536 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:3

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If a person could construct an equal cut by himself, he could make a creeping animal causing impurity in a tent and a corpse causing impurity in the volume of a lentil, by explaining textile, leather; textile, leather. So if a creeping animal is in a person’s hand, even if he immerses himself in the waters of the Siloam, or in waters of a primeval ocean, he never can achieve purity. If he throws it away, immediately he becomes pure. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may use an equal cut to confirm what he has learned; nobody may use an equal cut to invalidate what he has learned. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may argue de minore ad majus by himself; a person may not argue an equal cut by himself. Therefore one can contradict an argument de minore ad majus; one cannot contradict an equal cut.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:27

Is there anybody who says to his teacher, it is the other way around? Since Rebbi Eliezer was teaching him practice currently that the festival offering does not push aside the Sabbath and he objected to him at the time of argument, therefore he told him, it is the other way around.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:36

Halakhah 7: They said, that argument of Rebbi Eliezer is no answer to Rebbi Joshua, since he could say to him, how can you answer me with an argument about something that is apt to change for something that is not apt to being changed? Neither is the argument of Rebbi Joshua an answer to Rebbi Eliezer, since he could say to him, the Pesaḥ of Reuben which he slaughtered in the name of Simeon is changed into something qualified; and you are saying, he is liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:36

Halakhah 7: They said, that argument of Rebbi Eliezer is no answer to Rebbi Joshua, since he could say to him, how can you answer me with an argument about something that is apt to change for something that is not apt to being changed? Neither is the argument of Rebbi Joshua an answer to Rebbi Eliezer, since he could say to him, the Pesaḥ of Reuben which he slaughtered in the name of Simeon is changed into something qualified; and you are saying, he is liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:36

Halakhah 7: They said, that argument of Rebbi Eliezer is no answer to Rebbi Joshua, since he could say to him, how can you answer me with an argument about something that is apt to change for something that is not apt to being changed? Neither is the argument of Rebbi Joshua an answer to Rebbi Eliezer, since he could say to him, the Pesaḥ of Reuben which he slaughtered in the name of Simeon is changed into something qualified; and you are saying, he is liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:33

HALAKHAH: Who is the Tanna of “majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes. One tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public”. Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Meïr says, a single tribe does not drag all tribes, but Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. And Rebbi Jehudah follows Rebbi Simeon. Just as Rebbi Simeon said, one tribe drags all tribes, so Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes, he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: From this place which the Eternal will choose. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? The entire community of the Children of Israel will be forgiven. What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? Since the entire people acted in error. How does Rebbi Simeon uphold Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, the entire community of the Children of Israel will be forgiven? Except women and children. How does Rebbi Jehudah uphold Rebbi Simeon’s reason, since the entire people acted in error? Except if the beginning was criminal and the conclusion in error. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Benjamin bar Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written: A people and a public of peoples will come from you, and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity, as it was stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Pesaḥ] and impure the second, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves. They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in purity or all celebrate in impurity. Who is “they told him”? Rebbi Meïr. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If one of the loaves or one of the orders became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: who is “they told him”? The Sages who argue like Rebbi Meïr.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:45

It was stated: “Only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss.” Therefore, not a carcass<sub>.</sub> An argument de minore ad maius. Since a corpse, which does not cause impurity of couch and seat, creates a grave of the abyss, should a carcasss which causes impurity of couch and seat not create a grave of the abyss? Why was it said that only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss? To exclude couch and seat.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:58

May one start fire on a pyre of leavened matter? For him who infers from leftovers it is prohibited; for him who does not infer from leftovers it is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, they came to it following the argument of Rebbi Ismael. (etc.) [Just as Rebbi Ismael said, a baby whose time has passed can be circumcised either during the day or during the night, so when its time has passed the sanctum may be burned either during the day or during the night.]

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:60

HALAKHAH: What is the rule about soft sinews? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one subscribes to them; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not subscribe to them. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted; the argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is inverted. As they disagreed about what is stated there: “The following have their hides treated like their flesh: Human skin, and the hides of domesticated pigs, Rebbi Yose says also of wild pigs. [The soft skin of camel’s hump, the soft skin of a calf’s head, the skin near the hooves, the skin of genitals, the skin of an embryo, the skin under the fat tail, and the skin of anaqa, koah, leta’ah, and homet lizards. Rebbi Jehudah says, a lizard is like a mole. In all cases, if one tanned them, or started to use them as working material, they are pure, except for human skin. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri says, the “eight crawling animals” have hides.”] Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was only said as prohibition and regarding impurity, but for flogging it is hide. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Rebbi stated a complete Mishnah, for prohibition, for flogging, for impurity. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, he treats it as flesh, but here, he does not treat it as meat. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, there is a difference, since there one refers to skin which in the end will become hard. This emphasizes that the reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted! Since there, where in the end it will harden, he treats it as flesh, here where in the end it will not harden, not so much more? Rebbi Abun said, the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is: they shall eat the meat in that night, not sinews.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:60

HALAKHAH: What is the rule about soft sinews? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one subscribes to them; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not subscribe to them. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted; the argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is inverted. As they disagreed about what is stated there: “The following have their hides treated like their flesh: Human skin, and the hides of domesticated pigs, Rebbi Yose says also of wild pigs. [The soft skin of camel’s hump, the soft skin of a calf’s head, the skin near the hooves, the skin of genitals, the skin of an embryo, the skin under the fat tail, and the skin of anaqa, koah, leta’ah, and homet lizards. Rebbi Jehudah says, a lizard is like a mole. In all cases, if one tanned them, or started to use them as working material, they are pure, except for human skin. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri says, the “eight crawling animals” have hides.”] Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was only said as prohibition and regarding impurity, but for flogging it is hide. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Rebbi stated a complete Mishnah, for prohibition, for flogging, for impurity. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, he treats it as flesh, but here, he does not treat it as meat. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, there is a difference, since there one refers to skin which in the end will become hard. This emphasizes that the reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted! Since there, where in the end it will harden, he treats it as flesh, here where in the end it will not harden, not so much more? Rebbi Abun said, the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is: they shall eat the meat in that night, not sinews.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:65

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Simon, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaya: Piggul and leftovers add together to make hands impure in the amount that exposes to punishment, the volume of an olive. Do they disqualify heave? It is a argument de minore ad majus. If they make hands impure to disqualify heave, they themselves not so much more? This which left what are you doing with it? Does it make hands impure or does it not make hands impure? If you are saying that this which left makes hands impure, would piggul and leftovers not disqualify heave? If you are saying that piggul and leftovers do not disqualify heave, about that which left they did not decide anything. For if it were not so, the outer part would make the inner part impure. Rebbi Abbin said, who holds that something can become impure by [touching] itself? Rebbi Meïr. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, everything becomes pure by its greater part? When he cut off the greater part, is it not separated? Then it would be touching and be disqualified. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, if he cuts off minimal pieces and throws away.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 10:37

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Piggul and leftovers add together to make hands impure in the amount that exposes to punishment, the volume of an olive. Do they disqualify heave? It is a argument de minore ad maius. If they make hands impure to disqualify heave, they themselves not so much more? This which was left, what are you doing with it? Does it make hands impure or does it not make hands impure? If you are saying that this which was left makes hands impure, would piggul and leftovers not disqualify heave? About that which was left they did not decide anything. For if it were not so, the outer part would make the inner part impure. Rebbi Abbin said, who holds that something can become impure by touching itself? Rebbi Meïr. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, everything becomes pure by its greater part? When he cut off the greater part, is it not separated? Then it would be touching and be disqualified. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, if he cuts off minimal pieces and throws away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 2:4

It was stated “Rebbi Jehudah said, from where that kindling fire wood may only be done by a qualified Cohen and with a vessel of service? The verse says, Aaron’s the priest’s sons shall put fire on the altar. Rebbi Simeon said, could anybody think that a non-Cohen might approach the top of the altar? Then why is it said, Aaron’s the priest’s sons shall put fire on the altar? This teaches that kindling the fire may only be done on top of the altar” They objected, is it not written “and the fire on the altar shall burn there, it shall not go out, from here that kindling the fire may only be done on top of the altar, the words of Rebbi Jehudah”? The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted. There it needs a qualified Cohen, but here it does not need a qualified Cohen. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Yudan said, what do you understand from here? Could we say on top of the altar and a non-Cohen?

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 2:7

If he removed with his left hand, the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Jehudah ben Rebbi, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if a fistful had been sanctified in a dedicated vessel and he burned it whether out of his hand or out of a vessel, whether by his right hand or by the left. Jehudah ben Rebbi said, either like a purification offering from the hand, or like a reparation offering from a vessel, but only with the right hand. They objected: Was it not stated, if he received with his right hand and then put it into his left hand, he must return it to the right hand? If from the left hand he returns it for the altar, not so much more to the cup? Rebbi La said, if somebody stated this, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon stated it. As it was stated, it does not need sanctification in a cup. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his father Rebbi Simeon, as we have stated there, “not in a dedicated vessel it is disqualified, but Rebbi Simeon qualifies it.” How is it? The rabbis who require a dedicated vessel need the right hand; Rebbi Simeon [who] does not require a dedicated vessel does not need the right hand. Rebbi Mana said, I am wondering how the rabbis could compare the removal of ashes to burning, but it can be compared only to the lifting of the fistful, since both are by lifting.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 2:20

HALAKHAH: From where the cleaning of the interior altar? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: He shall throw it next to the altar, to the East, on the place of ashes. It is unnecessary. If to designate [the place], it already is written, next to the altar. If to teach you that it should be put to the East of the ramp, it already is written, to the East. Also he explained, next to the altar, next to the altar. Since in one case it is to the East of the ramp, so in the other case it is to the East of the ramp. From where that it is forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: to a pure place, that its place shall be pure. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar did not say so but, from where that the cleaning of the exterior altar is forbidden for usufruct? The verse says, to the place of ashes, that it be its place forever. From where the cleaning of the interior altar? He shall sprinkle on it, he shall burn incense. Since sprinkling is on its body, also burning incense on its body. From where that the interior altar is forbidden for usufruct? An argument de minore ad majus. If from the exterior altar it is forbidden, so much more from the interior.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 3:20

HALAKHAH: It is written about the daily sacrifice in the morning, and it is written about wood in the morning. Something about which is written in the morning, in the morning, shall precede something about which in the morning is written only once. Then even before its blood? Rebbi Hila said, you shall do, preceded action for it. It is written about the daily sacrifice in the morning, and it is written about incense in the morning, in the morning. Something about which is written in the morning, in the morning, shall precede something about which only [one] in the morning is written. Where do we hold? If about limbs, are they not like wood? But we are holding, even for its blood. It is written about wood in the morning, in the morning, and it is written about incense in the morning, in the morning, and I do not know which of the two is preceding. Which one is enabling what? Wood enables the incense; the wood shall precede the incense. Come and see, wood precedes the blood and blood precedes incense, and you are saying so? Rebbi Hila said, no. Since I could not prove by a logical argument that wood enables the incense, you needed that baraita. They wanted to say, what enables the incense? Charcoal. Rebbi Eleazar said, smoke-creating herb.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 3:30

”You find that by five immersions and ten sanctifications he immerses and sanctifies himself on that day. From where that there are two sanctifications for every immersion? The verse says, and he undressed, and he washed, and he washed, (and he undressed) [and he dressed]. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, it is an argument de minore ad majus. Since at a place where he does not need immersion he needs sanctification of hands and legs, here where he needs immersion not so much more that he should need sanctification of hands and legs? Take away your argument. Since there it is once for the entire day, also here it would be once for the entire day. The verse says, and he shall take off the linen garments, why does the verse say, which he wore? Could we ever think that he took off what he was not wearing? Then why does it say, which he wore? It bracketed undressing and dressing. Since dressing needs sanctification of hands and legs, also undressing needs sanctification of hands and legs.” Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable the opposite way. It bracketed undressing and dressing. Since undressing needs sanctification of hands and legs, also dressing needs sanctification of hands and legs.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 3:30

”You find that by five immersions and ten sanctifications he immerses and sanctifies himself on that day. From where that there are two sanctifications for every immersion? The verse says, and he undressed, and he washed, and he washed, (and he undressed) [and he dressed]. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, it is an argument de minore ad majus. Since at a place where he does not need immersion he needs sanctification of hands and legs, here where he needs immersion not so much more that he should need sanctification of hands and legs? Take away your argument. Since there it is once for the entire day, also here it would be once for the entire day. The verse says, and he shall take off the linen garments, why does the verse say, which he wore? Could we ever think that he took off what he was not wearing? Then why does it say, which he wore? It bracketed undressing and dressing. Since dressing needs sanctification of hands and legs, also undressing needs sanctification of hands and legs.” Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable the opposite way. It bracketed undressing and dressing. Since undressing needs sanctification of hands and legs, also dressing needs sanctification of hands and legs.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 4:5

The Torah said, lots. Lots made of anything. I could think that he should put two lots on one and two lots on the other, the verse says, lots, one lot for the Eternal and one lot for Azazel. I could think that he should give the Eternal’s and Azazel’s on one and the Eternal’s and Azazel’s on the other, the verse says, lot. Is that not the previous argument? It should be so: I could think that after he gave the Eternal’s on the Eternal’s and Azazel’s on Azazel’s, he could go back and switch, the verse says, one lot for the Eternal, there is only one for the Eternal, and one lot for Azazel, there is only one for Azazel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 4:7

Aaron shall put, if a non-Cohen puts it is qualified. Similarly, if a non-Cohen draws it is disqualified. An argument de minore ad majus. If putting, where Aaron’s sons are mentioned, is qualified if a non-Cohen puts it, drawing, where Aaron’s sons are not mentioned, not so much more? No, it is not necessarily so. Putting on, which is obstructive, if a non-Cohen puts it is qualified. Drawing, which is not obstructive, if a non-Cohen draws it is disqualified. And Rebbi Isaac ben Haqula said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, drawing from the urn is obstructive, putting on is not obstructive. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he establishes even by word of mouth. They thought to say, even one today and one tomorrow. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, even one today and one tomorrow, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Yannai, why does it say, lots? As meritorious deed. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan : The lot makes it a purification sacrifice, giving it the name does not make it a purification sacrifice. He explains it, if the drawing succeeds. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yannai: If he did not draw lots and did not confess it is qualified, only he missed a meritorious deed.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 6:23

Simeon the Just served Israel as High Priest for forty years, and in the last year he told them, in this year I am going to die. They asked him, whom shall we appoint in your stead? He told them, there is my son Onias before you. They went and appointed Onias. His brother [Simon] was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart: when I shall serve as High Priest I shall wear your undershirt and gird myself with your belt. They investigated and did not find [him]. It is said, he fled to King’s Mountain, from there he fled to Alexandria, based himself there and built there an altar, over which he recited this verse, on that day there will be an altar for the Eternal inside the Land of Egypt. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who fled from prominence went to seek it at the end, if one attained it and lost it not so much more? It was stated, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, it was not so but they appointed Simeon; his brother Onias was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart etc., as before Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who never attained prominence forced Israel to foreign worship, if one attained it and lost it not so much more?

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 6:23

Simeon the Just served Israel as High Priest for forty years, and in the last year he told them, in this year I am going to die. They asked him, whom shall we appoint in your stead? He told them, there is my son Onias before you. They went and appointed Onias. His brother [Simon] was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart: when I shall serve as High Priest I shall wear your undershirt and gird myself with your belt. They investigated and did not find [him]. It is said, he fled to King’s Mountain, from there he fled to Alexandria, based himself there and built there an altar, over which he recited this verse, on that day there will be an altar for the Eternal inside the Land of Egypt. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who fled from prominence went to seek it at the end, if one attained it and lost it not so much more? It was stated, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, it was not so but they appointed Simeon; his brother Onias was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart etc., as before Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who never attained prominence forced Israel to foreign worship, if one attained it and lost it not so much more?

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 6:40

Rebbi Shammai asked, if the parts were lost, may one pour the blood for the meat? He had not heard what Rebbi Eleazar had said, since he neither intended as food for humans nor as food for the altar. Rebbi Zakkai stated:A non-Cohen who burned makes garments impure. One only has to ask, is it qualified during nighttime? It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since burning of the parts which is not qualified for a non-Cohen may be done in the night, for these which are qualified for a non-Cohen it is logical that it should be qualified during nighttime.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 1:2

HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the roof as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they are not comparable. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed poles are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine, or squash, or ivy, and used it as roofing it is disqualified.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shade it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 1:46

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Yose said it only for Tabernacles, but in the matter of the Sabbath even Rebbi Yose agrees. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is even for the Sabbath, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a ruler came to Sepphoris and they suspended quilts; Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose permitted carrying under them following his father’s argument. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina comes like Rebbi Ḥanania and both disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan’s argument, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Yose, and Ḥanania bar Aqabia all three said the same. Rebbi Jehudah of the open bridges, Rebbi Yose that of tabernacles, Rebbi Ḥanania ben Aqabia as it was stated Rebbi Ḥanania permitted three things, he permitted a balcony, and seaweed, and bringing bathtowels.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 1:46

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Yose said it only for Tabernacles, but in the matter of the Sabbath even Rebbi Yose agrees. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is even for the Sabbath, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a ruler came to Sepphoris and they suspended quilts; Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose permitted carrying under them following his father’s argument. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina comes like Rebbi Ḥanania and both disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan’s argument, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Yose, and Ḥanania bar Aqabia all three said the same. Rebbi Jehudah of the open bridges, Rebbi Yose that of tabernacles, Rebbi Ḥanania ben Aqabia as it was stated Rebbi Ḥanania permitted three things, he permitted a balcony, and seaweed, and bringing bathtowels.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 2:2

HALAKHAH: “One who sleeps under the bed,” etc. There, we have stated: “But one may spread it over single posts of the bed.” And here he says so? Rebbi Eliezer said, there he and his toga are under the sukkah, but here he and his (bed) [toga] are under the (sukkah) [bed]. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he said, action has precedence over study, and here he says so? Rebbi Jehudah thinks that one sleeping under the bed is like the one sleeping under the sukkah. So much more is Rebbi Jehudah’s argument inverted, as we have stated there, “[Rebbi Jehudah says,] if there are no dwellers in the upper one the lower is qualified.” Therefore if there are dwellers in the upper one the lower is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, there is another space, but here there is no other space.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 2:2

HALAKHAH: “One who sleeps under the bed,” etc. There, we have stated: “But one may spread it over single posts of the bed.” And here he says so? Rebbi Eliezer said, there he and his toga are under the sukkah, but here he and his (bed) [toga] are under the (sukkah) [bed]. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he said, action has precedence over study, and here he says so? Rebbi Jehudah thinks that one sleeping under the bed is like the one sleeping under the sukkah. So much more is Rebbi Jehudah’s argument inverted, as we have stated there, “[Rebbi Jehudah says,] if there are no dwellers in the upper one the lower is qualified.” Therefore if there are dwellers in the upper one the lower is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, there is another space, but here there is no other space.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 2:3

The argument of Rabban Gamliel is inverted. As it was stated, Tabi, Rabban Gamliel’s slave, put on tefillin and the Sages did not object to him. And here they objected? In order not to push aside the Sages. If in order not to push aside the Sages, he could sit outside the sukkah. Tabi, Rabban Gamliel’s slave, wanted to hear the words of the Sages.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 3:27

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Aqiba says an unripe cedrat is not a fruit, but the Sages say it is a fruit. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It follows that Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his teacher, Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said it is not a fruit, so Rebbi Simeon said it is not a fruit. Rebbi Yose said, is everything qualified for lulav subject to tithes and everything disqualified for lulav not subject to tithes? Did they not object, there is the spotted one, one that grew in a form, or one shaped like a ball, which are disqualified for lulav but subject to tithes! It is reasonable {to hold that} Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba but Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba since it is written fruit and it is not a fruit. Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon, there is the spotted one, one that grew in a form, or one shaped like a ball, which are disqualified for lulav but subject to tithes.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:9

Because they disagreed: May the remainders of a wick, a fire, or oil that burned out on the Sabbath be lit on the holiday? Rav and Rebbi Ḥanina both say it is forbidden, but Rebbi Joḥanan says, it is permitted. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan, is it the reverse regarding an egg? He said to him, since the rabbis compare it, it means that the two cases are identical. They said in the name of four Elders: If somebody’s eruv was eaten on the first <day> he is like the people of his town on the second <day>. Rav Ḥuna said in the name of Rav: Practice follows the four Elders. Rav Ḥisda asked: the argument of Rav seems to be inverted. There, he makes it two sanctities, but here he makes it one sanctity. Because they disagreed: May the remainders of a wick, a fire, or oil that burned out on the Sabbath be lit on the holiday? Rav and Rebbi Ḥanina both say it is forbidden, but Rebbi Joḥanan says, it is permitted. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan, is it the reverse regarding an egg? He said to him, since the rabbis compare it, it means that the two cases are identical.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:16

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:16

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:16

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:20

“The House of Shammai say, one may not take unless one had moved when it was still daylight.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted, as we have stated there: “In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, a person stands near the drying figs Friday afternoon in a Sabbatical year and says, from here I shall eat tomorrow.” Is Rebbi Eliezer not a Shammaite? One is restrictive if living things are involved.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:21

“The House of Hillel say, he may stand there and say, this and that I shall take.” The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages say, only if he delineates and says, from here to there;” and here they are saying so? Still they hold that one is restrictive if living things are involved. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Levi was knocking on his dovecote and saying, my dovecote shall provide me tomorrow.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:38

Samuel pounded on the side of the mortar. Rav said, anything that is pounded may be pounded in its ordinary way. Rav Huna, Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Garlic, and cress, and mustard seed are pounded in their ordinary way. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who makes oenanthium on a Sabbath is liable because of compounding. Is it therefore permitted on a holiday? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Making oenanthium on a holiday is forbidden because of compounding. Isaac Gold asked Rebbi Joḥanan, may one pound for spice wine on a holiday? He said to him, it is permitted. <rebbi isaac from atosha asked rebi simeon be laqish, may one pound to make spice wine on a holiday? he said to him, it is permitted;> give it to me and I shall drink. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Would one not act well in pounding it the day before? He said to him, yes. The argument of Rebbi Abbahu is inverted. Here he says permitted, and there he says forbidden. But since Rebbi Abbahu knew that Rebbi Ze`ira was restrictive, and that they are restrictive, therefore he agreed with them. Some want to say that so he said to him: If one wants that it be good he will not pound it the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira asked Kallidromos, the slave of Rebbi Judah the Prince, does your master pound to make spice wine on a holiday? He said to him yes, and all kinds of cuts of meat. Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Elazar in the name of Rebbi Immi, the father of Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris. Where do they disagree? For grilling. Put for the pot it is permitted. Rebbi Naḥum said, Rebbi Samuel bar Abba asked about noodle dough. To let it dry is forbidden, for the pot it is permitted, part and part is questionable.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:46

It was stated: “One sends wheat because when crushed it is food, beans because when wet they are food, barley because it is animal feed.” Did we not state so in the name of Rebbi Simeon? For all breathing, also breathing animals are included. The argument of Rebbi Simeon parallels that of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, for all breathing, also breathing animals are included, so Rebbi Simeon said, for all breathing, also breathing animals are included.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:2

HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:2

HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:8

A student of Rebbi Simai went to Antipatris; they brought him Morocco-plums and he ate. A student of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi went there; they brought him Morocco-plums and he did not eat. He came and told it to his teacher who said to him, this one follows the argument of Rebbi Simai, as Rebbi Simai said, a Gentile does not need preparation. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The red grapes in a vineyard are forbidden. Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The hard dates on palm leaves are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:12

HALAKHAH: The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted since we stated there, “Rebbi Jehudah says, if it was not a cadaver before the Sabbath it is forbidden since it is not prepared.” And here he says so? Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion since Rebbi Jehudah said, the expert is not from the Torah. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Abba: It is Rebbi Jehudah’s since Rebbi Jehudah gives the same rules for inspecting a firstling as inspecting ṭerefah. As you are saying there, one inspects for ṭerefah on a holiday, similarly one inspects a firstling on the holiday. Rebbi Yudan asked: Demay is from their words. and inspecting for terefah is from their words. Since you are saying that one inspects for ṭerefah on a holiday, does one separate demay on a holiday? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Any whose defect was visible on the eve of a holiday but the expert permitted it only on the holiday is not prepared. But was it not stated, a [firstling] calf which was born from a terefah animal on the holiday is permitted. Rav Ḥisda said, explain it if the expert transgressed and saw it. There came a case before Rebbi Immi who wanted to say, between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rav Hoshaia brought a baraita of Bar Qappara from the South and stated: But the Sages say, any whose defect was visible on the eve of a holiday but the expert permitted it only on the holiday is not prepared. He changed his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:13

It and its young fell into a cistern. Rebbi Eliezer said, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and slaughter it. The second one has to be provided for at its place so it should not die. Rebbi Joshua says, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and not slaughter it, and be cunning and lift the second one. Even though he had no intention of slaughtering either of them, he is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Is the argument of Rebbi Eliezer not inverted? Here he says, one is prohibited from cunning but there he says, one is permitted to be cunning. There it is because “not to be seen nor found”; here, what do you have? Is the argument of Rebbi Joshua not inverted? Here he says, one is permitted to be cunning, but there he says, one is prohibited from cunning. Rebbi Idi said, here it is a rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, but there liability for a purification offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, here it is to protect Jews’ money; there what do you have? Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Joshia, one like one of them, the other like the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 3:13

It and its young fell into a cistern. Rebbi Eliezer said, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and slaughter it. The second one has to be provided for at its place so it should not die. Rebbi Joshua says, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and not slaughter it, and be cunning and lift the second one. Even though he had no intention of slaughtering either of them, he is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Is the argument of Rebbi Eliezer not inverted? Here he says, one is prohibited from cunning but there he says, one is permitted to be cunning. There it is because “not to be seen nor found”; here, what do you have? Is the argument of Rebbi Joshua not inverted? Here he says, one is permitted to be cunning, but there he says, one is prohibited from cunning. Rebbi Idi said, here it is a rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, but there liability for a purification offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, here it is to protect Jews’ money; there what do you have? Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Joshia, one like one of them, the other like the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 4:37

“In addition, Rebbi Eliezer says, a person stands by the Muqṣeh on a Sabbath eve in a sabbatical year and says, from here I shall eat tomorrow.” The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted, as we have stated there, “the House of Shammai say, one may not take unless one had moved when it was still daylight,” and is Rebbi Eliezer not a Shammaite? One is restrictive if living things are involved. “But the Sages say, only if he delineates and says, from here to here.” The argument of the Sages seems inverted, since we have stated there “the House of Hillel say, he may stand there and say, this and that I shall take,” and here they are saying so? Still they hold that one is restrictive if living things are involved.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 4:37

“In addition, Rebbi Eliezer says, a person stands by the Muqṣeh on a Sabbath eve in a sabbatical year and says, from here I shall eat tomorrow.” The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted, as we have stated there, “the House of Shammai say, one may not take unless one had moved when it was still daylight,” and is Rebbi Eliezer not a Shammaite? One is restrictive if living things are involved. “But the Sages say, only if he delineates and says, from here to here.” The argument of the Sages seems inverted, since we have stated there “the House of Hillel say, he may stand there and say, this and that I shall take,” and here they are saying so? Still they hold that one is restrictive if living things are involved.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 5:20

Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not preliminarily marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, God puts singles in a house; To rise on scales; they all are of vapor! And here, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:2

HALAKHAH: “From when does one mention the Power of rains,” etc. The reason of Rebbi Eliezer, because these four kinds grow on water, they become attorneys for water. Another explanation, when the slave serves all his master’s needs he asks for his reward from him. Rebbi Joshua said to him, is it not that when the slave has served all his master’s needs and his master is satisfied with him that he asks his [sustenance] from him? Another explanation. The slave asks for his reward only close to the time when his reward is due. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer says, from the time one takes the lulav; Rebbi Joshua says, from the time he puts it down. In the opinion of the latter Tanna, the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer in the first is his opinion in the latter. The argument of Rebbi Joshua is inverted. There, he says from the concluding holiday, but here he says, from the time he puts it down. Rebbi Mana says, because the entire day is qualified to take the lulav. Should he not mention in the evening? Not everybody is there. Then he should mention it in the morning. He would think that maybe they mentioned in the evening and he will mention. Since he sees that they do not mention in the first {prayer} but mention in the later {prayer}, he understands that they did not mention in the evening. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius said to him, so was your father Rebbi Jonah arguing it.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:13

“They said to him, if that is so, one should always mention it.” The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted; the argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. As they disagree: Rebbi Eliezer says, unless Israel repent they never will be redeemed, as it is said, by repentance and satisfaction you will be helped. Rebbi Joshua said to him, if Israel would stay and never repent, would they never be redeemed? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, the Holy One, praise to Him, causes a hard king like Haman to rule over them and immediately they repent and are redeemed. What is the reason? It is an evil time for Jacob and from it he will be helped. Rebbi Joshua said to him, but is it not written, gratis you were sold and not by money you will be redeemed? How does Rebbi Eliezer deal with this? Repentance, as you are saying, a bundle of money he took in his hand, etc. Rebbi Joshua said to him, but is it not written, in its time I shall quickly do it. How does Rebbi Eliezer deal with this? Repentance, as you are saying, but now, Israel, what does the Eternal, your God, ask from you but to fear etc. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If you merit it, I shall quickly do it; if not, in its time. When Rebbi Joshua said to him, he lifted his right and his left arms to heaven and swore by the Eternally Living that in term, terms and a half, when he finished to smash the hand of the holy people, all this will finish, Rebbi Eliezer withdrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:13

“They said to him, if that is so, one should always mention it.” The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted; the argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. As they disagree: Rebbi Eliezer says, unless Israel repent they never will be redeemed, as it is said, by repentance and satisfaction you will be helped. Rebbi Joshua said to him, if Israel would stay and never repent, would they never be redeemed? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, the Holy One, praise to Him, causes a hard king like Haman to rule over them and immediately they repent and are redeemed. What is the reason? It is an evil time for Jacob and from it he will be helped. Rebbi Joshua said to him, but is it not written, gratis you were sold and not by money you will be redeemed? How does Rebbi Eliezer deal with this? Repentance, as you are saying, a bundle of money he took in his hand, etc. Rebbi Joshua said to him, but is it not written, in its time I shall quickly do it. How does Rebbi Eliezer deal with this? Repentance, as you are saying, but now, Israel, what does the Eternal, your God, ask from you but to fear etc. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If you merit it, I shall quickly do it; if not, in its time. When Rebbi Joshua said to him, he lifted his right and his left arms to heaven and swore by the Eternally Living that in term, terms and a half, when he finished to smash the hand of the holy people, all this will finish, Rebbi Eliezer withdrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:21

The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says, “the one who stands before the Ark on the last holiday of Tabernacles, the last one mentions but the first one does not mention;” and here he says so? One {Mishnah} in his own name, the other one in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. But we do not know which one in his own name and which one in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Since “Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah who said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra, and Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah, that all holidays end with dew since dew is a good sign for the world,” this implies that the first one is in his own name, the second one in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:31

“If the year was deficient, one makes up for the deficiency; otherwise one follows its order, the words of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi says, one always follows its order. If the year was intercalary, one follows its intercalation.” The argument of Rebbi seems inverted. There he says, one follows its order. And here he says, after its intercalation. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac brings it in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, this was needed for the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:57

Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not preliminarily marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, God puts singles in a house; To rise on scales; they all are of vapor! And here, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:6

From where Ne`ilah? Rebbi [Levi] said: Even if you prolong your prayers I shall not hear. From here that everyone who increases his prayers will be answered. The argument of Rebbi Levi is inverted. There says Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Pappai, Rebbi Joshua of Sikhnin in the name of Rebbi Levi: In all excitement there is something superfluous; and the word of the lips is but for deficit. Hannah, because she prayed too long, reduced the years of Samuel because she said, he shall dwell there forever but “forever” for a Levite is only 50 years, as it is written: at age fifty he should return from the worshipping hosts. But in fact it was 52. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said two years until she weaned him. And here you say so? One for private, the other for public prayers. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Simeon bar Ḥalaphta in the name of Rebbi Meïr: when she prayed very long; it follows that everyone who extends his prayers will be answered.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:8

The maternal uncle of Rebbi Ada had rolled up the kaftan of Rav on the great fast. He said to him: When you see the sun on the top of the date palms, give me my kaftan so that we may pray the Locking of the Gates. The argument of Rav is inverted. There he says “the locking of the Gates of Heaven” and here he says “the locking of the gates of the Temple.” Rebbi Mattanah said: Since Rav needed a lot of time to pray, he reached the Locking of the Gates of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:41

HALAKHAH: It is written: The glory of the Eternal dwelt on Mount Sinai; the cloud covered it for six days; He called to Moses on the Seventh Day. Moses ascended. The Seventh after the Ten Commandments, the start of the Forty. Moses said to them, I shall be occupied on the Mountain for 40 days. When the fortieth day came and he did not come, immediately the people saw that Moses tarried in descending from the Mountain. When noontime came and he did not come, immediately the people congregated on Aaron and said to him, rise and make us gods which shall go before us, etc. The Eternal said to Moses, descend, for your people corrupted, etc. And Joshua heard the sound of the people in its dealings; he said to Moses, there is sound of war in the camp. Moses said, a man who in the future will rule over 600’000 does not know to distinguish between sound and sound? He said, there is no sound of shouts of strength nor sound of sounds of weakness, a sound of shouts I am hearing. Rebbi Yasa said, a sound of acclaim of foreign worship I am hearing. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Yasa: There is no generation in which there is not an ounce of the sin of the Calf. It was when he approached the camp that he saw the Calf and fifes. Rebbi Ḥilkiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: From here that a person should not argue from guesses. Moses made an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the pesaḥ sacrifice, which is an isolated obligation, it is said no uncircumcised may eat from it, the Torah in which all commandments are contained not so much more? Moses got angry and he threw the tablets from his hand and broke them below the Mountain. Rebbi Ismael stated, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him to break them, [as it is said,] I shall write on the tablets the words which were on the first tablets luckily you broke. He said to him, you did well that you broke. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The tablets were six hand-breadths long and three wide. Moses held two hand-breadth, the Holy One, praise to Him two hand-breadth, and two hand-breadths of space were between them. When Israel sinned in that way, the Holy One wanted to seize them from Moses’s hand, but Moses’s hand had the better of it and seized them from Him. That is what the verse praises him at the end and says, and all the strong hand, peace shall be on the hand which had the better on mine. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Abbai: the tablets wanted to fly off but Moses held them, [as is written,] I grabbed the two tablets. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nehemiah, the writing itself flew off. Rebbi Ezra in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Simon: The tablets were a load of forty seah but the writing was carrying them. When the writing flew off they were too heavy for Moses’s hands, they fell, and broke.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:65

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, that is a building of enjoyment. But if his wall was inclined, he tears it down and rebuilds it. Samuel said, the wall where he sleeps. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not preliminarily marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Av a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, God puts singles in a house; To rise on scales; they all are of vapor! And here, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:4

“Places walled from the days of Joshua bin Nun read on the Fifteenth.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: They honored the Land of Israel which was desolate in those days and attached it to the days of Joshua bin Nun. Then should not everybody read on the Fifteenth? Rebbi Abbahu analyzed “dwelling, dwelling”. Since “dwelling” mentioned there refers to the days of Joshua bin Nun, so also “dwelling” mentioned here refers to the days of Joshua bin Nun. Then should not everybody read on the Fourteenth? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy analyzed “open, openness.” It is said here “openness” and it said there except for very many open towns. Since “open” mentioned there refers to the days of Joshua bin Nun, so also “openness” mentioned here refers to the days of Joshua bin Nun. It was stated: “Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, from the days of Ahasuerus. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said to him, what has the reference to Susa the Fortress to do here? If you are inferring from Susa the Fortress then one should read in Susa the Fortress, but not read at any other place.” It seems that there are three Tannaim. The first Tanna intends to say, from the days of Joshua bin Nun. Another Tanna intends to say, from the days of Ahasuerus. Another Tanna intends to say, “town” in any case. It turns out that you may say that Rebbi Joshua ben Qorha and Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah say the same, only that each one of them infers from a separate argument; and it was stated so: “what is close to a walled place and what is seen with it has the same standing as it.” Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: For example like Ḥamata. Since he only said “like”, therefore Ḥamata itself was walled in the days of Joshua bin Nun. From the following: Fortified towns, Haṣsiddim, Ṣer, and Ḥamat, Raqqat, and Kinneret. Haṣsiddim is Wheat village, Ṣer is next to it, Ḥamat Ḥamata, Raqqat Tiberias, Kinneret, Genezareth. Rebbi Levi objected, is it not written, the prairie to the Kinneret lake? Were there two Genesareths? Or were there only two autonomous districts, like Bet Yeraḥ and Zinbarai, which are towers on Lake Kinneret, where the fortification was abandoned and taken over by Gentiles. Come and see, there one does not read, outside one reads?

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:55

If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:77

HALAKHAH: It was stated: The Anointed Priest brings a bull, the one clothed in multiple garb does not bring a bull. This disagrees with Rebbi Meïr, for Rebbi Meïr said, the one clothed in multiple garb brings a bull. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? The Anointed. Why does the verse say priest? To add the one clothed in multiple garb. What is the rabbis’ reason? The anointed. I could think that this is the king. The verse says, priest. If priest, I could think the one clothed in multiple garb. The verse says, anointed. Then I could think that I am adding also the one anointed for war. The verse says, Anointed; one who has no anointed person over him. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. Here is written anointed and there is written anointed. Here they say, to include the one clothed in multiple garb. But here they say, to exclude the one clothed in multiple garb. Rebbi Hila said, each inference refers to its meaning. There the entire paragraph is said for Aaron. Why is said priest? To include the one clothed in multiple garb. But here the paragraph does not mention Aaron. If it had said the Anointed but not priest, I would have said, [he brings a bull for forgetting a topic, but for acting in error he brings a goat. Therefore it is necessary that it would mention priest. But if it had mentioned priest but not the Anointed, I would have said,] this refers to the king. If you would say already this precedes the paragraph about the king, I would have said that for forgetting a topic he brings a bull but for acting in error he brings a goat. Therefore it is necessary that it mention the Anointed and that it mention priest.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 4:39

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated, “A blind person is not exiled, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; Rebbi Meïr says, he is exiled.” And both of them explained the same verse, without seeing. Rebbi Jehudah says, to include the blind person. Rebbi Meïr says, excluding the blind person. And here we have stated, “a person who never saw light does not spread out the Shema`.” Therefore if he saw he spreads. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose, is the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? There he says, excluding, but here he says, to include. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, the Mishnah is about one sitting in a dark house. So we are saying, “one sitting in a dark house may not spread the Shema`.” But here, without seeing, to include the blind person.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:10

“The hermaphrodite.” All your males, to exclude the hermaphrodite. There, we have stated: “One does not desecrate the Sabbath for a case of doubt {or} for a hermaphrodite; Rebbi Jehudah permits for the hermaphrodite.” What does Rebbi Jehudah say in this case? Let us hear from the following: Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, neither does the blind one. Nobody says “neither” unless he agrees with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except, but here he says including. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. The rabbis explain uncircumcised. Why does the verse say, an uncircumcised male? Only if he be totally male. Rebbi Jehudah explains male. Why does the verse say, uncircumcised? Even if he is only partially uncircumcised. But here, all your males, to exclude the hermaphrodite.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:31

HALAKHAH: “If Pentecost falls on a Friday, the House of Shammai are saying that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, but the House of Hillel are saying that it has no slaughter-day.” But its day is its slaughter-day. Here the House of Shammai are saying, its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, and the High Priest (wears) [does not wear] his garments (?)[.] It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since in a time where there are well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Hillel the High Priest does not wear his garments, in a time when there are no well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Shammai, not so much more?

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:36

HALAKHAH: Is hand-washing required for profane food? But it must follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, hand-washing is required for profane food. It is everybody’s opinion, so he should separate from heave. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr, hands are first degree impure for profane food and second degree impure for heave. Does Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follow Rebbi Aqiba, as we have stated there, “if somebody puts his hands into a leprous house, his hands are impure in the first degree, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages are saying, his hands are impure in the second degree”? There, it follows the rabbis; what is their reason here? Since you tell him that his hands are impure in the second degree, he will separate from heave. But did they not decide about them because of fluids; then they should be impure in the first degree? It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since the Tevul Yom, which is a word from the Torah, only disqualifies, impure hands, which are from their words, not so much more? Another explanation: Did they not decide about hands only that he should separate from heave? Since you tell him that his hands are impure in the second degree, he will separate from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:49

Rebbi Shiloh from Kefar-Tamarta in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: And you shall cover it with pure gold, etc. The Torah called it real estate. So far the golden altar. From where the altar of the elevation sacrifices? It is a logical argument. Since the golden altar which is one cubit square is called real estate, the altar of elevation sacrifices which is five cubits square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is real estate, also there it is real estate. Rebbi Hila said, the reason of the rabbis, the altar is of wood, three cubits its height, etc. The Torah called it movable. So far the altar of the elevation sacrifices. From where the golden altar? It is a logical argument. Since the the altar of the elevation sacrifices which is five cubit square is called soil, the golden altar which is one cubit square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is movable, also there it is movable. “But the Sages say, because they are covered.” But is it not cover which stands because of it? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Its thickness was that of a Gordian denar Rebbi La said, for its purpose it does not stand because of it. This parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, you shall make an altar for incense smoke is not written here but burning incense; the altar was burning the incense. But is it not like a table made to be moved and deposited? Does not Rebbi Immi say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: why is the table impure? Not because one was removing it and showing it to the pilgrims? But this one remains in its place. It also served as a vessel in the Sanctuary. Then it should be pure, why is it impure? Rebbi Mana said, as what we have stated there, “there are three baskets”. Rebbi Ze`ira said, because one uses it for its bales; so also here one uses it for its bales.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:49

Rebbi Shiloh from Kefar-Tamarta in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: And you shall cover it with pure gold, etc. The Torah called it real estate. So far the golden altar. From where the altar of the elevation sacrifices? It is a logical argument. Since the golden altar which is one cubit square is called real estate, the altar of elevation sacrifices which is five cubits square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is real estate, also there it is real estate. Rebbi Hila said, the reason of the rabbis, the altar is of wood, three cubits its height, etc. The Torah called it movable. So far the altar of the elevation sacrifices. From where the golden altar? It is a logical argument. Since the the altar of the elevation sacrifices which is five cubit square is called soil, the golden altar which is one cubit square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is movable, also there it is movable. “But the Sages say, because they are covered.” But is it not cover which stands because of it? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Its thickness was that of a Gordian denar Rebbi La said, for its purpose it does not stand because of it. This parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, you shall make an altar for incense smoke is not written here but burning incense; the altar was burning the incense. But is it not like a table made to be moved and deposited? Does not Rebbi Immi say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: why is the table impure? Not because one was removing it and showing it to the pilgrims? But this one remains in its place. It also served as a vessel in the Sanctuary. Then it should be pure, why is it impure? Rebbi Mana said, as what we have stated there, “there are three baskets”. Rebbi Ze`ira said, because one uses it for its bales; so also here one uses it for its bales.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:5

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they differ here they differ in the rules of mourning. As it was stated: The following things one does for the mourner in his mourning period. One presses his vat, and stirs his wine, and plugs his amphoras, and his repeatedly turned olives one grinds as usual, and one waters his irrigated fields if it is time for them to be irrigated, and one sows his field flax at the start of the rainy season, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. They told him, if it is not sown with flax it can be sown with another kind; if it was not sown in this week it can be sown in another week. Who is “they told him”? Rebbi Yose. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he said, small amounts may be lost so large amounts not be lost, and here he says so? There is a difference since there he is wont to be tricky. So much more the argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted, since there where he is wont to be tricky he says it is permitted, here where he is not wont to be tricky, not so much more? Rebbi Ḥinnena said, who is “they told him”? The Sages following Rebbi Jehudah’s argument for the holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:5

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they differ here they differ in the rules of mourning. As it was stated: The following things one does for the mourner in his mourning period. One presses his vat, and stirs his wine, and plugs his amphoras, and his repeatedly turned olives one grinds as usual, and one waters his irrigated fields if it is time for them to be irrigated, and one sows his field flax at the start of the rainy season, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. They told him, if it is not sown with flax it can be sown with another kind; if it was not sown in this week it can be sown in another week. Who is “they told him”? Rebbi Yose. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he said, small amounts may be lost so large amounts not be lost, and here he says so? There is a difference since there he is wont to be tricky. So much more the argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted, since there where he is wont to be tricky he says it is permitted, here where he is not wont to be tricky, not so much more? Rebbi Ḥinnena said, who is “they told him”? The Sages following Rebbi Jehudah’s argument for the holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:5

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they differ here they differ in the rules of mourning. As it was stated: The following things one does for the mourner in his mourning period. One presses his vat, and stirs his wine, and plugs his amphoras, and his repeatedly turned olives one grinds as usual, and one waters his irrigated fields if it is time for them to be irrigated, and one sows his field flax at the start of the rainy season, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. They told him, if it is not sown with flax it can be sown with another kind; if it was not sown in this week it can be sown in another week. Who is “they told him”? Rebbi Yose. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he said, small amounts may be lost so large amounts not be lost, and here he says so? There is a difference since there he is wont to be tricky. So much more the argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted, since there where he is wont to be tricky he says it is permitted, here where he is not wont to be tricky, not so much more? Rebbi Ḥinnena said, who is “they told him”? The Sages following Rebbi Jehudah’s argument for the holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:12

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:4

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:5

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:11

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:17

The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:17

The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:39

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:3

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:4

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”