case
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The Mishnah
If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.
If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.
If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.
One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.
If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!
If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!
If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it. It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah. If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah. If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; for it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal. If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices.
The blood which spurted out and that which is upon the knife must also be covered up. Rabbi Judah says: when is this the case? When there is no other blood but that; but when there is other blood besides this, it need not be covered up.
In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat. The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood. And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only.
A hide which had an olive’s bulk of [unclean] flesh clinging to it, one who touches a shred hanging from it, or a hair that was opposite to it, he becomes unclean. If there were two pieces of flesh attached to it, each the size of half an olive, they convey uncleanness by carrying but not by contact, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: neither by contact nor by carrying. Rabbi Akiva agrees that if there were two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive, that he stuck on a twig and he waved them, he becomes unclean. Why then does Rabbi Akiva declare him clean in the [case where they cling to the] hide? Because the hide renders them negligible.
The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go.
If one sets aside [a lamb] for the redemption of the first-birth of a donkey and it died: Rabbi Eliezer says: he is responsible as is the case with the five selas for the redemption of the first-born. But the sages say: he is not responsible, as is the case with the redemption of the second tithe. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption of the first-born of a donkey which died that the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. If the first-born of a donkey died [after the lamb for redemption had been set aside]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be buried, but the lamb may be used. But the sages say: it does not need to be buried and the lamb belongs to the priest.
If one sets aside [a lamb] for the redemption of the first-birth of a donkey and it died: Rabbi Eliezer says: he is responsible as is the case with the five selas for the redemption of the first-born. But the sages say: he is not responsible, as is the case with the redemption of the second tithe. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption of the first-born of a donkey which died that the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. If the first-born of a donkey died [after the lamb for redemption had been set aside]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be buried, but the lamb may be used. But the sages say: it does not need to be buried and the lamb belongs to the priest.
If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and it is not known whether it had given birth or had not given birth: Rabbi Ishmael says: that born of a goat in its first year certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first-born]. That born of a ewe two years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. That born of a cow or a donkey three years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. Rabbi Akiva to him: if an animal were exempted [from the law of the first born] only with the birth of [actual] offspring, it would be as you say. But they said: the sign of offspring in small cattle is a discharge [from the womb]. In large cattle, the after-birth; in a woman, the signs are the fetus and the after-birth. This is the general rule: Whenever it is known that it had given birth, the priest receives nothing. Whenever it had never given birth, it belongs to the priest. If there is a doubt, it shall be eaten blemished by the owners. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a large domestic animal has discharged a clot of blood, it [the clot] shall be buried, and it [the mother] is exempted from the law of the first born.
If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and it is not known whether it had given birth or had not given birth: Rabbi Ishmael says: that born of a goat in its first year certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first-born]. That born of a ewe two years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. That born of a cow or a donkey three years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. Rabbi Akiva to him: if an animal were exempted [from the law of the first born] only with the birth of [actual] offspring, it would be as you say. But they said: the sign of offspring in small cattle is a discharge [from the womb]. In large cattle, the after-birth; in a woman, the signs are the fetus and the after-birth. This is the general rule: Whenever it is known that it had given birth, the priest receives nothing. Whenever it had never given birth, it belongs to the priest. If there is a doubt, it shall be eaten blemished by the owners. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a large domestic animal has discharged a clot of blood, it [the clot] shall be buried, and it [the mother] is exempted from the law of the first born.
If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and it is not known whether it had given birth or had not given birth: Rabbi Ishmael says: that born of a goat in its first year certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first-born]. That born of a ewe two years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. That born of a cow or a donkey three years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. Rabbi Akiva to him: if an animal were exempted [from the law of the first born] only with the birth of [actual] offspring, it would be as you say. But they said: the sign of offspring in small cattle is a discharge [from the womb]. In large cattle, the after-birth; in a woman, the signs are the fetus and the after-birth. This is the general rule: Whenever it is known that it had given birth, the priest receives nothing. Whenever it had never given birth, it belongs to the priest. If there is a doubt, it shall be eaten blemished by the owners. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a large domestic animal has discharged a clot of blood, it [the clot] shall be buried, and it [the mother] is exempted from the law of the first born.
If [a portion of] the hair of a blemished first born fell out and he placed it in the window, and then he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel allows it. But the sages forbid it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not allow [only] in this case, but [even] in the case where the hair of a blemished first born which fell out and he placed it in the window, and the animal died subsequently, [even] in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel allows, but the sages forbid. If the wool of a first born is hanging loose, that part which appears [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is permitted, whereas that which does not appear [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is forbidden.
If [a portion of] the hair of a blemished first born fell out and he placed it in the window, and then he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel allows it. But the sages forbid it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not allow [only] in this case, but [even] in the case where the hair of a blemished first born which fell out and he placed it in the window, and the animal died subsequently, [even] in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel allows, but the sages forbid. If the wool of a first born is hanging loose, that part which appears [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is permitted, whereas that which does not appear [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is forbidden.
If [a portion of] the hair of a blemished first born fell out and he placed it in the window, and then he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel allows it. But the sages forbid it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not allow [only] in this case, but [even] in the case where the hair of a blemished first born which fell out and he placed it in the window, and the animal died subsequently, [even] in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel allows, but the sages forbid. If the wool of a first born is hanging loose, that part which appears [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is permitted, whereas that which does not appear [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is forbidden.
For how long is an Israelite bound to take care of a first born? In the case of small cattle, for thirty days, and large cattle, fifty days. Rabbi Yose says: in the case of small cattle, three months. If the priest says [to the Israelite] during this period “Give it to me,” he must not give it to him. But if the first born was blemished and the priest said to him “Give it to me so that I may eat it,” then it is allowed. And in Temple times, if [the first born] was in an unblemished state and the priest said to him “Give it to me, and I will offer it up it was allowed.” A first born is eaten year by year both in an unblemished as well as in a blemished state, for it is said: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20).
For how long is an Israelite bound to take care of a first born? In the case of small cattle, for thirty days, and large cattle, fifty days. Rabbi Yose says: in the case of small cattle, three months. If the priest says [to the Israelite] during this period “Give it to me,” he must not give it to him. But if the first born was blemished and the priest said to him “Give it to me so that I may eat it,” then it is allowed. And in Temple times, if [the first born] was in an unblemished state and the priest said to him “Give it to me, and I will offer it up it was allowed.” A first born is eaten year by year both in an unblemished as well as in a blemished state, for it is said: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20).
If one who is not an expert sees a first born and it was slaughtered by his instructions, in such a case it shall be buried and he shall make reparation from his own pocket. If a [non-expert] judge gave a judgment and declared innocent a person who was really liable or made liable a person who was really innocent, declared unclean a thing which was clean or declared clean a thing which was really unclean, his decision stands but he has to make reparation from his own pocket. If the judge was an expert [sanctioned by the] court, he is exempt from making reparation. It happened once that a cow's womb was removed and Rabbi Tarfon gave it [the cow] to the dogs to eat. The matter came before the sages at Yavneh and they permitted the animal. Todos the physician said: no cow or pig leaves Alexandria of Egypt before its womb is removed in order that it may not breed. Rabbi Tarfon said: “There goes your donkey, Tarfon.” Rabbi Akiva said to him: you are exempt, for you are an expert and whoever is an expert sanctioned by the court is exempt from reparation.
Bet Shammai says: An Israelite must not be invited to share [a blemished first born] with a priest. But Bet Hillel permits this, even in the case of a non-Jew. If a first born has a blood attack, even if it is going to die, its blood may not be let, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: he may let its blood, as long as he does not make a blemish. And if he made a blemish, he must not slaughter it on account of this. Rabbi Shimon says: he may let blood, even though he makes a blemish.
If the sheath [of the penis] is defective or the genitals of a female animal in the case of sacrificial offerings [it is defective.] If the tail is mutilated from the bone but not from the joint; or if the top end [root] of the tail is bared to the bone; or if there is flesh between one joint and another [in the tail] to the amount of a finger's breadth [the animal is defective].
The following are fit in the case of human beings, but unfit in the case of animals: A father with his son, A terefah; One born by means of a caesarean section. One with which a sin has been committed or has killed a person; A priest who contracts an illegal marriage is unfit [for the priesthood] until he vows not to derive any benefit from the woman. One who makes himself unclean through contact with the dead is unfit, until he undertakes that he will no longer make himself unclean through the dead.
The following are fit in the case of human beings, but unfit in the case of animals: A father with his son, A terefah; One born by means of a caesarean section. One with which a sin has been committed or has killed a person; A priest who contracts an illegal marriage is unfit [for the priesthood] until he vows not to derive any benefit from the woman. One who makes himself unclean through contact with the dead is unfit, until he undertakes that he will no longer make himself unclean through the dead.
If two women who had never before given birth married two men and gave birth to two males, the one father gives five selas to the priest and the other gives five selas to the priest. If one of the children died within thirty days [of its birth], if they gave the redemption money to one priest alone, he returns five selas to them, but if they gave the money to two priests, they are not able to recover it from them. If they gave birth to a male and a female, the fathers are exempt, whereas the son must redeem himself [as in any case he is a first-born]. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two females and two males, the priest receives nothing.
With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them. With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge. With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge. And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree. The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.
If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” (ibid) the man in possession of the field. One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things.
All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.
All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.
If one set aside money for his hatat, and it was lost and he set aside other money in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to buy a hatat with it until the [first] money was found, he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest of the money is used for a freewill-offering. If one set aside money for his hatat and it was lost and he set aside a hatat in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to offer it until the money was found, and the hatat was blemished, it is sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest is used as a freewill-offering. If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside money in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to buy a hatat until his hatat was found and it was blemished, it is sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest is used for a freewill-offering. If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside another hatat in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to offer it until the first hatat was found and both were blemished, they are to be sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums] and the rest is used for a freewill-offering. If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place, if he did not have the opportunity of offering it until the first hatat was found and both animals were unblemished, one of them is offered as a hatat and the second must be left to die, the words of Rabbi. The sages say: the only hatat which is left to die is a case where it is found after the owners obtained atonement, and the money does not go to the Dead Sea except where found after the owners have obtained atonement.
[If one says:] “Behold this [animal] is tahat [instead of] this,” [or] “Behold this is temurat [a substitute] this,” [or] “Behold this is halufat [in place of] this,” [each of these] is a substitute. [If however one says:] “This shall be redeemed for this,” it is not the case of a [valid] substitute. And if the dedicated animal was blemished, it becomes hullin and he is required to make up [the hullin] to the value [of the dedicated animal].
If he gave her [a prostitute] money, it is permitted [for use for the altar.] [But if he gave her] wine, oil, flour and anything similar which is offered on the altar, it is forbidden for the altar. If he gave her dedicated [animals] they are permitted [for the altar]. If he gave her birds [of hullin] they are disqualified. For one might have reasoned [as follows]: if in the case of dedicated animals, where a blemish disqualifies them, [the law] of [the prostitute’s] fee and price [of a dog] does not apply to them, in the case of birds, where a blemish does not disqualify, is it not all the more reason that the law of [the prostitute’s] fee and the price [of a dog] should not apply? Scripture says, “For any vow,” (Deuteronomy 23:19) this includes a bird.
If he gave her [a prostitute] money, it is permitted [for use for the altar.] [But if he gave her] wine, oil, flour and anything similar which is offered on the altar, it is forbidden for the altar. If he gave her dedicated [animals] they are permitted [for the altar]. If he gave her birds [of hullin] they are disqualified. For one might have reasoned [as follows]: if in the case of dedicated animals, where a blemish disqualifies them, [the law] of [the prostitute’s] fee and price [of a dog] does not apply to them, in the case of birds, where a blemish does not disqualify, is it not all the more reason that the law of [the prostitute’s] fee and the price [of a dog] should not apply? Scripture says, “For any vow,” (Deuteronomy 23:19) this includes a bird.
There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the altar which do not apply to dedications for repairs of the Temple, and there are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which do not apply to dedications for the altar. Dedications for the altar effect a substitute; They are subject to the laws of piggul, remnant and ritual uncleanness; Their offspring and milk are forbidden [even] after their redemption; If one kills them outside [the Temple] he is guilty; And wages are not paid from them to artisans, Which is not the case with dedications for temple repairs.
For these [transgressions] one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and if committed unwittingly to a hatat. If there is a doubt whether he had committed the transgression to an asham talui, except in the case of one who defiled the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case one is liable in this case to a sliding-scale sacrifice, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: also the blasphemer [is an exception], as it says: “You shall have one law for one that acts in error” (Numbers 15:29), this excludes the blasphemer who performs no action.
For these [transgressions] one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and if committed unwittingly to a hatat. If there is a doubt whether he had committed the transgression to an asham talui, except in the case of one who defiled the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case one is liable in this case to a sliding-scale sacrifice, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: also the blasphemer [is an exception], as it says: “You shall have one law for one that acts in error” (Numbers 15:29), this excludes the blasphemer who performs no action.
For these [transgressions] one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and if committed unwittingly to a hatat. If there is a doubt whether he had committed the transgression to an asham talui, except in the case of one who defiled the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case one is liable in this case to a sliding-scale sacrifice, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: also the blasphemer [is an exception], as it says: “You shall have one law for one that acts in error” (Numbers 15:29), this excludes the blasphemer who performs no action.
The following do not bring a sacrifice: A woman who discharges a sac filled with water or with blood or with pieces of flesh; Or if the miscarriage was in the shape of fish, locust, unclean animals or reptiles; Or if the miscarriage took place on the fortieth day [after the conception], Or if it was extracted by means of a caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon declares her liable [to an offering] in the case of a caesarean section.
If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable. Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings? Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering? Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering. Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings? As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering.
If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable. Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings? Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering? Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering. Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings? As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
In the case of all forbidden relations, if one partner was an adult and the other a minor, the minor is exempt; If one is awake and the other asleep, the one asleep is exempt; If one is an inadvertent and the other intentional, the former is liable to a hatat, the latter to karet.
Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal vehomer).
Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute regarding transgression of the same name, that in that case he is liable. About what did they dispute? About transgressions of different names: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat, And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah said: even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or grapes and he picked figs, white [grapes] and he picked black ones, or black and he picked white ones Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat. And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah said: I wonder whether Rabbi Joshua indeed declared him exempt in such a case. For then why is it written, “with which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23)? To exclude mindless action.
Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute regarding transgression of the same name, that in that case he is liable. About what did they dispute? About transgressions of different names: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat, And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah said: even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or grapes and he picked figs, white [grapes] and he picked black ones, or black and he picked white ones Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat. And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah said: I wonder whether Rabbi Joshua indeed declared him exempt in such a case. For then why is it written, “with which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23)? To exclude mindless action.
Rabbi Akiva declares one liable to an asham talui for sacrilege; But the sages declare him exempt. Rabbi Akiba admits that he does not bring his restitution money until he becomes aware [of his trespass], when he must bring with it a certain asham. Rabbi Tarfon: Why should he bring two ashams? Rather, let him set aside the principal with an added fifth, and bring an asham the value of two sela's and stipulate: “If I did commit sacrilege, here is my restitution and this my asham; and if the sacrilege was doubtful, let the money be a freewill gift and the [offering an] asham talui;” since the same type of sacrifice he brings for a case where he doesn’t know, he brings for one where he does know.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt.
If a woman is liable to a bird hatat brought in a case of doubt and Yom Kippur intervenes, she is still bound to offer it after Yom Kippur, because it renders her fit to eat sacrifices. If a hatat of a bird was brought for a matter of doubt and, after the pinching of its neck it became known [that there was no need for it], it must be buried.
One who deposited money with a moneychanger: if it was tied up, he may not use it; and therefore if he did spend it he is guilty of sacrilege. If it was loose he may use it and therefore if he spent it he is not guilty of sacrilege. If [the money was deposited] with a private person, he may not use it in neither case, and therefore if he did spent it he is guilty of sacrilege. A shopkeeper has the status of a private person, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: he is like a money-changer.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
What is meant by one "name"? For a birth and a birth, or for zivah and zivah, that is one name. And "two names"? For a birth, [and the other] for a zivah. What is meant by "two women"? [When] one [woman] brings [her offering] for a birth and the other for a birth, or [when one brings] for a zivah and the other for a zivah this is "of one name". And a case "of two names"? When one brings for a birth and the other for a zivah. Rabbi Yose says: when two women purchased their kinnim in partnership, or gave the price of their kinnim to the priest [for him to purchase them], then the priest can offer whichever one he wants as a hatat or as an olah, whether they are of one name or of two names.
When are these words said? When the priest asks advice. But in the case of a priest who does not seek advice, and one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and one to another, or two [pairs] to one and two to another, or three [pairs] to one and three to another, and he offered all of them above [the red line], then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly], if [he offered] all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If [he offered] half of them above and half of them below, then of those [offered] above, half are valid and half are invalid, and also of those [offered] below, half are valid and half are invalid.
A jar: the size of the hole must be such that a dried fig [will fall through], the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Judah said: walnuts. Rabbi Meir said: olives. A stew-pot or a cooking pot: such that olives [will fall through]. A bucket and a pitcher: such that oil [will fall through]. A tzartzur: such that water [will fall through]. Rabbi Shimon says: in the case of all three, [the hole] must be such that seedlings [will fall through]. A lamp: the size of the hole must be such that oil [will fall through]. Rabbi Eliezer says: such that a small perutah [will fall through]. A lamp whose nozzle has been removed is clean. And one made of earth whose nozzle has been burned by the wick is also clean.
A baking oven originally must be no less than four handbreadths [high] and what is left of it four handbreadths, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: this applies only to a large oven but in the case of a small one it originally can be [any height] and what is left is the greater part of it. [Its susceptibility to impurity begins] as soon as its manufacture is completed. What is regarded as the completion of its manufacture? When it is heated to a degree that suffices for the baking of spongy cakes. Rabbi Judah says: when a new oven has been heated to a degree that sufficed for the baking of spongy cakes in an old one.
An oven that was heated from its outside, or one that was heated without the owner's knowledge, or one that was heated while still in the craftsman's house is susceptible to impurity. It once happened that a fire broke out among the ovens of Kefar Signah, and when the case was brought up at Yavneh Rabban Gamaliel ruled that they were unclean.
An oven which they partitioned with boards or hangings, and in it was found a sheretz in one compartment, the entire oven is unclean. A hive which was broken and its gap was stopped up with straw and was suspended within the air-space of an oven while a sheretz was within it, the oven becomes unclean. If a sheretz was within the oven, any food within the hive becomes unclean. But Rabbi Eliezer says that it is clean. Rabbi Eliezer said: if it affords protection in the case of a corpse which is more consequential, should it not afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is less consequential? They said to him: if it affords protection in the case of corpse impurity, this is because tents are divided, should it also afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is not divided?
An oven which they partitioned with boards or hangings, and in it was found a sheretz in one compartment, the entire oven is unclean. A hive which was broken and its gap was stopped up with straw and was suspended within the air-space of an oven while a sheretz was within it, the oven becomes unclean. If a sheretz was within the oven, any food within the hive becomes unclean. But Rabbi Eliezer says that it is clean. Rabbi Eliezer said: if it affords protection in the case of a corpse which is more consequential, should it not afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is less consequential? They said to him: if it affords protection in the case of corpse impurity, this is because tents are divided, should it also afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is not divided?
An oven which they partitioned with boards or hangings, and in it was found a sheretz in one compartment, the entire oven is unclean. A hive which was broken and its gap was stopped up with straw and was suspended within the air-space of an oven while a sheretz was within it, the oven becomes unclean. If a sheretz was within the oven, any food within the hive becomes unclean. But Rabbi Eliezer says that it is clean. Rabbi Eliezer said: if it affords protection in the case of a corpse which is more consequential, should it not afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is less consequential? They said to him: if it affords protection in the case of corpse impurity, this is because tents are divided, should it also afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is not divided?
An oven which they partitioned with boards or hangings, and in it was found a sheretz in one compartment, the entire oven is unclean. A hive which was broken and its gap was stopped up with straw and was suspended within the air-space of an oven while a sheretz was within it, the oven becomes unclean. If a sheretz was within the oven, any food within the hive becomes unclean. But Rabbi Eliezer says that it is clean. Rabbi Eliezer said: if it affords protection in the case of a corpse which is more consequential, should it not afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is less consequential? They said to him: if it affords protection in the case of corpse impurity, this is because tents are divided, should it also afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is not divided?
If the hive was complete, and so too in the case of a basket or a skin-bottle, and a sheretz was within it the oven remains clean. If the sheretz was in the oven, any food in the hive remain clean. If a hole was made in it: A vessel that is used for food must have a hole large enough for olives to fall through, If it is used for liquids the hole must be large enough for liquids to pass into it, And if it is used for either it is subjected to the greater restriction: the hole need only be large enough for liquids to pass into it.
A metal spindle-knob: Rabbi Akiva says it is susceptible to impurity But the sages say it is not susceptible. If it was only plated [with metal] it is clean. A spindle, a distaff, a rod, a double flute and a pipe are susceptible to impurity if they are of metal, but if they are only plated [with metal] they are clean. If a double flute has a receptacle for the wings it is susceptible to impurity in either case.
The beam of a wool-combers’ balance is susceptible to impurity on account of the hooks. And that of a householder, if it has hooks is also susceptible to impurity. The hooks of porters are clean but those of peddlers are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Judah says: in the case of the peddlers' [hooks], [the hook] that is in front is susceptible to impurity but that which is behind is clean. The hook of a couch is susceptible to impurity but that of bed poles is clean. [The hook of] a chest is susceptible to impurity but that of a fish trap is clean. That of a table is susceptible to impurity but that of a wooden candlestick is clean. This is the general rule: any hook that is attached to a susceptible vessel is susceptible to impurity, but one that is attached to a vessel that is not susceptible to impurity is clean. All these, however, are by themselves clean.
There are four things which Rabban Gamaliel says are susceptible to impurity, and the sages say are not susceptible to impurity. The covering of a metal basket, if it belongs to householders; And the hanger of a strigil; And metal vessels which are still unshaped; And a plate that is divided into two [equal] parts. And the sages agree with Rabban Gamaliel in the case of a plate that was divided into two parts, one large and one small, that the large one is susceptible to impurity and the small one is not susceptible to impurity.
A needle whose eye or point is missing is clean. If he adapted it to be a stretching-pin it is susceptible to impurity. A pack-needle whose eye was missing is still susceptible to impurity since one writes with it. If its point was missing it is clean. A stretching-pin is in either case susceptible to impurity. A needle that has become rusty: If this hinders it from sewing it is clean, But if not it remains susceptible to impurity. A hook that was straightened out is clean. If it is bent back it resumes its susceptibility to impurity.
A staff to the end of which he attached a nail like an axe is susceptible to impurity. If the staff was studded with nails it is susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Shimon ruled: only if he put in three rows. In all cases where he put them in as ornamentation the staff is clean. If he attached a tube to its end, and so also in the case of a door, it is clean. If it was once an independent vessel and then it was fixed to the staff, it remains susceptible to impurity. When does it become pure? Bet Shammai says: when it is damaged; And Bet Hillel says: when it is joined on.
The dung bag of a bull and its muzzle, a bee shelf, and a fan are clean. The cover of a small box is susceptible to uncleanness; The cover of a clothes chest is clean. The cover of a box, the cover of a basket, a carpenter's vice, a cushion under a box or its arched cover, a reading-desk for a book, a bolt-socket, a lock-socket, a mezuzah case, a lyre case, a violin case, the block of the turban-makers, a wooden musical toy horse, the clappers of a wailing woman, a poor man's parasol, bed posts, a tefillin mould, and the mould of string makers all these are clean. This is the general rule which Rabbi Yose stated: all objects that serve as a protection to objects that a man uses, both when the latter are in use and when they are not in use, are susceptible to uncleanness; but those that serve them as a protection only when the latter are in use are clean.
The dung bag of a bull and its muzzle, a bee shelf, and a fan are clean. The cover of a small box is susceptible to uncleanness; The cover of a clothes chest is clean. The cover of a box, the cover of a basket, a carpenter's vice, a cushion under a box or its arched cover, a reading-desk for a book, a bolt-socket, a lock-socket, a mezuzah case, a lyre case, a violin case, the block of the turban-makers, a wooden musical toy horse, the clappers of a wailing woman, a poor man's parasol, bed posts, a tefillin mould, and the mould of string makers all these are clean. This is the general rule which Rabbi Yose stated: all objects that serve as a protection to objects that a man uses, both when the latter are in use and when they are not in use, are susceptible to uncleanness; but those that serve them as a protection only when the latter are in use are clean.
The dung bag of a bull and its muzzle, a bee shelf, and a fan are clean. The cover of a small box is susceptible to uncleanness; The cover of a clothes chest is clean. The cover of a box, the cover of a basket, a carpenter's vice, a cushion under a box or its arched cover, a reading-desk for a book, a bolt-socket, a lock-socket, a mezuzah case, a lyre case, a violin case, the block of the turban-makers, a wooden musical toy horse, the clappers of a wailing woman, a poor man's parasol, bed posts, a tefillin mould, and the mould of string makers all these are clean. This is the general rule which Rabbi Yose stated: all objects that serve as a protection to objects that a man uses, both when the latter are in use and when they are not in use, are susceptible to uncleanness; but those that serve them as a protection only when the latter are in use are clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.
The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.