intentional

206 occurrences across the corpus

The Writings of Origen

Against Celsus, Book I 6:1

After this, through the influence of some motive which is unknown to me, Celsus asserts that it is by the names of certain demons, and by the use of incantations, that the Christians appear to be possessed of [miraculous] power; hinting, I suppose, at the practices of those who expel evil spirits by incantations. And here he manifestly appears to malign the gospel. For it is not by incantations that Christians seem to prevail [over evil spirits], but by the name of Jesus, accompanied by the announcement of the narratives which relate to Him; for the repetition of these has frequently been the means of driving demons out of men, especially when those who repeated them did so in a sound and genuinely believing spirit. Such power, indeed, does the name of Jesus possess over evil spirits, that there have been instances where it was effectual, when it was pronounced even by bad men, which Jesus Himself taught [would be the case], when He said: “Many shall say to me in that day, In Thy name we have cast out devils, and done many wonderful works.” Whether Celsus omitted this from intentional malignity, or from ignorance, I do not know. And he next proceeds to bring a charge against the Saviour Himself, alleging that it was by means of sorcery that He was able to accomplish the wonders which He performed; and that foreseeing that others would attain the same knowledge, and do the same things, making a boast of doing them by help of the power of God, He excludes such from His kingdom. And his accusation is, that if they are justly excluded, while He Himself is guilty of the same practices, He is a wicked man; but if He is not guilty of wickedness in doing such things, neither are they who do the same as He. But even if it be impossible to show by what power Jesus wrought these miracles, it is clear that Christians employ no spells or incantations, but the simple name of Jesus, and certain other words in which they repose faith, according to the Holy Scriptures.

Against Celsus, Book I 34:1

But it was, as the prophets also predicted, from a virgin that there was to be born, according to the promised sign, one who was to give His name to the fact, showing that at His birth God was to be with man. Now it seems to me appropriate to the character of a Jew to have quoted the prophecy of Isaiah, which says that Emmanuel was to be born of a virgin. This, however, Celsus, who professes to know everything, has not done, either from ignorance or from an unwillingness (if he had read it and voluntarily passed it by in silence) to furnish an argument which might defeat his purpose. And the prediction runs thus: “And the Lord spake again unto Ahaz, saying, Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God; ask it either in the depth or in the height above. But Ahaz said, I will not ask, neither will I tempt the Lord. And he said, Hear ye now, O house of David; is it a small thing for you to weary men, but will ye weary my God also? Therefore the Lord Himself shall give you a sign. Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call His name Immanuel, which is, being interpreted, God with us.” And that it was from intentional malice that Celsus did not quote this prophecy, is clear to me from this, that although he makes numerous quotations from the Gospel according to Matthew, as of the star that appeared at the birth of Christ, and other miraculous occurrences, he has made no mention at all of this. Now, if a Jew should split words, and say that the words are not, “Lo, a virgin,” but, “Lo, a young woman,” we reply that the word “Olmah”—which the Septuagint have rendered by “a virgin,” and others by “a young woman”—occurs, as they say, in Deuteronomy, as applied to a “virgin,” in the following connection: “If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her; then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die; the damsel, because she cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he humbled his neighbour’s wife.” And again: “But if a man find a betrothed damsel in a field, and the man force her, and lie with her: then the man only that lay with her shall die: but unto the damsel ye shall do nothing; there is in her no sin worthy of death.”

Against Celsus, Book IV 33:1

Immediately after this, Celsus, assailing the contents of the first book of Moses, which is entitled “Genesis,” asserts that “the Jews accordingly endeavoured to derive their origin from the first race of jugglers and deceivers, appealing to the testimony of dark and ambiguous words, whose meaning was veiled in obscurity, and which they misinterpreted to the unlearned and ignorant, and that, too, when such a point had never been called in question during the long preceding period.” Now Celsus appears to me in these words to have expressed very obscurely the meaning which he intended to convey. It is probable, indeed, that his obscurity on this subject is intentional, inasmuch as he saw the strength of the argument which establishes the descent of the Jews from their ancestors; while again, on the other hand, he wished not to appear ignorant that the question regarding the Jews and their descent was one that could not be lightly disposed of. It is certain, however, that the Jews trace their genealogy back to the three fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And the names of these individuals possess such efficacy, when united with the name of God, that not only do those belonging to the nation employ in their prayers to God, and in the exorcising of demons, the words, “God of Abraham, and God of Isaac, and God of Jacob,” but so also do almost all those who occupy themselves with incantations and magical rites. For there is found in treatises on magic in many countries such an invocation of God, and assumption of the divine name, as implies a familiar use of it by these men in their dealings with demons. These facts, then—adduced by Jews and Christians to prove the sacred character of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, the fathers of the Jewish race—appear to me not to have been altogether unknown to Celsus, but not to have been distinctly set forth by him, because he was unable to answer the argument which might be founded on them.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Terumot 5:9

If a seah of terumah fell into a hundred [of hullin], and they were ground together and reduced in bulk, just as the hullin was reduced so too the terumah was reduced, and it is permitted. If a seah of terumah fell into less than a hundred [of hullin] and they were ground together and increased in bulk, just as the hullin became more, so too the terumah became more, and it is forbidden. If it is known that the kernels of hullin were better than the terumah, it is permitted. If a seah of terumah fell into less than a hundred [of hullin], and more hullin fell in afterwards, if it was accidental it is permissible, but if intentional it is forbidden.

Mishnah Shabbat 11:6

If one throws [something] and remembers [that it is Shabbat] after it leaves his hand, and another catches it, or a dog catches it or it is burnt, he is not liable. If one throws [something] in order to inflict a wound whether to a person or a beast, and he remembers [that it is Shabbat] before the wound is inflicted he is not liable. This is the general principle: all who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and the end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. If their beginning is unwitting while their end is intentional, if their beginning is intentional while their end is unwitting, they are not liable, unless their beginning and end are intentional.

Mishnah Shabbat 11:6

If one throws [something] and remembers [that it is Shabbat] after it leaves his hand, and another catches it, or a dog catches it or it is burnt, he is not liable. If one throws [something] in order to inflict a wound whether to a person or a beast, and he remembers [that it is Shabbat] before the wound is inflicted he is not liable. This is the general principle: all who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and the end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. If their beginning is unwitting while their end is intentional, if their beginning is intentional while their end is unwitting, they are not liable, unless their beginning and end are intentional.

Mishnah Shabbat 11:6

If one throws [something] and remembers [that it is Shabbat] after it leaves his hand, and another catches it, or a dog catches it or it is burnt, he is not liable. If one throws [something] in order to inflict a wound whether to a person or a beast, and he remembers [that it is Shabbat] before the wound is inflicted he is not liable. This is the general principle: all who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and the end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. If their beginning is unwitting while their end is intentional, if their beginning is intentional while their end is unwitting, they are not liable, unless their beginning and end are intentional.

Mishnah Shevuot 1:6

For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.

Mishnah Shevuot 1:6

For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:8

What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man. If he swore concerning a thing which is impossible, [for instance if he said,] “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air”, or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press”. If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me”, [and they replied,] “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you”. If he swore to annul a commandment, [for example] not to make a sukkah, or not to take a lulav, or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:10

The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:11

A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. [In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:2

And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression. And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 4:2

And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression. And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 4:2

And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression. And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:1

The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:1

The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:1

The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.

Mishnah Keritot 2:4

A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.

Mishnah Keritot 2:6

In the case of all forbidden relations, if one partner was an adult and the other a minor, the minor is exempt; If one is awake and the other asleep, the one asleep is exempt; If one is an inadvertent and the other intentional, the former is liable to a hatat, the latter to karet.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 4:10

HALAKHAH: It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: “One punishes him and takes away from him both the cut and the standing produce.” That refers to intentional misconduct; does it apply even to action in error or even to small sheaves?

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 5:2

HALAKHAH: Here you say that “one estimates what amount of gleanings that would have yielded, and he gives that to the poor.” But there, you say “all ears that touch the ground are for the poor.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They fined him because he put the stack on the gleanings of the poor. That is for intentional transgression; it is also for unintentional error, for sheaves, for a wheat stack on top of barley, even if it was stacked by others without his knowledge, even if he called the poor and they did not come.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:19

Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: “Unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally” when it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states this: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if unintentionally it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”; “unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally”, when it is [equally] forbidden. It was stated: “What was cooked on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally never. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rav in his own group instructed following Rebbi Meïr, in public following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he instructed us following Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. As it was stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, in any case where an intentional sin is punished by extirpation and an unintentional sin by an expiatory offering, if the sin was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both for him and for others; it may not be eaten. In any case an intentional sin is not punished by extirpation and for the unintentional sin no expiatory offering is due; if it was done on the Sabbath unintentionally the result may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”. Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Did not Rav Huna say in the name of Rav and did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:19

Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: “Unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally” when it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states this: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if unintentionally it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”; “unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally”, when it is [equally] forbidden. It was stated: “What was cooked on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally never. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rav in his own group instructed following Rebbi Meïr, in public following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he instructed us following Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. As it was stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, in any case where an intentional sin is punished by extirpation and an unintentional sin by an expiatory offering, if the sin was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both for him and for others; it may not be eaten. In any case an intentional sin is not punished by extirpation and for the unintentional sin no expiatory offering is due; if it was done on the Sabbath unintentionally the result may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”. Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Did not Rav Huna say in the name of Rav and did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 5:22

MISHNAH: A seah of heave which fell into 100, if he milled it and it lost volume, in proportion to what the profane lost, the heave lost, and it is permitted. A seah of heave which fell into less than 100, if he milled it and it increased in volume, in proportion to the increase of the profane is the increase of heave, and it is forbidden. If it is known that the profane wheat was of better quality than the heave, it might be permitted. If a seah of heave fell into less than 100 and more profane fell into it later, if it was in error, it is permitted, if intentional, it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 5:25

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All forbidden things, if one added against them in error, it is permitted, intentionally it is forbidden. Is that not the Mishnah: “if it was in error, it is permitted, if intentional, it is forbidden”? The Mishnah is about heave, he comes to tell you about all other things.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 6:3

Did not Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he is in error about fat but intentional about a sacrifice, he can be warned, is whipped, and brings a sacrifice. Say also here, if he has intention about heave but is inadvertent about the fifth, one should warn him and he should be whipped and bring a fifth. Rebbi Zeїra said, it is a decision of the verse, “if somebody eats heave in error,” that all his eating should be in error. If he is intentional in doubt it is as if he is unintentional in his certainty. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody forgot after he knew, he is guilty unintentionally.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 6:3

Did not Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he is in error about fat but intentional about a sacrifice, he can be warned, is whipped, and brings a sacrifice. Say also here, if he has intention about heave but is inadvertent about the fifth, one should warn him and he should be whipped and bring a fifth. Rebbi Zeїra said, it is a decision of the verse, “if somebody eats heave in error,” that all his eating should be in error. If he is intentional in doubt it is as if he is unintentional in his certainty. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody forgot after he knew, he is guilty unintentionally.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:4

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of a living animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him [from paying]. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:4

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of a living animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him [from paying]. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:7

Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! Did we not state “If somebody eats heave in error”? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, he is whipped and pays. But did we not state: “If somebody eats heave intentionally”? In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said, when he pays he is not flogged, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish holds with Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and he pays.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:7

Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! Did we not state “If somebody eats heave in error”? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, he is whipped and pays. But did we not state: “If somebody eats heave intentionally”? In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said, when he pays he is not flogged, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish holds with Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and he pays.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:11

In error for heave and intentional for leavened, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:11

In error for heave and intentional for leavened, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:11

In error for heave and intentional for leavened, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:12

There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. The Mishnah is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since they stated: “Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started, so the Day of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, this one will become permitted after her prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation applies also to this one, he does not have to pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:12

There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. The Mishnah is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since they stated: “Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started, so the Day of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, this one will become permitted after her prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation applies also to this one, he does not have to pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 3:4

It was stated: All that was brought from the field to town became ṭevel. The baraita is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “ If somebody brought figs from the field to eat them in his unprotected courtyard, then forgot and brought them into his house or the children brought them, he may bring them back to their intended place and eat.” They said that only concerning error; therefore, if intentional it is forbidden. Who stated this? Rebbi! As it was stated: “ If somebody brought figs from the field to eat them on his roof, Rebbi obligates, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah frees.” It is as it was stated, “if somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces;” therefore, if it is not to cut into pieces he is obligated.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:4

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 3:37

HALAKHAH: If they fell down and broke, whether unintentionally or intentionally they should not be lifted, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, whether unintentionally or intentionally they may be lifted. Rebbi Yose says, unintentionally they may be lifted, intentionally they may not be lifted. What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? They fined for the unintentional because of the intentional. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? He already paid his fine. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? As Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, any prohibited item to which [something permitted] was added, unintentionally it is permitted, intentionally it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:12

What is the difference between intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works or in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works? Rebbi Yose said, why intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works makes him liable for each single one? For if you tell him that this is [forbidden] work, he stops doing it and does other works. Why in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works makes him liable only once? For if you tell him that it is a Sabbath, he stops immediately. What if he is in error in both respects? Rav Hamnuna said, he is liable only once. Rebbi Zeˋira said to him, is that not a case a fortiori? If he is intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works, is he not liable for each single one? Because there was added for him the error regarding work on the Sabbath; the error about works is lost?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:12

What is the difference between intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works or in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works? Rebbi Yose said, why intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works makes him liable for each single one? For if you tell him that this is [forbidden] work, he stops doing it and does other works. Why in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works makes him liable only once? For if you tell him that it is a Sabbath, he stops immediately. What if he is in error in both respects? Rav Hamnuna said, he is liable only once. Rebbi Zeˋira said to him, is that not a case a fortiori? If he is intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works, is he not liable for each single one? Because there was added for him the error regarding work on the Sabbath; the error about works is lost?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:12

What is the difference between intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works or in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works? Rebbi Yose said, why intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works makes him liable for each single one? For if you tell him that this is [forbidden] work, he stops doing it and does other works. Why in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works makes him liable only once? For if you tell him that it is a Sabbath, he stops immediately. What if he is in error in both respects? Rav Hamnuna said, he is liable only once. Rebbi Zeˋira said to him, is that not a case a fortiori? If he is intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works, is he not liable for each single one? Because there was added for him the error regarding work on the Sabbath; the error about works is lost?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:12

What is the difference between intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works or in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works? Rebbi Yose said, why intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works makes him liable for each single one? For if you tell him that this is [forbidden] work, he stops doing it and does other works. Why in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works makes him liable only once? For if you tell him that it is a Sabbath, he stops immediately. What if he is in error in both respects? Rav Hamnuna said, he is liable only once. Rebbi Zeˋira said to him, is that not a case a fortiori? If he is intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works, is he not liable for each single one? Because there was added for him the error regarding work on the Sabbath; the error about works is lost?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:12

What is the difference between intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works or in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works? Rebbi Yose said, why intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works makes him liable for each single one? For if you tell him that this is [forbidden] work, he stops doing it and does other works. Why in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works makes him liable only once? For if you tell him that it is a Sabbath, he stops immediately. What if he is in error in both respects? Rav Hamnuna said, he is liable only once. Rebbi Zeˋira said to him, is that not a case a fortiori? If he is intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works, is he not liable for each single one? Because there was added for him the error regarding work on the Sabbath; the error about works is lost?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:13

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:13

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:14

Rebbi Ḥanania said, this is not what he said but he harvested half the volume of a dried fig in the morning, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig in the evening, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose did not address this, he said something similar. If one ate half the volume of an olive being aware of the Sanctuary but oblivious of impurity and half the volume of an olive being oblivious of the Sanctuary but aware of impurity; do the oblivions combine?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:14

Rebbi Ḥanania said, this is not what he said but he harvested half the volume of a dried fig in the morning, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig in the evening, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose did not address this, he said something similar. If one ate half the volume of an olive being aware of the Sanctuary but oblivious of impurity and half the volume of an olive being oblivious of the Sanctuary but aware of impurity; do the oblivions combine?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:26

HALAKHAH: 6 So is the Mishnah: “he acted intentionally.” This is difficult. If somebody shot an arrow intending to kill a person, he was warned, and changed his intention; is that anything? Finally you have to say that it was intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:27

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, unintentionally a prohibition, intentionally a prohibition. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, unintentionally extirpation, intentionally extirpation. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated, a support of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He blasphemes the Eternal and will be extirpated. Think of it; even if he was intentional in a matter of extirpation and he was warned and is being flogged, may he bring a sacrifice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was unintentional about fat but intentional about the purification sacrifice one warns him and he is flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:27

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, unintentionally a prohibition, intentionally a prohibition. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, unintentionally extirpation, intentionally extirpation. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated, a support of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He blasphemes the Eternal and will be extirpated. Think of it; even if he was intentional in a matter of extirpation and he was warned and is being flogged, may he bring a sacrifice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was unintentional about fat but intentional about the purification sacrifice one warns him and he is flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:13

Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish were staying in Rebbi Isaac’s street. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish carried, according to his opinion, Rebbi Joḥanan did not carry, according to his opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan neither forbade nor carried; he said, let the dwellers in the alley be in error, lest they be intentional. What, did he carry or did he not carry? If you say that he carried, then Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion did change. If you say that he did not carry, it should be forbidden to the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Joḥanan annulled his rights. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish forced Rebbi Joḥanan and he carried. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is correct. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? They considered him as unintentional compared to intentional. What is the rabbis’ opinion? Since they are suspected of carrying they are as if intentional. They told him, if this be so then the haters of Rebbi Joḥanan should be considered like a Sadducee for the dwellers in the alley and it should become forbidden for the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a Sadducee is suspected of carrying; here what can you say? What is the difference between them? If it was built like a χ. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he puts a beam or a lath on one side and makes a door frame on the other side. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even many beams do not make it permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:13

Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish were staying in Rebbi Isaac’s street. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish carried, according to his opinion, Rebbi Joḥanan did not carry, according to his opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan neither forbade nor carried; he said, let the dwellers in the alley be in error, lest they be intentional. What, did he carry or did he not carry? If you say that he carried, then Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion did change. If you say that he did not carry, it should be forbidden to the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Joḥanan annulled his rights. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish forced Rebbi Joḥanan and he carried. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is correct. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? They considered him as unintentional compared to intentional. What is the rabbis’ opinion? Since they are suspected of carrying they are as if intentional. They told him, if this be so then the haters of Rebbi Joḥanan should be considered like a Sadducee for the dwellers in the alley and it should become forbidden for the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a Sadducee is suspected of carrying; here what can you say? What is the difference between them? If it was built like a χ. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he puts a beam or a lath on one side and makes a door frame on the other side. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even many beams do not make it permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:13

Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish were staying in Rebbi Isaac’s street. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish carried, according to his opinion, Rebbi Joḥanan did not carry, according to his opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan neither forbade nor carried; he said, let the dwellers in the alley be in error, lest they be intentional. What, did he carry or did he not carry? If you say that he carried, then Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion did change. If you say that he did not carry, it should be forbidden to the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Joḥanan annulled his rights. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish forced Rebbi Joḥanan and he carried. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is correct. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? They considered him as unintentional compared to intentional. What is the rabbis’ opinion? Since they are suspected of carrying they are as if intentional. They told him, if this be so then the haters of Rebbi Joḥanan should be considered like a Sadducee for the dwellers in the alley and it should become forbidden for the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a Sadducee is suspected of carrying; here what can you say? What is the difference between them? If it was built like a χ. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he puts a beam or a lath on one side and makes a door frame on the other side. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even many beams do not make it permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 4:4

It only said, “if they brought him back.” Therefore, if he returned by himself, he is forbidden. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s. As it was stated: “Produce which came into the public domain and returned, if in error it may be eaten, if intentional it may not be eaten. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, whether in error or intentional it may not be eaten unless it was returned in error.” Rebbi Neḥemiah parallels Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: “If somebody tithed or cooked on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentional it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr.”

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 4:4

It only said, “if they brought him back.” Therefore, if he returned by himself, he is forbidden. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s. As it was stated: “Produce which came into the public domain and returned, if in error it may be eaten, if intentional it may not be eaten. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, whether in error or intentional it may not be eaten unless it was returned in error.” Rebbi Neḥemiah parallels Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: “If somebody tithed or cooked on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentional it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr.”

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 4:4

It only said, “if they brought him back.” Therefore, if he returned by himself, he is forbidden. Rebbi Aḥa said, this is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s. As it was stated: “Produce which came into the public domain and returned, if in error it may be eaten, if intentional it may not be eaten. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, whether in error or intentional it may not be eaten unless it was returned in error.” Rebbi Neḥemiah parallels Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: “If somebody tithed or cooked on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentional it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr.”

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:40

In error for heave and intentional for leavened matter, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:40

In error for heave and intentional for leavened matter, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:40

In error for heave and intentional for leavened matter, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 9:2

HALAKHAH: “He who was impure,” etc. Impure by a corpse, I not only have impure by a corpse, from where forced or in error? The verse says, every man, [it added]. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated, impure by a corpse is not equal to a far-away trip, nor is a far-away trip equal to impure by a corpse, what is common to them is that he did not make the First and shall make the Second; also I am adding those forced or in error who did not make the First that they shall make the Second. Intentional from where? Rebbi Zeˋira said, but the man, to add the one acting intentionally. We have stated; “if in error or by force;” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “if in error, or by force, or intentional.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this, “because these are not liable for extirpation but those are liable for extirpation;” who is subject to extirpation if not intentional?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 9:2

HALAKHAH: “He who was impure,” etc. Impure by a corpse, I not only have impure by a corpse, from where forced or in error? The verse says, every man, [it added]. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated, impure by a corpse is not equal to a far-away trip, nor is a far-away trip equal to impure by a corpse, what is common to them is that he did not make the First and shall make the Second; also I am adding those forced or in error who did not make the First that they shall make the Second. Intentional from where? Rebbi Zeˋira said, but the man, to add the one acting intentionally. We have stated; “if in error or by force;” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “if in error, or by force, or intentional.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this, “because these are not liable for extirpation but those are liable for extirpation;” who is subject to extirpation if not intentional?

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 9:2

HALAKHAH: “He who was impure,” etc. Impure by a corpse, I not only have impure by a corpse, from where forced or in error? The verse says, every man, [it added]. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated, impure by a corpse is not equal to a far-away trip, nor is a far-away trip equal to impure by a corpse, what is common to them is that he did not make the First and shall make the Second; also I am adding those forced or in error who did not make the First that they shall make the Second. Intentional from where? Rebbi Zeˋira said, but the man, to add the one acting intentionally. We have stated; “if in error or by force;” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “if in error, or by force, or intentional.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this, “because these are not liable for extirpation but those are liable for extirpation;” who is subject to extirpation if not intentional?

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 3:38

[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions, sins are inadvertent actions. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.] And so we find that confessors do confess. David said, we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said, [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said, we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 7:16

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, atonement is mentioned inside and atonement is mentioned outside. Since in atonement mentioned inside cattle atones for spillers of blood, also in atonement mentioned outside cattle atones for spillers of blood. Here unintentional, there intentional. There is a difference for the calf whose neck is broken, whether unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Yose said, here for known offense, there for unknown offense.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 7:16

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, atonement is mentioned inside and atonement is mentioned outside. Since in atonement mentioned inside cattle atones for spillers of blood, also in atonement mentioned outside cattle atones for spillers of blood. Here unintentional, there intentional. There is a difference for the calf whose neck is broken, whether unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Yose said, here for known offense, there for unknown offense.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:44

HALAKHAH: There we stated: Intentional [impurity] of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or severe ones, intentional and unintentional, [known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:44

HALAKHAH: There we stated: Intentional [impurity] of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or severe ones, intentional and unintentional, [known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:45

Are not minor sins positive commandments and prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rebbi Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or did not commit them intentionally. Those severe ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Severe ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional ones in cases where a sacrifice is required, also the scapegoat atones in the same way.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:47

There, we have stated: “For these one is liable for extirpation in case of intentional transgression, or a purification sacrifice for unintentional transgression, and for what was not certainly known in their cases a suspended sacrifice.” But did not the day of Atonement already atone? Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi Levi from Sokho: The Mishnah refers to one who rebels on the Day of Atonement.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 7:17

HALAKHAH: The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said (more)<to his son>` this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings, so it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is that not intentional misuse? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional misuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 7:17

HALAKHAH: The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said (more)<to his son>` this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings, so it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is that not intentional misuse? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional misuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:44

MISHNAH: The only difference between holiday and Sabbath refers to preparation of food. The only difference between Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that in the first case its intentional desecration is punished by man and in the second case by extirpation.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:47

“The only difference between Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that in the first case its intentional desecration is punished by man and in the second case by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment. What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abuna said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so the Day of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaim about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: Rebbi Tarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there can be no whipping connected to extirpation, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no whipping in a case involving extirpation. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters an animal and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:55

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All forbidden things, if one added to them in error it is permitted, intentionally it is forbidden. Is that not the Mishnah, “if it was in error it is permitted, if intentional it is forbidden”? The Mishnah is about addition to heave, he comes to tell you about other things. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as one has a duty to instruct about actions that should be done so one has a duty to instruct negatively about actions that should not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure as pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure as impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to suspend or to burn, always try to burn rather than to suspend since there is nothing in the Torah more distinguished than burned bulls and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked, is it possible to infer from something whose commandment is thus for something whose commandment is not so?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:12

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:12

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:13

What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:13

What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:55

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:55

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.