intended
404 occurrences across the corpus
The Writings of Origen
Now, of these opinions, let us first discuss that which is maintained by some, that there is in us a good and heavenly soul, and another earthly and inferior; and that the better soul is implanted within us from heaven, such as was that which, while Jacob was still in the womb, gave him the prize of victory in supplanting his brother Esau, and which in the case of Jeremiah was sanctified from his birth, and in that of John was filled by the Holy Spirit from the womb. Now, that which they term the inferior soul is produced, they allege, along with the body itself out of the seed of the body, whence they say it cannot live or subsist beyond the body, on which account also they say it is frequently termed flesh. For the expression, “The flesh lusteth against the spirit,” they take to be applicable not to the flesh, but to this soul, which is properly the soul of the flesh. From these words, moreover, they endeavour notwithstanding to make good the declaration in Leviticus: “The life of all flesh is the blood thereof.” For, from the circumstance that it is the diffusion of the blood throughout the whole flesh which produces life in the flesh, they assert that this soul, which is said to be the life of all flesh, is contained in the blood. This statement, moreover, that the flesh struggles against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and the further statement, that “the life of all flesh is the blood thereof,” is, according to these writers, simply calling the wisdom of the flesh by another name, because it is a kind of material spirit, which is not subject to the law of God, nor can be so, because it has earthly wishes and bodily desires. And it is with respect to this that they think the apostle uttered the words: “I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.” And if one were to object to them that these words were spoken of the nature of the body, which indeed, agreeably to the peculiarity of its nature, is dead, but is said to have sensibility, or wisdom, which is hostile to God, or which struggles against the spirit; or if one were to say that, in a certain degree, the flesh itself was possessed of a voice, which should cry out against the endurance of hunger, or thirst, or cold, or of any discomfort arising either from abundance or poverty,—they would endeavour to weaken and impair the force of such [arguments], by showing that there were many other mental perturbations which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul, as it were, of which we have spoken above, and which is generated from the seed by a process of traducianism. They are accustomed also to adduce, in support of their assertion, the declaration of the apostle, “Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, poisonings, hatred, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrelling, dissensions, heresies, sects, envyings, drunkenness, revellings, and the like;” asserting that all these do not derive their origin from the habits or pleasures of the flesh, so that all such movements are to be regarded as inherent in that substance which has not a soul, i.e. the flesh. The declaration, moreover, “For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men among you according to the flesh are called,” would seem to require to be understood as if there were one kind of wisdom, carnal and material, and another according to the spirit, the former of which cannot indeed be called wisdom, unless there be a soul of the flesh, which is wise in respect of what is called carnal wisdom. And in addition to these passages they adduce the following: “Since the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do the things that we would.” What are these things now respecting which he says, “that we cannot do the things that we would?” It is certain, they reply, that the spirit cannot be intended; for the will of the spirit suffers no hindrance. But neither can the flesh be meant, because if it has not a soul of its own, neither can it assuredly possess a will. It remains, then, that the will of this soul be intended which is capable of having a will of its own, and which certainly is opposed to the will of the spirit. And if this be the case, it is established that the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly obeying and serving that one of the two which it has elected to obey. And if it yield itself up to the pleasures of the flesh, it renders men carnal; but when it unites itself with the spirit, it produces men of the spirit, and who on that account are termed spiritual. And this seems to be the meaning of the apostle in the words, “But ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit.” We have accordingly to ascertain what is this very will [intermediate] between flesh and spirit, besides that will which is said to belong to the flesh or the spirit. For it is held as certain, that everything which is said to be a work of the spirit is [a product of] the will of the spirit, and everything that is called a work of the flesh [proceeds from] the will of the flesh. What else then, besides these, is that will of the soul which receives a separate name, and which will, the apostle being opposed to our executing, says: “Ye cannot do the things that ye would?” By this it would seem to be intended, that it ought to adhere to neither of these two, i.e. to neither flesh nor spirit. But some one will say, that as it is better for the soul to execute its own will than that of the flesh; so, on the other hand, it is better to do the will of the spirit than its own will. How, then, does the apostle say, “that ye cannot do the things that ye would?” Because in that contest which is waged between flesh and spirit, the spirit is by no means certain of victory, it being manifest that in very many individuals the flesh has the mastery. But since the subject of discussion on which we have entered is one of great profundity, which it is necessary to consider in all its bearings, let us see whether some such point as this may not be determined: that as it is better for the soul to follow the spirit when the latter has overcome the flesh, so also, if it seem to be a worse course for the former to follow the flesh in its struggles against the spirit, when the latter would recall the soul to its influence, it may nevertheless appear a more advantageous procedure for the soul to be under the mastery of the flesh than to remain under the power of its own will. For, since it is said to be neither hot nor cold, but to continue in a sort of tepid condition, it will find conversion a slow and somewhat difficult undertaking. If indeed it clung to the flesh, then, satiated at length, and filled with those very evils which it suffers from the vices of the flesh, and wearied as it were by the heavy burdens of luxury and lust, it may sometimes be converted with greater ease and rapidity from the filthiness of matter to a desire for heavenly things, and [to a taste for] spiritual graces. And the apostle must be supposed to have said, that “the spirit contends against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would” (those things, undoubtedly, which are designated as being beyond the will of the spirit, and the will of the flesh), meaning (as if we were to express it in other words) that it is better for a man to be either in a state of virtue or in one of wickedness, than in neither of these; but that the soul, before its conversion to the spirit, and its union with it, appears during its adherence to the body, and its meditation of carnal things, to be neither in a good condition nor in a manifestly bad one, but resembles, so to speak, an animal. It is better, however, for it, if possible, to be rendered spiritual through adherence to the spirit; but if that cannot be done, it is more expedient for it to follow even the wickedness of the flesh, than, placed under the influence of its own will, to retain the position of an irrational animal. These points we have now discussed, in our desire to consider each individual opinion, at greater length than we intended, that those views might not be supposed to have escaped our notice which are generally brought forward by those who inquire whether there is within us any other soul than this heavenly and rational one, which is naturally opposed to the latter, and is called either the flesh, or the wisdom of the flesh, or the soul of the flesh.
This being the state of the case, we have to sketch what seem to us to be the marks of the [true] understanding of Scriptures. And, in the first place, this must be pointed out, that the object of the Spirit, which by the providence of God, through the Word who was in the beginning with God, illuminated the ministers of truth, the prophets and apostles, was especially [the communication] of ineffable mysteries regarding the affairs of men (now by men I mean those souls that make use of bodies), in order that he who is capable of instruction may by investigation, and by devoting himself to the study of the profundities of meaning contained in the words, become a participator of all the doctrines of his counsel. And among those matters which relate to souls (who cannot otherwise obtain perfection apart from the rich and wise truth of God), the [doctrines] belonging to God and His only-begotten Son are necessarily laid down as primary, viz. of what nature He is, and in what manner He is the Son of God, and what are the causes of His descending even to [the assumption of] human flesh, and of complete humanity; and what, also, is the operation of this [Son], and upon whom and when exercised. And it was necessary also that the subject of kindred beings, and other rational creatures, both those who are divine and those who have fallen from blessedness, together with the reasons of their fall, should be contained in the divine teaching; and also that of the diversities of souls, and of the origin of these diversities, and of the nature of the world, and the cause of its existence. We must learn also the origin of the great and terrible wickedness which overspreads the earth, and whether it is confined to this earth only, or prevails elsewhere. Now, while these and similar objects were present to the Spirit, who enlightened the souls of the holy ministers of the truth, there was a second object, for the sake of those who were unable to endure the fatigue of investigating matters so important, viz. to conceal the doctrine relating to the previously mentioned subjects, in expressions containing a narrative which conveyed an announcement regarding the things of the visible creation, the creation of man, and the successive descendants of the first men until they became numerous; and other histories relating the acts of just men, and the sins occasionally committed by these same men as being human beings, and the wicked deeds, both of unchastity and vice, committed by sinful and ungodly men. And what is most remarkable, by the history of wars, and of the victors, and the vanquished, certain mysteries are indicated to those who are able to test these statements. And more wonderful still, the laws of truth are predicted by the written legislation;—all these being described in a connected series, with a power which is truly in keeping with the wisdom of God. For it was intended that the covering also of the spiritual truths—I mean the “bodily” part of Scripture—should not be without profit in many cases, but should be capable of improving the multitude, according to their capacity.
Such, then, being the state of the case, the apostle, elevating our power of discernment [above the letter], says somewhere, “Behold Israel after the flesh,” as if there were an Israel “according to the Spirit.” And in another place he says, “For they who are the children of the flesh are not the children of God;” nor are “they all Israel who are of Israel;” nor is “he a Jew who is one outwardly, nor is that ‘circumcision’ which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew who is one ‘inwardly;’ and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter.” For if the judgment respecting the “Jew inwardly” be adopted, we must understand that, as there is a “bodily” race of Jews, so also is there a race of “Jews inwardly,” the soul having acquired this nobility for certain mysterious reasons. Moreover, there are many prophecies which predict regarding Israel and Judah what is about to befall them. And do not such promises as are written concerning them, in respect of their being mean in expression, and manifesting no elevation [of thought], nor anything worthy of the promise of God, need a mystical interpretation? And if the “spiritual” promises are announced by visible signs, then they to whom the promises are made are not “corporeal.” And not to linger over the point of the Jew who is a Jew “inwardly,” nor over that of the Israelite according to the “inner man”—these statements being sufficient for those who are not devoid of understanding—we return to our subject, and say that Jacob is the father of the twelve patriarchs, and they of the rulers of the people; and these, again, of the other Israelites. Do not, then, the “corporeal” Israelites refer their descent to the rulers of the people, and the rulers of the people to the patriarchs, and the patriarchs to Jacob, and those still higher up; while are not the “spiritual” Israelites, of whom the “corporeal” Israelites were the type, sprung from the families, and the families from the tribes, and the tribes from some one individual whose descent is not of a “corporeal” but of a better kind,—he, too, being born of Isaac, and he of Abraham,—all going back to Adam, whom the apostle declares to be Christ? For every beginning of those families which have relation to God as to the Father of all, took its commencement lower down with Christ, who is next to the God and Father of all, being thus the Father of every soul, as Adam is the father of all men. And if Eve also is intended by the apostle to refer to the church, it is not surprising that Cain, who was born of Eve, and all after him, whose descent goes back to Eve, should be types of the church, inasmuch as in a pre-eminent sense they are all descended from the church.
Paul, indeed, observing that there are in Greek philosophy certain things not to be lightly esteemed, which are plausible in the eyes of the many, but which represent falsehood as truth, says with regard to such: “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.” And seeing that there was a kind of greatness manifest in the words of the world’s wisdom, he said that the words of the philosophers were “according to the rudiments of the world.” No man of sense, however, would say that those of Celsus were “according to the rudiments of the world.” Now those words, which contained some element of deceitfulness, the apostle named “vain deceit,” probably by way of distinction from a deceit that was not “vain;” and the prophet Jeremiah observing this, ventured to say to God, “O Lord, Thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived; Thou art stronger than I, and hast prevailed.” But in the language of Celsus there seems to me to be no deceitfulness at all, not even that which is “vain;” such deceitfulness, viz., as is found in the language of those who have founded philosophical sects, and who have been endowed with no ordinary talent for such pursuits. And as no one would say that any ordinary error in geometrical demonstrations was intended to deceive, or would describe it for the sake of exercise in such matters; so those opinions which are to be styled “vain deceit,” and the “tradition of men,” and “according to the rudiments of the world,” must have some resemblance to the views of those who have been the founders of philosophical sects, [if such titles are to be appropriately applied to them].
The Jew, moreover, in the treatise, addresses the Saviour thus: “If you say that every man, born according to the decree of Divine Providence, is a son of God, in what respect should you differ from another?” In reply to whom we say, that every man who, as Paul expresses it, is no longer under fear, as a schoolmaster, but who chooses good for its own sake, is “a son of God;” but this man is distinguished far and wide above every man who is called, on account of his virtues, a son of God, seeing He is, as it were, a kind of source and beginning of all such. The words of Paul are as follow: “For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.” But, according to the Jew of Celsus, “countless individuals will convict Jesus of falsehood, alleging that those predictions which were spoken of him were intended of them.” We are not aware, indeed, whether Celsus knew of any who, after coming into this world, and having desired to act as Jesus did, declared themselves to be also the “sons of God,” or the “power” of God. But since it is in the spirit of truth that we examine each passage, we shall mention that there was a certain Theudas among the Jews before the birth of Christ, who gave himself out as some great one, after whose death his deluded followers were completely dispersed. And after him, in the days of the census, when Jesus appears to have been born, one Judas, a Galilean, gathered around him many of the Jewish people, saying he was a wise man, and a teacher of certain new doctrines. And when he also had paid the penalty of his rebellion, his doctrine was overturned, having taken hold of very few persons indeed, and these of the very humblest condition. And after the times of Jesus, Dositheus the Samaritan also wished to persuade the Samaritans that he was the Christ predicted by Moses; and he appears to have gained over some to his views. But it is not absurd, in quoting the extremely wise observation of that Gamaliel named in the book of Acts, to show how those persons above mentioned were strangers to the promise, being neither “sons of God” nor “powers” of God, whereas Christ Jesus was truly the Son of God. Now Gamaliel, in the passage referred to, said: “If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought” (as also did the designs of those men already mentioned after their death); “but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow this doctrine, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.” There was also Simon the Samaritan magician, who wished to draw away certain by his magical arts. And on that occasion he was successful; but now-a-days it is impossible to find, I suppose, thirty of his followers in the entire world, and probably I have even overstated the number. There are exceedingly few in Palestine; while in the rest of the world, through which he desired to spread the glory of his name, you find it nowhere mentioned. And where it is found, it is found quoted from the Acts of the Apostles; so that it is to Christians that he owes this mention of himself, the unmistakeable result having proved that Simon was in no respect divine.
After this the Jew makes another silly remark, saying, “How is it that, if Jesus pointed out beforehand both the traitor and the perjurer, they did not fear him as a God, and cease, the one from his intended treason, and the other from his perjury?” Here the learned Celsus did not see the contradiction in his statement: for if Jesus foreknew events as a God, then it was impossible for His foreknowledge to prove untrue; and therefore it was impossible for him who was known to Him as going to betray Him not to execute his purpose, nor for him who was rebuked as going to deny Him not to have been guilty of that crime. For if it had been possible for the one to abstain from the act of betrayal, and the other from that of denial, as having been warned of the consequences of these actions beforehand, then His words were no longer true, who predicted that the one would betray Him and the other deny Him. For if He had foreknowledge of the traitor, He knew the wickedness in which the treason originated, and this wickedness was by no means taken away by the foreknowledge. And, again, if He had ascertained that one would deny Him, He made that prediction from seeing the weakness out of which that act of denial would arise, and yet this weakness was not to be taken away thus at once by the foreknowledge. But whence he derived the statement, “that these persons betrayed and denied him without manifesting any concern about him,” I know not; for it was proved, with respect to the traitor, that it is false to say that he betrayed his master without an exhibition of anxiety regarding Him. And this was shown to be equally true of him who denied Him; for he went out, after the denial, and wept bitterly.
Immediately after this, Celsus, assailing the contents of the first book of Moses, which is entitled “Genesis,” asserts that “the Jews accordingly endeavoured to derive their origin from the first race of jugglers and deceivers, appealing to the testimony of dark and ambiguous words, whose meaning was veiled in obscurity, and which they misinterpreted to the unlearned and ignorant, and that, too, when such a point had never been called in question during the long preceding period.” Now Celsus appears to me in these words to have expressed very obscurely the meaning which he intended to convey. It is probable, indeed, that his obscurity on this subject is intentional, inasmuch as he saw the strength of the argument which establishes the descent of the Jews from their ancestors; while again, on the other hand, he wished not to appear ignorant that the question regarding the Jews and their descent was one that could not be lightly disposed of. It is certain, however, that the Jews trace their genealogy back to the three fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And the names of these individuals possess such efficacy, when united with the name of God, that not only do those belonging to the nation employ in their prayers to God, and in the exorcising of demons, the words, “God of Abraham, and God of Isaac, and God of Jacob,” but so also do almost all those who occupy themselves with incantations and magical rites. For there is found in treatises on magic in many countries such an invocation of God, and assumption of the divine name, as implies a familiar use of it by these men in their dealings with demons. These facts, then—adduced by Jews and Christians to prove the sacred character of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, the fathers of the Jewish race—appear to me not to have been altogether unknown to Celsus, but not to have been distinctly set forth by him, because he was unable to answer the argument which might be founded on them.
In the next place, as it is his object to slander our Scriptures, he ridicules the following statement: “And God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof. And the rib, which He had taken from the man, made He a woman,” and so on; without quoting the words, which would give the hearer the impression that they are spoken with a figurative meaning. He would not even have it appear that the words were used allegorically, although he says afterwards, that “the more modest among Jews and Christians are ashamed of these things, and endeavour to give them somehow an allegorical signification.” Now we might say to him, Are the statements of your “inspired” Hesiod, which he makes regarding the woman in the form of a myth, to be explained allegorically, in the sense that she was given by Jove to men as an evil thing, and as a retribution for the theft of “the fire;” while that regarding the woman who was taken from the side of the man (after he had been buried in deep slumber), and was formed by God, appears to you to be related without any rational meaning and secret signification? But is it not uncandid, not to ridicule the former as myths, but to admire them as philosophical ideas in a mythical dress, and to treat with contempt the latter, as offending the understanding, and to declare that they are of no account? For if, because of the mere phraseology, we are to find fault with what is intended to have a secret meaning, see whether the following lines of Hesiod, a man, as you say, “inspired,” are not better fitted to excite laughter:
And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as “worse than the crimes of Thyestes.” The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: “Look not behind thee, neither stay thou in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest thou be consumed;” nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions—good, bad, and indifferent—has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to “things indifferent,” that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending [its full meaning], saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughters in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offence at the desire of Lot’s daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations—Moab and Ammon—have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
And since he asserts that, “when ants die, the survivors set apart a special place [for their interment], and that their ancestral sepulchres such a place is,” we have to answer, that the greater the laudations which he heaps upon irrational animals, so much the more does he magnify (although against his will) the work of that reason which arranged all things in order, and points out the skill which exists among men, and which is capable of adorning by its reason even the gifts which are bestowed by nature on the irrational creation. But why do I say “irrational,” since Celsus is of opinion that these animals, which, agreeably to the common ideas of all men, are termed irrational, are not really so? Nor does he regard the ants as devoid of reason, who professed to speak of “universal nature,” and who boasted of his truthfulness in the inscription of his book. For, speaking of the ants conversing with one another, he uses the following language: “And when they meet one another they enter into conversation, for which reason they never mistake their way; consequently they possess a full endowment of reason, and some common ideas on certain general subjects, and a voice by which they express themselves regarding accidental things.” Now conversation between one man and another is carried on by means of a voice, which gives expression to the meaning intended, and which also gives utterances concerning what are called “accidental things;” but to say that this was the case with ants would be a most ridiculous assertion.
But since he has ridiculed at great length the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, which has been preached in the churches, and which is more clearly understood by the more intelligent believer; and as it is unnecessary again to quote his words, which have been already adduced, let us, with regard to the problem (as in an apologetic work directed against an alien from the faith, and for the sake of those who are still “children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive”), state and establish to the best of our ability a few points expressly intended for our readers. Neither we, then, nor the Holy Scriptures, assert that with the same bodies, without a change to a higher condition, “shall those who were long dead arise from the earth and live again;” for in so speaking, Celsus makes a false charge against us. For we may listen to many passages of Scripture treating of the resurrection in a manner worthy of God, although it may suffice for the present to quote the language of Paul from the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where he says: “But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body.” Now, observe how in these words he says that there is sown, “not that body that shall be;” but that of the body which is sown and cast naked into the earth (God giving to each seed its own body), there takes place as it were a resurrection: from the seed that was cast into the ground there arising a stalk, e.g. among such plants as the following, viz. the mustard plant, or of a larger tree, as in the olive, or one of the fruit-trees.
It appears to me, indeed, that Celsus has misunderstood some of the deeper reasons relating to the arrangement of terrestrial affairs, some of which are touched upon even in Grecian history, when certain of those who are considered to be gods are introduced as having contended with each other about the possession of Attica; while in the writings of the Greek poets also, some who are called gods are represented as acknowledging that certain places here are preferred by them before others. The history of barbarian nations, moreover, and especially that of Egypt, contains some such allusions to the division of the so-called Egyptian nomes, when it states that Athena, who obtained Saïs by lot, is the same who also has possession of Attica. And the learned among the Egyptians can enumerate innumerable instances of this kind, although I do not know whether they include the Jews and their country in this division. And now, so far as testimonies outside the word of God bearing on this point are concerned, enough have been adduced for the present. We say, moreover, that our prophet of God and His genuine servant Moses, in his song in the book of Deuteronomy, makes a statement regarding the portioning out of the earth in the following terms: “When the Most High divided the nations, when He dispersed the sons of Adam, He set the bounds of the people according to the number of the angels of God; and the Lord’s portion was His people Jacob, and Israel the cord of His inheritance.” And regarding the distribution of the nations, the same Moses, in his work entitled Genesis, thus expresses himself in the style of a historical narrative: “And the whole earth was of one language and of one speech; and it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar, and they dwelt there.” A little further on he continues: “And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men had built. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they have begun to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech. And the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city and the tower. Therefore is the name of it called Confusion; because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.” In the treatise of Solomon, moreover, on “Wisdom,” and on the events at the time of the confusion of languages, when the division of the earth took place, we find the following regarding Wisdom: “Moreover, the nations. in their wicked conspiracy being confounded, she found out the righteous, and preserved him blameless unto God, and kept him strong in his tender compassion towards his son.” But on these subjects much, and that of a mystical kind, might be said; in keeping with which is the following: “It is good to keep close the secret of a king,”—in order that the doctrine of the entrance of souls into bodies (not, however, that of the transmigration from one body into another) may not be thrown before the common understanding, nor what is holy given to the dogs, nor pearls be cast before swine. For such a procedure would be impious, being equivalent to a betrayal of the mysterious declarations of God’s wisdom, of which it has been well said: “Into a malicious soul wisdom shall not enter, nor dwell in a body subject to sin.” It is sufficient, however, to represent in the style of a historic narrative what is intended to convey a secret meaning in the garb of history, that those who have the capacity may work out for themselves all that relates to the subject.
In this diagram were described ten circles, distinct from each other, but united by one circle, which was said to be the soul of all things, and was called “Leviathan.” This Leviathan, the Jewish Scriptures say, whatever they mean by the expression, was created by God for a plaything; for we find in the Psalms: “In wisdom hast Thou made all things: the earth is full of Thy creatures; so is this great and wide sea. There go the ships; small animals with great; there is this dragon, which Thou hast formed to play therein.” Instead of the word “dragon,” the term “leviathan” is in the Hebrew. This impious diagram, then, said of this leviathan, which is so clearly depreciated by the psalmist, that it was the soul which had travelled through all things! We observed, also, in the diagram, the being named “Behemoth,” placed as it were under the lowest circle. The inventor of this accursed diagram had inscribed this leviathan at its circumference and centre, thus placing its name in two separate places. Moreover, Celsus says that the diagram was “divided by a thick black line, and this line he asserted was called Gehenna, which is Tartarus.” Now as we found that Gehenna was mentioned in the Gospel as a place of punishment, we searched to see whether it is mentioned anywhere in the ancient Scriptures, and especially because the Jews too use the word. And we ascertained that where the valley of the son of Ennom was named in Scripture in the Hebrew, instead of “valley,” with fundamentally the same meaning, it was termed both the valley of Ennom and also Geenna. And continuing our researches, we find that what was termed “Geenna,” or “the valley of Ennom,” was included in the lot of the tribe of Benjamin, in which Jerusalem also was situated. And seeking to ascertain what might be the inference from the heavenly Jerusalem belonging to the lot of Benjamin and the valley of Ennom, we find a certain confirmation of what is said regarding the place of punishment, intended for the purification of such souls as are to be purified by torments, agreeably to the saying: “The Lord cometh like a refiner’s fire, and like fuller’s soap: and He shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver and of gold.”
After finishing the foregoing, and those analogous matters which we ourselves have added, Celsus continues as follows: “They continue to heap together one thing after another,—discourses of prophets, and circles upon circles, and effluents from an earthly church, and from circumcision; and a power flowing from one Prunicos, a virgin and a living soul; and a heaven slain in order to live, and an earth slaughtered by the sword, and many put to death that they may live, and death ceasing in the world, when the sin of the world is dead; and, again, a narrow way, and gates that open spontaneously. And in all their writings [is mention made] of the tree of life, and a resurrection of the flesh by means of the ‘tree,’ because, I imagine, their teacher was nailed to a cross, and was a carpenter by trade; so that if he had chanced to have been cast from a precipice, or thrust into a pit, or suffocated by hanging, or had been a leather-cutter, or stone-cutter, or worker in iron, there would have been [invented] a precipice of life beyond the heavens, or a pit of resurrection, or a cord of immortality, or a blessed stone, or an iron of love, or a sacred leather! Now what old woman would not be ashamed to utter such things in a whisper, even when making stories to lull an infant to sleep?” In using such language as this, Celsus appears to me to confuse together matters which he has imperfectly heard. For it seems likely that, even supposing that he had heard a few words traceable to some existing heresy, he did not clearly understand the meaning intended to be conveyed; but heaping the words together, he wished to show before those who knew nothing either of our opinions or of those of the heretics, that he was acquainted with all the doctrines of the Christians. And this is evident also from the foregoing words.
After thus misrepresenting our views of the nature of God, Celsus goes on to ask of us “where we hope to go after death;” and he makes our answer to be, “to another land better than this.” On this he comments as follows: “The divine men of a former age have spoken of a happy life reserved for the souls of the blessed. Some designated it ‘the isles of the blest,’ and others ‘the Elysian plain,’ so called because they were there to be delivered from their present evils. Thus Homer says: ‘But the gods shall send thee to the Elysian plain, on the borders of the earth, where they lead a most quiet life.’ Plato also, who believed in the immortality of the soul, distinctly gives the name ‘land’ to the place where it is sent. ‘The extent of it,’ says he, ‘is immense, and we only occupy a small portion of it, from the Phasis to the Pillars of Hercules, where we dwell along the shores of the sea, as grasshoppers and frogs beside a marsh. But there are many other places inhabited in like manner by other men. For there are in different parts of the earth cavities, varying in form and in magnitude, into which run water, and clouds, and air. But that land which is pure lies in the pure region of heaven.’” Celsus therefore supposes that what we say of a land which is much better and more excellent than this, has been borrowed from certain ancient writers whom he styles “divine,” and chiefly from Plato, who in his Phœdon discourses on the pure land lying in a pure heaven. But he does not see that Moses, who is much older than the Greek literature, introduces God as promising to those who lived according to His law the holy land, which is “a good land and a large, a land flowing with milk and honey;” which promise is not to be understood to refer, as some suppose, to that part of the earth which we call Judæa; for it, however good it may be, still forms part of the earth, which was originally cursed for the transgression of Adam. For these words, “Cursed shall the ground be for what thou hast done; with grief, that is, with labour, shalt thou eat of the fruit of it all the days of thy life,” were spoken of the whole earth, the fruit of which every man who died in Adam eats with sorrow or labour all the days of his life. And as all the earth has been cursed, it brings forth thorns and briers all the days of the life of those who in Adam were driven out of paradise; and in the sweat of his face every man eats bread until he returns to the ground from which he was taken. For the full exposition of all that is contained in this passage much might be said; but we have confined ourselves to these few words at present, which are intended to remove the idea, that what is said of the good land promised by God to the righteous, refers to the land of Judæa.
He next represents Christians as saying what he never heard from any Christian; or if he did, it must have been from one of the most ignorant and lawless of the people. “Behold,” they are made to say, “I go up to a statue of Jupiter or Apollo, or some other god: I revile it, and beat it, yet it takes no vengeance on me.” He is not aware that among the prohibitions of the divine law is this, “Thou shalt not revile the gods,” and this is intended to prevent the formation of the habit of reviling any one whatever; for we have been taught, “Bless, and curse not,” and it is said that “revilers shall not inherit the kingdom of God.” And who amongst us is so foolish as to speak in the way Celsus describes, and to fail to see that such contemptuous language can be of no avail for removing prevailing notions about the gods? For it is matter of observation that there are men who utterly deny the existence of a God or of an overruling providence, and who by their impious and destructive teaching have founded sects among those who are called philosophers, and yet neither they themselves, nor those who have embraced their opinions, have suffered any of those things which mankind generally account evils: they are both strong in body and rich in possessions. And yet if we ask what loss they have sustained, we shall find that they have suffered the most certain injury. For what greater injury can befall a man than that he should be unable amidst the order of the world to see Him who has made it? and what sorer affliction can come to any one than that blindness of mind which prevents him from seeing the Creator and Father of every soul?
The Zohar (selections)
Rabbi Schimeon spake unto his companions, and said: “When that veil is expanded (by which is to be understood the representation of the beard of Macroprosopus) which ye behold above us, I see that all the conformations have descended therein, and that they shine forth in that place. (Now like as if he intended to say, AMN, Amen, the discourse concerning Macroprosopus being finished, he describeth this particular symbolism, which is contained in the ensuing symbols.)
And although everywhere it be called the hand of Tetragrammaton, it is understood (that sometimes) the left hand (is intended to be spoken of). For if they be benevolent, it is called the right hand of Tetragrammaton, and the hand is included in the arm, and is for aid, and is called the hand; and if, on the other hand, it be not so, the inferior hand of Tetragrammaton is (to be understood).
What is this passage intended to imply? Assuredly the sense of these words, “they know not,” is this, “They do not know, and they do not wish to know.”
The Book of the Cave of Treasures
And whilst Christ was in the grave, and the watchmen were sitting round about it, Simon Peter conceived the design of giving the watchmen wine to drink so that they might become drunk and fall asleep, when he intended to rise up and open the tomb, and take out the body of Christ without breaking the seals on the tomb, so that the Jews might not say, “‘ Assuredly His disciples stole Him away.” And whilst the watchmen were eating and drinking, Christ rose up and showed Himself to Kipa (Peter), for He had indeed risen. And Peter believed that He was truly Christ, the Lord of the heavens and the earth, and did not approach the tomb. And afterwards Christ also appeared to the watchmen openly, and He went to His disciples in the Upper Chamber, and Thomas felt Him. And He appeared to His disciples on the sea shore. Now, though Simon Peter denied Him thrice before the Jews, he acknowledged Him thrice before the disciples. And Christ delivered to him and committed to his hands all His flock, saying, before His disciples, “‘ Feed thou for Me My sheep and lambs and ewes,” that is to say, men, women and children. And forty days after His Resurrection He bestowed upon the Apostles the laying on of hands of the priesthood, and He went up to heaven, and sat down on the right hand of His Father.
The Book of the Bee
So also the blessed Diodorus, who says in the ‘ Book of the Dispensation V ‘A lasting reward, which is worthy of the justice of the Giver, is laid up for the good, in return for their labours; and torment for sinners, but not everlasting, that the immortality which is prepared for them may not be worthless. They must however be tormented for a short time, as they deserve, in proportion to the measure of their iniquity and wickedness, according to the amount of the wickedness of their deeds. This they will have to bear, that they suffer for a short time; but immortal and unending happiness is prepared for them. If it be then that the rewards of good deeds are as great (in proportion to them) as the times of the immortality which are prepared for them are longer than the times of the limited contests which take place in this world, the torments for many and great sins must be very much less than the greatness of mercy. So then it is not for the good only that the grace of the resurrection from the dead is intended, but also for the wicked; for the grace of God greatly honours the good, but chastises the wicked sparingly/ Again he says: ‘God pours out the wages of reward beyond the measure of the labours (wrought), and in the abundance of His goodness He lessens and diminishes the penalty of those who are to be tormented, and in His mercy He shortens and reduces the length of the time. But even thus He does not punish the whole time according to (the length of) the time of folly, seeing that He requites them far less than they deserve, just as He does the good beyond the measure and period (of their deserts); for the reward is everlasting. It has not been revealed whether the goodness of God wishes to punish without ceasing the blameworthy who have been found guilty of evil deeds (or not), as we have already said before.
The Mishnah
They may give terumah from oil for pickled olives, or from wine for grapes made into raisins. Behold, he gave terumah from oil for olives intended for eating, or from [other] olives for olives intended for eating, or for wine for grapes intended for eating, of from [other] grapes for grapes intended for eating, and he decided afterwards to press them, he need not give terumah again.
They may give terumah from oil for pickled olives, or from wine for grapes made into raisins. Behold, he gave terumah from oil for olives intended for eating, or from [other] olives for olives intended for eating, or for wine for grapes intended for eating, of from [other] grapes for grapes intended for eating, and he decided afterwards to press them, he need not give terumah again.
They may give terumah from oil for pickled olives, or from wine for grapes made into raisins. Behold, he gave terumah from oil for olives intended for eating, or from [other] olives for olives intended for eating, or for wine for grapes intended for eating, of from [other] grapes for grapes intended for eating, and he decided afterwards to press them, he need not give terumah again.
They may give terumah from oil for pickled olives, or from wine for grapes made into raisins. Behold, he gave terumah from oil for olives intended for eating, or from [other] olives for olives intended for eating, or for wine for grapes intended for eating, of from [other] grapes for grapes intended for eating, and he decided afterwards to press them, he need not give terumah again.
Dough which was originally [intended for] sponge-cakes, and in the end is [cooked as] sponge-cake, is exempt from hallah. [If it was] originally [ordinary] dough, but in the end [cooked as] sponge-cakes, [or if it was] originally [intended for] sponge-cakes, but finally [cooked as ordinary] dough, it is subject to hallah. Similarly, bread crumbs (kenuvkaot) are subject [to hallah].
Dough which was originally [intended for] sponge-cakes, and in the end is [cooked as] sponge-cake, is exempt from hallah. [If it was] originally [ordinary] dough, but in the end [cooked as] sponge-cakes, [or if it was] originally [intended for] sponge-cakes, but finally [cooked as ordinary] dough, it is subject to hallah. Similarly, bread crumbs (kenuvkaot) are subject [to hallah].
If he wrote with liquids, or with fruit juice, on the dust of the road, or on writer’s powder, or with anything that cannot endure, he is exempt. [If he wrote] with the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; If he wrote one letter near [other] writing, If he wrote on top of other writing; If he intended to write a cheth but wrote two zayyinin; [If he wrote] one [letter] on the ground and another on a beam; If he wrote on two walls of the house, or on two leaves of a ledger which are not read together, he is exempt. If he wrote one letter as an abbreviation: Rabbi Joshua ben Bathyra declares him liable, But the sages exempt him.
What is the minimum measure [for Shabbat border eruvin]? Food for two meals for each person, for weekdays and not for Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: for Shabbat and not for weekdays. And both intended to give a leniency. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: not less than a loaf that is purchased for a pondium when the price of wheat is four se’ah for a sela. Rabbi Shimon says: two thirds of a loaf, when three [loaves] are made from a kav [of wheat]. Half of this loaf is the size prescribed for a leprous house, and half of its half is the size that disqualifies one’s body [from eating terumah].
A priest who was wounded in his finger may wrap some reed-grass round it in the Temple but not in the country. But if he intended to draw out blood it is forbidden in both cases. They scatter salt on the altar’s ramp so that the priests shall not slip. They draw water by means of a wheel on Shabbat from the cistern of the exiles and from the great cistern, and on a festival day from the Hakar cistern.
A man may bring his produce indoors for fear of thieves and withdraw his flax from a soaking pool to prevent it spoiling, as long as he doesn’t intend to do this work during the festival. And all those who deliberately intended to do their work on the festival, they must leave it to spoil.
A virgin is given twelve months from the [time her intended] husband claimed her, [in which] to prepare herself for marriage. Just as [such a period] is given to the woman, so is it given to the man to prepare himself. A widow is given thirty days. If the time has come and they were not married they are entitled to receive maintenance from the man’s estate and [if he is a priest] they may eat terumah. Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her [all of her food] in terumah. Rabbi Akiva says: One half unconsecrated food and one half terumah.
Any get which is not written [expressly] for the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid. How is this so? If a man was passing through the street and heard the voice of a scribe dictating “So-and-so divorces so-and-so from such and such a place” and he says “that is my name and that is the name of my wife”, it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. Moreover: if he wrote [a get] with which to divorce his wife and changed his mind and a person found him and said to him, “My name is the same as yours and my wife’s name the same as your wife’s”, it is not a valid [document with which the second] may divorce his wife. Moreover: if he had two wives with the same name and wrote a get with which to divorce the elder, he may not use it to divorce the younger. Moreover: if he said to the scribe, “Write [a get] and I will divorce whichever I choose,” it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife.
If an ox was rubbing itself against a wall and it fell on a person; or if it intended to kill an animal and it killed a man; or if it intended to kill a gentile and it killed an Israelite; or if it intended to kill an untimely birth and it killed a viable infant, it is exempt [from death by stoning].
If an ox was rubbing itself against a wall and it fell on a person; or if it intended to kill an animal and it killed a man; or if it intended to kill a gentile and it killed an Israelite; or if it intended to kill an untimely birth and it killed a viable infant, it is exempt [from death by stoning].
If an ox was rubbing itself against a wall and it fell on a person; or if it intended to kill an animal and it killed a man; or if it intended to kill a gentile and it killed an Israelite; or if it intended to kill an untimely birth and it killed a viable infant, it is exempt [from death by stoning].
If an ox intended [to gore] another ox and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], its owner is not liable for the value of the offspring. But if a man intended to strike his fellow and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], he must pay the value of the offspring. How does he pay the value of the offspring? They assess the value of the woman before she gave birth and the value after she gave birth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If so, once a woman gives birth she is more valuable. Rather, they assess how much the offspring would be worth, and he pays it to the husband, or if she has no husband to his heirs.” If she was a freed bondwoman or a proselyte no penalty is incurred.
If an ox intended [to gore] another ox and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], its owner is not liable for the value of the offspring. But if a man intended to strike his fellow and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], he must pay the value of the offspring. How does he pay the value of the offspring? They assess the value of the woman before she gave birth and the value after she gave birth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If so, once a woman gives birth she is more valuable. Rather, they assess how much the offspring would be worth, and he pays it to the husband, or if she has no husband to his heirs.” If she was a freed bondwoman or a proselyte no penalty is incurred.
He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a sleeping man inflicted indignity, he is exempt. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity].
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive on the outside its intended place, [or] as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive on the outside its intended place, [or] as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive on the outside its intended place, [or] as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive on the outside its intended place, [or] as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
If he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of something else; if he drained out its blood for the sake of something else, or for its own sake and for the sake of something else, or for the sake of something else and for its own sake, it is unfit. An olah of a bird is fit [in such circumstances] except that it does not count for its owner’s obligation. A hatat of a bird or an olah of a bird which he nipped, or drained out the blood [with the intention] to eat what was normally eaten or to burn what was normally burned outside of the appropriate place, is invalid, but it does not involve karet; After the appropriate time, it is piggul and involves karet, Provided that the mattir was offered in accordance with the regulations. How does he offer the mattir according to regulations? If he nipped it in silence and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood in silence; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time: in these cases he offered the mattir according to regulation. How does he not offer the mattir according to regulation? If he nipped it [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of a different sacrifice and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice; or if he nipped it and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice: in these cases he did not offer the mattir according to regulation. [If he intended] to eat as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] as much as an olive the next day, [or] as much as an olive the next day [and] as much as an olive outside the appropriate place; Or half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] half as much as an olive the next day; Or half as much as an olive the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place, [the sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: if the [wrongful] intention of time precedes that of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [wrongful] intention of place precedes that of time, it is unfit and does not involve karet. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice is] unfit and does not involve karet. [If he intended] to eat half as much as an olive [outside the appropriate place or after the appropriate time] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is fit, for eating and burning do not combine.
If he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of something else; if he drained out its blood for the sake of something else, or for its own sake and for the sake of something else, or for the sake of something else and for its own sake, it is unfit. An olah of a bird is fit [in such circumstances] except that it does not count for its owner’s obligation. A hatat of a bird or an olah of a bird which he nipped, or drained out the blood [with the intention] to eat what was normally eaten or to burn what was normally burned outside of the appropriate place, is invalid, but it does not involve karet; After the appropriate time, it is piggul and involves karet, Provided that the mattir was offered in accordance with the regulations. How does he offer the mattir according to regulations? If he nipped it in silence and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood in silence; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time: in these cases he offered the mattir according to regulation. How does he not offer the mattir according to regulation? If he nipped it [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of a different sacrifice and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice; or if he nipped it and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice: in these cases he did not offer the mattir according to regulation. [If he intended] to eat as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] as much as an olive the next day, [or] as much as an olive the next day [and] as much as an olive outside the appropriate place; Or half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] half as much as an olive the next day; Or half as much as an olive the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place, [the sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: if the [wrongful] intention of time precedes that of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [wrongful] intention of place precedes that of time, it is unfit and does not involve karet. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice is] unfit and does not involve karet. [If he intended] to eat half as much as an olive [outside the appropriate place or after the appropriate time] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is fit, for eating and burning do not combine.
How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] outside the designated place, [and] put it in a vessel, carried it to the altar, and burned [with the intention of eating it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] after its designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned it [intending to eat it] outside its designated place, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat it] outside its designated time. If one took out the fistful of a sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy for the sake of something else, and received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [from them, intending to eat] after their designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else; Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. In these cases the mattir was not offered in accordance with the law. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intended] to eat as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day, [or] as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] half as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] outside the designated place, [and] put it in a vessel, carried it to the altar, and burned [with the intention of eating it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] after its designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned it [intending to eat it] outside its designated place, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat it] outside its designated time. If one took out the fistful of a sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy for the sake of something else, and received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [from them, intending to eat] after their designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else; Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. In these cases the mattir was not offered in accordance with the law. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intended] to eat as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day, [or] as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] half as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] outside the designated place, [and] put it in a vessel, carried it to the altar, and burned [with the intention of eating it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] after its designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned it [intending to eat it] outside its designated place, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat it] outside its designated time. If one took out the fistful of a sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy for the sake of something else, and received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [from them, intending to eat] after their designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else; Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. In these cases the mattir was not offered in accordance with the law. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. [If one intended] to eat as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day, [or] as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] half as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. [If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
If he took out the handful [intending] to eat the remainder or to burn the handful the next day, in this case Rabbi Yose agrees that the offering is piggul and he is obligated for karet. [If he intended] to burn its frankincense the next day: Rabbi Yose says: it is invalid but he is not liable for karet. But the sages say: it is piggul and he is liable for karet. They said to him: how does this differ from an animal-offering? He said to them: with the animal-offering the blood, the flesh and the sacrificial portions are all one; but the frankincense is not part of the minhah.
The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not.
The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not.
The animal-offering can render the libations piggul after they have been sanctified in the vessel, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the libations cannot render the animal-offering piggul. Thus, if he slaughtered an animal-offering intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the libations are piggul; if he intended to offer the libations the next day, the libations are piggul but the animal-offering is not.
If he had an intention which makes piggul [with regard to the remainder of the minhah] during the [burning of the] handful and not during the [burning of the] frankincense, or during the [burning of the] frankincense and not during the [burning of the] incense: Rabbi Meir says: it is piggul and he is liable for karet for it; But the sages say: there is no karet unless he had an intention that makes piggul during the service of the whole of the mattir. The sages agree with Rabbi Meir with regard to a sinner’s minhah or a minhah of jealousy, that if he had an intention which makes piggul during the [burning of the] handful, [the remainder] is piggul and he is liable for karet for it, since the handful is the entire mattir. If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat the two loaves the next day, or if he burned one of the dishes of frankincense intending to eat the two rows [of the showbread] on the next day: Rabbi Meir says: it is piggul and he is liable for karet for it; But the sages say: it is not piggul, unless he had an intention that makes piggul during the service of the whole of the mattir. If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat part of it the next day, that [lamb] is piggul but the other [lamb] is valid. If he intended to eat the other [lamb] the next day, both are valid.
If he took the handful from the minhah intending to eat [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to eat or to burn [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to burn, the offering is valid. But Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. If he intended to eat less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to eat, or to burn less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to burn, the offering is valid. If he intended to eat a half of an olive's worth and to burn a half of an olive’s worth, the offering is valid, for eating and burning cannot be reckoned together.
If he took the handful from the minhah intending to eat [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to eat or to burn [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to burn, the offering is valid. But Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. If he intended to eat less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to eat, or to burn less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to burn, the offering is valid. If he intended to eat a half of an olive's worth and to burn a half of an olive’s worth, the offering is valid, for eating and burning cannot be reckoned together.
If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it. It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah. If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah. If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; for it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal. If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices.
If he does not wish to redeem it, he breaks its neck from behind with a large knife and buries it. The mitzvah of redemption takes priority over the miztzah of breaking its neck, for it says: “And if you don’t redeem it, you must break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). The mitzvah of designation takes priority over the mitzvah of redemption, for it says: “Who has betrothed her to himself, he must let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8). The mitzvah of yibbum is prior to the mitzvah of halitzah. [This was so] at first when they intended to carry out the mitzvah. But now that they do not intend to carry out the mitzvah, the [rabbis] have said: the mitzvah of halitzah takes priority over the mitzvah of yibbum. The mitzvah of redemption [of an unclean animal whose value has been dedicated to the Temple] is upon the owner. He takes priority over any other man, for it says: “If it is not redeemed, then it shall be sold according to your evaluation” (Leviticus 27:27).
If one says: “The offspring of this [pregnant animal] shall be an olah and it [the animal itself] shall be a shelamim,” his words stand. But if he says [first]: “It [the animal] shall be a shelamim” [and then], “and its offspring shall be an olah,” [its offspring] is regarded as the offspring of an shelamim, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if he intended [to say] this at first, since it is impossible to mention both kinds [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand; but if after he already said [intentionally]: this shall be a shelamim, and then he changed his mind and says: its offspring shall be an olah, [its offspring] is regarded as the offspring of a shelamim.
[If one says:] “Behold, this animal shall be the substitute of an olah and the substitute of a shelamim,” it is the substitute of an olah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if he originally intended this, since it is impossible to mention both names [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand. But if after he had already said: “This shall be the substitute of an olah,” he changed his mind and then said: “The substitute of a shelamim,” it is the substitute of an olah.
Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute regarding transgression of the same name, that in that case he is liable. About what did they dispute? About transgressions of different names: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat, And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah said: even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or grapes and he picked figs, white [grapes] and he picked black ones, or black and he picked white ones Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat. And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah said: I wonder whether Rabbi Joshua indeed declared him exempt in such a case. For then why is it written, “with which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23)? To exclude mindless action.
Every metal vessel that has a name of its own [is susceptible to impurity,] Except for a door, a bolt, a lock, a socket under a hinge, a hinge, a clapper, and the [threshold] groove under a door post, since these are intended to be attached to the ground.
Vessels of wood, leather, bone or glass: those that are flat are clean and those that form a receptacle are susceptible to impurity. If they are broken they become clean again. If one remade them into vessels they are susceptible to impurity henceforth. A chest, a box, a cupboard, a straw basket, a reed basket, or the tank of an Alexandrian ship, that have flat bottoms and can hold a minimum of forty se'ah in liquid measure which represent two kor in dry measure, are clean. All other vessels whether they can contain the minimum or cannot contain it, are susceptible to impurity, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: the tub of a wagon, the food chests of kings, the tanners trough, the tank of a small ship, and an ark, even though they are able to contain the minimum, are susceptible to impurity, since they are intended to be moved about with their contents. As to all other vessels, those that can contain the minimum are clean and those that cannot contain it are susceptible to impurity. There is no difference between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah except a baking trough which belongs to a householder.
All hangers are susceptible to impurity, except for those of a sifter and a sieve that are used by householders, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: all hangers are clean, excepting those of a sifter of flour-dealers, of a sieve used in threshing-floors, of a hand-sickle and of a detective's staff, since they aid when the instrument is in use. This is the general rule: [a hanger] that is intended to aid when the instrument is in use is susceptible to impurity and one intended to serve only as a hanger is clean.
All hangers are susceptible to impurity, except for those of a sifter and a sieve that are used by householders, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: all hangers are clean, excepting those of a sifter of flour-dealers, of a sieve used in threshing-floors, of a hand-sickle and of a detective's staff, since they aid when the instrument is in use. This is the general rule: [a hanger] that is intended to aid when the instrument is in use is susceptible to impurity and one intended to serve only as a hanger is clean.
The grist-dealers’ shovel is susceptible to impurity but the one used in grain stores is clean. The one used in wine-presses is susceptible to impurity but that used in threshing-floors is clean. This is the general rule: [a shovel] that is intended to hold anything is susceptible to impurity but one intended only to heap stuff together is clean.
The grist-dealers’ shovel is susceptible to impurity but the one used in grain stores is clean. The one used in wine-presses is susceptible to impurity but that used in threshing-floors is clean. This is the general rule: [a shovel] that is intended to hold anything is susceptible to impurity but one intended only to heap stuff together is clean.
Sometimes they stated a smaller measure: Liquid and dry measures were measured with the Italian standard which was the one that was used in the wilderness. Sometimes they stated a measure that varied according to the individual concerned: One who takes the handful of a minhah, One who takes both hands full of incense, One who drinks a cheek full on Yom Kippur, And the two meals for an eruv, The quantity being the food one eats on weekdays and not on Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: as on Shabbat and not as on weekdays. And both intended to give the more lenient ruling. Rabbi Shimon says: two thirds of a loaf, when three [loaves] are made of a kav. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: not less than a loaf that is purchased for a pundium when the price of wheat is four se'ah for a sela’.
There are three different types of hides: That which is used as a rug is susceptible to midras uncleanness; That which is used as a wrapper for vessels is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And that which is intended for straps and sandals is free from all uncleanness.
The following hides are susceptible to midras uncleanness: A hide which he intended to use as a rug, A hide used as an apron, A hide used as the lower covering of a bed, A hide used by a donkey-driver, A hide used by a flax-worker, A hide used by a porter, A hide used by a doctor, A hide used for a crib, A hide put over a child's chest, A hide for a cushion. A hide for a covering. All these are susceptible to midras uncleanness. A hide for wrapping up combed wool and a hide worn by a wool-comber: Rabbi Eliezer says it is susceptible to midras, But the sages say that it is susceptible to corpse uncleanness only.
If a hide had contracted midras uncleanness and its owner then intended it to be used for straps or sandals, it becomes clean as soon as he put the knife to it, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: it does not become clean until he has reduced its size to less than five handbreadths. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: even if one made a napkin from a hide it remains unclean, But if [he made one from] a covering it becomes clean.
If a piece of cloth three [handbreadths] square [was found] in a rubbish heap it must be both sound and capable of wrapping up salt; But [if it was found] in the house it need only be either sound or capable of wrapping up salt. How much salt must it be capable of wrapping up? A quarter of a kav. Rabbi Judah says: this refers to fine salt, But the sages stated: it refers to coarse salt. Both intended to be lenient. Rabbi Shimon says: the law concerning a piece of cloth three [handbreadths] square found in a rubbish heap is the same as that for a piece of cloth that was three [fingerbreadths] square in a house.
If a corpse is in a house in which there are many doors, they all become unclean. If one of them was opened, that one becomes unclean but all the rest remain clean. If he intended to carry out the corpse through one of them or through a window of four hand breadths square, he protects all the other doors. Bet Shammai says: the intention must have been formed before the person died. Bet Hillel say: even after he died. If [a door] was blocked up and it was decided to open it: Bet Shammai says: [it is effective] as soon he opens a [a space] four handbreadths square. Bet Hillel says: as soon as [the process] has begun. They agree, however, that when making an opening for the first time, four handbreadths must be opened up.
One who makes a new light hole, its minimum size is that of a hole made by the large drill of the Temple chamber. The remains of a light-hole [the size is] two fingerbreadths high by a thumb-breadth broad. The following is considered the remains of a light-hole: a window that a person had blocked up but had not been able to finish [being blocked up]. [A hole] that was bored by water, or by reptiles or eaten away by salt: the minimum size is that of a fist. If he intended to use it, its minimum size is one handbreadth square; For lighting its minimum size is that of a hole made by the drill. The holes in grating or lattice-work may be joined together to form [an opening] the size of a hole made by the drill, according to the opinion of Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel says: unless there is a hole of the size made by the drill in one place. [The above applies] for purposes of allowing the uncleanness to come in or to go out. Rabbi Shimon says: only for allowing the uncleanness to come in; but for allowing the uncleanness to go out [the minimum size] is one handbreadth square.
The following [objects serve to] reduce [the area of a square] handbreadth: [A portion] of less than an olive-size of flesh [of a corpse] reduces [the opening for uncleanness that is] caused by a quarter of a kav of bones [from a corpse]; [A portion] of less than a barley-corn size of bone reduces [the opening for uncleanness that is] caused by an olive-sized portion of flesh; Less than an olive-sized portion of a corpse, Less than an olive-sized portion of carrion, Less than a lentil-sized portion of sheretz; Less than an egg-sized portion of food; Produce growing next to the window, A cobweb having substance; The carcass of a clean bird that he did not intend to eat, And the carcass of an unclean bird that had been intended [for food] that had not been rendered susceptible [to uncleanness], or which had been rendered susceptible [to uncleanness] but had not been intended [for food].
The following [objects serve to] reduce [the area of a square] handbreadth: [A portion] of less than an olive-size of flesh [of a corpse] reduces [the opening for uncleanness that is] caused by a quarter of a kav of bones [from a corpse]; [A portion] of less than a barley-corn size of bone reduces [the opening for uncleanness that is] caused by an olive-sized portion of flesh; Less than an olive-sized portion of a corpse, Less than an olive-sized portion of carrion, Less than a lentil-sized portion of sheretz; Less than an egg-sized portion of food; Produce growing next to the window, A cobweb having substance; The carcass of a clean bird that he did not intend to eat, And the carcass of an unclean bird that had been intended [for food] that had not been rendered susceptible [to uncleanness], or which had been rendered susceptible [to uncleanness] but had not been intended [for food].
The following do not reduce [the area of the window]: Bone does not reduce [the area] for [other] bones; Nor [corpse] flesh for [other] flesh; Nor an olive-sized [portion] of a corpse; Nor an olive-sized portion of carrion; Nor a lentil-sized portion of reptile; Nor an egg-sized portion of food; Nor produce growing in the windows; Nor a cobweb having no substance; Nor the carcass of a clean bird which had been intended [for food]; Nor the carcass of an unclean bird which had been intended [for food] and had been rendered susceptible to uncleanness; Nor warp and woof threads that have negaim; Nor a brick from a bet haperas, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the brick can reduce, because the dust [of the bet haperas] is clean. This is the general rule: what is clean reduces [the area], and what is unclean does not reduce it.
The following do not reduce [the area of the window]: Bone does not reduce [the area] for [other] bones; Nor [corpse] flesh for [other] flesh; Nor an olive-sized [portion] of a corpse; Nor an olive-sized portion of carrion; Nor a lentil-sized portion of reptile; Nor an egg-sized portion of food; Nor produce growing in the windows; Nor a cobweb having no substance; Nor the carcass of a clean bird which had been intended [for food]; Nor the carcass of an unclean bird which had been intended [for food] and had been rendered susceptible to uncleanness; Nor warp and woof threads that have negaim; Nor a brick from a bet haperas, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the brick can reduce, because the dust [of the bet haperas] is clean. This is the general rule: what is clean reduces [the area], and what is unclean does not reduce it.
If one immersed a vessel for the hatat in water that is not fit for the mixing he must dry it; If in water that is fit for the mixing he need not dry it. But if [he intended] to collect in it water that was already mixed with the ashes, he must dry it in either case.
If five men filled five jars to prepare with them five mixtures, and then they changed their minds to prepare one mixture from all of them, or if they filled the jars to prepare with them one mixture and then they changed their minds to prepare with them five mixtures, all the water remains valid. If one man filled five jars intending to prepare five [separate] mixtures, [even though] he changed his mind to prepare one mixture from all of them, only the last is valid. If he intended to prepare one mixture from all of them and then he changed his mind to prepare five separate mixtures, only the water in the one that was mixed first is valid. If he said to another man, "Prepare mixtures from these for yourself," only the first is valid; But if he said, "Prepare a mixture from these for me," all are valid.
One who puts the jar away in order that it shall not be broken, or if he inverted it in order to dry it, [If he did one of these things] so that he might draw more water with it, [the water he had already drawn] is valid; But if he intended to carry in it the ashes, it is invalid. One who cleared potsherds from a trough: If in order that it may hold more water, the water is valid; But if he intended that they should not hinder him when he pours out the water, it is invalid.
One who puts the jar away in order that it shall not be broken, or if he inverted it in order to dry it, [If he did one of these things] so that he might draw more water with it, [the water he had already drawn] is valid; But if he intended to carry in it the ashes, it is invalid. One who cleared potsherds from a trough: If in order that it may hold more water, the water is valid; But if he intended that they should not hinder him when he pours out the water, it is invalid.
If one intended to drink the hatat water: Rabbi Eliezer says: it becomes invalid. Rabbi Joshua says: only when one tips the flask. Rabbi Yose said: To what does this apply? To water that had not yet been prepared, But in the case of water that had been prepared: Rabbi Eliezer says: it becomes invalid [only] when one tips the flask; And Rabbi Joshua says: [only] when one drinks. And if it was poured directly into one's throat, it remains valid.
If a person sprinkled and it is doubtful whether the water came from the thread or the spindle-reed or the buds, the sprinkling is invalid. If he sprinkled upon two vessels and it is doubtful whether he sprinkled on both or whether some water from the one dripped on to the other, it is invalid. If a needle was on a piece of earthenware and one sprinkled upon it, and it is doubtful whether he sprinkled on the needle or whether some water dripped on it from the earthenware, his sprinkling is invalid. A flask with a narrow mouth, one may dip in and draw out in the usual way. Rabbi Judah says: this may be done only for the first sprinkling. Hatat waters which were diminished, one may dip only the tips of the buds and sprinkle, provided the hyssop does not absorb [any of the moisture on the sides of the flask]. If one intended to sprinkle in front of him and he sprinkled behind him, or behind him and he sprinkled in front of him, his sprinkling is invalid. If he intended to sprinkle in front of him and he sprinkled to the sides in front of him, his sprinkling is valid. It is permitted to sprinkle upon a person with his knowledge or without his knowledge. It is permitted to sprinkle upon a person and vessels even though there are a hundred of them.
If a person sprinkled and it is doubtful whether the water came from the thread or the spindle-reed or the buds, the sprinkling is invalid. If he sprinkled upon two vessels and it is doubtful whether he sprinkled on both or whether some water from the one dripped on to the other, it is invalid. If a needle was on a piece of earthenware and one sprinkled upon it, and it is doubtful whether he sprinkled on the needle or whether some water dripped on it from the earthenware, his sprinkling is invalid. A flask with a narrow mouth, one may dip in and draw out in the usual way. Rabbi Judah says: this may be done only for the first sprinkling. Hatat waters which were diminished, one may dip only the tips of the buds and sprinkle, provided the hyssop does not absorb [any of the moisture on the sides of the flask]. If one intended to sprinkle in front of him and he sprinkled behind him, or behind him and he sprinkled in front of him, his sprinkling is invalid. If he intended to sprinkle in front of him and he sprinkled to the sides in front of him, his sprinkling is valid. It is permitted to sprinkle upon a person with his knowledge or without his knowledge. It is permitted to sprinkle upon a person and vessels even though there are a hundred of them.
If he intended to sprinkle upon a thing that is susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled upon something that is not susceptible to uncleanness, if any of the water still remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a thing that is not susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled on that which is susceptible to uncleanness, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a man and he sprinkled upon a beast, if any of the water remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again; But [if he intended to sprinkle] upon a beast and he sprinkled upon a man, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. The water that drips off is valid, and therefore it conveys uncleanness as the usual hatat waters.
If he intended to sprinkle upon a thing that is susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled upon something that is not susceptible to uncleanness, if any of the water still remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a thing that is not susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled on that which is susceptible to uncleanness, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a man and he sprinkled upon a beast, if any of the water remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again; But [if he intended to sprinkle] upon a beast and he sprinkled upon a man, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. The water that drips off is valid, and therefore it conveys uncleanness as the usual hatat waters.
If he intended to sprinkle upon a thing that is susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled upon something that is not susceptible to uncleanness, if any of the water still remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a thing that is not susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled on that which is susceptible to uncleanness, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a man and he sprinkled upon a beast, if any of the water remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again; But [if he intended to sprinkle] upon a beast and he sprinkled upon a man, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. The water that drips off is valid, and therefore it conveys uncleanness as the usual hatat waters.
If he intended to sprinkle upon a thing that is susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled upon something that is not susceptible to uncleanness, if any of the water still remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a thing that is not susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled on that which is susceptible to uncleanness, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a man and he sprinkled upon a beast, if any of the water remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again; But [if he intended to sprinkle] upon a beast and he sprinkled upon a man, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. The water that drips off is valid, and therefore it conveys uncleanness as the usual hatat waters.
They said a general rule with regard to clean food: whatever is designated as food for human consumption is susceptible to uncleanness unless it is rendered unfit to be food for a dog; And whatever is not designated as food for human consumption is not susceptible to uncleanness unless it is designated for human consumption. How so? If a pigeon fell into a wine-press and one intended to pick it out for an idolater, it becomes susceptible to uncleanness; but if he intended it for a dog it is not susceptible to uncleanness. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri rules that it is susceptible to uncleanness. If a deaf mute, one not of sound senses or a minor intended it as food, it remains insusceptible. But if they picked it up it becomes susceptible; since only an act of theirs is effective while their intention is of no consequence.