does
8640 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: One writes with anything, with ink, with vermilion, with gum, and with copper sulfate, and anything that leaves a record. One does not write with drinks, or fruit juice, or anything not permanent. One writes on anything, on a leaf of the olive tree, on a cow’s horn if one delivers the cow to her, on a slave’s hand if one delivers the slave to her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, one does not write on anything living nor on food.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed, and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such, he cannot send it by somebody else since he does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.
This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick, he assembles a court to send it and declares before them: “it was written and signed before me.” The later messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says: “I am an agent of the court.
HALAKHAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, this is only necessary if he already has arrived in the Land of Israel. Lest you say, since he arrived in the Land of Israel it should be treated as a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel, and for bills of divorce from the Land of Israel one does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me.”
If the messenger fell sick. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a case came before the son of Rebbi Abba and he sent to ask Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa and Rebbi Immi. They instructed him that the first messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says, “I am an agent of the court.”
Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’”
Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’”
Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’”
MISHNAH: If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account, he can proceed on the assumption that they are alive and does not worry whether the Cohen or Levite died or the poor person became rich. If they died, he has to receive permission from the heirs; if the loan was executed in court he does not need permission.
MISHNAH: If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account, he can proceed on the assumption that they are alive and does not worry whether the Cohen or Levite died or the poor person became rich. If they died, he has to receive permission from the heirs; if the loan was executed in court he does not need permission.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
There is no “he does not worry,” since he has to worry lest the poor became rich. It was stated so: “If somebody lends money to a poor and rich person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost.”
There is no “he does not worry,” since he has to worry lest the poor became rich. It was stated so: “If somebody lends money to a poor and rich person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost.”
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.
Does this not disagree with Rav? Since Rav said, an heir is like a holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan given before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. He explains it for a documented loan. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan given before witnesses can be collected from heirs, on condition that they inherited real estate. As those from the house of Rav Neḥemiah, who lent money to the public. The case came before the rabbis who said, the public is neither all rich nor all poor.
There, we have stated: “If someone buys wine from Samaritans.” It was stated: “Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon prohibit to do so, for the wine bag might spring a leak and it may turn out retroactively that he drank ṭevel.” Does the Mishnah here not follow Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there it was not in order from the start. But here it is not in order from now to the future.
Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.
Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.
HALAKHAH: “In earlier times, he could go to court,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said that nobody can annul an agency by speech. Explain it in a fully constituted court.
Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.
MISHNAH: If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed, if it was as a slave he shall serve, if as a free person he shall not serve; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve. A slave whom his master gave as mortgage to others and then freed in strict law does not owe anything, but for the public good one forces the master to formally manumit him and he writes a bond for his own value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the one who manumits writes.
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a slave fled from the kidnappers to his master, the master may not enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody declares his slave as ownerless he can neither enslave him nor write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, everybody says that he needs one; do you say that he does not need? Would he hinder him from eating the Passah [sacrifice]? As it was stated: “The slave of any man, acquisition of his money, if you circumcise him.” Anytime he serves his master, he prevents his master from eating the Passah; if he does not serve his master, he does not prevent his master from eating the Passah.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a slave fled from the kidnappers to his master, the master may not enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody declares his slave as ownerless he can neither enslave him nor write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, everybody says that he needs one; do you say that he does not need? Would he hinder him from eating the Passah [sacrifice]? As it was stated: “The slave of any man, acquisition of his money, if you circumcise him.” Anytime he serves his master, he prevents his master from eating the Passah; if he does not serve his master, he does not prevent his master from eating the Passah.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a slave fled from the kidnappers to his master, the master may not enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody declares his slave as ownerless he can neither enslave him nor write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, everybody says that he needs one; do you say that he does not need? Would he hinder him from eating the Passah [sacrifice]? As it was stated: “The slave of any man, acquisition of his money, if you circumcise him.” Anytime he serves his master, he prevents his master from eating the Passah; if he does not serve his master, he does not prevent his master from eating the Passah.
If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.
If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.
MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.
MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.
MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
“One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims.” That they should not be put in chains. “One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good.”
“One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims.” That they should not be put in chains. “One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good.”
MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
MISHNAH: If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles, one does not buy him back, but one buys his children back after their father’s death. If somebody sold his field to a Gentile and then a Jew bought it back from him, the buyer brings first fruits because of the public good.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sold himself repeatedly. But if he sold himself once, one buys him back, but if he sold himself to the games, one does not buy him back. There was a case of one who sold himself to the games; the case came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said, what can we do? He did it for his livelihood.
If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.
If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.
” ‘For creditors, average quality,’ because of tricksters. That a man should not see a desirable field in his neighbor’s hand, lend him money, and contrives to take it from him. Then one should estimate only from the least quality! Rebbi Jehudah said, that is correct; but not to lock the door before people needing to borrow. For tomorrow he may need to borrow and does not find [a lender.]”
MISHNAH: One does not collect from encumbered property as long as there is free property, even if the latter is of lowest quality. One may collect from orphans’ property only from the lowest quality.
HALAKHAH: “One does not collect from encumbered property,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, because they have no fixed amount.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, and he did not have time to write the foreclosure document before he died: whose is it? Rav Huna and Ḥiyya the son of Rav: One said, if he wrote the foreclosure document, it is Reuben’s, if not, it is Levi’s. The other one said, whether he wrote or did not write, it belongs to Levi. Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable that it does not belong to Reuben since he can say to him, I sold you something which was not mine. Rebbi Yose said, it is not reasonable that it should not be Levi’s, since Reuben can tell him, is this not before you? You are good to confirm the sale.
Can one collect dowry from encumbered property? Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained.
Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.
Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.
There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.
HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?
Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?
Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?
A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for usually he is not checked out. If he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for usually he was checked out. Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around; a guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for he is like one who is paid; if he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for for he can say to him, I am doing this as a favor to you. It turns out that Rebbi Joḥanan follows the rabbis and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina Abba Shaul. Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow the rabbis? Even if he holds with Abba Shaul, a person acts as a trustee in order to be declared trustworthy. Does Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina [follow] Abba Shaul? Even if he holds with the rabbis, a person is apt to slip away from an oath but not from payments.
A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for usually he is not checked out. If he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for usually he was checked out. Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around; a guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for he is like one who is paid; if he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for for he can say to him, I am doing this as a favor to you. It turns out that Rebbi Joḥanan follows the rabbis and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina Abba Shaul. Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow the rabbis? Even if he holds with Abba Shaul, a person acts as a trustee in order to be declared trustworthy. Does Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina [follow] Abba Shaul? Even if he holds with the rabbis, a person is apt to slip away from an oath but not from payments.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, why did they say “an Israel underage girl eats heave,” that all should be eager to marry her for her attractiveness. Rebbi Shammai said, only if she knows how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.” Rebbi Ḥananiah said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, for her attractiveness, that means, even if she does not know how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage.
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
Ulla bar Ismael: By law, it should not atone even if it was [not] known in public. Why did they say that it atones? Not to let the altar be deserted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, by law, it should atone even if it was known in public. Why did they say that it does not atone? Not to let the altar accept robberies. How many are “public”? Rebbi Gorion in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Three people. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You brought robbed goods with the lame and the sick.” Since lame and sick are obvious, so everything must be obvious.
HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah. When was this said? About war killings before the war. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply.” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial.
“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.
“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.
MISHNAH: The following was said for communal peace: A Cohen reads first, after him a Levite, after him an Israel, for communal peace. One puts an eruv in an old house, for communal peace. A cistern which is close to a water canal is filled first, for communal peace. Finds of a deaf-mute, or an insane person, or a minor fall under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. Traps for wild animals, birds, or fish fall under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. If one knocks off [olives] from high up in the olive tree, it falls under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. One does not hinder poor Gentiles [from taking] gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or peah, for communal peace.
Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer, and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”
“One does not hinder poor Gentiles [from taking] gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or peah, for communal peace.” It was stated: “In a town where Gentiles and Jews live together, one appoints overseers of charity from Gentiles and Jews; one provides for the Gentile and Jewish poor, visits Gentile and Jewish sick, buries Gentile and Jewish dead, and consoles Gentile and Jewish mourners. Also, one washes Gentile and Jewish clothes for the sake of peaceful coexistence.”
MISHNAH: A woman may lend to her neighbor, whom she suspects in matters of the Sabbatical, a coarse sieve, a fine sieve, grindstones, or an oven, but she should neither cull nor grind with her. The wife of a Fellow may lend to the wife of a vulgar a coarse sieve and a fine sieve, she may cull, grind, and sift with her, but she may not touch hers once water has been put in because one does not support transgressors. All this has only been said for communal peace. One encourages Gentiles in the Sabbatical year but not Jews. One greets them for communal peace.
HALAKHAH: “A woman may lend to her neighbor,” etc. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does our Mishnah deal with the implicit case, rather than the explicit? He said to him, is the implicit case not explicit? He said to him, I can say a coarse sieve to count coins, a sieve to sift sand, grindstones to grind spices, a stove to put in flax bundles.
There, we have stated: One does not knead or form bread with a baker working in impurity. And it was stated additionally: One should neither cull nor grind with him. And here, it says so? Rebbi La said, here for profane [bread], there for heave. Can you say heave at a baker’s? The colleagues say, one if he washes, there if he does not wash. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “But she may not touch hers once water has been put in.”
There, we have stated: One does not knead or form bread with a baker working in impurity. And it was stated additionally: One should neither cull nor grind with him. And here, it says so? Rebbi La said, here for profane [bread], there for heave. Can you say heave at a baker’s? The colleagues say, one if he washes, there if he does not wash. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “But she may not touch hers once water has been put in.”
Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.
Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Does he disagree? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice.
The colleagues said, they disagree about courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has both courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, she has neither courtyard nor four cubits. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree about the courtyard but she has no four cubits. What did Rebbi Joḥanan say about outstretched hands? Rebbi Eleazar asked, does an agent’s courtyard act as his hand?
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
Rebbi Mana said, not only a neck-iron of mortal danger but also a neck-iron of money. For every neck-iron is a mortal danger. Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jacob the Armenian: That which is a problem for Rebbi Simeon is obvious for Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina, as we have stated there: “One may have use for the hair of a woman who was executed but an animal which was executed is forbidden for all use.” Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if she said, my bonnet should be given to my daughter.
As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed. He said, One should give money to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya. They did not give him; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.