intentional
206 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
MISHNAH: It is sufficient even if somebody heard women say, the man X died. Rebbi Jehudah said, even if he heard children say, we go to lament and bury X, whether intentional or unintentional. Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba said, if he is a Jew, only if he intends [to testify]; but if a Gentile intends to testify, it is no testimony.
What means “intentional”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, anytime one mentions a woman. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, anybody one asks and he responds. Rebbi Ḥaggai said to Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, does the Rabbi remember that thirty and some Elders were up in arms against Rebbi Hoshaiah to follow the rule of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish but he did not accept it
There, we have stated: “In all matters of incest, He made him who touches equal to him who completes and one is guilty for each single intercourse. He was more stringent with the slave girl since in her case He treated the intentional as unintentional.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamai in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. Here is written “flow of semen”, and here is written “flow of semen.” Here, you say “flow of semen” until he ejaculates. And here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for it is written: “She was hidden and became impure.” From the moment she was hidden, the Torah calls her “impure”. But here, “flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. For what reason is written “flow of semen”? For measures, as it is stated: “She was hidden and became impure”; what is counted as hiding? Time to become impure. What is the time for impurity? Time for intercourse. What is the time for intercourse? Time for ‘touching’.
HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s wife drinks,” etc. Otherwise, what could we say? She drank and the water had no influence on her; she is pure! I could say, merit suspended for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, really we deal with the case that she drank and the water had no influence on her; that you should not say since the water has no influence on a rape victim, but only on a seduced woman, this one is a rape victim. But a rape victim in the priesthood is like a willing one for an Israel, therefore it is necessary to say that she is permitted to her house. From where that rape disables a married woman in the priesthood? Since in matters of crawling things, which are a trifling matter, He made forced [impurity] equal to intentional [impurity], in the weighty matter of the deviant not so much more? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi stated before Rebbi Jonathan: “If you deviated from under your husband and became defiled,” that excludes rape. How do you understand this? He said to him, just as “under your husband” is by consent, so “if you became defiled” is by consent. “She was not raped”, she is forbidden. Therefore, if she was raped, she is permitted. But there is a rape victim which is forbidden for an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started by consent and ended up raped. And there is one who is not a rape victim which is permitted to an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started as a rape victim and ended up consenting. Like that woman who came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was raped. He said to her, but was it not sweet to you in the end? She said to him, if a person dips a finger into honey and puts it into his mouth on the Day of Atonement, does he not feel bad about it and at the end it is sweet? He accepted her.
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! “If somebody eats heave intentionally he pays the principal but not the fifth.” In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said he pays, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. He explains following Rebbi Meïr who says, he is flogged and he pays.
Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! “If somebody eats heave intentionally he pays the principal but not the fifth.” In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said he pays, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. He explains following Rebbi Meïr who says, he is flogged and he pays.
In error for heave and intentional for leavened, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
In error for heave and intentional for leavened, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
In error for heave and intentional for leavened, in error for heave and intentional for nazir, in error for heave and intentional for the Day of Atonement. If one explains it with two things, it is fine. If one explains it for one, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.
There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.
MISHNAH: If someone causes impurity, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated. If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: If he mixed. If he made a libation and then mixed it, at the start he committed a capital crime and at the end he has to pay? Rebbi Abba objected: Think of it, if he killed somebody and broke the flask, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? Rebbi Yose objected: Think of it, if he set fire to somebody’s grain stack on the Day of Atonement, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? “If someone causes anything to become impure, or turn into dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine.
There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.
There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
HALAKHAH: Did not Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he is intentional about fat but in error about a sacrifice, he can be warned, is whipped, and brings a sacrifice. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two alternatives are presented to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.
HALAKHAH: “One who stole and slaughtered on the Sabbath,” etc. Did not Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he is intentional error about fat but in error about a sacrifice, he can be warned, is whipped, and brings a sacrifice. Who stated it? [Rebbi Simeon, as we have stated]: “Rebbi Simeon says, for sancta for which he is liable by a warranty he has to pay quadruple or quintuple, but if there is no warranty, he is not liable.”
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.
HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.
HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.
HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.
MISHNAH: Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or serious ones, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.
MISHNAH: Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or serious ones, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.
HALAKHAH: “Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary.” etc. That means it atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional.
HALAKHAH: “Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary.” etc. That means it atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional.
Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”
Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.
MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.
MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.
HALAKHAH: “For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged,” etc. There, we have stated: “If I did not see on this road [crowds] like those who left Egypt.” Is it impossible that crowds like those who left Egypt went by? But we are dealing with one look. Was it not the case that when Diocletian went there, 1’200’000 [men] went with him? But we must be dealing with one look.
MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.
MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May the oath of a deviant woman be liable for a blurted oath? Where do we hold? If she is in error in sin and oath she is not deviant. If she is intentional in sin and error there is no sacrifice. Rav follows Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Ismael would argue like Rebbi Meïr it would follow, since Rebbi Meïr said: “Amen that I was not defiled, Amen that I shall not be defiled.” But you may question this.
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction. What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable.
MISHNAH: They are liable only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice. The same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice.
MISHNAH: They are liable only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice. The same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
[It is written]: If the Prince sin. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, fortunate [is the generation] whose Prince brings a purification sacrifice. He brings it for his inadvertent sin, not so much more for his intentional one? If its Prince brings, not so much more the commoner?
The Babylonian Talmud
R. Ashi said You may even say that it is the view of the Rabbis: in the case of the one [the breaker of Sabbath], the essential [punishment for] an intentional transgression is inflicted by the human court, but in the case of the other, the essential punishment for his intentional transgression is karet.
R. Ashi said You may even say that it is the view of the Rabbis: in the case of the one [the breaker of Sabbath], the essential [punishment for] an intentional transgression is inflicted by the human court, but in the case of the other, the essential punishment for his intentional transgression is karet.
“And she stood in the inner court of the king’s house” (Esther 5:1): R. Levi said: When she reached the chamber of the idols, the Divine Presence left her. he said, “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me” (Psalms 22:2)? Maybe you punish the inadvertent sin like the intentional one, or one done under compulsion like one done willingly?