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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:39

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:39

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:44

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Following him, who said “for servitude”, he makes up before he leaves. But was it not stated: After he redeemed him it is as if he were sold to him, he enslaves him before he leaves. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is no “enslaves him before he leaves”, only “he makes up before he leaves.” If his relatives want to redeem him from the first [master’s], they redeem. If his relatives want to redeem him from the second [master’s], they cannot redeem. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That follows him who said: “by these to freedom, by all others to servitude.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:56

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah learned from Aḥaz, as it was stated: Aḥaz produced a child at age nine, Haran at age six, and Caleb at age ten following him who identifies Caleb ben Ḥeṣron with Caleb ben Yephuneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:63

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:80

“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:80

“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:96

HALAKHAH: “Guaranteed properties,” etc. In earlier times, transfer of possession was effected by taking off a shoe. That is what is written: “This was earlier in Israel about redemption and exchange, a person would take off his shoe.” Who took it off? There, they say Rav and Levi, one said the acquirer, and one said the transferer. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement which was stated: Boaz was giving to the redeemer; Rebbi Jehudah said that the redeemer gave to Boaz.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:103

From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:107

From where did they learn rollover of oaths? From the suspected wife: Amen from this man, Amen from any other man. That refers to subjects he is able to make her swear about. What about subjects he is not able to make her swear about? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “Amen that I was not deviant preliminarily married and married, waiting for the levir and taken in.” Can he make her swear when she is preliminarily married or waiting for the levir? Nevertheless one rolls over.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:117

There, we have stated: “The father bestows on his son beauty, strength, riches, wisdom, and years.” From where beauty? “May Your deeds appear on Your servants, and Your glory on their sons.” Strength, “strong on earth will be his descendants.” Riches, “I was young and became old, but never saw a just man abandoned and his descendants in need of bread.” Wisdom, “you shall teach your sons to argue about them.” Years, “that your and your sons’ days be many.” And just as he inherits five qualities, so he owes him the following five things. He feeds him, he gives him to drink, he clothes him, he puts on his shoes, he leads him. That is what is written: “This should fall on Joab’s head: sufferer from flux and from skin disease, holding the distaff, falling by the sword, and senseless.” Sufferer from flux, weak. From skin disease, abandoned. Holding the distaff, uneducated. Falling by the sword, short lived. Without bread, poor. When Solomon came to kill Joab, he said to him: Your father gave me five sentences; accept them and I can be killed. He accepted them and all of them came to pass on the House of David. Sufferer from flux was Rehabeam: “King Rehabeam with difficulty climbed on his chariot to flee to Jerusalem;” some say, he suffered from flux; some say, he was weak. Suffering from skin disease was Uziahu: “King Uziahu suffered from skin disease until the day of his death.” Holding the distaff was Joash: “They punished Joash.” Rebbi Ismael stated: This teaches that they gave him over to hardened hoodlums who had never known a woman and they raped him the way women are raped. That is what is written: “Israel’s pride will testify against it,” Israel’s pride will be raped in its face. Falling by the sword, this is Josiah, as is written: “The archers shot at king Josia,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, this teaches that they made his body like a sieve. Rebbi Ismael stated: 300 arrows were shot at the Eternal’s anointed. Without bread, that is Jehoiachin: “And his meal, a permanent meal was given to him,.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:120

[They asked Rebbi Eliezer,] how far does honoring father and mother go? He said to them, you are asking me? Go and ask Dama ben Netinah. Dama ben Netinah was the head of the city council. Once his mother was slapping him in front of the entire council and a slipper fell from her hand, and he handed it back to her so that she should feel no inconvenience. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said: He was a Gentile from Ascalon and the head of the city council. He never sat on the stone on which his father used to sit and when his father died, he worshipped the stone. Once the jaspis of Benjamin was lost. They inquired, who would have one of similar quality? They were informed that Dama ben Netinah did. They went to him and agreed on 100 denars. He went to the upper floor to bring it and found his father sleeping. Some say that the key to the chest was in his father’s fingers; some say his father’s foot was resting on the chest. He descended to them and told them: I could not bring it to you. They thought, maybe he wants more money, and raised the price to two hundred, then to a thousand. When his father woke up from his sleep, he went up and brought it to them. They wanted to give him according to the amount last mentioned, but he refused. He said: Do I sell my father’s honor for money? I will not have any advantage from honoring my father. What reward did the Holy One, praise to Him, give him? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: The following night, his cow gave birth to a red heifer and Israel gave him its weight in gold and took it. Rebbi Sabbatai said (Job 37:23), it is written: “Justice and much charity He will not suppress.” The Holy One, praise to Him, will not wait to give the reward for good deeds to the Gentiles.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:133

“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:4

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:6

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:6

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:12

“Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma,” and she said, “throw it into the sea or the river,” she is not married. “Give it to a poor person,” she is married. In either case nothing came into her hand; in one case you say, she is married; in the other case you say, she is not married! Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She wants to be married and be seen as benefiting the poor. Rebbi Phineas said, this can be interpreted either following Rebbi Ze‘ira or Rebbi Ila.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is preliminarily married unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not preliminarily marry me to her except at place X and he went and executed the preliminary marriage at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:30

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:30

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:31

“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” Rebbi Ḥamai bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” Is this not of the visible defects? Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as.” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar: its measure is half a ubiquitous gold piece. Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addition, for a man women’s breasts.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:33

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:33

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:53

They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:6

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This shall be an elevation sacrifice for thirty days,” it is an elevation sacrifice for thirty days; after thirty days it automatically becomes profane. What is its status regarding larceny? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the larceny is clear. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Hila both say, the larceny is in doubt. “You are preliminarily married to me for thirty days,” she is preliminarily married. What is the difference between dedication and woman? We find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption but we do not find that a woman could leave without a divorce document. Where do we find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “they enter without paying.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it according to everybody regarding a bought field. “This is your bill of divorce for thirty days”: it is no bill of divorce. Rebbi Isaac ben R. Eleazar said, when do you say that she is preliminarily married? If he effectuated the preliminary marriage by money. But if he effectuated the preliminary marriage by a document, since marriage documents were inferred from divorce documents and in the case of a divorce she is not divorced, so in the case of a preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:16

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:16

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:18

The following is the way of contracting: One witness for the groom and one witness for the bride; these two together select a third in order to have two witnesses for each side. That is, if not both of them agree. But if both of them agree, both may invalidate the preliminary marriage. As, e. g., “if he said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed his story and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption.” If there was one witness for the groom, one witness for the bride, and the groom signed personally: Rebbi Abbahu said, it is a symphōn, Rebbi Abba said, it is preliminary marriage, for I am saying that he did not really intend a symphōn but thought that it would permit her sister to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:19

Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:20

If he performed a preliminary marriage during the validity of the symphōn, this is unconditional preliminary marriage. If he divorced, the students of Rebbi Jonah said, divorce touched her; Rebbi Jonah said, divorce did not touch her. When Rebbi Jonah died, his students acted following him. They said, since after 30 [days] she would leave without a bill of divorce, how can you say that divorce touched her? But divorce did not touch her. If he died during the time stipulated in the symphōn, Rebbi Abbahu said, she is permitted to marry; Rebbi Abba said, she is not permitted to marry. Rebbi Mana asked the family of Rebbi Yose’s father: How did your master usually act? He said to him, when it was a long time, he said that she should go and marry immediately. If the time was short, he said, what is the hurt if she waits? If he sent things during the validity of the symphōn, Rebbi Mana said, [it follows the rules of] symphōn; Rebbi Abba said, [it follows the rules of] preliminary marriage. The rabbis take note of Rebbi Mana’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:24

Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:34

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia and Rebbi Jehudah Neśia were sitting together. They said, let us say something on the subject of preliminary marriage. If somebody say to his wife, here you have a peruṭaḣ that you should be preliminarily married to me after I have divorced you, what is the rule? They laughed and got up. Rebbi Yose said, why did they laugh? Did not Rebbi Abba bar Mamal say, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will; and here “after you are divorced,” she is made dependent on another’s will. If you want to find a difficulty. ask the following: A person went to preliminarily marry a woman. Another person overtook him and said to her, you should know that the man who is coming to preliminarily marry you has a bad mind. In the future he will abandon you. But here you have this peruṭah that you should be preliminarily married to me after he will have divorced you. What is the rule?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:37

Rebbi Yannai said: More than 30 Elders voted: from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with an outsider. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy, that I can answer those who insult me”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:66

A slave woman: “The woman and her children shall belong to her owner.” A Gentile woman. Rebbi Joḥanan [said] in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them, your daughter you shall not give to his son”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from following Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:3

“Desecrated priest.” Following “from the sons of Cohanim, the family Ḥavaya, the family Haqqoṣ . . . they tried to find their genealogical documents; but they were not found and they were freed from priesthood. And the tiršata told them.” Why was he called hattiršata? Because they permitted him to drink of the wine. Hatiršata, “I was the king’s cup bearer.” “That they should not eat from what was dedicated as holy.” Therefore, from outside holy food they might eat? Rebbi Yose said, great is the permanence of the status quo ante Since they were used to eat there, they may also eat here. One understands there, as it is written: “Put up signposts for yourself.” What can one say here? Following him who said, they accepted tithes voluntarily. “Until a priest will be appointed for urim and tummim.” But were there any urim and tummim then, in the Second Temple? But [he is] like a person who says until the dead will be resurrected, until David’s son will come.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:3

“Desecrated priest.” Following “from the sons of Cohanim, the family Ḥavaya, the family Haqqoṣ . . . they tried to find their genealogical documents; but they were not found and they were freed from priesthood. And the tiršata told them.” Why was he called hattiršata? Because they permitted him to drink of the wine. Hatiršata, “I was the king’s cup bearer.” “That they should not eat from what was dedicated as holy.” Therefore, from outside holy food they might eat? Rebbi Yose said, great is the permanence of the status quo ante Since they were used to eat there, they may also eat here. One understands there, as it is written: “Put up signposts for yourself.” What can one say here? Following him who said, they accepted tithes voluntarily. “Until a priest will be appointed for urim and tummim.” But were there any urim and tummim then, in the Second Temple? But [he is] like a person who says until the dead will be resurrected, until David’s son will come.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:4

Did those daughters of Barzilai’s convert in the name of Heaven or not in the name of Heaven? If you say that they converted in the name of Heaven should not [their descendants] eat most holy sacrifices? But if you say that they converted not in the name of Heaven, then [their descendants] should not eat even outside sancta. Even if you say that they converted in the name of Heaven, is a female proselyte not like a prostitute for the priesthood? Explain it that they were not daughters but daughters of daughters. But if they were daughters of daughters, they are like Israel! But following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon said, a proselyte who converted at less that three years and one day of age. She had no intent to immerse herself but [her mother] immersed her, if then later she immerses herself for the holiness of Israel, each of them then becomes a proselyte and a proselyte is like a prostitute for the priesthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:6

“Proselytes,” meaning “everyone who separated himself from the impurities of the peoples of the earth to join them.” Freedmen, as in “and all the Gibeonites, etc.” Bastards. Rebbi Simeon said, it is written: “And the following came up from Salt Hill, Ploughing Hill”. From Salt Hill, that is Babylon. Ploughing Hill refers to silenced ones and foundlings. Kerub means the bastards; the young are those who go after their eyes; Addon, for they were saying, there is no judgment and no Master. Rebbi Ḥizqiah changed the wording: These are those who went after their eyes and said, there is no judgment and no judge. And Immer, who rebelled against God by their evil deeds. Rebbi Abbun in the name of Rebbi Phineas: They publicized themselves like the seam of a garment. Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They would have been worthy of being turned into a salt hill, but Divine justice was silent for them. Ploughing Hill.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:12

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use [the principle of gezerah šawah for] “the tenth, the tenth.” It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meïr. As Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth onward.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:21

MISHNAH: Any who are forbidden to marry in the congregation are permitted to marry one another but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Eliezer says, certain with certain are permitted, certain with questionable, questionable with certain, and questionable with questionable are forbidden. The following are questionable: the silenced one, the foundling, and the Samaritan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:23

[In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard?] Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah thought that this disqualified converts from any of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl and marries her to him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on either side.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:23

[In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard?] Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah thought that this disqualified converts from any of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl and marries her to him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on either side.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:27

HALAKHAH: “One who comes to marry a woman from a priestly family,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, as we have stated: “What is qualified dough? Anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated one, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with any of these is qualified for the priesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.” Rav said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he checks from which family one marries into the priesthood and marries. Through whom does he check? Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Josia: He checks through his female relatives. To Rebbi Ḥama came an old man; he asked him: Does one marry into the priesthood from this family? He answered: yes, and he was making a match based on this information. Rav said to his son Ḥiyya: Descend a degree to marry a wife. Rebbi Idi said, the following is a frequent saying of the rabbis: “If the woman was not impure but she is pure.” If she was not impure, she is pure. Not like Pappos ben Jehudah who locks the door before his wife. One said to him, did your forefathers act like this? A Cohen came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him: I acted on the Mishnah when I married a woman from a priestly family and checked after her four mothers which are eight. He said to him, if the origin was defective, who would inform you?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:33

Example. The elder Rebbi Hoshaia and Rebbi Judah Neśia were sitting together. Rebbi Joḥanan ran und whispered into Rebbi Hoshaia’s ear: May a Cohen who is injured in his testicles marry the daughter ofconverts? He asked him, what did he tell you? He answered, a question which a carpenter, son of carpenters, cannot resolve. He did not ask me about a convert, since she is like a whore for him. He did not ask about an Israelite daughter, whom he will desecrate. He asked only about the daughter of converts! Is the daughter of converts not an Israel? You have to explain it following Rebbi Jehudah, who said, the daughter of a male convert has the status of the daughter of a desecrated male.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:39

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, this my son is a bastard, he cannot be believed,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody said, this is my son, he is to be believed.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah: “Even if both of them say about the fetus in her belly that he is a bastard, they cannot be believed”? Maybe it was said following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah said, they can be believed; Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, still it is a baraita: “For he has to recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If they maintained that he was his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was not his son, he cannot be believed. That he was not his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was his son, he is believed. Some Tannaïm state on the first case that he is believed. Rebbi Ḥisqiah, Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Huna: If they maintained that he was from his slave girl, he is believed. If he was standing next to the customs collectors and said, he is my son, but later he said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, but later he said, he is my son, he is not believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is believed. Rebbi Mana said, because of those Samaritans who use their sons as slaves.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:18

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr for the tame animal and Rebbi Jehudah for testimony, as we have stated: “A bull which gored three times on the same day is not notorious. Why does the verse say ‘from yesterday and the day before’? For if it mended its ways for three days one after the other it is judged to be tame.” We were thinking to say that practice follows Rav Huna who said following both of them. This is confirmed by Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr for the tame [bull] and Rebbi Jehudah for testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:3

If it was filling the entire public domain, if he took it from here and put it down there he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull mounted another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, or [the bull] slipped away, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Could he not tell him, if you had not interferred, I would have paid your damages? But he could have answered, If I had not interferred, you would have paid me half the damage! Think of it, if it was notorious? It is not in your power to drag me through the courts.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:5

A person put down a stone in the public domain, another person put down another stone next to the first, a third person stumbled over the first and struck the other. Who has to pay damages, the first or the second person? Let us hear from the following: “A bull pushed another ox which then fell into a pit. The owner of the bull has to pay; the ‘owner’ of the pit is free. Rebbi Nathan says, if the attacker was notorious, each of them pays one half; if it was tame, the owner of the bull pays two thirds and the ‘owner’ of the pit a quarter.” Rebbi Ḥanania said, so is the baraita: The owner of the bull pays three quarters and the ‘owner’ of the pit a quarter. (A person put down a stone in the public domain, another person put down another stone next to the first, a third person stumbled over the first and struck the other. Who has to pay damages, the first or the second person?)

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:14

New Paragraph. “He fences his fence with thorns.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, explain it according to everybody if it grew outwardly. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Why do we not explain it following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah who said, three [handbreadths] close to a domain are counted with the domain? He answered, why are you not satisfied with what Rebbi Joḥanan said; explain it according to everybody if it grew outwardly.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:15

“A fence which collapsed into the public domain.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, one is liable for damage caused by inaction. This is the following: “If he was given a deadline by which to cut the tree or demolish the wall and they collapsed, if it happened within the term, he is not liable; after the term, he is liable.” How much is a term? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: 30 days.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:23

“One came with an amphora, another came with a beam.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If they changed and caused damage, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “Five people sat on a couch; another came, saton it, and it broke. He pays for all of them. But if it broke because of all of them, they are all liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:36

HALAKHAH: “A person may be liable for the action of his bull,” etc. Rebbi Yudan asked: How is the court trial? Let us hear from the following: “Two persons threw two pebbles and broke two jugs, one full of wine and one full of oil. Each of them said, I broke the one full of wine. Both of them pay for the wine. One empty and one full; each of them said, I broke the empty one. Both of them pay for the empty one. If they broke one amphora. Each of them said, you broke it. Neither of them is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:14

HALAKHAH: “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew,” etc. Rav said, “He saw and permitted Gentiles,” He permitted the Gentiles’ money. Ḥizqiah said, “He appeared from Mont Paran,” He appeared in front of the Gentiles; Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, He made them poor. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, following their laws. Rebbi La said, this was not said referring to this topic, but to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If a Gentile’s bull gored another Gentile’s bull, even though they accepted to be judged by the laws of Israel, he is liable for full damages whether tame or notorious. On that it was said that Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, following their laws.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:14

HALAKHAH: “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew,” etc. Rav said, “He saw and permitted Gentiles,” He permitted the Gentiles’ money. Ḥizqiah said, “He appeared from Mont Paran,” He appeared in front of the Gentiles; Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, He made them poor. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, following their laws. Rebbi La said, this was not said referring to this topic, but to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If a Gentile’s bull gored another Gentile’s bull, even though they accepted to be judged by the laws of Israel, he is liable for full damages whether tame or notorious. On that it was said that Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, following their laws.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:18

Did we not state: “If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian”? So far if testimony was taken in the presence of the owner and he delivered to the guardian. If testimony was taken in the presence of the guardian and he delivered to the owner? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame but it turned out to be notorious, the owner pays half of the damages and the borrower pays half of the damages.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. But if this is Rebbi Yose’s, he should pay in full. If he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame. But if he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame, he should not have to pay anything. If he knew that it was apt to gore. It was stated: “If it killed while at the borrower’s, who handed it back to the owners, before judgment was rendered he is not liable, after judgment was rendered he is liable. Rebbi Jacob said, even after judgment was rendered but before it was stoned, he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:23

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:23

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:28

If somebody sells a bull to another person and it turns out to be goring. Rav said, it is an acquisition in error, but Samuel says, he can tell him: I sold it to you to be slaughtered. “He shall give weregilt for his person.” Some Tannaїm state: The attacker’s person. Some Tannaїm state: The person suffering the damage. Following him who said, the person suffering the damage, [assume] the first one injured him fatally and then the second came and kept him in confusion. If you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays damages and the second pays the weregilt. If you say that damages are not fully required, the first one pays weregilt but the second is not liable. Following him who said, the attacker’s person, if you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays weregilt and the second is not liable. If you say that damages are not fully required, neither one is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:28

If somebody sells a bull to another person and it turns out to be goring. Rav said, it is an acquisition in error, but Samuel says, he can tell him: I sold it to you to be slaughtered. “He shall give weregilt for his person.” Some Tannaїm state: The attacker’s person. Some Tannaїm state: The person suffering the damage. Following him who said, the person suffering the damage, [assume] the first one injured him fatally and then the second came and kept him in confusion. If you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays damages and the second pays the weregilt. If you say that damages are not fully required, the first one pays weregilt but the second is not liable. Following him who said, the attacker’s person, if you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays weregilt and the second is not liable. If you say that damages are not fully required, neither one is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:30

HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:17

HALAKHAH: “One who digs a pit in the public domain,” etc. It is written: “If a man open a pit” and “if a man dig a pit.” One pit for damages, the other pit for death. Rebbi Isaac said, both the pit of death and the pit of damages were added from the same verse, but when it comes to the pit of death you say he is not liable for vessels, but when it comes to the pit of damages you say he is liable for vessels! This is not only if he dug, from where if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift? The verse says, “if a man acquire a pit.” Has one the right to abandon his damages in the public domain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah who said, three [handbreadths] close to a domain are like that domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:3

So far if [the corral] was fenced in on four sides. If it was fenced in on three sides and breached on one side, and [an animal] left through the breach, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If his wall fell in from the noise of earthquakes or thunder and he rebuilt it as required, he is not liable, otherwise he is liable.” The only problem is if three better built walls fell together with it.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:24

HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:25

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can one argue for him an argument which does not apply to him? Let us hear from the following: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. He said, does not everybody know that all Bar Ziza’s sharecrooper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza had adult and underage sons. He said, the adult one should take half and when the underage ones grow up, they should receive half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing [since there are people who do not flout their wealth]; it should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underaged ones is compared to one who gave a gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:16

HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:18

HALAKHAH: “If he was drawing it to lead it out but it died,” etc.; “If he gave it for his first-born son,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, if somebody would explain to me the following, I would carry his בנרייה: What means “is not liable”? Is he not liable for his obligation or not liable for theft?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 8:15

HALAKHAH: “It is bad to meet a deaf-mute, an insane, or an underage person,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded the eye of his slave and broke his tooth, for that is what the master said, and they are found to be perjured, they pay to the slave. How can they say this about the case? Rebbi Nasa said, those might say the following: We testify about X that [the slave] came to his hand unimpaired and left with two injuries. Then he gains his freedom with the first and he has to pay him for the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 8:19

Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “You killed my ox, you cut down my fruit trees,” and the other says, I do not know, he is liable. He said to him, certainly you state that to the rabble. He answered, it is my fault, they said the following: “We testify against X that he killed ox Y” and the other says, I do not know, he is liable. [He said, that was stated.]

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 8:22

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rabban Gamliel. Since it says that “He will give you mercy etc.”, let the following be a sign in your hand: Whenever that you show mercy, the Omnipresent will have mercy on you. If you do not show mercy, the Omnipresent will not have mercy on you. Rav said: If a person misbehaved towards another and asked for pardon but the other did not respond, let him assemble a row of people and ask for pardon, as it is written: “Form a row of men, etc.” If he does so, what is written there? “He redeemed his soul from the pit, not to go to destruction etc.” Rebbi Yose said, that is if he did not defame, but the defamer is never pardoned.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:22

HALAKHAH: “Where is my deposit? He told him ‘it was lost’,” etc. It was stated: “One does not accept deposits from women, or slaves, or underage children. If one accepted from a woman, he should return it to her; if she died, he should return it to her husband. If one accepted from a slave, he should return it to him; if he died, he should return it to his master. From an underage child, he should return it to him, if he died he should return it to his father, and make it a safe investment. If any of these said at the moment of their death, it should be given to X because it is his property, one should follow his interpretation.” Rebbi Zebida in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Only before witnesses. As the following: When Rebbi Abba bar Ḥana’s wife was dying, she said, these rings belong to my daughter. But he said no, they are mine. The case came before Rav who said, people are not given to lying at the time of their death.