebbi Jehudah says, from noontime on it is biblical. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fifteenth. I could think at nightfall; the verse says only,. How is this? Give it one hour before sundown. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fourteenth. I could think the entire day; the verse says only. How is that? Split the day, half for leavened matter, half for mazzah. Rebbi Meïr’s argument seems inverted. There, he said only to add; here he said only to diminish. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he diminished, he excludes leavened matter. Rebbi Meïr says, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is eaten. Rebbi Jehudah says, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is prepared.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 1:28

Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There, he says that the fifth cannot be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Yose said, there the matter is given over to the court, and the court is diligent. But here the matter is given over to women who are slow. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there it is a matter between the beginning of the fifth and the end of the seventh hour. Here it is between the end of the fifth and the start of the seventh. It also was stated thus: At the start of the fifth hour the sun is in the East, and at the end of the [seventh] hour the sun is in the West. The sun never starts setting before the end of the seventh hour.]

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:12

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:12

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:12

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:13

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:13

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:13

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:13

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:14

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:14

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:14

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:15

Rebbi Jehudah came back and presented another argument: Leavened matter is forbidden as food and leftover is forbidden as food. Since the latter is to be burned, the former is to be burned. They told him, carcass meat disproves since it is forbidden as food and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food and for usufruct and leftover is forbidden as food and for usufruct; carcass meat does not disprove since it is not forbidden for usufruct. They told him, the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food and for usufruct and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, [and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation]; the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not make liable for extirpation. They told him, the fat of the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time; the fat of the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not depend on time. They told him, a suspended sacrifice following your opinion does disprove since it is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, [but is not to be burned]. Rebbi Jehudah remained silent.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:62

It is written: or cooking cooked in water. I not only have water, from where other fluids? The verse says, cooking cooked, in any way. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? An argument de minore ad majus. Since for water which does not mask its taste you are saying it is forbidden, other fluids which mask its taste not so much more?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 3:28

It and its young fell into a cistern. Rebbi Eliezer said, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and slaughter it. The second one has to be provided for so it should not die. Rebbi Joshua says, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and not slaughter it, and be cunning and lift the second one. Even though he had no intention of slaughtering either of them, he is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Is the argument of Rebbi Eliezer not inverted? There he says, one is prohibited from cunning but here he says, one is permitted to be cunning. Here it is because “not to be seen nor found”; there, what do you have? Is the argument of Rebbi Joshua not inverted? There he says, one is permitted to be cunning, but here, he says, one is prohibited from cunning. Rebbi Idi said, there it is a rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, but here liability for a purification offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, there it is to protect Jews’ money; here what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 3:28

It and its young fell into a cistern. Rebbi Eliezer said, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and slaughter it. The second one has to be provided for so it should not die. Rebbi Joshua says, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and not slaughter it, and be cunning and lift the second one. Even though he had no intention of slaughtering either of them, he is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Is the argument of Rebbi Eliezer not inverted? There he says, one is prohibited from cunning but here he says, one is permitted to be cunning. Here it is because “not to be seen nor found”; there, what do you have? Is the argument of Rebbi Joshua not inverted? There he says, one is permitted to be cunning, but here, he says, one is prohibited from cunning. Rebbi Idi said, there it is a rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, but here liability for a purification offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, there it is to protect Jews’ money; here what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 4:23

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Rebbi Jehudah said this only about a male horse because it kills [its owner] in war. Some say, because it runs after a female, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after a female, [this one] does not run after a female. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a large domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Ḥanin bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a small domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 4:23

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Rebbi Jehudah said this only about a male horse because it kills [its owner] in war. Some say, because it runs after a female, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after a female, [this one] does not run after a female. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a large domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Ḥanin bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a small domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 5:14

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:2

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:2

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:2

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.