following
3174 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.
If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.
Do stillbirths generate “decay”? For him who says that their blood induces impurity by a quartarius they generate “decay”; for him who says that their blood does not induce impurity by a quartarius, do they generate “decay”? Let us hear from the following: “Why is the dust from small heaps impure? Because women bury there their stillbirths.” Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Would it not be reasonable otherwise, that lepers bury their limbs there? You must say that it is because of “decay”, not because a bone the size of a lentil, since it was stated: “If he took some dust from it and replaced it, [the small heap] is pure.” Explain it following Tannaïm, as it was stated: If one removed it, it remains impure; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares it pure.
Do stillbirths generate “decay”? For him who says that their blood induces impurity by a quartarius they generate “decay”; for him who says that their blood does not induce impurity by a quartarius, do they generate “decay”? Let us hear from the following: “Why is the dust from small heaps impure? Because women bury there their stillbirths.” Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Would it not be reasonable otherwise, that lepers bury their limbs there? You must say that it is because of “decay”, not because a bone the size of a lentil, since it was stated: “If he took some dust from it and replaced it, [the small heap] is pure.” Explain it following Tannaïm, as it was stated: If one removed it, it remains impure; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares it pure.
Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it was formulated following Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: The spine and the skull are impure even if crushed, even disconnected, because the grave unites them as “a human in a tent”.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: One sprinkles on an uncircumcised Jew, for we find that our forefathers in the desert received sprinkling when uncircumcised. Rav Ḥisda said, following him who said that they circumcised on the eleventh. But for him who said that they circumcised on the tenth, they did not count sprinkling when uncircumcised. Rebbi Abin said, did they not have to count for sprinkling when uncircumcised in any case? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: It happened that an uncircumcised Cohen was sprinkled and the sprinklings were declared valid. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, there were soldiers and gate keepers in Jerusalem who immersed themselves and ate their Passover sacrifices in the evening.
Rebbi Simeon said: On the next day, he brings his reparation sacrifice and a log of oil with it and says: If I was impure, this is my obligatory offering, otherwise it is my doubtful offering. He slaughters in the North, it needs giving on the thumbs, and it is eaten by male Cohanim at any place during the day and the following night until midnight. But the Sages did [not] agree with Rebbi Simeon because he causes sacrifices to become invalid.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are Ben Zoma’s words, but the words of the Sages: Forever is he definitively [impure] until he heave the reparation sacrifice. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Why is he definitively [impure] until he heave the reparation sacrifice? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? We find several reparation sacrifices which are pushed aside because of doubts! As we have stated there: “If a reparation sacrifice was mixed up with a well-being sacrifice, Rebbi Simeon says that both should be slaughtered in the North and eaten following the more restrictive rules. They said to him, one does not cause sacrifices to become invalid.
Does the obligatory shaving push aside the rules of voluntary shaving? Let us hear from the following: “He shaves his head, his beard, and his eyebrows in the way sufferers from skin disease shave.” But there one could say, maybe it was an obligatory shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yudan: The Mishnah says so; “for Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead.” Is he not forbidden because of “do not destroy”? Samuel bar Abba said, explain it if he was a eunuch. But did we not state “the beard”? How can you say, a eunuch? You have only what Rebbi Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he removed it from bottom to top it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose bar Abin said, there is no difference between bottom to top or top to bottom.
The following is obvious: If he became impure and then was manumitted, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. When is that, if his master forced him or if his master did not force him? If you say that he forced him, how can be bring a sacrifice of impurity? If you say he did not force him, should he not count for his master as long as he still is in the latter’s power? Rebbi Yose said, we are dealing with the case that his master forced him. You should not say that because he was manumitted, the nezirut in impurity was lifted from him. Therefore, it was necessary to say that he counts nezirut in impurity.
“Rebbi Yose said, if a slave said, ‘I shall be a nazir when manumitted,’ his master forces him in matters of nezirut. [The master] can force a slave in matters of nezirut; he does not have to force him in matters either of vows or of oaths.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If his master forced him and he became impure, is he to be whipped? Or is that only practice? Where do we hold? If his nezirut has biblical status and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped. Rebbi Mana said, does one whip for practice? But it must be the following: If his nezirut is practice and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped.
If he completed his nezirut but did not manage to shave before he was informed about a possible case of a grave in the abyss, he cancels. If he designated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before he was informed about a grave in the abyss? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? Whether he shaved or did not shave following Rebbi Eliezer, or whether it happened before or after blood was sprinkled according to the rabbis!
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
MISHNAH: Samuel was a nazir following the words of Rebbi Nahorai, as it is said: “A shaving knife shall not come on his head.” It is said about Samson “a shaving knife”, and it is said about Samuel “a shaving knife”. Since “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samson refers to nazir, so “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samuel refers to nazir. Rebbi Yose said, but fear is only of flesh and blood! Rebbi Nahorai answered him: Was it not said: “Samuel said, how can I go? Will not Saul hear of it and kill me?” The fear of flesh and blood already was on him.
If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
If a bond was signed by four witnesses and it turned out that the first two were relatives or disqualified, it is valid and is confirmed by the remaining testimony. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: This follows him who says that witnesses sign only in the presence of each other. But following him who says that witnesses may sign without being in the presence of each other, even if the Jew signed last it is invalid. And would it not be remote testimony? That one cannot say since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah that disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave.
Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.
Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.
Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.
Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is presented by him personally. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked, why are you looking at me? Even if it is presented by another person. It meansthat Rebbi Yasa before he changed his mind followed Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Mana said, even after he changed his mind it can be explained following him. There is a difference between two witnesses to the writing and two witnesses to the signing. Signing before two [witnesses] is empowered, writing before two is not empowered.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.
If he transgressed and annulled? Let us hear from the following: “If he annulled it is annulled, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he can neither annul it nor add to his condition.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says it correctly. What is the reason of Rebbi? It is the word of the Torah that he has the power to annul but they said, he shall not annul. Can their word uproot the words of the Torah? But is it not from the Torah that one may [give as heave] olives for oil and grapes for wine, but because of robbing the tribe they said not only that one may not give heave [in this way] but if he transgressed and gave, his heave is not heave. Rebbi Oshaia bar Abba said to Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Who could tell exactly what your ancestor meant?
Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.
Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.
If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.
If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
MISHNAH: A person who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of the House of Hillel. The House of Shammai say, you provided for his master but you did not provide for him. He can marry neither a slave woman nor a free woman: shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase, as it is said: “He did not create it to be empty, He formed it to be settled.” For the public good one forces his master to manumit him and he writes a bond for half his value. The House of Hillel changed and instructed following the House of Shammai.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.
There could be terms. If he entered into terms with him, it is permitted. That means, with adults. With minors, the terms can be with their masters. That is, if the master was a Jew. If he was Gentile? Rebbi Tevele sold his slave and entered into terms with his master. Rebbi Isaac the goldsmith had slaves who fled to Bnoton. He came and asked Rebbi Immi who instructed him that a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable. The slave girl of Rebbi Abba bar Ada fled to Cilicia. He came and asked Rebbi Mana, who instructed him following Rebbi Immi: a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable.
The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.
The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.
If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.
“For a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, they taught only for a ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects from average quality. Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects only from lowest quality. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement: “While she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she loses her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he sells through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.
A judgment was rendered for Ṣippor bat Absalom. Rebbi Simon and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: I and our teachers collected for her from movables, following the custom of her place.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
So far if he thought that it was profane. If he knew that it was heave but he thought that it was permitted to make it impure? Let ushear from the following: “If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.” Could the Cohen think that it was profane? Is there piggul of profane things? But we must hold that he knew that it was holy but thought that it was permitted to make piggul of sacrifices. And here, if he knew that it was heave but thought that it was permitted to make it impure.
Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: An underage girl has no definitive marriage to let her eat heave. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.” Rebbi Abin asked: If she was definitively married but had no intercourse, [the husband] sent her to her father’s house and she grew up, may she eat heave? Let us hear from the following: “Based on her earlier definitive marriage.”
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
MISHNAH: The following was said for communal peace: A Cohen reads first, after him a Levite, after him an Israel, for communal peace. One puts an eruv in an old house, for communal peace. A cistern which is close to a water canal is filled first, for communal peace. Finds of a deaf-mute, or an insane person, or a minor fall under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. Traps for wild animals, birds, or fish fall under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. If one knocks off [olives] from high up in the olive tree, it falls under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. One does not hinder poor Gentiles [from taking] gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or peah, for communal peace.
HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.
Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer, and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed. He said, One should give money to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya. They did not give him; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.
As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed. He said, One should give money to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya. They did not give him; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.
If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce.
We understand, to the witnesses, sign! But to the scribe, write? Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. He explains it following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulas.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote a bill to divorce his wife and then changed his mind,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is no problem because of the purity of the priestly line and the court will not denigrate her. There came a case before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and he acted following the House of Hillel. Rav asked him, why did you bring yourself into this great doubt? He answered, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose was with me. He quoted about them: “Two are better than one.”
MISHNAH: Anybody can supplement a bald document following the words of Ben Nanas. Rebbi Aqiba says, one supplements the signatures only by relatives who would be able to testify under other circumstances. What is a bald document? One whose knots are more than its signatures.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: There is no “she shall be divorced”. Rebbi Immi said, several boxes of cases came before Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and they said, go and complete following Rebbi Aqiba.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.
In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wanted to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgress the words of the House of Hillel are deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of God, but practice follows the House of Hillel. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rebbi Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.
In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wanted to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgress the words of the House of Hillel are deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of God, but practice follows the House of Hillel. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rebbi Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.
Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.
Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.
HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.