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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:6

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:6

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:8

MISHNAH: Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women specified in the Torah, or of the disqualified ones, [i. e.,] a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah for a private Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite female for an Israel, or an Israel woman for a male bastard or Gibeonite, disqualified her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:10

MISHNAH: A widow betrothed to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah to a private Cohen are not permitted to eat heave; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon declare them able. When they were widowed or divorced, after marriage they are disabled, after betrothal they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:12

MISHNAH: The High Priest shall not marry a widow, whether a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult. He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. If he gave qiddushin and afterwards was elected High Priest, he shall marry her; it happened that Joshua ben Gamla had given qiddushin to Martha bat Boetos when the king appointed him as High Priest and he married her. If a woman was waiting for her Cohen levir when he was elected High Priest, even though he “bespoke” her, he may not marry her. If the brother of a High Priest died, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:15

A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:25

MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:25

MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:28

If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:29

If she had children but they died, she counts from the time of death. She can say, a spirit strangled the children of this woman and made me sterile.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:15

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:15

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:19

“When the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” Why do we come here to state doubts? Since we had stated [the rules for] co-wives, we now state for doubts concerning co-wives.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:22

This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats, against Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, also if an unmarried man had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the purpose of marriage it is copulation of harlotry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:24

“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are: “A child of nine years and one day, an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite, Samaritan, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:25

MISHNAH: A slave disables because of intercourse but not because of descendants. How is this? A daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen [or] the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel had a son from him. The son went and was pressed on a slave girl who had a son from him; the latter is a slave. If his father’s mother was a daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, she cannot eat heave, the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel may eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:25

MISHNAH: A slave disables because of intercourse but not because of descendants. How is this? A daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen [or] the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel had a son from him. The son went and was pressed on a slave girl who had a son from him; the latter is a slave. If his father’s mother was a daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, she cannot eat heave, the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel may eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:27

MISHNAH: A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this? A daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen [or] the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel had a daughter from him. If the daughter went and married a slave or a Gentile and had a son from him, that is a bastard. If his mother’s mother was a daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, she can eat heave, the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel cannot eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:27

MISHNAH: A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this? A daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen [or] the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel had a daughter from him. If the daughter went and married a slave or a Gentile and had a son from him, that is a bastard. If his mother’s mother was a daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, she can eat heave, the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel cannot eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:29

MISHNAH: Sometimes the High Priest disables. How is this? A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him. The daughter went and was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:29

MISHNAH: Sometimes the High Priest disables. How is this? A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him. The daughter went and was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:31

So is the Mishnah: “Not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.” A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him; an Israel’s daughter was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The two married and had a son. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:31

So is the Mishnah: “Not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.” A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him; an Israel’s daughter was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The two married and had a son. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:31

So is the Mishnah: “Not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.” A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him; an Israel’s daughter was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The two married and had a son. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:18

It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:30

If a Cohen had intercourse with a divorcee and had a daughter, and the daughter a daughter, what is her status? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said she is qualified, the other said she is disqualified. The one who said she is qualified objected to the one who said she is disqualified: The daughter of a desecrated male is desecrated for the priesthood. Is this one not from an Israel? Why do you declare her disqualified?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:30

If a Cohen had intercourse with a divorcee and had a daughter, and the daughter a daughter, what is her status? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said she is qualified, the other said she is disqualified. The one who said she is qualified objected to the one who said she is disqualified: The daughter of a desecrated male is desecrated for the priesthood. Is this one not from an Israel? Why do you declare her disqualified?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:34

It is written: “Shaḥaraim fathered children in the fields of Moab, after he had sent them, Ḥushim and Ba‘arah his wives.” “Shaḥaraim,” that is Boaz who was freed from sins. “He fathered children in the fields of Moab” because he married Ruth the Moabite. “After he had sent them,” he was from the tribe of Judah, of whom it is written, “he sent Jehudah before him”. “Ḥushim and Ba‘arah his wives,” can anybody father his wives? But it means that he was quick as a panther and explained the practice. “He fathered from New Moon his wife,” should it not have been: he fathered from Baarah, one of his wives? But through her, practice was newly defined: “Ammonite,” and but female Ammonite. “Moabite,” but not female Moabite.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:34

It is written: “Shaḥaraim fathered children in the fields of Moab, after he had sent them, Ḥushim and Ba‘arah his wives.” “Shaḥaraim,” that is Boaz who was freed from sins. “He fathered children in the fields of Moab” because he married Ruth the Moabite. “After he had sent them,” he was from the tribe of Judah, of whom it is written, “he sent Jehudah before him”. “Ḥushim and Ba‘arah his wives,” can anybody father his wives? But it means that he was quick as a panther and explained the practice. “He fathered from New Moon his wife,” should it not have been: he fathered from Baarah, one of his wives? But through her, practice was newly defined: “Ammonite,” and but female Ammonite. “Moabite,” but not female Moabite.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:35

One verse says, “his name was Yitra the Israelite;” another verse says, “Yeter the Ismaelite.” Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, he was an Ismaelite. And you say, he was an Israelite? But he entered the court of Isaiah and found him sitting and explaining: “turn to me and be saved, all ends of the earth,” and converted. Then he gave him his daughter. But the rabbis say, he was an Israelite, and you say, an Ismaelite? But he girded his loins like an Ismaelite and stuck his sword in the earth in court, to kill or be killed, to support the word of my teacher: I shall kill with this sword anybody who transgresses this practice: “Ammonite,” and not female Ammonite; “Moabite,” and not female Moabite. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, I have only what I did learn: “Naomi returned with Ruth the Moabite, her daughter-in-law, who returned from the fields of Moab.” She is the one who first returned from the fields of Moab. Afterwards, he told her: “You abandoned your father and your mother.” He said to her: If you had come to us yesterday or the day before, we would not have accepted you.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:42

Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not investigate a family in which a family disqualification has disappeared. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a Mishnah says so: “There was a family in Bet Ṣerifa in Transjordan who was forcibly distanced by Ben Ṣion. Another [family] was there who was forcibly integrated by Ben Ṣion.” Nevertheless, the Sages did not want to make their names public. But the Sages transmit them to their sons and students two times in a Week. Rebbi Joḥanan said, by the Temple service, I know them and the leading personalities of the generation have disappeared in them. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Pashḥur ben Immer the priest had 5000 slaves, and their traces have disappeared in the high priesthood. These are the insolent in the priesthood. Rebbi Eleazar said, their main training: “Your people is like quarrelsome priests.” Rebbi Abbahu said, Samaritans disappeared in thirteen villages in the times of persecution. They said, the village of Moshhan is one of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:43

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:43

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:6

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:6

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:12

“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:16

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah do not need support, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have Ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have Ketubah What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has Ketubah. For those who want to say since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no Ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:22

MISHNAH: An Israel woman married to a Cohen shall eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she shall eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat tithe. If [then] she marries an Israel, she may eat neither heave nor tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:22

MISHNAH: An Israel woman married to a Cohen shall eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she shall eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat tithe. If [then] she marries an Israel, she may eat neither heave nor tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:23

MISHNAH: If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat neither heave nor tithe. If her son from the Israel died, she may eat tithe. From the Levite, she may eat heave. If her son from the Cohen died, she may eat neither heave nor tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:24

MISHNAH: A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may not eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may not eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat tithe. If [then] she married a Cohen, she may eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat heave. If her son from the Cohen died, she may eat tithe; from the Levite, she may not eat tithe. If her son from the Israel died, she returns to her father’s house and for this case it was said: “She returns to her father’s house as in her youth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:24

MISHNAH: A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may not eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may not eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat tithe. If [then] she married a Cohen, she may eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat heave. If her son from the Cohen died, she may eat tithe; from the Levite, she may not eat tithe. If her son from the Israel died, she returns to her father’s house and for this case it was said: “She returns to her father’s house as in her youth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:24

MISHNAH: A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may not eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may not eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat tithe. If [then] she married a Cohen, she may eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat heave. If her son from the Cohen died, she may eat tithe; from the Levite, she may not eat tithe. If her son from the Israel died, she returns to her father’s house and for this case it was said: “She returns to her father’s house as in her youth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:6

“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:10

Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim. Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:11

Had it not already been stated: “she has no ketubah”? Rebbi Yose ben Jacob said, that you should not say, they fined her but not her heirs. Therefore it was necessary to say, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:12

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:12

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:37

“If they said to him “your wife died,” etc. How can that be? A man has a daughter and a stepdaughter, a woman has a daughter and a stepdaughter. They married and had a daughter. It starts with the woman’s stepdaughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:44

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:44

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:46

MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:48

Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:48

Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:8

So far his daughter’s daughter from marriage. His daughter’s daughter from a rape? “The genitals of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter.” Where do we hold? If from marriage, it already had been said. So it it cannot refer to marriage but must refer to rape. So far for the warning, from where the punishment? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, “they, they; taboo, taboo”. That follows Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “they”, from “them”. So far about his daughter’s daughter, from where his daughter? Rav said, if he is forewarned about his daughter’s daughter, so much more for his daughter! If for his daughter’s daughter he is subject to extirpation, so much more for his daughter!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:9

They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: His daughter’s daughter from a marriage; his daughter’s daughter from a rape? He said to them, every “daughter’s daughter” falls under the same category. They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: If [a man] came to a woman, she had a daughter, and after that he came and copulated with her. Is he guilty about her because of a woman and her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter? He said to them, “they are relatives, it is taboo;” all because of taboo.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:33

From where that a Cohen presents his sacrifices during [the period of duty of] any watch he chooses? The verse says, “he may come as his heart desires … and serve”. If he was old or sick, he may give it to any watch he likes but the hide and meat are his. If he was impure or had a bodily defect, he must give it to the acting watch, and the hide and meat are theirs. These mixed-up ones, how do you treat them? Comparing them to the old or sick, or to the impure or to those with a bodily defect. It seems reasonable to compare them to the impure or those having a bodily defect; but the Mishnah compares them to the old or sick, since we have stated: “One cannot take his from him.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:34

MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:34

MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:36

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One mourns deeply and defiles himself in a case of doubt. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” Rebbi Ashian bar Yaqim had a case. He asked Rebbi Yose, who told him, you do not have to. He said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say, one mourns deeply and defiles himself in a case of doubt? His signs were clear. But did not the colleagues say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not act on the signs of an eight months’ child? He had a sign that he had intercourse and then separated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:36

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One mourns deeply and defiles himself in a case of doubt. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” Rebbi Ashian bar Yaqim had a case. He asked Rebbi Yose, who told him, you do not have to. He said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say, one mourns deeply and defiles himself in a case of doubt? His signs were clear. But did not the colleagues say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not act on the signs of an eight months’ child? He had a sign that he had intercourse and then separated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:36

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One mourns deeply and defiles himself in a case of doubt. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” Rebbi Ashian bar Yaqim had a case. He asked Rebbi Yose, who told him, you do not have to. He said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say, one mourns deeply and defiles himself in a case of doubt? His signs were clear. But did not the colleagues say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not act on the signs of an eight months’ child? He had a sign that he had intercourse and then separated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:14

Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:16

“With a sandal having a heel it is valid.” There, they say, for example those קנסרוס. But the rabbis here say, like ours. Rav said, if I had not seen my uncle, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, performing a ḥalîṣah with a sandal with plaited straps, I would not feel competent to do so. The maternal uncle of Rav Cahana performed ḥalîṣah in the night, as single judge, on Friday night, with a cork sandal, and standing; (Rabbi Zeriqa said) and she did not spit. Rav heard that and said, who would ever do that except the maternal uncle of Rav Cahana?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:3

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:3

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:4

If she had been in a situation that she could not repudiate, may she go and repudiate? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father but then was divorced, if she went and married by herself she nevertheless can repudiate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:11

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Assi: The Mishnah speaks about a sister-in-law who has two levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her, she may repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry on the market place. Why can she not repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry his brother? Explain it, if she says, I cannot stand you. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yosina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The Mishnah speaks about a sister-in-law who has five levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her, she may repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry his brother. Why can she not repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry on the market place? Explain it if her father had married her off, this was a marriage by biblical standards.