1383 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:13

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:2

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:4

“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:4

“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:30

So far if he thought that it was profane. If he knew that it was heave but he thought that it was permitted to make it impure? Let ushear from the following: “If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.” Could the Cohen think that it was profane? Is there piggul of profane things? But we must hold that he knew that it was holy but thought that it was permitted to make piggul of sacrifices. And here, if he knew that it was heave but thought that it was permitted to make it impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:24

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:26

HALAKHAH: “If the scribe wrote,” etc. Where do we hold? If he made a mistake, even Rebbi Eleazar agrees. If he made no error, even the rabbis agree. But we must hold that it was unexplained. Rebbi Eleazar suspects that possibly he made no mistake; the rabbis suspect that possibly he did make a mistake.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:26

HALAKHAH: “If the scribe wrote,” etc. Where do we hold? If he made a mistake, even Rebbi Eleazar agrees. If he made no error, even the rabbis agree. But we must hold that it was unexplained. Rebbi Eleazar suspects that possibly he made no mistake; the rabbis suspect that possibly he did make a mistake.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:38

Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:74

Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:74

Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:74

Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:74

Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:101

By document. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, by a contract without obligating money, but with a contract obligating money he did not acquire until he paid. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, he acquired even if he did not pay. A baraita supports Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose: “If he sold him ten fields together, when he took possession of one of them, he took possession of all of them. But if he only paid the amount for one or wrote the deed only for one of them he acquired only the one which was sold to him.” Does there exist a deed without money? If you say, we hold that he paid for all of them, did it not say: “the amount of one”? It must be one or the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:109

MISHNAH: If anything is given instead of money, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. How is this? If an ox was exchanged for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. Possession of Heaven is by money, possession of an individual by taking hold. A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:113

The Mishnah: “Possession of Heaven is by money, possession of any individual by taking hold.” How? If the treasurer paid with Temple money for movables, they are in the Temple’s possession anywhere they are, for it is written: “The Eternal’s are the earth and what fills it, dry land and its inhabitants.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:114

“A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.” How? If he bought a cow from the Temple for 200. If he did not have occasion to pay the 200 until the going rate was a mina, he has to pay 200. That means, a promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual. A cow from the Temple for a mina. If he did not have occasion to pay the mina until the going rate was 200, he has to pay 200. That is what is written: “He has to add a fifth of its estimated value, then it is delivered to him.” Therefore, if he adds, it is delivered to him; if he does not add, it is not delivered to him. “ ‘This steer as elevation offering, or this house as a qorbān,’ they are in the Temple’s possession wherever they are, for it is written: “The Eternal’s are the earth and what fills it,” etc. But among private persons one obtains possession only be taking hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:142

HALAKHAH: “Everybody who keeps one commandment they treat well,” etc. “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandment,” and you say so? But we hold with one who is 50–50. If he keeps one commandment, they treat him well and prolong his life; he will inherit the Land. But if he commits one sin, they do not treat him well, do not prolong his life, and he does not inherit the Land. There, we have stated: “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandement.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one who had occasion to commit a possible sin and did not act. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one who chose one commandment which he never violated in his lifetime. What kind? Mar Uqban said, for example the honor of father and mother. Rebbi Mana said, “Happy are those on a straight path, who walk in the Eternal’s Torah,” as if they did walk in the Eternal’s Torah. Rebbi Abun said, “Also they did no evil, in His path they went,” as if they went in His path. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, what is written? “ Happy the man who did not walk in the council of the wicked;” since he did not walk in the council of the wicked it is as if he walked in the council of the just.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:4

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:4

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:4

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:10

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:18

“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married. After delivery, if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married. If one denar was bad, she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.] It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:30

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:33

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:29

A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:29

A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 1:1

MISHNAH: If two persons hold on to one toga and each of them says “I found it” [or] “it wholly belongs to me”, each of them has to swear that he owns no less than half of it and they shall divide it evenly. If one says “it wholly belongs to me” and one says “half of it belongs to me”, the one who says “it wholly belongs to me” shall swear that he owns no less than three parts and the one who says “half of it belongs to me” shall swear that he owns no less than a quarter. The first one takes three parts, the second takes a fourth.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 1:2

HALAKHAH: “If two people hold on to one stole,” etc. It was stated: One person said to another, give me the mina which you owe me. He answered, it never happened. He went and brought witnesses that the other owed him 50 zuz. The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, the confession of the witnesses is the same as his own confession; he has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the confession of the witnesses is not the same as his own confession that he should have to swear. Rebbi La said, Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder’s statement is implied by “if two people hold on to one stole”. Since he holds on to half of it, is it not as if he brought witnesses that one half belongs to him? Could one not say that he swears and collects? Is this a similar case?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 1:2

HALAKHAH: “If two people hold on to one stole,” etc. It was stated: One person said to another, give me the mina which you owe me. He answered, it never happened. He went and brought witnesses that the other owed him 50 zuz. The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, the confession of the witnesses is the same as his own confession; he has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the confession of the witnesses is not the same as his own confession that he should have to swear. Rebbi La said, Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder’s statement is implied by “if two people hold on to one stole”. Since he holds on to half of it, is it not as if he brought witnesses that one half belongs to him? Could one not say that he swears and collects? Is this a similar case?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 3:20

MISHNAH: If a person appropriates a deposit, the House of Shammai say, he shall be hit by less or more, but the House of Hillel say, [at the price] at the time of delivery; Rebbi Aqiba says, at the time of claim. If somebody intends to take the deposit, the House of Shammai hold him liable but the House of Hillel say, he is liable only from the moment he takes it. How is this? If he tilted the amphora and took a quartarius, and then it broke, he pays only for a quartarius. If he lifted it and took a quartarius, and then it broke, he pays for all.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:10

Rebbi Joḥanan gave denars to a relative of his for oil. The oil rose in price. He went and asked Rebbi Yannai who told him, by Torah standards money acquires, but why did they say it does not acquire? Lest [the seller] tell him, your wheat was burned in the storage room. Rebbi Samuel ben Sosartai in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: If [the seller] told him, your wheat was burned in the storage room, he is trustworthy. Rebbi Isaac objected: Where do we hold? If his money had acquired for him, his property would have been burned. But if his money had not acquired for him, the other’s property was burned.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 1:5

MISHNAH: Somebody’s [property] surrounded another’s on three sides. If he fenced in the first, and the second, and the third sides, one does not hold [the other] liable. Rebbi Yose said, if the latter then fenced in the fourth side, one rolls everything over to him. If the wall of a courtyard collapsed, one obligates him to rebuild up to four cubits. There is a presumption that he gave, unless he brings proof that he did not give. Higher than four cubits one does not obligate him, but if he built an adjacent wall, even though he did not put on roofing, one rolls everything over to him. There is a presumption that he did not give, unless he brings proof that he gave.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 2:27

HALAKHAH: “One distances a tree,” etc. Halakhah 12: “A person should not plant,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The rabbis’ reason is that civilization is based on cisterns. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joshua answers the rabbis thus: just as you hold that civilization is based on cisterns, so I am holding that civilization is based on trees.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:6

There, they said: Admon and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La said, they disagree when nothing was specified. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was specified. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he does have to buy access.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:6

There, they said: Admon and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La said, they disagree when nothing was specified. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was specified. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he does have to buy access.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:30

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:22

HALAKHAH: They brought in the second,” etc. It was stated: “If they found him innocent, they freed him; otherwise they hold his case over, split into groups of two, eat little and refrain from wine, and discuss during the entire night. The next morning they start early, the beadles of the synagogues come for them. They ask, Mr. X [ben Mr. Y. He says, present.] I was for conviction and I still am for conviction; or I was for acquittal and I still am for acquittal; I was for conviction and now I am for acquittal; one accepts his vote. I was for acquittal and now I am for conviction; argue as before.” It was stated: If one of the judges erred, the clerks of court remind him. If he was for conviction, they tell him, argue as before.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:24

MISHNAH: If they found him innocent, they free him. Otherwise they hold his case over to the next day, split into groups of two, eat little and refrain from wine the entire day, and discuss during the entire night. The next morning they start early. One who voted for acquittal says, I am for acquittal and I remain for acquittal. One who voted for conviction says, I am for conviction and I remain for conviction. He who voted for conviction may vote for acquittal; but he who voted for acquittal may not change and vote for conviction. If they erred in the matter, the two clerks of court will remind them. If they found him innocent, they free him; otherwise they tally the vote. If twelve are for acquittal and eleven for conviction, he is found innocent. If twelve are for conviction and eleven for acquittal, or even twenty-two are for acquittal or conviction and one says, I do not know, they shall add judges. Up to what number does one add? [One adds] two and two up to 71. If 36 vote for acquittal and 35 for conviction, he is found innocent. If 36 vote for conviction and 35 for acquittal, they have to continue to argue with one another until one of the voters for conviction is convinced by the arguments of those in favor of acquittal.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:34

MISHNAH: If the flesh has rotted away, one collects the bones and buries them at their place. The relatives come and greet the witnesses and judges, implying that “we hold no grudge against you because you delivered a true judgment.” They did not mourn but were in deep sorrow, since deep sorrow is only in the mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:37

An accident happened to Rebbi Abbahu; he lost a baby. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose ascended to visit him. Out of respect for him, they did not speak to him words of Torah. He told them, would the rabbis think saying a word of Torah? They answered, think of it, our teacher. He said to them: If about a terrestrial authority, where one finds lies, and untruth, and misleading statements, and favoritism, and bribery, and they are here one day and gone the next, it was said: “the relatives come and greet the judges and witnesses, implying that we hold no grudge against you because you delivered a true judgment,” the Heavenly authority, before which there are no lies, no untruth, no misleading statements, no favoritism, and no bribery, and He exists forever in all worlds, so much more are we obligated to accept His judgment. And it is said, May He give you mercy, have mercy on you, and make you increase as He has sworn to your ancestors.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 8:12

Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rav Hoshaia: he is guilty only if he steals money. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: he is guilty only if he shows contempt for money. What means showing contempt for money? Where do we hold? If about him who says, here you have five and give me for three, he is an idiot. Here you have three and give me for five, he is a regular person. But we deal with one who says, here you have five and give me for five.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:7

(Rav Huna said:) so far his daughter’s daughter from marriage. His daughter’s daughter from a rape? It is written, the genitals of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter you shall not uncover. Where do we hold? If from marriage, it already had been said. So it cannot refer to marriage but must refer to rape. So far about his daughter’s daughter; from where his daughter? Rav said, if he is forewarned about his daughter’s daughter, so much more for his daughter! If for his daughter’s daughter he is subject to punishment (by extirpation), so much more for his daughter!

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:44

When Israel came to exact vengeance from Midian, they found there Bileam ben Beor. What did he do there? He came to collect his wages for the 24’000 of Israel who died at Shittim. Phineas told him, you followed neither your Creator nor Balaq. You did not follow your Creator, Who told you, do not go with Balaq’s emissaries, but you went. You did not follow Balaq who told you to come and curse Israel, but you blessed them. I also will not hold back your wages. That is what is written: The Children of Israel slew Bileam ben Beor the sorcerer on top of their slain. What means on their slain? That he was as important as all their slain. Another explanation, on their slain. Just as their slain were irrelevant, so he was irrelevant. Another explanation, on their slain. He was flying over their corpses, but Phineas showed him the [High Priest’s] diadem and he fell down. Another explanation, on their slain. This teaches that Israel paid him his wages in full and did not hold back.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:44

When Israel came to exact vengeance from Midian, they found there Bileam ben Beor. What did he do there? He came to collect his wages for the 24’000 of Israel who died at Shittim. Phineas told him, you followed neither your Creator nor Balaq. You did not follow your Creator, Who told you, do not go with Balaq’s emissaries, but you went. You did not follow Balaq who told you to come and curse Israel, but you blessed them. I also will not hold back your wages. That is what is written: The Children of Israel slew Bileam ben Beor the sorcerer on top of their slain. What means on their slain? That he was as important as all their slain. Another explanation, on their slain. Just as their slain were irrelevant, so he was irrelevant. Another explanation, on their slain. He was flying over their corpses, but Phineas showed him the [High Priest’s] diadem and he fell down. Another explanation, on their slain. This teaches that Israel paid him his wages in full and did not hold back.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:6

Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: he is punishable only if he steals money. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: he is punishable only if he shows contempt for money. What means showing contempt for money? Where do we hold? If about him who says, here you have five and give me for three, he is an idiot. Here you have three and give me for five, he is a regular person. But we deal with one who says, here you have five and give me for five.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:11

Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rebbi Yose said, the following is what we are saying: One knew that there exists impurity in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the following is where we hold, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he was oblivious of the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. And so if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he was oblivious of the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:17

HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:18

There, we have stated: “They removed the cup and the censer for him”. About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the last. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, enter, and you say about the last? But we must hold about the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:5

MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:27

Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:21

When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:21

When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:2

HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:2

HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:16

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May the oath of a deviant woman be liable for a blurted oath? Where do we hold? If she is in error in sin and oath she is not deviant. If she is intentional in sin and error there is no sacrifice. Rav follows Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Ismael would argue like Rebbi Meïr it would follow, since Rebbi Meïr said: “Amen that I was not defiled, Amen that I shall not be defiled.” But you may question this.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:19

“Cratesis.” The day when Rome took hold of the Empire. Was this not stated already? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, for the second time. Rebbi Levi said, on the day when Solomon married the daughter of Pharao Necho, the king of Egypt, Michael descended and put a stick into the Sea which attracted debris and formed a forest; that is the great fortification in Rome. On the day when Jeroboam put up two golden calves, Remus and Romulus built two sheds in Rome. On the day Eliahu disappeared a king was installed at Rome; a king, there is no king appointed in Edom.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:3

Where do we hold? If it is certain that they are of kings, according to everybody they are forbidden. If it is certain that they are of rulers, according to everybody they are permitted. But where we hold is if it is indeterminate. Rebbi Meïr says, indeterminate they are of kings but the rabbis say, indeterminate they are of rulers.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:3

Where do we hold? If it is certain that they are of kings, according to everybody they are forbidden. If it is certain that they are of rulers, according to everybody they are permitted. But where we hold is if it is indeterminate. Rebbi Meïr says, indeterminate they are of kings but the rabbis say, indeterminate they are of rulers.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:25

An idol which was broken, Rebbi Joḥanan said it is forbidden, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is permitted. Where do we hold? If in the future he would return it to its vessel, everybody agrees it is forbidden. If in the future he will not return it to its vessel, everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we hold if it is not indicated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not indicated is as if he would return it to its vessel; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, not indicated is as if he would not return it to its vessel. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, if they were lying on their spot it is if he would return it to its vessel. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to Rebbi [Joḥanan]: Is it not written, therefore the priests of Dagon and all visitors to Dagon’s temple will not step on Dagon’s threshold? He told him, this teaches that they honored the threshold more than Dagon. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, the peoples of the world made one threshold; Israel made many thresholds; what is the reason? I shall visit on [any] who skips over the threshold [on that day].

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:25

An idol which was broken, Rebbi Joḥanan said it is forbidden, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is permitted. Where do we hold? If in the future he would return it to its vessel, everybody agrees it is forbidden. If in the future he will not return it to its vessel, everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we hold if it is not indicated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not indicated is as if he would return it to its vessel; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, not indicated is as if he would not return it to its vessel. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, if they were lying on their spot it is if he would return it to its vessel. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to Rebbi [Joḥanan]: Is it not written, therefore the priests of Dagon and all visitors to Dagon’s temple will not step on Dagon’s threshold? He told him, this teaches that they honored the threshold more than Dagon. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, the peoples of the world made one threshold; Israel made many thresholds; what is the reason? I shall visit on [any] who skips over the threshold [on that day].

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:31

Where do we hold? If it is certain that they are worshipped, even the contemptible ones are forbidden. If it is certain that they are not worshipped, even the honored ones are permitted. But we must deal with the indeterminate case. Rebbi Crispus said, those cups belong to the contemptible category, for Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba had a pitcher and the (worth) [fortune] of Rome was pictured on it. He came to ask Rebbi Joḥanan who told him, since water swims on top of it, it is a contemptible one. A drinking cup is contemptible since one immerses it in water. In the days of Rebbi Joḥanan they started painting on walls and he did not protest against it. [In the days of Rebbi Abun they started depicting by mosaics and he did not protest against it.]

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:35

HALAKHAH: “Proclos ben Ploslos asked,” etc. Where do we hold? If he asked him about practice in the bath he should have answered; if he did not ask him about practice in the bath he should not have answered. As Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One asks about practice in the bath while in the bathhouse, about practice in the toilet while in the toilet. As when Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar went to bathe with Rebbi Meïr, he asked him, may one rinse? He told him, it is forbidden. May one dry himself with a towel? He told him, it is forbidden. But did not Samuel ask Rav, may one say “Amen” at a dirty place? He told him, it is forbidden, and it is forbidden that I told you that it is forbidden. It was found stated, one asks about practice in the bath while in the bathhouse, about practice in the toilet while in the toilet. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said, he asked him about practice in the bath but it is not done to answer in the bath. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he asked him about practice in the bath but the steam in the bath is bad for the teeth. The colleagues, Rebbi Ḥama bar Yose in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Zeˋira in the name if Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He answered him in an evasive answer, for he could have replied about Baal Peˋor whose worship only consists in exposure and defecation. What about it? What is treated as a divinity is forbidden, what is not treated as divinity is not forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:42

An egg of pagan worship which turned into a chick. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Josia: Cahana and Ḥizqiah disagree. Cahana said, it is permitted, Ḥizqiah said, it is forbidden. There is a difficulty in the opinion of Ḥizqiah: how is it possible for an egg of pagan worship to become a chick? Where do we hold? If somebody squashed it, there is no chick. If he brought it inside the lattice enclosure, come and look: If he worshipped it it is not forbidden; because he brought it inside the grating it should be forbidden? Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if he used to tow the idol.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:64

HALAKHAH: What is an Ashera? Rav Ḥisda said, They disagree in the indeterminate case. Where do we hold? If it is certain that they worship both idol and tree, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. But if it is certain that they worship the idol and do not worship the tree, everybody agrees that it is permitted. But where do we hold? If it is indeterminate. Rebbi Simeon says, normally they worship both idol and tree; but the rabbis say, normally they worship the idol but do not worship the tree. And it is difficult. Rebbi Simeon disagrees with the Sages and acts in their sense!

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:64

HALAKHAH: What is an Ashera? Rav Ḥisda said, They disagree in the indeterminate case. Where do we hold? If it is certain that they worship both idol and tree, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. But if it is certain that they worship the idol and do not worship the tree, everybody agrees that it is permitted. But where do we hold? If it is indeterminate. Rebbi Simeon says, normally they worship both idol and tree; but the rabbis say, normally they worship the idol but do not worship the tree. And it is difficult. Rebbi Simeon disagrees with the Sages and acts in their sense!

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:71

HALAKHAH: “If he took wood from it,” etc. Rav Ḥasdai said, they are disagreeing in the indeterminate case. Where do we hold? If to heat, everybody agrees that it is permitted. If to fumigate, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Where do we hold? In the indeterminate case.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:71

HALAKHAH: “If he took wood from it,” etc. Rav Ḥasdai said, they are disagreeing in the indeterminate case. Where do we hold? If to heat, everybody agrees that it is permitted. If to fumigate, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Where do we hold? In the indeterminate case.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:12

HALAKHAH: “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously? One explains it, that he was not present. Does this invalidate? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:12

HALAKHAH: “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously? One explains it, that he was not present. Does this invalidate? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 1:11

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua said, I heard only about the virgin, but practice follows Rebbi Eliezer.” One does not say, somebody who did not see the new moon should come and testify, but one says, if somebody saw the new moon, he should come and testify. You did not hear, I heard. All during Rebbi Eliezer’s lifetime, practice followed Rebbi Joshua. After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, Rebbi Joshua introduced practice following Rebbi Eliezer. Where do we hold? If Rebbi Eliezer heard from one [authority] but Rebbi Joshua from two, practice should follow Rebbi Joshua whether [Rebbi Eliezer] was alive or dead. But if Rebbi Joshua heard from one [authority] but Rebbi Eliezer from two, practice should follow Rebbi Eliezer whether he was alive or dead. As it was stated: One says, I heard from two [authorities] and two say, we heard from one, the power of the one who heard from two is greater than that of two who heard from one. But we must hold either that either one heard from one or that either one heard from two. During his lifetime he was not convinced of his opinion, after he died he became convinced of his opinion. What did he see to say that he became convinced of his opinion? As it was stated: The stains of all four categories of women, about whom the Sages said that their timings are exact, cause retroactive impurity except for a girl who is too young to menstruate, for that one has no stains, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, for all four categories of women about whom the Sages said that their timings are exact, their stains cause retroactive impurity except for a girl about to start to menstruate, for her stains start with her menstruation. Since if she sees blood her timing is exact, so also for her stain her timing. Rebbi Yannai said, because her sap is frequent. If the timing of one whose sap is frequent is exact, the others whose sap is not so frequent so much more! By this reason he became convinced of his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 1:11

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua said, I heard only about the virgin, but practice follows Rebbi Eliezer.” One does not say, somebody who did not see the new moon should come and testify, but one says, if somebody saw the new moon, he should come and testify. You did not hear, I heard. All during Rebbi Eliezer’s lifetime, practice followed Rebbi Joshua. After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, Rebbi Joshua introduced practice following Rebbi Eliezer. Where do we hold? If Rebbi Eliezer heard from one [authority] but Rebbi Joshua from two, practice should follow Rebbi Joshua whether [Rebbi Eliezer] was alive or dead. But if Rebbi Joshua heard from one [authority] but Rebbi Eliezer from two, practice should follow Rebbi Eliezer whether he was alive or dead. As it was stated: One says, I heard from two [authorities] and two say, we heard from one, the power of the one who heard from two is greater than that of two who heard from one. But we must hold either that either one heard from one or that either one heard from two. During his lifetime he was not convinced of his opinion, after he died he became convinced of his opinion. What did he see to say that he became convinced of his opinion? As it was stated: The stains of all four categories of women, about whom the Sages said that their timings are exact, cause retroactive impurity except for a girl who is too young to menstruate, for that one has no stains, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, for all four categories of women about whom the Sages said that their timings are exact, their stains cause retroactive impurity except for a girl about to start to menstruate, for her stains start with her menstruation. Since if she sees blood her timing is exact, so also for her stain her timing. Rebbi Yannai said, because her sap is frequent. If the timing of one whose sap is frequent is exact, the others whose sap is not so frequent so much more! By this reason he became convinced of his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 1:17

Rebbi Yudan asked: Does this hold until she gives birth? No, even if she had a miscarriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 1:36

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: In every situation in which the Sages said that her husband would be obligated for a sacrifice, pure food became impure; her husband would be exempt from a sacrifice, pure food remains pure; her husband would have to bring a sacrifice for a doubt, pure food is in limbo. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: If an old man and a child walk in a dining room, does the old man not enter first? But the child can come and make a fool of him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yudan: I say, it was here but the intercourse stopped it from leaving; but there, what hindered it to leave? The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Hoshaiah: “If she left [the bed] and saw blood, she is impure but all the food is pure.” The Mishnah disagrees with Bar Pedaiah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, also when they stop eating heave.” Why? Not that if she would bleed, the food should not retroactively become impure? Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana: Explain it for a woman who has no regular period. He said to him, so says my teacher Rebbi Yose: All that is described here is about a woman who has a regular period. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah rises: Up to this point [it speaks] about a woman who has a regular period; from there on about a woman who has no regular period. But even if you say that the Mishnah does not rise, and we deal only with a woman who has a regular period, where does Bar Pedaiah hold? One differs with Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 2:4

They said in Rabbi Yannai’s name: There is no blind woman. Does this hold up? They said in Rabbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina’s name: There is no blind woman. Does this hold up? Rebbi Ila, Rabbi Yose ben Ḥanina, in the name of the House of Rebbi Yannai: There is no blind woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 2:4

They said in Rabbi Yannai’s name: There is no blind woman. Does this hold up? They said in Rabbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina’s name: There is no blind woman. Does this hold up? Rebbi Ila, Rabbi Yose ben Ḥanina, in the name of the House of Rebbi Yannai: There is no blind woman.