does
8640 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.
It was stated: “If a deaf-mute person gave heave, it is not heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, to what does this refer? If he was born deaf-mute. But if he was normal and became deaf and dumb, he writes and others confirm his signature.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others execute his written instructions? They upheld it, if he was illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the bill] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, (here also it is invalid). Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others execute his written instructions? They upheld it, if he was illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the bill] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, (here also it is invalid). Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!
We understand, to the witnesses, sign! But to the scribe, write? Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. He explains it following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulas.
“Whether he died from the original sickness.” Are male or female slaves trustworthy? The witnesses know that at the time she was alone with him a male or female slave was present. “If she was alone with him with the knowledge of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him. One witness, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. One in the morning and one in the afternoon, that was a case and Rebbi Eleazar bar Thaddeus asked the Sages who said, this is not [testimony of] being alone. If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage.” Rebbi Jeremiah explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect anything. Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage by intercourse. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by intercourse. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect preliminary marriage bymoney. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by money. Rebbi Abin said, It turns out that the House of Shammai parallels the rabbis and the House of Hillel Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.
“Whether he died from the original sickness.” Are male or female slaves trustworthy? The witnesses know that at the time she was alone with him a male or female slave was present. “If she was alone with him with the knowledge of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him. One witness, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. One in the morning and one in the afternoon, that was a case and Rebbi Eleazar bar Thaddeus asked the Sages who said, this is not [testimony of] being alone. If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage.” Rebbi Jeremiah explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect anything. Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage by intercourse. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by intercourse. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect preliminary marriage bymoney. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by money. Rebbi Abin said, It turns out that the House of Shammai parallels the rabbis and the House of Hillel Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.
“Whether he died from the original sickness.” Are male or female slaves trustworthy? The witnesses know that at the time she was alone with him a male or female slave was present. “If she was alone with him with the knowledge of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him. One witness, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. One in the morning and one in the afternoon, that was a case and Rebbi Eleazar bar Thaddeus asked the Sages who said, this is not [testimony of] being alone. If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage.” Rebbi Jeremiah explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect anything. Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage by intercourse. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by intercourse. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect preliminary marriage bymoney. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by money. Rebbi Abin said, It turns out that the House of Shammai parallels the rabbis and the House of Hillel Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.
What is the status of her intercourse? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain, but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” “on condition that you breast-feed my son,” how long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years; Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months. If the son or the father died, it is a valid divorce. “On condition that you serve my father for two years,” or “on condition that you breast-feed my son for two years;” if the son died or the father said, I cannot stand you serving me (without being offended), it is no divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, that is a divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated a principle: Given any hindrance which is not from her side, it is a divorce.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” etc. Rebbi Abba said: During his lifetime, on condition that she serve all his needs, on condition that she breast-feed all his needs. Even if she did not serve all his needs, even if she did not breast-feed all his needs, but even if she served him for one hour, or breast-fed him for one hour. After death, even if she never served him or never breast-fed him. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “How long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years, Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months.” Rebbi Abin said, this was taught about the cost of a wet-nurse.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he threw it to her in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them, what is the rule? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Abin said, it is a disagreement between Rav and the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, for Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he threw it to her in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them, what is the rule? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Abin said, it is a disagreement between Rav and the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, for Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he threw it to her in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them, what is the rule? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Abin said, it is a disagreement between Rav and the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, for Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.
If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid. “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid. “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh.
HALAKHAH: “If some of the text remained,” etc. What does “remained” mean? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Baibon said, e. g., “true, valid, and clear.”
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.
MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness.” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes, etc.”
By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.
By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.
“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.
If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.
HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
If he was married to her sister who died. For him who says, he gives money for the allotment at the end, she needs additional money. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she does not need additional money. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she needs additional money. Why? Everybody agrees that preliminary marriage is impossible in an incestuous relationship.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.
This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires, as it was stated: If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked to, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land in length and breadth, for I shall give it to you.”
A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”
“By money.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, from another person to his master, therefore not from his master to another person. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even from his master to another person. What brings this? From his master to himself. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Here you have money that your field shall be unencumbered.” He answered, it is unencumbered. “That it be ownerless”? He answered, it is not ownerless. What is the difference between the cases? Here he advantaged a thinking person, there he did not advantage any thinking person. Think of it, if he was deaf-mute? He said to him, “a man.” Think of it, if he was underage? He said to him, one usually grows up. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Even with a contract through others, not by himself. Does not his master deliver a document to others that his slave regain his freedom? Here also, his master gives money to others that his field become ownerless.
Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!
It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!
Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires. If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land, etc.”
By document. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, by a contract without obligating money, but with a contract obligating money he did not acquire until he paid. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, he acquired even if he did not pay. A baraita supports Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose: “If he sold him ten fields together, when he took possession of one of them, he took possession of all of them. But if he only paid the amount for one or wrote the deed only for one of them he acquired only the one which was sold to him.” Does there exist a deed without money? If you say, we hold that he paid for all of them, did it not say: “the amount of one”? It must be one or the other.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
“A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.” How? If he bought a cow from the Temple for 200. If he did not have occasion to pay the 200 until the going rate was a mina, he has to pay 200. That means, a promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual. A cow from the Temple for a mina. If he did not have occasion to pay the mina until the going rate was 200, he has to pay 200. That is what is written: “He has to add a fifth of its estimated value, then it is delivered to him.” Therefore, if he adds, it is delivered to him; if he does not add, it is not delivered to him. “ ‘This steer as elevation offering, or this house as a qorbān,’ they are in the Temple’s possession wherever they are, for it is written: “The Eternal’s are the earth and what fills it,” etc. But among private persons one obtains possession only be taking hold.”
There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.
There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.
There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.
Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.
[They asked Rebbi Eliezer,] how far does honoring father and mother go? He said to them, you are asking me? Go and ask Dama ben Netinah. Dama ben Netinah was the head of the city council. Once his mother was slapping him in front of the entire council and a slipper fell from her hand, and he handed it back to her so that she should feel no inconvenience. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said: He was a Gentile from Ascalon and the head of the city council. He never sat on the stone on which his father used to sit and when his father died, he worshipped the stone. Once the jaspis of Benjamin was lost. They inquired, who would have one of similar quality? They were informed that Dama ben Netinah did. They went to him and agreed on 100 denars. He went to the upper floor to bring it and found his father sleeping. Some say that the key to the chest was in his father’s fingers; some say his father’s foot was resting on the chest. He descended to them and told them: I could not bring it to you. They thought, maybe he wants more money, and raised the price to two hundred, then to a thousand. When his father woke up from his sleep, he went up and brought it to them. They wanted to give him according to the amount last mentioned, but he refused. He said: Do I sell my father’s honor for money? I will not have any advantage from honoring my father. What reward did the Holy One, praise to Him, give him? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: The following night, his cow gave birth to a red heifer and Israel gave him its weight in gold and took it. Rebbi Sabbatai said (Job 37:23), it is written: “Justice and much charity He will not suppress.” The Holy One, praise to Him, will not wait to give the reward for good deeds to the Gentiles.
Rebbi Ismael’s mother came, spoke, and complained to our teachers about him. She said to them: Scold my son Ismael because he does not honor me! At that, the faces of our teachers became saffron colored. They said, is it possible that Rebbi Ismael does not honor his parents? They said to her, what did he do to you? She said, when he comes from the house of assembly, I want to wash his feet and drink from it, and he refuses. They said, since it is her wish it is her honor.
Rebbi Ismael’s mother came, spoke, and complained to our teachers about him. She said to them: Scold my son Ismael because he does not honor me! At that, the faces of our teachers became saffron colored. They said, is it possible that Rebbi Ismael does not honor his parents? They said to her, what did he do to you? She said, when he comes from the house of assembly, I want to wash his feet and drink from it, and he refuses. They said, since it is her wish it is her honor.