can
4701 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.
A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.
The hide, meat juice, sediment, dried-up meat, bones, sinews, horns and hooves join together [to make up the minimum quantity in order] to convey food-uncleanness, but not to [make up the minimum quantity in order to] convey nevelah-uncleanness. Similarly, if a man slaughtered an unclean animal for a Gentile and it still has convulsions, it can convey food-uncleanness, but it conveys nevelah-uncleanness only after it is dead, or its head has been chopped off. [Scripture] has [thus] made more cases that convey food-uncleanness than those that convey nevelah-uncleanness. Rabbi Judah says: if an olive’s bulk of dried-up meat was gathered in one place, one would thereby become liable [for nevelah-uncleanness].
One who was flaying cattle or wild animals, clean or unclean, small or large: In order to use the hide for a covering, if he stripped as can be taken hold of [the hide is no longer considered as connected to the flesh.] In order to make a water-skin, until the breast has been flayed. If he was flaying from the feet upwards, until the whole hide [has been flayed]. [All of these measures apply] for both conveying uncleanness and becoming unclean. As for the skin that is on the neck: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: it is not connected. But the sages say it is connected until the whole hide has been flayed.
With regard to a thigh-bone of a corpse or a thigh-bone of a consecrated animal, he who touches it, whether it be stopped up or pierced, becomes unclean. With regard to a thighbone of a nevelah or of a [dead] sheretz, if it was stopped up, he who touches it remains clean, but if it was at all pierced it conveys uncleanness by contact. From where do we know [the same rules apply] for carrying? Scripture says, “He that touches and he that carries” (Leviticus 11:39-40), anything that [can become unclean] by contact [can become unclean] by carrying. And anything that cannot [become unclean] by contact, cannot become [unclean] by carrying.
With regard to a thigh-bone of a corpse or a thigh-bone of a consecrated animal, he who touches it, whether it be stopped up or pierced, becomes unclean. With regard to a thighbone of a nevelah or of a [dead] sheretz, if it was stopped up, he who touches it remains clean, but if it was at all pierced it conveys uncleanness by contact. From where do we know [the same rules apply] for carrying? Scripture says, “He that touches and he that carries” (Leviticus 11:39-40), anything that [can become unclean] by contact [can become unclean] by carrying. And anything that cannot [become unclean] by contact, cannot become [unclean] by carrying.
If one donkey had given birth before and one had not given birth before and they gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. [If they gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. For it says, “And the firstling of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20), [the lamb can come either] from the sheep or the goats, male or female, large or small, unblemished or blemished. He can redeem with the same lamb many times. [And the lamb] enters the pen to be tithed. If it dies [before he gives it to the priest], he can benefit from it.
If one donkey had given birth before and one had not given birth before and they gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. [If they gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. For it says, “And the firstling of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20), [the lamb can come either] from the sheep or the goats, male or female, large or small, unblemished or blemished. He can redeem with the same lamb many times. [And the lamb] enters the pen to be tithed. If it dies [before he gives it to the priest], he can benefit from it.
If one donkey had given birth before and one had not given birth before and they gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. [If they gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. For it says, “And the firstling of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20), [the lamb can come either] from the sheep or the goats, male or female, large or small, unblemished or blemished. He can redeem with the same lamb many times. [And the lamb] enters the pen to be tithed. If it dies [before he gives it to the priest], he can benefit from it.
All dedicated animals which became unfit [for the altar] are sold in a market, slaughtered in a market and weighed by the liter, except for a first born or a tithed animal, as their profit goes to the owners, [whereas] the profit on dedicated objects which became unfit goes to the Temple. One can weigh one piece of meat of the first-born against another piece of ordinary meat.
A harum is unfit [for the priesthood]. What is a harum? One who can paint both of his eyes with one movement. If both of his eyes were above or both of his eyes were below; or if one one eye was above and the other below; Or one who sees the room and the ceiling in one glance; Or one who covers [his eyes] from the sun; A zugdos and a tziran. One whose eyelashes have fallen off is unfit [for the priesthood] for appearance sake.
The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession.
The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession.
The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession.
Animals are combined for purposes of tithing so long as they can still pasture within the distance that cattle wander. And what is the distance over which they wander while pasturing? Sixteen mils. If there was between two groups of animals a distance of thirty-two mils, they do not combine for the purpose of tithing. If however there was one in the middle [of the distance of thirty-two mils] he brings them into the middle and tithes them. Rabbi Meir says: the [river] Jordan is regarded as forming a division as regards the tithing of animals.
If two [lambs] came out at the same time, he counts them in pairs. If he counted [the two] as one, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If the ninth and the tenth came out at the same time, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, all three are holy: the ninth can be eaten when it becomes blemished, the tenth is the tithe and the eleventh is sacrificed as a shelamim, and it can make a substitute, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah said: can one substitute make another substitute? They said in the name of Rabbi Meir: if it were a substitute, it would not have been sacrificed. If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the tenth and the eleventh the tenth, the eleventh is not holy. The following is the rule: wherever the name of the tenth [animal] has not been taken away from it, the eleventh is not consecrated.
If two [lambs] came out at the same time, he counts them in pairs. If he counted [the two] as one, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If the ninth and the tenth came out at the same time, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, all three are holy: the ninth can be eaten when it becomes blemished, the tenth is the tithe and the eleventh is sacrificed as a shelamim, and it can make a substitute, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah said: can one substitute make another substitute? They said in the name of Rabbi Meir: if it were a substitute, it would not have been sacrificed. If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the tenth and the eleventh the tenth, the eleventh is not holy. The following is the rule: wherever the name of the tenth [animal] has not been taken away from it, the eleventh is not consecrated.
If two [lambs] came out at the same time, he counts them in pairs. If he counted [the two] as one, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If the ninth and the tenth came out at the same time, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, all three are holy: the ninth can be eaten when it becomes blemished, the tenth is the tithe and the eleventh is sacrificed as a shelamim, and it can make a substitute, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah said: can one substitute make another substitute? They said in the name of Rabbi Meir: if it were a substitute, it would not have been sacrificed. If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the tenth and the eleventh the tenth, the eleventh is not holy. The following is the rule: wherever the name of the tenth [animal] has not been taken away from it, the eleventh is not consecrated.
A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others.
A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others.
A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others.
One at the point of death or about to be put to death cannot have his worth vowed, nor be evaluated. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia says: he can be evaluated because his value is fixed, but his worth cannot be vowed because his worth is not fixed. Rabbi Yose says: he may vow, evaluate, and consecrate [to the sanctuary], and if he caused damage, he is obliged to make restitution.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
Whether one consecrates his property or evaluates himself, it [the Sanctuary] has no claim to his wife's garment or his children's garment or to the dyed clothes which he had dyed for their use or to the new sandals which he has bought for their use. Although they said: “Slaves are sold with their garments to increase their value,” because when a garment for thirty denars is bought for him his value is increased by a maneh. And likewise with a cow, if it is kept waiting to the market-day it increases in value, and similarly a pearl, if brought to a big city increases in value. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary can only claim the value of anything in its own place and at its own time.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them.
If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
Houses in courtyards - we accord to them the advantages of houses in a walled city and the advantages given to fields: They can be redeemed at once, and at any time within the twelve months like houses [in a walled city], and they return [to the owners] in the Jubilee or [at an earlier time] by [payment of a] reduced price like fields. The following are considered houses in courtyards: [a city which has] two courtyards, each having two houses, even though they have been encompassed by a wall since the days of Joshua ben Nun, they count as houses in courtyards.
All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.
All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.
One can substitute Herd animals for flock animals and flock animals for herd animals; Sheep for goats and goats for sheep; Males for females and females for males; Unblemished animals for blemished animals and blemished animals for unblemished animals, since Scripture says: “One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). What is meant by “good for bad”? Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish. One can substitute one [hullin animal] for two [consecrated animals], and two [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; One [hullin animal] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and a hundred [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; Rabbi Shimon says: one can only substitute one for one, as it says, “Then it and its substitute” (ibid), just as “it” [the consecrated animal] is only one, so [its substitute] must also be only one.
One can substitute Herd animals for flock animals and flock animals for herd animals; Sheep for goats and goats for sheep; Males for females and females for males; Unblemished animals for blemished animals and blemished animals for unblemished animals, since Scripture says: “One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). What is meant by “good for bad”? Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish. One can substitute one [hullin animal] for two [consecrated animals], and two [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; One [hullin animal] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and a hundred [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; Rabbi Shimon says: one can only substitute one for one, as it says, “Then it and its substitute” (ibid), just as “it” [the consecrated animal] is only one, so [its substitute] must also be only one.
One can substitute Herd animals for flock animals and flock animals for herd animals; Sheep for goats and goats for sheep; Males for females and females for males; Unblemished animals for blemished animals and blemished animals for unblemished animals, since Scripture says: “One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). What is meant by “good for bad”? Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish. One can substitute one [hullin animal] for two [consecrated animals], and two [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; One [hullin animal] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and a hundred [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; Rabbi Shimon says: one can only substitute one for one, as it says, “Then it and its substitute” (ibid), just as “it” [the consecrated animal] is only one, so [its substitute] must also be only one.
One cannot substitute limbs [of hullin] for [dedicated] embryos; Or embryos [of hullin] for [dedicated] limbs; Or embryos and limbs [of hullin] for whole [dedicated animals]; Or whole [animals of hullin] for them. Rabbi Yose says: limbs [of hullin] can be substituted for whole [dedicated animals], but whole [animals of hullin] cannot be substitute for them. Rabbi Yose said: When it comes to dedicating animals, is it not true that if one says: “This foot shall be an olah (a burnt offering),” the whole [animal] becomes an olah? Similarly, if one says, “This foot shall be in place of this [whole dedicated animal],” the whole [animal] should become a substitute in its place!
[Anything which has become subject to the law of terumah through] a mixture can affect a [second] mixture only in proportion. [Dough] leavened [through terumah] can affect [other dough] only in proportion. Drawn water can disqualify a mikweh only in proportion.
[Anything which has become subject to the law of terumah through] a mixture can affect a [second] mixture only in proportion. [Dough] leavened [through terumah] can affect [other dough] only in proportion. Drawn water can disqualify a mikweh only in proportion.
[Anything which has become subject to the law of terumah through] a mixture can affect a [second] mixture only in proportion. [Dough] leavened [through terumah] can affect [other dough] only in proportion. Drawn water can disqualify a mikweh only in proportion.
Hatat water does not become hatat water except with the putting of ashes [in the water]. A doubtful graveyard cannot make another doubtful graveyard. Nor can terumah be made after terumah. A substitute cannot make another substitute. The offspring of a dedicated animal cannot make a substitute. Rabbi Judah says: the offspring of a dedicated animal can make a substitute. They said to him: a dedicated animal can make a substitute, but neither the offspring of a dedicated animal nor a substitute can make a substitute.
Hatat water does not become hatat water except with the putting of ashes [in the water]. A doubtful graveyard cannot make another doubtful graveyard. Nor can terumah be made after terumah. A substitute cannot make another substitute. The offspring of a dedicated animal cannot make a substitute. Rabbi Judah says: the offspring of a dedicated animal can make a substitute. They said to him: a dedicated animal can make a substitute, but neither the offspring of a dedicated animal nor a substitute can make a substitute.
Hatat water does not become hatat water except with the putting of ashes [in the water]. A doubtful graveyard cannot make another doubtful graveyard. Nor can terumah be made after terumah. A substitute cannot make another substitute. The offspring of a dedicated animal cannot make a substitute. Rabbi Judah says: the offspring of a dedicated animal can make a substitute. They said to him: a dedicated animal can make a substitute, but neither the offspring of a dedicated animal nor a substitute can make a substitute.
Hatat water does not become hatat water except with the putting of ashes [in the water]. A doubtful graveyard cannot make another doubtful graveyard. Nor can terumah be made after terumah. A substitute cannot make another substitute. The offspring of a dedicated animal cannot make a substitute. Rabbi Judah says: the offspring of a dedicated animal can make a substitute. They said to him: a dedicated animal can make a substitute, but neither the offspring of a dedicated animal nor a substitute can make a substitute.
Birds and menahot do not make a substitute, since it only says “a beast” (Leviticus 27:10). A congregation or partners cannot make a substitute, since it says: “He shall not substitute for it” an individual can make a substitute but a congregation or partners cannot make substitute. One cannot make a substitute with [objects] dedicated for Temple repairs. Rabbi Shimon said: Now is not tithe included [in the laws of substitutes]? Then why was it specially mentioned? In order to make a comparison with it: tithe is a private offering, it thus excludes congregational offerings. And tithe is a dedication for the altar, it thus excludes offerings dedicated for Temple repairs.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. [The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred.
In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. [The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred.
In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. [The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred.
In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. [The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred.
How can we act deceptively with regard to the first-born? He says in respect of a pregnant animal which was giving birth for the first time: if what is in the inside of this [animal] is a male, let it be an olah. If it then gave birth to a male, it is offered as an olah. [If he said:] if it is a female, let it be a shelamim, then if it gave birth to a female, it is offered as a shelamim. [If he said:] if it is a male, let it be an olah, and if a female [let it be] a shelamim, then if it gave birth to a male and a female, the male is offered as an olah and the female is offered as a shelamim.
There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which don’t apply to dedications to the altar. Unspecified dedications go to the repairs of the Temple. Dedication for the repairs of the temple can have an effect on all things, The law of sacrilege applies to things that grow from them. And there is no benefit to be derived from them for the priest.
If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable. Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings? Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering? Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering. Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings? As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering.
To which type of female slave [does this refer]? To one who is half a slave and half a free person, as it is written: “And she has been redeemed and not redeemed” (Leviticus 19:20), the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Ishmael says: to a full female slave. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria says: all other forbidden sexual relations are stated explicitly, and of the remainder there is only one who can be half a slave and half a free person.
If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat; If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt. If two [witnesses] say, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat: Rabbi Meir says he is liable. Rabbi Meir said: if two witnesses are capable of bringing upon him severe penalty of death, can they not impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice? They replied: suppose he said, I did it intentionally, would he not be exempted?
By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant. If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife. So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter.
By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant. If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife. So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter.
By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant. If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife. So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter.
Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
If the flesh of most holy sacrifices was taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is still subject to the laws of sacrilege and one does not become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiba says: it is not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiba said: if one set aside his hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place and afterwards the first was found, and both of them are in front of us, [do you not agree] that just as [the sprinkling of] the blood [of the one] exempts its own flesh [from the laws of sacrilege] so it exempts the flesh of the other one? Now, if the sprinkling of its blood can exempt the flesh of the other from the laws of sacrilege, how much more must it exempt its own flesh.
If the flesh of most holy sacrifices was taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is still subject to the laws of sacrilege and one does not become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiba says: it is not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiba said: if one set aside his hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place and afterwards the first was found, and both of them are in front of us, [do you not agree] that just as [the sprinkling of] the blood [of the one] exempts its own flesh [from the laws of sacrilege] so it exempts the flesh of the other one? Now, if the sprinkling of its blood can exempt the flesh of the other from the laws of sacrilege, how much more must it exempt its own flesh.
If the innards of sacrifices of that have a lower degree of holiness were taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled: Rabbi Eliezer says: they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one cannot become guilty of [transgressing with them the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiva says: they are subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with them the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement.
The law of sacrilege applies to the two loaves of bread from the moment of their dedication. Once they have formed a crust in the oven they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, and the [festival] offerings can then be slaughtered. Once the blood of the lambs has been sprinkled they [the loaves] are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to them.
All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another.
All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another.
All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another.
All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another.
All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another.
All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another.
Piggul and remnant do not combine with one another because they are of two different names. Sheretz and carrion, as well as carrion and the flesh of a corpse do not combine with one another to effect impurity, not even in respect of the more lenient of the two [grades] of defilement. Food contaminated through contact with a primary defilement can combine with that contaminated by a secondary defilement to affect uncleanness according to the lower degree of defilement of the two.
All kinds of food can combine with one another: To make up the quantity of half a peras in order to render the body unfit [To make up the food] for two meals to form an eruv; To make up the volume of an egg to contaminate food; To make up the volume of a dry fig with regard to carrying on Shabbat; And the volume of a date with regard to Yom Kippur. All kinds of drinks can combine with one another: To make up a quarter [of a log] in order to render the body unfit; To make up a mouthful with regard to Yom Kippur.
All kinds of food can combine with one another: To make up the quantity of half a peras in order to render the body unfit [To make up the food] for two meals to form an eruv; To make up the volume of an egg to contaminate food; To make up the volume of a dry fig with regard to carrying on Shabbat; And the volume of a date with regard to Yom Kippur. All kinds of drinks can combine with one another: To make up a quarter [of a log] in order to render the body unfit; To make up a mouthful with regard to Yom Kippur.
Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard can combine with one another. Rabbi Shimon says: they do not combine. Cloth, sack-cloth, sack-cloth and leather, leather and matting combine with one another. Rabbi Shimon: What is the reason? Because these are all susceptible to the uncleanness caused by sitting.
If one derived a perutah's worth of benefit from a sacred thing, he is guilty of sacrilege even though he did not lessen its value, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: Anything that can deteriorate [through use], the law of sacrilege applies to it only after it has suffered deterioration. And anything that does not deteriorate [through use], the law of sacrilege applies to it as soon as he made use of it. How is this so? If [a woman] puts a necklace round her neck or a ring on her finger, or if she drank from a golden cup, she is liable to the law of sacrilege as soon as she made use of it [to the value of a perutah]. But if one puts on a shirt or covers oneself with a cloak, or if one chopped [wood] with an axe, he is subject to the law of sacrilege only if [those objects] have suffered deterioration. If one sheared a hatat while it was alive, he is not liable for sacrilege unless he has diminished its value. If when dead, he is liable as soon as he made use of it.
If he removed a stone or a beam belonging to Temple property, he is not guilty of sacrilege. But if he gave it to his friend he is guilty of sacrilege, but his fellow is not guilty. If he built it into his house he is not guilty of sacrilege until he lives beneath it and benefits the equivalent of a perutah. If he took a perutah from Temple property he is not guilty of sacrilege. But if he gave it to his friend he is guilty of sacrilege, but his fellow is not guilty. If he gave it to the bathhouse keeper, he is guilty of sacrilege even though he has not bathed, for he can say to him, “Behold the bath is ready for you, go in and bathe.”
The portion which a person has eaten himself and that which he has given his friend to eat, or the portion which he has made use of himself and that which he has given to his friend to make use of, or the portion which he has eaten himself and that which he has given his friend to make use of, or the portion which he has made use of himself and that which he has given his friend to eat can combine with one another even after the lapse of a lot of time.
One who has sent a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor: If they carried out their agency the employer is guilty, If they did not carry out their appointed errand, the shopkeeper is guilty. If one sent one of sound senses and remembers [that the money belongs to Temple property] before it has come into the possession of the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper will be guilty when he spends it. What should he do? He should take a perutah or a vessel and say “The perutah that is Temple property, wherever it may be, is redeemed with this;” for consecrated things can be redeemed both with money and with money's worth.
If he gave him two perutahs and said, “Bring me for them an etrog,” and he brought for one perutah an etrog and for the other a pomegranate, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege for he could say, “I wanted a large etrog and you brought me a small and bad one.” If he gave him a golden denar and said to him, “Bring me a shirt,” and he brought him for three [silver selas] a shirt and for the other three a cloak, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege, for he can argue, “I wanted a large shirt and you brought me a small and bad one.”
What is meant by one "name"? For a birth and a birth, or for zivah and zivah, that is one name. And "two names"? For a birth, [and the other] for a zivah. What is meant by "two women"? [When] one [woman] brings [her offering] for a birth and the other for a birth, or [when one brings] for a zivah and the other for a zivah this is "of one name". And a case "of two names"? When one brings for a birth and the other for a zivah. Rabbi Yose says: when two women purchased their kinnim in partnership, or gave the price of their kinnim to the priest [for him to purchase them], then the priest can offer whichever one he wants as a hatat or as an olah, whether they are of one name or of two names.
Hatat [birds] are on one side, and olot [birds] are on the other and an unassigned [pair] is in the middle: If from the middle pair one bird flew to this side, and one bird flew to this side, then he has not lost anything, because he [the priest] says that the bird that flew [from the middle] towards the hataot is a hatat and the bird that flew towards the olot is a olah. If one [from each side] returns to the middle, then [all] those in the middle must be left to die, but those [left on either side] can be offered up as hataot or as olot respectively. If again a bird [from the middle] returned and flew away to the sides, then all must be left to die. One cannot pair turtle-doves with pigeons or pigeons with turtle-doves. How is this so? If a woman has brought a turtle-dove as her hatat and a pigeon as her olah, she must then bring another turtle-dove as her olah; If her olah had been a turtle-dove and her hatat a pigeon, then she must bring another pigeon as her olah. Ben Azzai says: we go after the first [offering]. If a woman brought her hatat and then died, her heirs must bring her olah; [But if she first brought] her olah and then died, her heirs need not bring her hatat.
If one [pair] belonged to one woman and two [pairs] to another, or [even] three [pairs] to another, or [ten] pairs to another or a hundred to another, and he offered all of them above, then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly], if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. [If he offered] half of them above and half below, then the [number of birds as there is in the] larger part are valid. This is the general principle: whenever you can divide the pairs [of birds] so that those belonging to one woman need not have part of them [offered] above and part [offered] below, then half of them are valid and half are invalid; But whenever you cannot divide the pairs [of birds] without some of those belonging to one woman being [offered] above and some below, then [the number as there is in] the larger part are valid.
If the hatats belonged to one and the olot to another, and the priest offered them all above, then half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered them all below, half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered half of them above and half below, then all of them are disqualified, because I can argue that the hatats were offered above and the olot below.
Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.
Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.
Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.
Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.
As regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of the larger but broken vessels] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold oil sufficient for the anointing of a little finger of a child [if their former capacity] was that of a log. If [their former capacity] was from one log to a se'ah [their present capacity] must be a quarter of a log. If it was from a se'ah to two se'ah it must be half a log. If from two se'ah to three se'ah or as much as five se'ah it must be a log, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: I do not prescribe any size for the unbroken vessels, rather: as regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of larger but broken ones] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold enough oil to anoint the little finger of a child. [This size is prescribed for pots] that are not bigger than the small cooking-pots. For small cooking-pots and for those between these and the jars from Lydda the prescribed capacity is a quarter of a log. For those which have a size between that of Lydda jars and Bethlehem jars the capacity must be that of half a log. For those between Bethlehem jars and large stone jars the capacity must be that of a log. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai says: [the prescribed capacity for the fragments] of large stone jars is two logs, and that for the bottoms of broken Galilean flasks and small jars is any whatsoever, but the fragments of their sides are not susceptible to impurity
As regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of the larger but broken vessels] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold oil sufficient for the anointing of a little finger of a child [if their former capacity] was that of a log. If [their former capacity] was from one log to a se'ah [their present capacity] must be a quarter of a log. If it was from a se'ah to two se'ah it must be half a log. If from two se'ah to three se'ah or as much as five se'ah it must be a log, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: I do not prescribe any size for the unbroken vessels, rather: as regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of larger but broken ones] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold enough oil to anoint the little finger of a child. [This size is prescribed for pots] that are not bigger than the small cooking-pots. For small cooking-pots and for those between these and the jars from Lydda the prescribed capacity is a quarter of a log. For those which have a size between that of Lydda jars and Bethlehem jars the capacity must be that of half a log. For those between Bethlehem jars and large stone jars the capacity must be that of a log. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai says: [the prescribed capacity for the fragments] of large stone jars is two logs, and that for the bottoms of broken Galilean flasks and small jars is any whatsoever, but the fragments of their sides are not susceptible to impurity
A jar that had a hole and was mended with pitch and then was broken again: If the fragment that was mended with the pitch can hold a quarter of a log it is unclean, since the designation of a vessel has never ceased to be applied to it. A potsherd that had a hole and was mended with pitch, it is clean though it can contain a quarter of a log, because the designation of a vessel has ceased to be applied to it.
A jar that had a hole and was mended with pitch and then was broken again: If the fragment that was mended with the pitch can hold a quarter of a log it is unclean, since the designation of a vessel has never ceased to be applied to it. A potsherd that had a hole and was mended with pitch, it is clean though it can contain a quarter of a log, because the designation of a vessel has ceased to be applied to it.
If a jar was cracked and cannot be moved with half a kav of dried figs in it, it is clean. If a damaged vessel (gistera) was cracked and it cannot hold any liquid, even though it can hold foodstuffs, it is clean, since remnants do not have remnants.
What is meant by a "damaged vessel" (gistera)? One whose handles were removed. If sharp ends projected from it: Any part of it which can contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while any impurity opposite an end conveys impurity to the vessel through its air-space, But any part of it which cannot contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while an impurity opposite an end does not convey impurity through its air-space. If it was leaning on its side like a kind of cathedra, Any part of it which can contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while any impurity opposite an end conveys impurity to the vessel through its air-space, But any part of it which cannot contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while an impurity opposite an end does not convey impurity to the vessel through its air-space. Bowls with Korfian [bottoms], and cups with Zidonian bottoms, although they cannot stand unsupported, are susceptible to impurity, because they were originally fashioned in this manner.
What is meant by a "damaged vessel" (gistera)? One whose handles were removed. If sharp ends projected from it: Any part of it which can contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while any impurity opposite an end conveys impurity to the vessel through its air-space, But any part of it which cannot contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while an impurity opposite an end does not convey impurity through its air-space. If it was leaning on its side like a kind of cathedra, Any part of it which can contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while any impurity opposite an end conveys impurity to the vessel through its air-space, But any part of it which cannot contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while an impurity opposite an end does not convey impurity to the vessel through its air-space. Bowls with Korfian [bottoms], and cups with Zidonian bottoms, although they cannot stand unsupported, are susceptible to impurity, because they were originally fashioned in this manner.
A baking oven originally must be no less than four handbreadths [high] and what is left of it four handbreadths, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: this applies only to a large oven but in the case of a small one it originally can be [any height] and what is left is the greater part of it. [Its susceptibility to impurity begins] as soon as its manufacture is completed. What is regarded as the completion of its manufacture? When it is heated to a degree that suffices for the baking of spongy cakes. Rabbi Judah says: when a new oven has been heated to a degree that sufficed for the baking of spongy cakes in an old one.
If he cut the oven up into rings, and then he put sand between each pair of rings, Rabbi Eliezer says: it is clean. But the sages say: it is unclean. This is the oven of Akhnai. As regards Arabian vats, which are holes dug in the ground and plastered with clay, if the plastering can stand of itself it is susceptible to impurity; Otherwise it is not susceptible. This is the oven of Ben Dinai.