can
4701 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
A simple document has the signatures within (at the bottom of the page); a sewn document has signatures behind [each fold]. If in a simple document its witnesses signed behind, or if in a sewn document its witnesses signed within, they are invalid. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: “If in a sewn document its witnesses signed within, it is valid, since it can be made into a simple document.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Everything should follow local custom.”
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).
Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.
Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.
When the judges reached their decision they would bring in the litigants. The chief among the judges says: “You, so-and-so are not obligated”, or “You, so-and-so are obligated”. And from where do we know that after one of the judges has gone out that he may not say, “I declared him not obligated and my colleagues declared him obligated, so what can I do since they outvoted me?” Of such a one it says, “Do not go about as a talebearer amongst your people” (Lev. 19:16) and it also says, “He that goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets” (Proverbs 11:13).
So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.
When he is about ten cubits away from the place of stoning, they say to him, ‘confess’, for such is the practice of all who are executed, that they [first] confess, for he who confesses has a portion in the world to come. For so we find in the case of Achan, that Joshua said to him, “My son, pay honor to the Lord, the God of Israel, and make confession to him. [Tell me what you have done, do not hold anything back from me.]” And Achan answered Joshua and said, “It is true, I have sinned against the Lord the God of Israel, and this is what I have done” (Josh. 7:19-20). And how do we know that his confessions made atonement for him? As it says, “And Joshua said, “What calamity have you brought upon us! The Lord will bring calamity upon you this day” (Josh. 7:35), [meaning] this day you are a calamity, but you are not to be a calamity in the next world. And if he does not know how to confess, they say to him, “Say, may my death be an expiation for all my sins.” Rabbi Judah said: “If he knows that he is a victim of false evidence, he can say: may my death be an expiation for all my sins but this.” They [the sages] said to him: “If so, everyone will speak likewise in order to clear himself.”
One who incites [individuals to idolatry] -- this refers to an ordinary person who incites an individual who said, “There is an idol in such and such a place; it eats thus, it drinks thus, it does good [to those who worship it] and harm [to those who do not].” For all who are liable for the death penalty according to the Torah no witnesses are hidden to entrap them, excepting for this one. If he said [these things] to two, they themselves are witnesses against him, and he is brought to court and stoned. But if he said [these things] to one, he should reply, “I have friends who wish to do so likewise [come and propose it to them too].” But if he was cunning and declined to speak before them, witnesses are hidden behind a partition, while he [who was incited] says to him, make your proposal to me now in private. When the inciter says to him (repeats to him what he had already said), the other replies, “How can we abandon our God in heaven to go and serve wood and stones?” Should he retract, it is well. But if he answers, “It is our duty [to worship idols], and is seemly for us”, then the witnesses stationed behind the partition take him to court, and have him stoned. He who incites [individuals to idolatry is one who] is one who says, “I will worship it”, or, “I will go and worship”, or, “let us go and worship”; or, “I will sacrifice [to it]”, “I will go and sacrifice”, “let us go and sacrifice”; “I will burn incense, “I will go and burn incense”; “let us go and burn incense”; or “I will make libations to it”, “I will go and make libations to it”, “let us go and make libations”; “I will prostrate myself before it”, “I will go and prostrate myself”, “let us go and prostrate ourselves”. One who seduces [a whole town to idolatry] is one who says, “Let us go and serve idols”.
The following can be saved [from sinning] even at the cost of their lives: he who pursues after his neighbor to slay him, [or] after a male [to rape him], [or] after a betrothed maiden [to rape her]. But he who pursues after an animal [to have relations with it], or one who would violate the Sabbath, or commit idolatry, must not be saved [from sinning] at the cost of his life.
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
The father goes into banishment for [the death of] his son, and the son goes into banishment for [that of] his father. All go into banishment for [the death of] an Israelite, and Israelites go into banishment on their account, except for a resident alien. And a resident alien does not go into banishment except for [the death of another] resident alien. A blind person does not go into banishment, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “He goes into banishment.” An enemy does not go into banishment. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: “An enemy is executed, for it is as if he has been warned.” Rabbi Shimon says: “There is an enemy that goes into banishment and there is an enemy that does not go into banishment: wherever it can be said that he had killed [his victim] wittingly, he goes not into banishment, and where he had slain unwittingly, he goes into banishment.
If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.
When they estimate the number of lashes he can stand it must be a number divisible by three. If they estimated him capable of receiving forty, and after receiving some they said he cannot receive forty, he is exempt [from the rest]. If they estimated him fit to receive eighteen, and after he was lashed they said he could receive forty, he is exempt [from the rest]. If he committed a transgression which violated two prohibitions and they made one estimate [for the lashes for both prohibitions], he is lashed and then exempt [from more]. And if [they had] not [made one estimate for both], he is lashed [for one transgression], is allowed to recover and then is lashed again.
All who have incurred [the penalty of] kareth, on being flogged are exempt from their punishment of kareth, for it says, “[He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more] ... lest your brother shall be dishonored before your eyes” (Deut. 25;3) once he has been lashed he is [considered] “your brother”, the words of Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel. Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel said: “Just as one who transgresses one transgression forfeits his life, how much more does one who performs one commandment have his life granted him.” Rabbi Shimon says: “You can learn this from its own passage; as it says: “[All who do any of those abhorrent things] such persons shall be cut off from their people” (Lev. 18:29), and it says: “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Lev. 18:5), which means that one who desists from transgressing is granted reward like one who performs a precept. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi says: Behold [the Torah] says, “But makes sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh…[that it may go well with you and with your descendents to come..” (Deut. 12:23-25”-- now, if in the case of blood which a person’s soul loathes, anyone who refrains from it receives reward, how much more so in regard to robbery and sexual sin for which a person’s soul craves and longs shall one who refrains from them acquire merit for himself and for generations and generations to come, to the end of all generations!
Where there is no knowledge [of the impurity] either at the beginning or at the end, the goats offered as sin-offerings on festivals and new months bring atonement, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: “The festival goats atone [for such sins] and not the new moon goats. And for what do the new month goats bring atonement? For a pure man who ate impure holy food.” Rabbi Meir says: “All the goats have equal powers of atonement for imparting impurity to the Temple and holy food. Rabbi Shimon used to say: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure man who ate impure holy food; and the festival goats atone for transgression of the laws of impurity where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; and the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement atones for transgression of these laws where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said to them: “Let it be offered.” They said to him: “Since they are not equal in the atonement they bring how can they take each other's place?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name [of Rabbi Shimon (bar Yohai)]: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They [further] said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
The oath of deposit how? If he said to him: “Give me my deposit which I have in your possession” [and the other replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession”; or he replied to him; “You have nothing in my possession,” [and the depositor said:] “I adjure you”, and he responded, “Amen!”, he is liable. If he adjured him five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and he denied, he is liable for each one. Rabbi Shimon said: “What is the reason? Because he can retract and admit.”
“And the shopkeeper with his account book,” How so? Not that he [the shopkeeper] says to him [the customer], “It is written in my account book that you owe me two hundred zuz”. Rather he [the customer] says to him [the shopkeeper], “Give my son two seahs of wheat,” or, “Give my laborer small change to the value of a sela” and then he says, “I have given,” and they say, “We have not received”; he [the shopkeeper] takes an oath, and receives [his due from the customer]. And they take an oath, and receive [their due]. Ben Nanas said: “How can both be permitted to come to a vain oath? Rather he takes without an oath, and they take without an oath.”
Vetches of terumah: Beth Shammai says, “They must be soaked and rubbed in purity, but can be given for food in impurity.” And Beth Hillel says: “They must be soaked in purity, but can be rubbed and given for food in impurity.” Shammai says: “They must be eaten dry.” Rabbi Akiva says: “All actions in connection with them [can be carried out] in impurity.”
Vetches of terumah: Beth Shammai says, “They must be soaked and rubbed in purity, but can be given for food in impurity.” And Beth Hillel says: “They must be soaked in purity, but can be rubbed and given for food in impurity.” Shammai says: “They must be eaten dry.” Rabbi Akiva says: “All actions in connection with them [can be carried out] in impurity.”
Vetches of terumah: Beth Shammai says, “They must be soaked and rubbed in purity, but can be given for food in impurity.” And Beth Hillel says: “They must be soaked in purity, but can be rubbed and given for food in impurity.” Shammai says: “They must be eaten dry.” Rabbi Akiva says: “All actions in connection with them [can be carried out] in impurity.”
Whoever is half a slave and half a free man should work one day for his master and one day for himself, according to Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai said to them: “You have set matters in order with regards to his master, but you have not set matters in order with regards to himself. He is not able to marry a slave-woman, nor is he able [to marry] a woman who is free. Is he to refrain [from marrying]? [How can he] for is it not the case that the world was created in order for people to be fruitful and multiply? For it is said, “He did not create it to be a waste; but formed it for inhabitation” (Isaiah 45:18). But for the rightful ordering of the world his master is compelled to make him free, and he writes out a bond for half his value.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel. But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them: “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them: “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them: “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel. But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them: “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them: “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them: “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection. And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor. And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.
In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai. One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”
A barrel of pickled olives: Beth Shammai says: one need not perforate it, And Beth Hillel say: one must perforate it. But they agree that if it was perforated and the dregs stopped it up, it is not liable to receive impurity. One who had anointed himself with clean oil and [then] became unclean, and he went down and immersed himself, Beth Shammai says: although he still drips [oil], it is clean. And Beth Hillel says: [only while there remains] enough for anointing a small limb. And if from the beginning it was unclean oil, Beth Shammai says: [it is unclean as long as there remains] enough for anointing a small limb, And Beth Hillel says: [even if there remains as much] as a moist liquid. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Beth Hillel: [provided it remains] moist [itself] and [can also] moisten [other things].
1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?
1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?
1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it can be brought as a peace-offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring of a peace-offering cannot be brought as a peace-offering. But the sages say: it can be brought. Rabbi Papias said: “I testify that we had a cow, which was a peace-offering, and we ate it at Passover, and its offspring we ate as a peace-offering at the [next] festival.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it can be brought as a peace-offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring of a peace-offering cannot be brought as a peace-offering. But the sages say: it can be brought. Rabbi Papias said: “I testify that we had a cow, which was a peace-offering, and we ate it at Passover, and its offspring we ate as a peace-offering at the [next] festival.
They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.
They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testified concerning the widow of [a man belonging to] a family of doubtful lineage (an issa), that she was fit to marry into the priesthood, [And that those of] a family of doubtful lineage are fit to declare who was unclean and who clean, who was to be put away and who was to be brought near. Rabban Gamaliel said: we accept your testimony, but what can we do since Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai ordained that courts should not be commissioned for this purpose? The priests would listen to you concerning those who might be put away, but not concerning those who might be brought near!
On the three days preceding the festivals of idolaters, it is forbidden to conduct business with them, to lend articles to them or borrow from them, to lend or borrow any money from them, to repay a debt, or receive repayment from them. Rabbi Judah says: we should receive repayment from them, as this can only depress them; But they [the Rabbis] said to him: even though it is depressing at the time, they are glad of it subsequently.
When an idolatrous [festival] takes place within a city it is permitted [to conduct business with non-Jews] outside it. If the idolatrous [festival] takes place outside it, [business] is permitted within it. Is it permitted to go there? If the road leads solely to that place, it is forbidden; But if one can go by it to any other place, it is permitted. A city in which an idolatrous festival is taking place, some of its shops being decorated and some not decorated this was the case with Beth-Shean, and the Sages said: in the decorated stores it is forbidden [to buy] but in the undecorated ones it is permitted.
The idol of an idolater is prohibited immediately; but if it belonged to a Jew it is not prohibited until it is worshipped. An idolater can annul an idol belonging to himself or to another idolater, but a Jew cannot annul the idol of an idolater. He who annuls an idol annuls the things that pertain to it. If he only annulled the things that pertain to it these are permitted but the idol itself is prohibited.
He used to say: A brute is not sin-fearing, nor is an ignorant person pious; nor can a timid person learn, nor can an impatient person teach; nor will someone who engages too much in business become wise. In a place where there are no men, strive to be a man.
He used to say: A brute is not sin-fearing, nor is an ignorant person pious; nor can a timid person learn, nor can an impatient person teach; nor will someone who engages too much in business become wise. In a place where there are no men, strive to be a man.
He used to say: everything is given against a pledge, and a net is spread out over all the living; the store is open and the storekeeper allows credit, but the ledger is open and the hand writes, and whoever wishes to borrow may come and borrow; but the collectors go round regularly every day and exact dues from man, either with his consent or without his consent, and they have that on which they [can] rely [in their claims], seeing that the judgment is a righteous judgment, and everything is prepared for the banquet.
A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name, Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified. What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim. ‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah. For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles. Rabbi Eliezer says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it].
The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar]. They differ in the [rules governing] their eating: The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night. The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.
The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar]. They differ in the [rules governing] their eating: The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night. The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.
The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar]. They differ in the [rules governing] their eating: The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night. The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.
The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar]. They differ in the [rules governing] their eating: The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night. The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.
A sacrifice [which was mixed up] with another sacrifice, both being of the same kind: this one is offered in the name of whoever is its owner, and the other is offered in the name of whoever is its owner. A sacrifice [which was mixed up] with a sacrifice, both being of different kinds: they must graze until they become unfit, and then he purchases at the price of the better of them [an animal] of each kind, and he pays the loss of the excess out of his own pocket. If they were mixed up with a firstling or tithe, they must graze until they become unfit, and then they are eaten as firstling or tithe. All [sacrifices] can be mixed up, except the hatat and the asham.
[If] blood of unblemished animals [was mixed] with blood of blemished animals, it must be poured out into the duct. [If] a goblet [of valid blood was mixed up] with other goblets [of invalid blood]: Rabbi Eliezer said: if he [the priest] offered [sprinkled] one goblet, all the goblets can be offered; But the sages say: even if they offered all of them save one, it must be poured out into the duct.
The altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it. Rabbi Joshua says: whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it has ascended, as it is said, “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:: just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar fire, does not descend once it has ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it ascended. Rabban Gamaliel said: whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended, as it is said: “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:2): just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar, does not descend once it ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended. The only difference between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua is in respect of the blood and libations, for Rabban Gamaliel says that they cannot descend, while Rabbi Joshua says that they can descend. Rabbi Shimon says: if the sacrifice is fit while the libations [which accompanied it] are unfit; or if the libations are fit while the sacrifice is unfit; or even if both are unfit, the sacrifice does not descend, while the libations do descend.
Just as the altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it, so does the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for it; And just as the altar and the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for them, so do vessels sanctify. Vessels for liquids sanctify liquids, And the measures sanctify dry material. A liquid vessel does not sanctify dry matter, nor does a dry [measure] sanctify a liquid. If holy vessels were perforated and they can be used for the same purpose as when whole, they sanctify [what is placed in them]; if not, they do not sanctify. And all these sanctify only in the holy place.
Rabbi Shimon said: if you see oil being divided in the Temple courtyard, you don’t need to ask what it is for, for it is the remnant of oil of the wafers of the Israelite’s meal-offerings, or of the metzora’s log of oil. If you see oil being poured on to the fires, you don’t need not ask what it is for, for it is the remnant of the oil of the wafers of priests’ meal-offerings, or of the anointed priest's meal-offering; for one cannot voluntarily offer offer oil [alone]. Rabbi Tarfon say: oil can be voluntarily offered [alone].
Whether one boiled in it or poured boiling [sacrificial flesh] into it, whether most sacred sacrifices or lesser sacrifices, [the pot] requires scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: lesser sacrifices do not require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Tarfon says: if one boiled [sacrifices in a pot] at the beginning of a festival, he can boil in it during the whole festival. But the sages say: until the time of eating, scouring and rinsing. Scouring is done as the scouring of a goblet; and rinsing is as the rinsing of a goblet, Scouring [in hot water] and rinsing in cold [water]. The spit and the grill are cleansed with hot water.
All minhahs from which the handful was taken not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy. A sinner’s minhah and the minhah of jealousy from which he removed the handful not in their own name, or he put into the vessel, or brought [to the altar], or burned not in their own name, or for their own name and not for their own name, or not for their own name and for their own name, they are invalid. How can they be “for their own name and not for their own name”? [If offered it] as a sinner's minhah and as a voluntary minhah. And how can they be “not for their own name and for their own name”? [If offered it] as a voluntary minhah and as a sinner's minhah.
All minhahs from which the handful was taken not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy. A sinner’s minhah and the minhah of jealousy from which he removed the handful not in their own name, or he put into the vessel, or brought [to the altar], or burned not in their own name, or for their own name and not for their own name, or not for their own name and for their own name, they are invalid. How can they be “for their own name and not for their own name”? [If offered it] as a sinner's minhah and as a voluntary minhah. And how can they be “not for their own name and for their own name”? [If offered it] as a voluntary minhah and as a sinner's minhah.
The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not.
The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not.
The animal-offering can render the libations piggul after they have been sanctified in the vessel, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the libations cannot render the animal-offering piggul. Thus, if he slaughtered an animal-offering intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the libations are piggul; if he intended to offer the libations the next day, the libations are piggul but the animal-offering is not.
Regarding the seven branches of the menorah, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the seven lamps on it, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the two portions of Scripture in the mezuzah, the [absence of] one invalidates the other; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four portions of Scripture in the tefillin, the [absence of] one invalidates the others; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four fringes, the [absence of] one invalidates the others, since the four together form one mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael says: the four are four separate mitzvot.
Regarding the seven branches of the menorah, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the seven lamps on it, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the two portions of Scripture in the mezuzah, the [absence of] one invalidates the other; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four portions of Scripture in the tefillin, the [absence of] one invalidates the others; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four fringes, the [absence of] one invalidates the others, since the four together form one mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael says: the four are four separate mitzvot.
One is liable for the oil on its own and for the frankincense on its own. If he put in oil, he has rendered it invalid, but if frankincense, he can remove it. If he put oil on the remainder, he has not transgressed a negative commandment. If he put one vessel above the other vessel, he has not rendered it invalid.
From where [is it derived] that if one says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” he can bring it only from hullin? As it is said, “And you shall sacrifice the pesah to the Lord your God, from the flock or the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:. But is not the pesah sacrifice brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Why then is it written, “from the flock or the herd”? It is to compare whatever is brought from the flock and the herd with the pesah: just as the pesah is obligatory and offered only from what is hullin, so everything that is obligatory may be offered only from what is hullin. Therefore if a man says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” or “I take upon myself [to offer] a shelamim,” since [in these cases] these are obligatory they may be offered only from what is hullin. The libations in every case may be offered only from what is hullin.
None of the communal offerings require the laying on of hands except the bull that is offered for [the transgression by the congregation] of any of the commandments, and the scapegoat. Rabbi Shimon says: also the he-goat offered for [the sin] of idol worship. All the offerings of an individual require the laying on of hands except the first-born, the cattle tithe, and the pesah. And an heir may lay his hands [on his father’s offering], and he may bring the libations for it, and can substitute [another animal for it].
The high priest’s griddle cakes: their kneading, their shaping, and their baking were performed within [the Temple Court], And they override the Shabbat. The grinding [of the grain for it] and the sifting did not override the Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva said a general rule: any work that can be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat, but that which cannot be done on the eve of Shabbat does override Shabbat.
A man may offer a minhah consisting of sixty tenths and bring them in one vessel. If one said, “I take upon myself to offer sixty-one tenths,” he must bring sixty in one vessel and the one in another vessel, since the congregation brings on the first day of the festival [of Sukkot] when it falls on Shabbat sixty-one tenths [as a minhah], it is enough for an individual that [his minhah] should be one tenth less than that of the congregation. Rabbi Shimon said: but some of these [sixty-one tenths] are for the bullocks and some for the lambs, and they may not be mixed one with the other! Rather sixty tenths mingles [in one vessel]. They said to him: can sixty be mingled [in one vessel] and not sixty-one? He answered, so it is with all the measures prescribed by the sages: a man may immerse himself in forty seahs of water, but he may not immerse himself in forty seahs less one kortob. One may not offer one [log], two, or five [logs], but one may offer three, four, six, or anything above six.
One may offer wine but not oil, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But Rabbi Tarfon says: one may also offer oil. Rabbi Tarfon said: just as we find that wine is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering, so oil which is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you say so of wine it is because it is offered by itself even when offered as an obligation, can you say the same of oil which is not offered by itself when offered as an obligation? Two [men] may not jointly offer one tenth [of flour for a minhah]; but they may jointly offer an olah or a shelamim, and bird sacrifices even a single bird.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid. Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon. Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell. Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal. When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is havdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.”
Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid. Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon. Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell. Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal. When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is havdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.”
If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!
If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid.
The characteristics of cattle and of wild animals are stated in the Torah. The characteristics of birds are not stated, but the sages said: every bird that seizes its prey is unclean. Every bird that has an extra toe, or a crop and a gizzard that can be peeled, is clean. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: every bird that parts its toes is unclean.
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it. It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah. If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah. If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; for it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal. If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices.
If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered the red cow, or an ox which was condemned to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to be broken: Rabbi Shimon exempts [him from having transgressed the law of “it and its young”]; but the sages make him liable. If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it became nevelah under his hand, or if he stabbed it, or tore away [the organs of the throat], he does not thereby transgress the law of it and its young. If two people bought a cow and its young, he who bought first can slaughter first; but if the second preceded him, he holds his advantage. If a person slaughtered a cow and then two of its calves, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered its two calves and then the cow, he is liable for forty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf and then the calf's offspring, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf's offspring and then the calf, he is liable for forty lashes. Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: he is liable for eighty lashes. At four periods in the year he who sells a beast to another must inform him, “I sold today its mother to be slaughtered,” or “I sold today its young to be slaughtered,” and these are they: on the eve of the last day of the feast [of Sukkot], on the eve of the first day of Pesah, on the eve of Shavuot, and on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, also on the eve of Yom Kippur, in the Galilee. Rabbi Judah says, this is so, only when there was no time in between the sales, but if there was time, he need not inform him. Rabbi Judah agrees that if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the young to the bride, he must inform them of it, for it is certain that they will each slaughter on the same day.
At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it. Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser. At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller.
At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it. Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser. At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller.
A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.
A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.