ate
886 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.
HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.
MISHNAH: The kinds of awareness of impurity are two which are four. If one became impure, realized it, then the impurity was forgotten but he was aware of sancta; or sancta were forgotten by him but he remembered impurity; or he forgot both, ate sanctum and realized it after he had eaten: he is obligated for a variable sacrifice. If one became impure, realized it, the impurity was forgotten but he was aware of the Sanctuary; or the Sanctuary was forgotten by him but he remembered impurity; or he forgot both, entered the Sanctuary and realized it after he had left: he is obligated for a variable sacrifice.
One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
Rebbi Yose asked: If one ate half the volume of an olive being aware of the Sanctuary but oblivious of impurity and about half the volume of an olive being aware of impurity but oblivious of the Sanctuary; do the oblivions combine?
MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate and drank he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall not eat or drink, when he ate and drank he is liable for two.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate and drank he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall not eat or drink, when he ate and drank he is liable for two.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?
Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Phineas understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable.” Therefore if he ate edible food and drank drinkable fluid he is liable.
Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Phineas understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable.” Therefore if he ate edible food and drank drinkable fluid he is liable.
Rebbi Abba understood all this from the following: “If he ate and drank in one forgetting he is liable only once.”
So far if he said, that I shall not eat, but he drank. If he said, that I shall not drink, but he ate? Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. An oath that I shall eat neither wheat bread, nor barley bread, nor spelt bread; when he ate wheat bred, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable for each single one. An oath that I shall not drink; if he drank many kinds he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall drink neither wine, nor oil, not date syrup, if he drank he is liable for each single one.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. An oath that I shall eat neither wheat bread, nor barley bread, nor spelt bread; when he ate wheat bred, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable for each single one. An oath that I shall not drink; if he drank many kinds he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall drink neither wine, nor oil, not date syrup, if he drank he is liable for each single one.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I shall not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I shall not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds, and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a nazir he is liable for three. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in comprehensive form. But in detail, no oaths fall on prohibitions. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even in comprehensive form no oaths fall on prohibitions.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable. An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, he is liable; Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable. If he said, a qonam that my wife may not benefit from me if I had eaten today, if he had eaten carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, his wife is forbidden benefits.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable. An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, he is liable; Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable. If he said, a qonam that my wife may not benefit from me if I had eaten today, if he had eaten carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, his wife is forbidden benefits.
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.
HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.
Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.
Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.
Ḥefa continued to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat these five loaves. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, this one, and ate the first one. He said to him, he is liable only once. He answered, he is liable for each single one; if somebody said “an oath if I would eat five loaves” and he ate four, is he not free from liability?
Ḥefa continued to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat these five loaves. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, this one, and ate the first one. He said to him, he is liable only once. He answered, he is liable for each single one; if somebody said “an oath if I would eat five loaves” and he ate four, is he not free from liability?
MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. If he ate it he violated a vain oath, if he did not eat it he violated a blurted oath.
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept the first oath and invalidated the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one and did not keep the second.
“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he invalidated the first oath and kept the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one. One tells him to keep the second with another loaf.
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept both of them. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he kept the first one and one tells him to keep the second with another loaf.
“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
Rebbi Yose asked: “An oath, an oath that I am not holding for you,” what? Rebbi Yose said, let us hear from the following: “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it’. Then he ate it. He is liable only once.” Because he mentioned “this”. Therefore, had he not mentioned “this” we would be liable for each one. Is it the same for a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat, and wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread.” Since he is not liable for carcass meat he is not liable for the remainder.
Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering”. The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, it he swore to him and only later ate it.
Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering”. The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, it he swore to him and only later ate it.
Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering”. The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, it he swore to him and only later ate it.
MISHNAH: “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.
Rebbi Yose ben Shaul understands it from the following occurrence. It happened that a woman loved to do good deeds but her husband hated good deeds. There came a poor man and she gave him to eat. While he was eating she noticed her husband; she made him climb and hid him in the upper floor. She returned to her husband who ate and fell asleep. There came a snake and ate from what was before him; her husband awoke from his sleep and wanted to eat. The one in the upper floor started to talk. That means if he was sleeping it is permitted. It was used to it. But is it not forbidden because of being alone? For they committed adultery, blood is on their hands. Since he is not suspected of one he is not suspected of the other.
Rebbi Yose ben Shaul understands it from the following occurrence. It happened that a woman loved to do good deeds but her husband hated good deeds. There came a poor man and she gave him to eat. While he was eating she noticed her husband; she made him climb and hid him in the upper floor. She returned to her husband who ate and fell asleep. There came a snake and ate from what was before him; her husband awoke from his sleep and wanted to eat. The one in the upper floor started to talk. That means if he was sleeping it is permitted. It was used to it. But is it not forbidden because of being alone? For they committed adultery, blood is on their hands. Since he is not suspected of one he is not suspected of the other.
HALAKHAH: “The following matters of Gentiles are forbidden,” etc. Why is Gentile’s milk forbidden? Rebbi Abba (son of) [in the name of] Rav Jehudah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Why is Gentile’s milk forbidden? Because of uncovering. Let him make cheese! Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, because of the poison given between the holes. It was stated so: There are three kinds of poison; one swims, one sinks down, and one is similar to a net. Workers were in the field. The water pitcher was uncovered. The first ones drank and were [not] disabled. The second ones died. I say that it was sinking poison. In the days of Rebbi Jeremiah the barrels of the great assembly were uncovered. The first ones drank and were not disabled. The second ones died. I say that it was sinking poison. It was stated thus: “If a watermelon was pecked and ten people ate from it or wine was uncovered and ten people drank from it, it is forbidden to eat or drink after them; I say that there is sinking poison.”
Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, but some say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: They were climbing up King’s Mountain and were killed about it. Isaac bar Samuel bar Martha went down to Nisibis. He met Simlai the Southerner who sat and expounded: Rebbi and his court permitted the oil. Samuel said, true! Rav did not accept on himself to eat. Samuel told him, eat! Otherwise I shall declare you a rebellious Elder. He answered him, when I still was there I knew who complained about it, Simlai the Southerner. He told him, he said it in the name of himself, not in the name of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince. He bothered him and he ate.
HALAKHAH: “If one’s house was connected to a house of pagan worship,” etc. There is written abomination about the menstruating women, abomination about vermin, abomination about idolatry. About the menstruating woman, for anybody who would commit any of these abominations. About vermin, do not eat any abomination. About idolatry, and do not bring any abomination into your house. But I do not know for which purpose it was compared. Rebbi Aqiba says, it was compared to abomination regarding the menstruating woman. As the menstruating woman imparts impurity by load, also idolatry imparts impurity by load. Or since the menstruating woman imparts impurity through a cover stone, does idolatry impart impurity through a cover stone? Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, but some say in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages that idolatry does not impart impurity through a cover stone. But the rabbis say it was compared to abominations of vermin. As vermin imparts impurity by motion, so also idolatry imparts impurity by motion. Or as vermin in the size of a lentil imparts impurity does also idolatry in the size of a lentil impart impurity? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They were yoked to Baal Peor and ate sacrifices to the dead. As the dead in the size of an olive impart impurity so idolatry in the size of an olive imparts impurity. Or since a corpse imparts impurity once a person puts his finger tips in, could I think that idolatry imparts once a person puts his finger tips in? Tearing down, tearing down one infers from the leprous house. Since in a leprous house when he entered with his head and most of his body, so idolatry when he entered with his head and most of his body. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this means that the impurity of idolatry is not consistent. For otherwise, why does one compare if for the facile [impurity] and does not compare for the strict? Rebbi Mana said, it is consistent. Why was it compared to a corpse and to vermin? To inform in both cases about the facile [impurity] attached to it. This is for a broken idol. But an entire one even in the most minute size, as Rebbi Yose hen Rebbi Abun said, Rav Ḥama bar Gorion in the name of Rav: Baal was the penis gland in the form of a bean. What is the reason? They selected the Baal of circumcision as god.
Rebbi Aḥa went to Emmaus and ate something made in boiling water. Rebbi Jeremiah ate pickles. Rebbi Ḥizqiah ate locusts. Rebbi Abbahu forbade their wine on the testimony of Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Assi, and Rebbi Immi who went up King’s Mountain and saw a Gentile who was suspected because of wine. They came and said it before him. He told them, but not as a pretext. But some say, one Sabbath eve no wine was found in all of Samaria. When Sabbath ended, it was found full from what the Arameans brought and the Samaritans accepted from them. But some say, when King Diocletian came here he decided and said, all peoples have to offer libations except the Jews. The Samaritans offered libations and their wine was forbidden. But some say, they have a kind of dove and they offer libations to it.
Rebbi Aḥa went to Emmaus and ate something made in boiling water. Rebbi Jeremiah ate pickles. Rebbi Ḥizqiah ate locusts. Rebbi Abbahu forbade their wine on the testimony of Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Assi, and Rebbi Immi who went up King’s Mountain and saw a Gentile who was suspected because of wine. They came and said it before him. He told them, but not as a pretext. But some say, one Sabbath eve no wine was found in all of Samaria. When Sabbath ended, it was found full from what the Arameans brought and the Samaritans accepted from them. But some say, when King Diocletian came here he decided and said, all peoples have to offer libations except the Jews. The Samaritans offered libations and their wine was forbidden. But some say, they have a kind of dove and they offer libations to it.
Rebbi Aḥa went to Emmaus and ate something made in boiling water. Rebbi Jeremiah ate pickles. Rebbi Ḥizqiah ate locusts. Rebbi Abbahu forbade their wine on the testimony of Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Assi, and Rebbi Immi who went up King’s Mountain and saw a Gentile who was suspected because of wine. They came and said it before him. He told them, but not as a pretext. But some say, one Sabbath eve no wine was found in all of Samaria. When Sabbath ended, it was found full from what the Arameans brought and the Samaritans accepted from them. But some say, when King Diocletian came here he decided and said, all peoples have to offer libations except the Jews. The Samaritans offered libations and their wine was forbidden. But some say, they have a kind of dove and they offer libations to it.
MISHNAH: An impure person who ate holy food, or who came into the Temple when impure. One who eats fat, or blood, or leftover, or piggul, or impure [sacrificial meat]. One who sacrifices outside, or one who eats leavened matter on Passover. One who eats or does work on the Day of Atonement, and one who compounds the oil, or compounds the incense, and who rubs with the anointing oil, and one who eats carcass or torn meat, abominations and crawling things. If one ate ṭevel or first tithe from which heave was not taken, or second tithe or dedicated food which was not redeemed. How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats (carcass meat) [an ant] is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.
MISHNAH: An impure person who ate holy food, or who came into the Temple when impure. One who eats fat, or blood, or leftover, or piggul, or impure [sacrificial meat]. One who sacrifices outside, or one who eats leavened matter on Passover. One who eats or does work on the Day of Atonement, and one who compounds the oil, or compounds the incense, and who rubs with the anointing oil, and one who eats carcass or torn meat, abominations and crawling things. If one ate ṭevel or first tithe from which heave was not taken, or second tithe or dedicated food which was not redeemed. How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats (carcass meat) [an ant] is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.
Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.
Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.
Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
One ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed and the volume of an olive after he was appointed. If it was in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. If the volume of an olive was in doubt before he was appointed, and the volume of an olive was in doubt after he was appointed, in one oblivion he is liable only for one, in two forgettings he is liable for two [sacrifices.]
One ate the volume of three olives but was of the opinion that he ate only two. {He selected a sacrifice following Rebbi Joḥanan.} [If he selected one sacrifice, this atones.] For Rebbi Joḥanan said, if part of the sin was atoned for, all of the sin was atoned for. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if part of the sin was atoned for, not all of the sin was atoned for.
One ate the volume of three olives but was of the opinion that he ate only two. {He selected a sacrifice following Rebbi Joḥanan.} [If he selected one sacrifice, this atones.] For Rebbi Joḥanan said, if part of the sin was atoned for, all of the sin was atoned for. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if part of the sin was atoned for, not all of the sin was atoned for.
One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him (in court) [as a certainty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed (and in court) [as the certainty] after he was removed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is not liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to free from liability, not rather to insist on liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him before he was appointed; the certainty after he was appointed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression, he must say that one is liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression, he must say that one is not liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither itself not its blood are usable, it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed (and in court) [as the certainty] after he was removed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is not liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to free from liability, not rather to insist on liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him before he was appointed; the certainty after he was appointed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression, he must say that one is liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression, he must say that one is not liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither itself not its blood are usable, it dies immediately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
Rebbi Isaac asked: Is it the same with the eating of half loaves? Rebbi Yose said, this question of Rebbi Isaac is nothing. (Is it written) [Does] the matter depend on eating half loaves? If one ate the volume of half an olive during the time allotted for this half loaf and another volume of half an olive during the time allotted for that half loaf, is that anything? If one ate the volume of several olives during times allotted for several half-loaves in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. The rabbis of Caesarea say, instead of comparing it to kinds of fat, why not compare it to [the laws of] Sabbath? If he wove a single thread for one cloth and a single thread for another cloth, is that anything? If he wove several threads for several pieces of cloth in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Was there not an obligation for a sacrifice in the meantime, and you say that they are counted together? Rebbi Abun said, there it is about the obligation of a sacrifice; but here [a change] of sacrifice.
Rebbi Isaac asked: Is it the same with the eating of half loaves? Rebbi Yose said, this question of Rebbi Isaac is nothing. (Is it written) [Does] the matter depend on eating half loaves? If one ate the volume of half an olive during the time allotted for this half loaf and another volume of half an olive during the time allotted for that half loaf, is that anything? If one ate the volume of several olives during times allotted for several half-loaves in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. The rabbis of Caesarea say, instead of comparing it to kinds of fat, why not compare it to [the laws of] Sabbath? If he wove a single thread for one cloth and a single thread for another cloth, is that anything? If he wove several threads for several pieces of cloth in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Was there not an obligation for a sacrifice in the meantime, and you say that they are counted together? Rebbi Abun said, there it is about the obligation of a sacrifice; but here [a change] of sacrifice.
If one ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed, the volume of an olive after he was appointed, and the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. In the opinion of the colleagues who say, because high office atones, the office atoned for the first and he is liable for the second and the third. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, he is liable for the first and the second, but not liable for the third. He ate the size of an olive. If it is in doubt whether he ate before he was appointed or after he was appointed, or whether it was before he converted or after he converted, or whether it was before he had grown two pubic hairs or after he had grown two pubic hairs, he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice.
If one ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed, the volume of an olive after he was appointed, and the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. In the opinion of the colleagues who say, because high office atones, the office atoned for the first and he is liable for the second and the third. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, he is liable for the first and the second, but not liable for the third. He ate the size of an olive. If it is in doubt whether he ate before he was appointed or after he was appointed, or whether it was before he converted or after he converted, or whether it was before he had grown two pubic hairs or after he had grown two pubic hairs, he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice.
If one ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed, the volume of an olive after he was appointed, and the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. In the opinion of the colleagues who say, because high office atones, the office atoned for the first and he is liable for the second and the third. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, he is liable for the first and the second, but not liable for the third. He ate the size of an olive. If it is in doubt whether he ate before he was appointed or after he was appointed, or whether it was before he converted or after he converted, or whether it was before he had grown two pubic hairs or after he had grown two pubic hairs, he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice.
If he ate a full olive sized piece but there is doubt whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or before the Day of Atonement. The atonement atones for the doubt. Whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or after the Day of Atonement. The colleagues say, atonement atones for the doubt. Rebbi Mattaniah said, the atonement atones only for doubt of the kinds of blood. A Mishnah supports the colleagues: “Sabbath and the Day of Atonement and he worked in twilight.” As you take it, if it was the Day of Atonement, it atoned. If it was weekday, it is permitted. But did we not state “he ate”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, eating permitted [food].
If he ate a full olive sized piece but there is doubt whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or before the Day of Atonement. The atonement atones for the doubt. Whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or after the Day of Atonement. The colleagues say, atonement atones for the doubt. Rebbi Mattaniah said, the atonement atones only for doubt of the kinds of blood. A Mishnah supports the colleagues: “Sabbath and the Day of Atonement and he worked in twilight.” As you take it, if it was the Day of Atonement, it atoned. If it was weekday, it is permitted. But did we not state “he ate”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, eating permitted [food].
If he ate a full olive sized piece but there is doubt whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or before the Day of Atonement. The atonement atones for the doubt. Whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or after the Day of Atonement. The colleagues say, atonement atones for the doubt. Rebbi Mattaniah said, the atonement atones only for doubt of the kinds of blood. A Mishnah supports the colleagues: “Sabbath and the Day of Atonement and he worked in twilight.” As you take it, if it was the Day of Atonement, it atoned. If it was weekday, it is permitted. But did we not state “he ate”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, eating permitted [food].