hold
1383 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers,” etc. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name ofNehorai: The reason of the House of Shammai, “the outside wife of the deceased shall not belong to a strange man,” the “outer one” should not be another man’s. It turns out that the House of Shammai hold like those Samaritans who perform levirate with the betrothed but remove the married, for they explain “outside” as “the outer one.” How do the House of Shammai confirm “when he has no child”? Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, “when he has no child” from the married one, “the outer one shall not belong outside to a strange man.” He said to him, will not the Samaritans love you that you confirm their interpretations! Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: I told the learned Samaritans, what did cause you to err? That you did not explain following Rebbi Neḥemiah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: Anything which needs a ל as a prefix but did not get it, we give it a ה at the end, e. g., to the outside חוּצָה, to Se‘ir שְׂעִירָה, to Succoth סוּכּוֹתָה. They objected to Rebbi Neḥemiah, is it not written: “The wicked shall return to the pit לִשְׁאוֹלָה.” Rabba bar Zabda said, to the lowest living space in Sheol.
HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”
There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
Rebbi Yudan asked: Does this hold until she gives birth? No, even if she had a miscarriage.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.
Immi the father of Samuel bar Immi in the name of Rav Jehudah: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon. There came a case before Rebbi Mana and he removed her from him. Does he hold with Rebbi Jehudah? No, she regularly came to him.
So far his daughter’s daughter from marriage. His daughter’s daughter from a rape? “The genitals of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter.” Where do we hold? If from marriage, it already had been said. So it it cannot refer to marriage but must refer to rape. So far for the warning, from where the punishment? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, “they, they; taboo, taboo”. That follows Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “they”, from “them”. So far about his daughter’s daughter, from where his daughter? Rav said, if he is forewarned about his daughter’s daughter, so much more for his daughter! If for his daughter’s daughter he is subject to extirpation, so much more for his daughter!
HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, can he dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he can free his ṭevel by Torah law! But here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says that First Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of cereals? If he holds with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said (Num.18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, one is guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. The statement of Cahana disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. And you say so? We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.
HALAKHAH: “If he was betrothed to one.” Should she not be trusted to say “my father-in-law died”? Did we not hold that just as they are not trusted about her so she is not trusted about them? Rebbi Ḥanina said, explain it if her father-in-law was there and she described the circumstances.
There, we have stated: “One does not make the proselyte drink, etc. But the Sages say, one makes her drink.” Where do we hold? If about an Israel who married a proselyte, it already is written: “The sons of Israel” (not proselytes). If about a proselyte who married a Jewish girl, it already is written: “The man has to bring his wife to the Cohen.” But we must hold about a proselyte who married a proselyte. What is the reason of Rebbi Aqiba? “The children of Israel”, not proselytes. What is the reason of the Sages? “You shall say to them”, to add everything written in that paragraph. What is written in that paragraph? “A man slept with her”. His lying with her makes her forbidden, then her husband declares his jealousy and makes her drink.
There, we have stated: “One does not make the proselyte drink, etc. But the Sages say, one makes her drink.” Where do we hold? If about an Israel who married a proselyte, it already is written: “The sons of Israel” (not proselytes). If about a proselyte who married a Jewish girl, it already is written: “The man has to bring his wife to the Cohen.” But we must hold about a proselyte who married a proselyte. What is the reason of Rebbi Aqiba? “The children of Israel”, not proselytes. What is the reason of the Sages? “You shall say to them”, to add everything written in that paragraph. What is written in that paragraph? “A man slept with her”. His lying with her makes her forbidden, then her husband declares his jealousy and makes her drink.
There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”
There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”
“If she said ‘I shall not drink’ after the scroll was erased, one makes her gargle and forces her to drink against her will.” How many letters have to be erased? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: The House of Shammai say, one; the House of Hillel say, two. Rebbi Hilai said, the reason of the House of Hillel: That he could have written Yah. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: But why does one make her drink? If it is to check her out, she already is completely checked out! But Rebbi Aqiba must hold that the one who says “I shall not drink” is as the one who says “I am impure for you”. But does Rebbi Aqiba not agree that “one makes her gargle until her face turned yellow and forces her to drink against her will”? He does, if she started to drink.
Where do we hold? If about him who heard and did not know from whom he heard, it is like a bird flying by. If about him who heard and knew from whom he heard, it is a witness reporting the words of another witness. But here we deal with the case that X [heard] from Y and Y from Z; a word without foundation.
I could think that somebody who redeems a vineyard outside the Land would return, the verse says: “And he did not redeem it”. In case one is commanded to redeem it; this excludes where there is no commandment to redeem. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, one only understands “vineyard”. And similarly, one only understands “planted”. It was stated: “And he did not redeem it”, that excludes him who sinks or grafts. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Rav Ḥisda said, this is everybody’s opinion if he grafted fruits of sin. Where do we hold? If he grafted a fruit tree on another fruit tree of a different kind; these are fruits of sin. But if he grafted a fruit tree on a futile tree, as if it were its own kind, he is planting anew. But we hold if he grafted a black fig tree on a white one.
I could think that somebody who redeems a vineyard outside the Land would return, the verse says: “And he did not redeem it”. In case one is commanded to redeem it; this excludes where there is no commandment to redeem. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, one only understands “vineyard”. And similarly, one only understands “planted”. It was stated: “And he did not redeem it”, that excludes him who sinks or grafts. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Rav Ḥisda said, this is everybody’s opinion if he grafted fruits of sin. Where do we hold? If he grafted a fruit tree on another fruit tree of a different kind; these are fruits of sin. But if he grafted a fruit tree on a futile tree, as if it were its own kind, he is planting anew. But we hold if he grafted a black fig tree on a white one.
Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion to follow the standard of Judea in Galilee. Rebbi Yose said to him, is the standard of Judea in Galilee a testimony by biblical standards? No, [one follows] the standard of Judea in Judea and the standard of Galilee in Galilee. If you say, it is not testimony by biblical standards, why appoint them? That the daughters of Israel should not become wanton in immorality. If it is that the daughters of Israel should not become wanton in immorality, even if one appoints, they should not be trustworthy! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: A man would not go to all this expense in order to give his wife a bad reputation. If it is that a man would not go to all this expense in order to give his wife a bad reputation, even if one does not appoint, he should be believed. Rebbi Hila said, because of one suspicion, because of one immoral person. Where do we hold? If he investigated and found, he found! If he did not find but investigated, did he not investigate? But we deal with the case that he did not investigate and found. She says, it is blood of virginity. He says no, it is a bird’s blood. His case is damaged since he did not follow the procedures. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. It follows what we statedthere: “A virgin and a widow, etc.” All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A complaint needs at least two [plaintiffs]. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, how do we hold? If they elevated him on the testimony of one person, they should demote him on the testimony of one person. If they elevated him on the testimony of two persons, even if there are many [opposed] they should not demote him! Rebbi Ḥuna said, it follows the rabbis there. But following the rabbis here and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob, just as one elevates him on the testimony of two persons, one demotes him on the testimony of two persons.
Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.
Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”
Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
HALAKHAH: “Vows in connection with acts of God: His friend made him vow,” etc. because he fell ill. Therefore, if he did not fall ill, no. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, “he is forbidden until he gives.” Rebbi Yose said, why do we not explain it according to everybody? As my teacher said, they disagree when it was indeterminate. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. Rebbi Hila said, is it the way of people to say χαρίζεσθαι βίᾳ?
He who makes a vow not to use bread or produce is forbidden them, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Therefore, is he who makes a vow not to use bread or produce forbidden everything according to the rabbis? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is the Mishnah: “He who makes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these.” How do we hold? If he uses “bread” in the biblical sense, then also if he says “produce” it is meant in the biblical sense. He should be forbidden everything since it is written (Deut. 22:9): “The produce of the vineyard.” If he simply says “bread”; only from wheat or barley is it simply called “bread”. Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed it, at a place where one eats bread from all [kinds], only from the five kinds it is simply called “bread”.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. But we hold if it is undetermined. Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. But we hold if it is undetermined. Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
“Or I shall be beautiful”. Where do we hold? If he said “beautiful”, is that not the previous case? When he grabs his hair, is that not what we have stated: “I shall be like this one”, following Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina who holds that “I shall be like this one” refers to the case that he is grabbing his hair. But we must hold that he says, “there is nothing more beautiful than this”.
“Or I shall be beautiful”. Where do we hold? If he said “beautiful”, is that not the previous case? When he grabs his hair, is that not what we have stated: “I shall be like this one”, following Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina who holds that “I shall be like this one” refers to the case that he is grabbing his hair. But we must hold that he says, “there is nothing more beautiful than this”.
From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.
From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir from here to place X,” etc. Where do we hold? If in the count of a solar year, 365 neziriot following the count of a solar year. If in the count of a lunar year, 354 neziriot following the count of a lunar year. But “the count of the days of a year” is problematic.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?
Ulla bar Ismael said, what is his problem? Of an impure nazir. But for a pure nazir, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees if he has nothing to omit. Samuel bar Abba asked: May one day of his nezirut and one day of nezirut for his son be combined? Where do we hold? If his son was born today and tomorrow he enters, he has two days for his nezirut. If his son was born the next day and he enters the next day, he has two days for his son’s nezirut! Rebbi Mana said, explain it at twilight. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say in the middle of the day, did we not intend to say that the start of the day is counted for him, the end of the day is counted for his son?
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
Where do we hold? If one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon, as you take it, if he is Reuben, one is a nazir, if he is Simeon, one is anazir. But we must hold that one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon. He suddenly disappeared, he was neither Reuben nor Simeon; nobody is a nazir.
Where do we hold? If one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon, as you take it, if he is Reuben, one is a nazir, if he is Simeon, one is anazir. But we must hold that one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon. He suddenly disappeared, he was neither Reuben nor Simeon; nobody is a nazir.
Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.
Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.
Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaiah: All sources of flavor one in a hundred. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaiah: All sources of flavor one in sixty. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said to Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Yasa disagrees with you and the Mishnah disagrees with both of you: “Anything which sours, flavors, or creates dema‘? If you say about 100 or 200, even if it does not sour, flavor, or create dema‘! Therefore, we hold even more. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it for meat in meat. Rebbi Yose said, meat in meat is the same as all other prohibitions since Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one estimates as if they were onion or leeks.
HALAKHAH: “The High Priest and the nazir,” etc. It is written: “He shall not go close to a dead body.” Where do we hold? If to forbid non-relatives, is he not also under the rules of a simple priest? If it cannot refer to non-relatives, refer it to relatives. It is written: “Not to go close to a dead body,” and you say so? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said, from here repeated prohibitions in the Torah. But it is to permit the corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ The man shall not defile himself, in the midst of his people” he may not defile himself. But he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ To profane himself.” He may not defile himself to profane himself; he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation.
“Rebbi Yose said, if a slave said, ‘I shall be a nazir when manumitted,’ his master forces him in matters of nezirut. [The master] can force a slave in matters of nezirut; he does not have to force him in matters either of vows or of oaths.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If his master forced him and he became impure, is he to be whipped? Or is that only practice? Where do we hold? If his nezirut has biblical status and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped. Rebbi Mana said, does one whip for practice? But it must be the following: If his nezirut is practice and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped.
If his master forced him in one respect, did he force him in all respects? We came to the disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meїr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.” Where do we hold? If he told him, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence, even Rebbi Meїr will agree. If he told him, drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence, even Rebbi Yose will agree. But we hold in the case that he tells him: “drink!” Rebbi Meїr says, [it means] drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence. Rebbi Yose says, [it is] as if he said, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence.
If his master forced him in one respect, did he force him in all respects? We came to the disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meїr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.” Where do we hold? If he told him, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence, even Rebbi Meїr will agree. If he told him, drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence, even Rebbi Yose will agree. But we hold in the case that he tells him: “drink!” Rebbi Meїr says, [it means] drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence. Rebbi Yose says, [it is] as if he said, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence.
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire. Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed: If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split. Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses. Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand.
Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire. Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed: If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split. Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses. Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand.
Rebbi Eliezer objected to the rabbis: Just as you hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another overseas has to say, “it was written and signed before me,” so I hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another in the Land of Israel has to say, “it was written and signed before me.” Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, it happened that one brought a bill of divorce from the harbor of Caesarea. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said yes, he has to say that it was written and signed before him. But is the harbor of Caesarea not part of Caesarea? Rebbi Abin said, it was from a departing ship, and it was stated thus: One who brings a bill of divorce from a ship is like one who brings from outside the Land and has to say that it was written and signed before him.
Rebbi Eliezer objected to the rabbis: Just as you hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another overseas has to say, “it was written and signed before me,” so I hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another in the Land of Israel has to say, “it was written and signed before me.” Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, it happened that one brought a bill of divorce from the harbor of Caesarea. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said yes, he has to say that it was written and signed before him. But is the harbor of Caesarea not part of Caesarea? Rebbi Abin said, it was from a departing ship, and it was stated thus: One who brings a bill of divorce from a ship is like one who brings from outside the Land and has to say that it was written and signed before him.
“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.
“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.