baraisa

Now this [Baraisa] is well according to the authority who says that their difference of opinion was in the case where the walls did not reach the covering; Since it is the custom of a queen to sit in a sukkah whose walls do not reach the roof,

It's as was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yosi bar Yehuda says, Initially, both accidental [murderers] and wilful [murderers] would proceed to the cities of refuge, and the court would summon them from there,

Does this mean to say that all occurrences of the word "דבר" (speak) connotate a harsh tone? Yes, as the Torah writes (Genesis 42, 30) "The matter if the land spoke (דבר) to us harshly". But we learned [otherwise] in a baraisa, (Malachi 3,16) "They spoke (דבר)" there is no use of "They spoke (דבר)" except to connote a gentle tone. And so too it is said (Psalms 47, 4) "He will subdue people under us". דבר connotes one thing. ידבר connotes another thing.

A murderer who exits the boundary etc.: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,27) "And the goel hadam will kill the murderer" [we can derive that] it is a mitzvah in the hands of the goel hadam. If there is no goel hadam, it's permissible for anyone else. These are the words of Rebbi Yossi Hagalili. Rebbi Akiva says, It's permissible for the Goel Hadam, and anyone else is liable [for killing the murderer].

He says like the following Tanna, that we learned in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says, (Numbers 35, 12) "Untill he stands before a court for judgement" what is the Torah teaching us? Since it says (Numbers 35,27) "And the Goel Hadam will find the murderer" I might think that it means [he can kill him immediately] [therefore] the Torah teaches us "until he stand before a court for judgement"

And what do Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Akiva and derive from (Numbers 35, 12) "until he stand before a court for judgement"? that [verse] is needed for [that which is taught] in a baraisa, Rebbi Akiva says, From where is it derived that a court which witnesses a murder cannot execute him [the murderer] until he stands before a different court? The Torah says "until he stands before a court for judgment" [which means] until he stands before a different court.

The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,36) "If the killer shall surely go out" [from this] I can only derive [that he may be killed if he left] intentionally, from where [can I derive that he may also be killed if he left] inadvertently? The Torah says "if he shall surely go out" (יצא יצא) [the word go out is repeated, which implies that he may be killed] in any event [even if he left inadvertently].

But contrast that with a baraisa, [If he left] intentionally he is executed, [if he left] inadvertently he is [re-]exiled. It is not a difficulty, this [baraisa that says only an intentional leaving is penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah sometimes speaks in the vernacular, while this [baraisa that says only an inadvertent leaving is also penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah does not speak in the vernacular.

But contrast that with a baraisa, [If he left] intentionally he is executed, [if he left] inadvertently he is [re-]exiled. It is not a difficulty, this [baraisa that says only an intentional leaving is penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah sometimes speaks in the vernacular, while this [baraisa that says only an inadvertent leaving is also penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah does not speak in the vernacular.

But contrast that with a baraisa, [If he left] intentionally he is executed, [if he left] inadvertently he is [re-]exiled. It is not a difficulty, this [baraisa that says only an intentional leaving is penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah sometimes speaks in the vernacular, while this [baraisa that says only an inadvertent leaving is also penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah does not speak in the vernacular.

One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.

One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.

One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.

One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.

But I'd this logical?! Whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is a mitzvah [for the Goel HaDam to kill the murderer] or whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is permissible, is it permitted [for a son to kill his father]? But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and so too was taught in a baraisa of the academy of Rebbi Yishmael, For everything a son may not be made into an agent [of the court] against his father to hit him or curse him, except in the case of one who instigates [idolatry] upon which the Torah says (Deuteronomy 13,9) "do not spare him and do not conceal him".

Rather it's not a difficulty, [because] this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his son, and this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his grandson.

Rather it's not a difficulty, [because] this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his son, and this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his grandson.

GEMARA: But note a contradiction [from a baraisa regarding maiser sheni, the 2nd tithe], A tree which stands inside [of Jerusalem] but its branches extend outside [the city], or [a tree] which stands outside but its branches extend inside, from the wall and inside is considered inside [with regard to redeeming maiser shenei], and from the wall and outside is considered outside.

But note a contradiction from maiser to maiser, that it was taught in a baraisa, By Jerusalem go after the branches, by cities of refuge go after the branches. Rav Kahana said, It's not a difficulty, This [second baraisa that says maiser goes after the branches is like] Rebbi Yehuda, and this [first baraisa that says maiser shenei goes after the wall is like] the Rabbis. That it [Rebbi Yehuda's opinion] was taught in a baraisa,

But note a contradiction from maiser to maiser, that it was taught in a baraisa, By Jerusalem go after the branches, by cities of refuge go after the branches. Rav Kahana said, It's not a difficulty, This [second baraisa that says maiser goes after the branches is like] Rebbi Yehuda, and this [first baraisa that says maiser shenei goes after the wall is like] the Rabbis. That it [Rebbi Yehuda's opinion] was taught in a baraisa,

But note a contradiction from maiser to maiser, that it was taught in a baraisa, By Jerusalem go after the branches, by cities of refuge go after the branches. Rav Kahana said, It's not a difficulty, This [second baraisa that says maiser goes after the branches is like] Rebbi Yehuda, and this [first baraisa that says maiser shenei goes after the wall is like] the Rabbis. That it [Rebbi Yehuda's opinion] was taught in a baraisa,

But note a contradiction from maiser to maiser, that it was taught in a baraisa, By Jerusalem go after the branches, by cities of refuge go after the branches. Rav Kahana said, It's not a difficulty, This [second baraisa that says maiser goes after the branches is like] Rebbi Yehuda, and this [first baraisa that says maiser shenei goes after the wall is like] the Rabbis. That it [Rebbi Yehuda's opinion] was taught in a baraisa,

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa],... (Exodus 21, 13) "And I have set aside for you a place etc." "And I have set aside for you" [implies] during your lifetime. "A place" [implies] from your place. "where he shall flee to" This teaches us that when Jews where exiled [while] in the wilderness, they would be exiled to the Levite camp.

He returns to the position that he had previously occupied etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa regarding a freed Jewish slave], (Leviticus 25,41) "And he shall return to his family and to his ancestral holdings he shall return" [this implies that] to his family he returns but that he does not return to his ancestral positions. These are the words of Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Meir says, He even returns to the positions of his ancestors [as the Torah says] "to his ancestral holdings" [which implies] like his ancestors.

What do we mean "and similarly by an exile"? Like we learned in a baraisa, (Numbers 35,28) "The murderer shall return to his family and to his ancestral land" [this implies that] to his ancestral lands he returns but that he does not return to his ancestral positions. These are the words of Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Meir says, He even returns to the positions of his ancestors. [Rebbi Meir] learns [a gezaira shava of] שיבה שיבה from there [the Jewish slave].

GEMARA: Liabilities of kares are taught in our mishna, liabilities of court execution are not taught in our mishna. Who is the author of our mishna? Rebbi Akiva. That we learned in a baraisa, Both liabilities of kares and liabilities of court execution

A baraisa was taught in accordance with [the view of] Reish Lakash, "B'chol kodesh lo sigah" is a scriptural warning for eating [sacrificial foods while one is impure]. You say that it is a warning for eating? Or maybe it's only a warning for touching? The Torah therefore says, "In all sanctity he shall not touch and into the Temple etc." The Torah juxtaposes sacrificial foods with the Temple. Just as the Temple is a thing that involve the loss of life [one who enters while impure is subject to kares], so too the whole [verse] most involve the loss of life. And does touching [sacrificial foods, which is punishable with malkus] involve any loss of life? Rather you must say that the "b'chol kodesh lo sigah" refers to eating [sacrificial foods].

he holds like the other opinion of Rebbi Yehudah's views, that it was taught in a baraisa If one hit this [person who might have been his father] and then hit the other [person who might have been his father], or if he cursed this one and then that one, or if he hit them both simultaneously, or cursed them both simultaneously, Rebbi Yehudah says, If it was simultaneously he is liable, if not he is exempt [because it would be only an questionable warning.]

Rebbi Ellazer asked him, Where is [the other case]? [Rebbi Yochanon] responded to him, when you look for it [you will find it]. He looked hard and found it. For it was taught in a baraisa An Oneiss who divorces his wife, if he is a Yisroel [a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not recieve malkus. If he is a Kohen, however, [who is forbiden to marry a divorcee,] he is flogged and does not take her back.

That we learned in a baraisa, The mitzvah of pea'uh is to separate from the standing grain. If one did not separate from the standing grain, he should separate from the bundles. If he did not separate from the bundles, he should separate from the pile until he smooths it. Once he smoothes it, [making it subject to maiser] he should separate maiser and then give it [to the poor. Thus it is subject to nullification if he makes it into dough. So why is this not also a good example of a case where it's possible to nullify the remedial commandment?].

Who is this ruling in accordance with? It's in accordance to the following Tanna, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yossi said, I might think that a person is only liable for tevel which no tithes were separated from. But if he separated terumah gedolah but did not separate maiser rishon, or he separated maiser rishon but did not separate maiser sheni, or even if maeser ani [was the only tithe unseparated], where do we know [that he is still liable for eating it]?

[No,] he was just saying an answer according to their words, according to me, even flour also one is liable for, but even according to your opinion, agree to me at least that one wheat kernel is in the form that it was created. And [what would] the sages [answer to that]? A living soul is significant, but a wheat kernel is not significant. A baraisa was taught in accordance with Rebbi Yirmiya's view. Rebbi Shimon says any amount [makes one liable] to malkus. The measurement of a k'zias was only stated regarding making one obligated to bring a sacrifice.

But lets say that these are the words of Rebbi Shimon, [and that he is] the unnamed authority, [which would be collaborated by a baraisa]? This is what he is saying, that Rebbi Akiva holds like Rebbi Shimon.

What is the view of Rebbi Shimon? That it was taught in a baraisa, (Deutermany 12, 17) "And the terumah of your hand" this is refering to bikorim.

But let him also incur malkas according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says anything that is subject to being "entirely burnt" has an additional prohibition on its consumption. Yes this is so, but Rava was only talking about prohibitions derived from that one verse.

What is this opinion of Rebbi Yehuda? That it was taught it a baraisa, Rebbi Yehudah says, (Deuteronomy 26,10) "And he shall place" it this is a reference to the waving. You say that it is referring to the waving or maybe it is really referring to the actual placement? But when the Torah also says, (Deuteronomy 26,4) "And he shall place", the [requirement of] placement has already been stated. So how will I maintain (Deuteronomy 26,10) "And he shall place"? It [must be referring to] waving.

And who is the Tanna that argues with Rebbi Yehuda? It is Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. As it was taught in a baraisa (Deuteronomy 26,4) "And the Kohen will take the basket from his hand" this teaches ud that Bikorim require waving. These are the words of Rebbi Elezier ben Yaakov. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov?

when is one liable for eating them? From when they see the face of the Temple. Who is this in accordance with? It's in accordance with the following Tanna, That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer said, [Regarding] Bikorim that are part inside [the temple] and part outside [the temple], those that are outside are like non-sanctified foods in every facet, and those which are inside are like sanctified foods in every facet.

Who is this statement in accordance with? It is in accordance with the following Tanna, That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yosi said over three things from three elders. Rebbi Yishmael said, A person may ascend with his maaser sheni to Jerusalem and eat it nowadays. And this can be logically derived, A Bechor needs to be brought to "the place" and maaser sheni needs to be brought to "the place". Just as bechor is only possible in the time of the Temple, so is Maaser only possible in the time of the Temple.

And from where do we know that one is liable for eating [maaser sheni] while tamai? That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Shimon says (Deuteronomy 26,14) "I did not partake of it in tamai" means regardless of whether I was tamai and it was tahor or whether I was tahor and it was tamai. But as for where one is scripturally warned against it's consumption-- I do not know.

that the Torah says, (Deuteronomy 12, 17) "Do not eat it in your gates" and then later on says, (Deuteronomy 15,22) "In your gates you shall eat it--both the tamai and the tahor", and a baraisa was taught about this in the academy of Rebbi Yishmael

Rebbi Yossi asked [a possible contradiction from the following baraisa,] A Kohen that held in his hand a fig of tevel [untithed produce], and said that this fig has its Terumah portion in its stem, its maaser rishon in its northern part, and its maaser sheni in its southern part, and it is in a year of Maaser Sheni and he is in Jerusaelem or it is in a year of maaser ani and he is in the outskirts, if he then eats it

The reason [why he would only be liable two] is that he was in Jersulselm, but if he would have been in the provinces, he would have liable three even though it never "saw the face of the wall"! The baraisa was referring to a case where he brought it in and out.

But does Rebbi Yossi hold that gifts that weren't yet given are considered as if they were given? But, it was taught in a baraisa that Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rebbi Yossi, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel did not argue about produce where the processing was unfinished when it passed through Jerusalem, that the maaser sheni from them can [still] be redeemed and eaten anywhere.

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught in a baraisa (Leviticus 21,5) "Do not make a bald spot", I might think may mean that even one who made four or five bald spots is only liable once, the Torah therefore says, "A bald spot" to make one liable for each and every bald spot. Why does the Torah say "On the head"? Because it says (Deuteronomy 14,1) "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness between your eyes the dead", I may think that this would mean that one is only liable for between the eyes, from where do I know to include the rest of the head? The Torah therefore says "On the head" to include the entire head.

It was taught in a baraisa, One who removes a scissortip full of hair on Shabbos is liable. And how much is a scissortip full? Rav Yehuda says, two hairs But it was taught in a baraisa "For a bald spot - two [hairs]" [implying that for Shabbos something else.] [rather,] say "And also for a bald spot - two [hairs]"

It was taught in a baraisa, One who removes a scissortip full of hair on Shabbos is liable. And how much is a scissortip full? Rav Yehuda says, two hairs But it was taught in a baraisa "For a bald spot - two [hairs]" [implying that for Shabbos something else.] [rather,] say "And also for a bald spot - two [hairs]"

It was taught in a baraisa as well, One who removes a scissortip full [of hair] on shabbos is liable, and how much is a scissortip full? Two [hairs]. Rebbi Eliezer says, One [hair]. And the sages agree to Rebbi Eliezer in a case where one is removing the white from the black, then even one hair would make one liable. And this would even be prohibited on the weekday, because it says (Deuteronomy 22, 5) "A man shall not wear a woman's garment"....

And one who rounds the corners of his head. etc.: The rabbis taught in a baraisa, The corners of his head are the extremities of his head. And what are the extremities of his head? This refers to someone who smooths out his side from behind his ears to his forehead.

And one who destroys the corners of his beard. etc.: The Rabbis taught in a baraisa "the corner of his beard" refers to the extremities of his beard. And what are the extremities of his beard? The pointy corn-like parts of the beard.

And one is not liable until he removes them with a razor.: The rabbis taught in a baraisa, (Leviticus 21, 5) "And the corners of their beards they shall not shave" From this I may think that even if they shaved it with scissors, they would be liable [to malkus]. The Torah therefore says, (Leviticus 19,27) "You shall not destroy". If it only had said "You shall not destroy", then I might think that one who cut it with wood planes or tweezers would be liable. The Torah therefore says, "they shall not shave".

What is this ruling of Rebbi Akiva? That it was taught in a baraisa, One who weeds or covers Kilayim incurs malkus. Rebbi Akiva says, also one who merely maintains [Kilayim still incurs malkus].

What is the reason of Rebbi Akiva? That it was taught in a baraisa. (Leviticus 19,19) "Your fields you shall not plant with Kilayim" only teaches us the planting [kilayim is forbidden]. From where do we derive maintaining [kilayim is also forbidden]? "Kilayim in your field don't".

But I'll challenge that [with the following baraisa:] If they evaluated him to be able to withstand forty and then reevaluated him to be unable to withstand forty, he is exonerated. If they evaluated him to be [only] able to withstand eighteen and then reevaluated him to be able to withstand [the full] forty, he is exonerated. [Thus implying that he gets exonerated even if he wasn't yet flogged at all!]

Rav Sheises anwered, It is not a contradiction. [Our mishna which says that he is still flogged] is where they reexamined him on the same day. [The baraisa, however, which says that he is exonerated] is referring to where he was reexamined the following day or the day after.

GEMARA: But it was taught in a baraisa, we do not use a single evaluation for two prohibitions!?

And two straps. etc.: It was taught in a baraisa, of donkey.... As a certain Galelien expounded to Rav Chisdah. (Issiah 1,3) The ox knows its master and the donkey knows its master's trough. Isreal does not know etc." Hashem says let the one who recognizes his master's trough come and exact punishment from the one who does not recognize his master's trough.

The striker strikes with his hand: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], We only appoint attendants [to flog] who are lacking in strength but have superior intellect. Rebbi Yehuda says that we even appoint those lacking intellect but possessing superior strength.

It was taught in a baraisa: When he lifts [the strap], he lifts it with both hands. And when he strikes, he strikes with one hand in order that it will come from him....

And the reader reads. etc.: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], The greatest of the judges reads, the second counts, and the third one says "strike him". In times when the lashes are many, he lengthens [the recital]. In times when the lashes are few, he shortens [the recital]. But we learned in our mishna, that he returns the beginning of the verses. [Why then does the baraisa say to adjust the length]? The mitzvah is to be precise, but if one is not precise then he returns to the beginning of the verses.

And the reader reads. etc.: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], The greatest of the judges reads, the second counts, and the third one says "strike him". In times when the lashes are many, he lengthens [the recital]. In times when the lashes are few, he shortens [the recital]. But we learned in our mishna, that he returns the beginning of the verses. [Why then does the baraisa say to adjust the length]? The mitzvah is to be precise, but if one is not precise then he returns to the beginning of the verses.

The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], From (Deuteronomy 25,3) "many lashes", I only know [that it is prohibited for the attendant to add] many lashes. From where do I learn out also few lashes? The Torah says "do not add" If so, the why does the Torah say "many lashes"? to teach us a bout the first [extra lashes] that they are considered "many lashes"

If he soiled himself. etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], Both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement, but not urine, these are the words of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Yehuda says, a man [is exempt] with excrement and a woman with urine. And the sages say, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with either excrement or urine.

But it was taught in a different baraisa, Rebbi Yehuda says, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answered,... [The second baraisa means that] both of them are equal with regards to excrement....

But it was taught in a different baraisa, Rebbi Yehuda says, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answered,... [The second baraisa means that] both of them are equal with regards to excrement....

Shmuel said if they tied him [to the post] and then he fled from court, he is exempt. They challenged this [from the following baraisa], If he soiled himself whether after the first lash or after the second lash, he is exempt. If the strap broke, by the second lash, we exonerate him, by the first lash, however, we do not exonerate him. Why is this? Let him be like the one fled? There he fled [which is humiliation enough]. Here, however, he did not flee.

The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], If they evaluated him that he would soil himself when lashed, then we exonerate him. [If they evaluated him] that he would soil himself after leaving Beis Din, we nevertheless flog him. And not only that, but even [if they evaluated him to soil himself beforehand, we still flog him. That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25,2) "And he strikes him etc. And he becomes demeaned" And not that he was already demeaned in Beis Din.

Rav Nachman (bar Yitzchak) says, Who is this tanna? Rabbi Yitchak who says that there is no kares by liabilities of malkus, that we learned in a baraisa, Rebbi Yitzchak says, Liabilities of kares are included in the punishment of malkus, and why was kares bachoso singled out? To punish him with kares alone but not malkus.

What does [the baraisa mean with] "And it also said"? That if you will attempt to say that Boaz was acting from his own intuition, but Heaven did agree with him, then come and learn, "And he said 'Hashem is with you, man of valor'.".