concede
60 occurrences across the corpus
The Writings of Origen
As, then, after those first discussions which, according to the requirements of the case, we held at the beginning regarding the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it seemed right that we should retrace our steps, and show that the same God was the creator and founder of the world, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, i.e. that the God of the law and of the prophets and of the gospel was one and the same; and that, in the next place, it ought to be shown, with respect to Christ, in what manner He who had formerly been demonstrated to be the Word and Wisdom of God became man; it remains that we now return with all possible brevity to the subject of the Holy Spirit. It is time, then, that we say a few words to the best of our ability regarding the Holy Spirit, whom our Lord and Saviour in the Gospel according to John has named the Paraclete. For as it is the same God Himself, and the same Christ, so also is it the same Holy Spirit who was in the prophets and apostles, i.e. either in those who believed in God before the advent of Christ, or in those who by means of Christ have sought refuge in God. We have heard, indeed, that certain heretics have dared to say that there are two Gods and two Christs, but we have never known of the doctrine of two Holy Spirits being preached by any one. For how could they maintain this out of Scripture, or what distinction could they lay down between Holy Spirit and Holy Spirit, if indeed any definition or description of Holy Spirit can be discovered? For although we should concede to Marcion or to Valentinus that it is possible to draw distinctions in the question of Deity, and to describe the nature of the good God as one, and that of the just God as another, what will he devise, or what will he discover, to enable him to introduce a distinction in the Holy Spirit? I consider, then, that they are able to discover nothing which may indicate a distinction of any kind whatever.
Others, then, may concede to Celsus that God does not undergo a change, but leads the spectators to imagine that He does; whereas we who are persuaded that the advent of Jesus among men was no mere appearance, but a real manifestation, are not affected by this charge of Celsus. We nevertheless will attempt a reply, because you assert, Celsus, do you not, that it is sometimes allowable to employ deceit and falsehood by way, as it were, of medicine? Where, then, is the absurdity, if such a saving result were to be accomplished, that some such events should have taken place? For certain words, when savouring of falsehood, produce upon such characters a corrective effect (like the similar declarations of physicians to their patients), rather than when spoken in the spirit of truth. This, however, must be our defence against other opponents. For there is no absurdity in Him who healed sick friends, healing the dear human race by means of such remedies as He would not employ preferentially, but only according to circumstances. The human race, moreover, when in a state of mental alienation, had to be cured by methods which the Word saw would aid in bringing back those so afflicted to a sound state of mind. But Celsus says also, that “one acts thus towards enemies when taking measures to escape danger. But God does not fear any one, so as to escape danger by leading into error those who conspire against him.” Now it is altogether unnecessary and absurd to answer a charge which is advanced by no one against our Saviour. And we have already replied, when answering other charges, to the statement that “no one who is either in a state of sickness or mental alienation is a friend of God.” For the answer is, that such arrangements have been made, not for the sake of those who, being already friends, afterwards fell sick or became afflicted with mental disease, but in order that those who were still enemies through sickness of the soul, and alienation of the natural reason, might become the friends of God. For it is distinctly stated that Jesus endured all things on behalf of sinners, that He might free them from sin, and convert them to righteousness.
After the above remarks he proceeds as follows: “Let no one suppose that I am ignorant that some of them will concede that their God is the same as that of the Jews, while others will maintain that he is a different one, to whom the latter is in opposition, and that it was from the former that the Son came.” Now, if he imagine that the existence of numerous heresies among the Christians is a ground of accusation against Christianity, why, in a similar way, should it not be a ground of accusation against philosophy, that the various sects of philosophers differ from each other, not on small and indifferent points, but upon those of the highest importance? Nay, medicine also ought to be a subject of attack, on account of its many conflicting schools. Let it be admitted, then, that there are amongst us some who deny that our God is the same as that of the Jews: nevertheless, on that account those are not to be blamed who prove from the same Scriptures that one and the same Deity is the God of the Jews and of the Gentiles alike, as Paul, too, distinctly says, who was a convert from Judaism to Christianity, “I thank my God, whom I serve from my forefathers with a pure conscience.” And let it be admitted also, that there is a third class who call certain persons “carnal,” and others “spiritual” (I think he here means the followers of Valentinus): yet what does this avail against us, who belong to the church, and who make it an accusation against such as hold that certain natures are saved, and that others perish in consequence of their natural constitution? And let it be admitted further, that there are some who give themselves out as Gnostics, in the same way as those Epicureans who call themselves philosophers: yet neither will they who annihilate the doctrine of providence be deemed true philosophers, nor those true Christians who introduce monstrous inventions, which are disapproved of by those who are the disciples of Jesus. Let it be admitted, moreover, that there are some who accept Jesus, and who boast on that account of being Christians, and yet would regulate their lives, like the Jewish multitude, in accordance with the Jewish law,—and these are the twofold sect of Ebionites, who either acknowledge with us that Jesus was born of a virgin, or deny this, and maintain that He was begotten like other human beings,—what does that avail by way of charge against such as belong to the church, and whom Celsus has styled “those of the multitude?” He adds, also, that certain of the Christians are believers in the Sibyl, having probably misunderstood some who blamed such as believed in the existence of a prophetic Sibyl, and termed those who held this belief Sibyllists.
The Jerusalem Talmud
The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: So did Rebbi Jehudah disprove Rebbi Meїr[’s argument]: Do you not concede to me that one who gives to his son is free? What is the difference between gathering and giving to his son or gathering and giving to another person? Rebbi Yudan asked: What did you see to say ‘if he gathers and delivers,’ can we not say ‘if he gathers and eats’? Rebbi Mana said, there cannot be “if he gathers and eats”, only “if he gathers and delivers,” because of that rose garden. Can you say the rose garden [is a case of] gathering and eating? No, gathering and delivering! There also, he gathers and delivers because he would say to him, if you enter you will damage its roses! A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Mana’s argument: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the orchard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.’ ”
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.
HALAKHAH: Rav and Samuel: one says, like the feet of the depositor. The other one says, they are like the feet of him they are deposited with. The Mishnah disagrees with him who says, they are like the feet of him they are deposited with. As we have stated, “If somebody had produce in another village and the people of that village made an eruv to come to him, they should not bring him his produce” If you would say, they are like the feet of him they are deposited with, they should bring him his produce. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if the key was in the hands of the owner, or that he did not concede his powers to them before the start of the holiday. And what says this? “If he invited guests they may not carry away their parts unless through another person he gave them the right to their parts on the eve of the holiday”. Are they not like the feet of him they are deposited with from the moment that he gave them the rights to their parts.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who went overseas with her husband,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Meïr agrees in the first case. It was found stated: That is also in dispute. What is the difference between the second and the first cases? In the first case, did they not consider her word as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
The Roman Missal
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that we who are depressed by our old servitude under the yoke of sin, may be delivered by the new birth of thy only-begotten Son, which we expect. Who lives, &c.
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that the new birth of thy only-begotten Son in the flesh may deliver us, whom the old servitude keeps down under the yoke of sin. Through, &c.
[Then follows a Commemoration of the Nativity, by the Prayer of the Third Mass: Concede, page 66.]
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that the new birth of thy only-begotten Son in the flesh may deliver us, whom the old servitude keeps down under the yoke of sin. Through, &c.
Prayer. Concede nobis. Grant us, O Lord, to begin the defence of our Christian warfare with holy fasts; that, being about to fight against the spirits of wickedness, we may be defended by the help of self-denial. Through our Lord, &c. R. Amen.
Prayer. Concede. Grant we beseech thee, O Almighty God, that we who seek the favour of thy protection, being delivered from all evils, may serve thee with secure minds. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, O Almighty God, that we who are afflicted for our deeds as we deserve, may be relieved by the comfort of thy grace. Through our Lord, &c.
Postcommunion. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that the receiving of the paschal sacrament may ever remain in our minds. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, O Almighty God, that we who have kept with veneration the paschal solemnities, may by them deserve to arrive at eternal joys. Through our Lord, &c.
[Of the Blessed Virgin. Concede. As in the Votive Mass of the B. V. Mary from Easter to Pentecost, page LXXI.]
[Second Prayer of the Rogations, Præsta, page 386. Third, of the B. V. Mary, Concede, page LXXI.]
Prayer. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that we who believe that the only-begotten Son, our Redeemer, ascended this day into heaven, may ourselves also in mind dwell in heavenly things. Through the same, &c.
[Commemoration of the Ascension, Concede, as above.]
[When this Mass is repeated during the Octave, the Second Prayer is of the B. Virgin, Concede nos; as page LXXIII: and the Third, Ecclesiæ tuæ, or Deus omnium, as page 39.]
Postcom. Concede. Grant us, we beseech thee, O Lord, by this sacrament which we have received, that whatever is vitiated in our souls may be restored by the gift of its efficacy. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede nos. Grant to us thy servants, we beseech thee, O Lord God, to enjoy perpetual health of mind and body, and by the glorious intercession of blessed Mary ever virgin, to be delivered from present sorrow, and to enjoy eternal gladness. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede nos. Grant to us thy servants, we beseech thee, O Lord God, to enjoy perpetual health of mind and body, and by the glorious intercession of blessed Mary, ever virgin, to be delivered from present sorrow, and to enjoy eternal gladness. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede nos. Grant to us thy servants, we beseech thee, O Lord God, to enjoy perpetual health of mind and body, and by the glorious intercession of blessed Mary, ever virgin, to be delivered from present sorrow, and to enjoy eternal gladness. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant, we beseech thee, O Almighty God, that the intercession of holy Mary, mother of God, of all the holy apostles, martyrs, confessors, and virgins, and of all thy elect, may ever cause us to rejoice; that while we celebrate their memory, we may experience their patronage. Through the same Lord Jesus Christ, &c.
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant, we beseech thee, O Almighty God, that the examples of thy saints may animate us to a better life, that we may imitate the actions of those whose solemnities we celebrate.
Prayer. Concede nos. Grant us, we beseech thee, O Almighty God, to follow the admonitions and examples of Blessed Peter thy Confessor and Bishop; that by the contempt of terrestrial things we may obtain eternal joys. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede nobis. Grant us, O Almighty God, that the pious intercession of blessed David, thy confessor and bishop, may protect us, and whilst we celebrate his solemn festival, may we imitate his firmness in defending the Catholic faith. Through our Lord, &c.
[Within the Octave, and on the Octave Day of St John, the Mass is said as above; but, except on the Octave Day, the second Prayer is of the B. Virgin, Concede, page lxxiii, the third either for the Church or for the Pope, as above, page 39.]
[Second Prayer of the B. Virgin, Concede nos, page LXXIII. Third, Ecclesiæ tuæ, or Deus omnium, page 39.]
Postcom. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that we who are oppressed by the weight of our sins, may be relieved by the intercession of blessed Dominic, thy confessor. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede nos. Grant to us thy servants, we beseech thee, O Lord God, to enjoy perpetual health of mind and body, and by the glorious intercession of blessed Mary, ever virgin, to be delivered from present sorrow, and to enjoy eternal gladness. Through our Lord, &c.
[Third Prayer, Concede, as at page 664.]
[Third Prayer Concede, as at page 664.]
Postcom. Concede. Grant, O merciful God, support to our weakness; that we who anticipate the festival of the holy mother of God, may by the help of our intercession rise up from our iniquities. Through the same Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant to thy Church, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that she may possess blessed Stephen, thy confessor, as a glorious defender in heaven, whom she had a promoter while he reigned upon earth. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that thy faithful, who rejoice under the name and protection of the most holy virgin Mary, may by her pious intercession, be delivered from all evils on earth, and deserve to arrive at eternal joys in heaven. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Concede. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that as we anticipate the glorious festival of thy apostles Simon and Jude, they may come before thy majesty in our behalf, to procure thy benefits. Through our Lord, &c.
[Second prayer of the B. V. Mary, Concede, as page LXXI. and Third for the Church, or for the Pope, as at page 39.]
Prayer. Concede quæsumus. Grant, we beseech thee, Almighty God, that we, who, glorying in the most sacred heart of thy Son, commemorate the chief benefits of his charity towards us, may equally rejoice in their acts and fruits. Through the same, &c.
[Second Prayer. Concede nos, p. lxxi.]