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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:6

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:6

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:14

Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:15

Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:15

Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:15

Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:15

Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:15

Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:15

Rebbi Eleazar said, in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he may go back. And in some cases they said that her ḥalîṣah is valid and if he wants to go back he may not go back. [If a woman] performed ḥalîṣah with felt slippers or for an underage boy, her ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back he cannot go back. If she performed ḥalîṣah with a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. He who says that the ḥalîṣah is valid, with a leather slipper; he who says that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, with a textile slipper. A shoe in a slipper, some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is valid and some Tannaim state that the ḥalîṣah is invalid. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is valid, the slipper is textile but the shoe leather. For him who holds that the ḥalîṣah is invalid, the slipper is leather but the shoe textile. Some Tannaim state that one may wear a slipper of the Day of Atonement and some Tannaim state that one may not wear a slipper. Rav Ḥisda said, For him who holds that one leaves the house [wearing a slipper,] a textile slipper, he who says that one may not leave the house [wearing a slipper,] a leather slipper.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:17

So is the Mishnah: “If he ties lower than the knee, it is valid, above the knee it is invalid.” It is written: “Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet from it.” It was stated about this: The hand up to the wrist, the foot up to the calf; and here you say so? There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”. In that case, even higher than the knee should be valid! There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”, and not from higher than above his foot. Cahana objected: Is it not written, “and the afterbirth which comes out from between her feet;” does it come out from between her feet? It looks as if it was between her feet; as we have stated there: “The water pit was between the Temple hall and the alter drawn towards the South.” Was it put between the hall and the altar? Only it looked as if between hall and altar.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:18

MISHNAH: If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his, with a wooden sandal, or with a left [foot sandal] on the right [foot], the ḥalîṣah is valid. If she performed ḥalîṣah with [a sandal that was] too large but he could walk in it, or one too small which covers most of his foot, the ḥalîṣah is valid. If she performed ḥalîṣah in the night, the ḥalîṣah is valid; Rebbi Eliezer declares it invalid. [If she performed ḥalîṣah] with her left hand, the ḥalîṣah is invalid but Rebbi Eliezer declares it valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:18

MISHNAH: If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his, with a wooden sandal, or with a left [foot sandal] on the right [foot], the ḥalîṣah is valid. If she performed ḥalîṣah with [a sandal that was] too large but he could walk in it, or one too small which covers most of his foot, the ḥalîṣah is valid. If she performed ḥalîṣah in the night, the ḥalîṣah is valid; Rebbi Eliezer declares it invalid. [If she performed ḥalîṣah] with her left hand, the ḥalîṣah is invalid but Rebbi Eliezer declares it valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:19

HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:19

HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:24

MISHNAH: If she stripped off and spat but did not recite, the ḥalîṣah is valid. If she recited and spat but did not strip off, the ḥalîṣah is invalid. If she stripped off and recited but did not spit, Rebbi Eliezer says, the ḥalîṣah is invalid, but Rebbi Aqiba says, the ḥalîṣah is valid. Rebbi Eliezer said, “so it shall be done”, anything which is an action is preventing. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, is that a proof? “So it shall be done to the man”, any activity of the male [is preventing.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:24

MISHNAH: If she stripped off and spat but did not recite, the ḥalîṣah is valid. If she recited and spat but did not strip off, the ḥalîṣah is invalid. If she stripped off and recited but did not spit, Rebbi Eliezer says, the ḥalîṣah is invalid, but Rebbi Aqiba says, the ḥalîṣah is valid. Rebbi Eliezer said, “so it shall be done”, anything which is an action is preventing. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, is that a proof? “So it shall be done to the man”, any activity of the male [is preventing.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:25

HALAKHAH: “If she stripped off and spat,” etc. Samuel said, if she stripped but did not spit, she shall spit. This follows Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If she stripped but did not recite nor spit, her ḥalîṣah is invalid. Still that is Rebbi Eliezer’s. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, Zeriqan turned to it in the name of Rav: If she stripped but did not spit, or spat but did not strip, she did not do anything until she strips and spits. Rebbi Abba asked before Rebbi Immi: If she spat before she stripped? He said, it is as if in the correct order. If he made a betrothal with a cluster of end-of-harvest [figs]? He said to him, with the figs hanging there he made the betrothal. May one open an Egyptian window into a common backyard higher than four cubits? He said to him, so we are saying: He comes simply for the air. Rebbi Nasa said, that is what he said: If somebody wants to build his house in the form of a dovecot, does one not listen to him?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:26

MISHNAH: ḥalîṣah is invalid if performed for a deaf-mute man, or by a deaf-mute woman, or for an underage male. The underage woman who performed ḥalîṣah should repeat ḥalîṣah once she becomes of age but if she did not repeat it, the ḥalîṣah is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:28

There, we have stated: “Everybody is obligated for appearance except the deaf-mute, the insane, and the minor.” The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Eleazar (Deut. 31:12): “So they should hear and learn.” So far one who speaks but cannot hear; what about one who hears but cannot speak? Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar (Deut. 31:12): “So they should learn,” so they should teach. Rebbi Jonah said, this means that the principles of Rebbi are no principles, since we have stated: “A ḥereš who speaks but cannot hear should not give heave,” and we thought that one who speaks but does not hear is ḥereš, one who hears but does not speak isḥereš. But we have stated: “Ḥalîṣah is invalid if performed for a ḥereš man, or by a ḥereš woman, or for an underage male.” And Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they cannot say (Deut. 25:8): “he shall say”, (Deut. 25:7,9) “she shall say.” We also have stated: “A ḥereš mentioned anywhere by the Sages is a deaf-mute.” This supports Rebbi Jonah, for Rebbi Jonah said that the principles of Rebbi are no principles.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:31

MISHNAH: If she performed ḥalîṣah in front of two [judges] or of three when it turned out that one was a relative or unfit, the ḥalîṣah is invalid; Rebbi Simeon and Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian declare it valid. If happened that she performed ḥalîṣah between herself and him in jail; the case came before Rebbi Aqiba and he declared it valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:39

It was stated: A mistaken ḥalîṣah is valid. What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will be permitted to you after some time. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and learning that “if he has the intention but not she, or she has the intention but not he, ḥalîṣah is always invalid unless both of them have the intention!” What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah for Rebbi Joḥanan? A case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will pay you a hundred talents. Rebbi Mana said, if this was stipulated as a condition, she has to pay. A case came before Rebbi Huna and he followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When he heard that Rebbi Joḥanan disagreed, he changed his opinion and forced a second ḥalîṣah. A case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He told him, my son, this woman does not want to be married in levirate; therefore perform ḥalîṣah and remove your candidacy from her, then she will marry you in a regular marriage. After the ḥalîṣah, he said to him: Even if Moses and Samuel came, they could not permit her. He referred to himself as “they are wise to do evil; they do not know how to do good.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:27

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:27

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:27

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:27

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:27

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:2

HALAKHAH: “If a man declares his jealousy to his wife,” etc. It is written: “A spirit of jealousy overcame him and he declared his jealousy to his wife;” this implies that he should not declare his jealousy jokingly, or in the middle of a conversation, or lightly, or in a friendly manner but in a way that inspires fear. If he transgressed and declared his jealousy in one of the aforementioned ways: was this said as an obligation or as a necessity? If you say as an obligation, his declaration of jealousy is valid. If you say as a necessity, his declaration of jealousy is invalid. This is resolved referring to the statement: Anywhere “law” or “teaching” is mentioned, it is an absolute necessity.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:10

There, they say, because Rebbi Joshua praised Rebbi Aqiba, it implies that practice follows his argument. The rabbis of Caesarea say, he praised him for his ingenuity, but in fact practice does not follow his argument, since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Maisha, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for tertiary [impurity] for tithes, even according to Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Hilai: Even according to Rebbi Aqiba one does not whip. Why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Since the ṭevul yom has no touch for profane food, also secondary impurity has no touch for profane food. Rebbi Eleazar said, as the count for profane food so is the count of tithes. This corresponds to what Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Immi, said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We deal with somebody who ate profane food, and that Chapter deals with tithe. Rebbi Yose said, even its primary [impurity] is not clear. Not “I will not eat” is written, but “I did not eat.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, since it is written “following all Your commandments which You commanded me,” is it as if it were not clear?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:10

There, they say, because Rebbi Joshua praised Rebbi Aqiba, it implies that practice follows his argument. The rabbis of Caesarea say, he praised him for his ingenuity, but in fact practice does not follow his argument, since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Maisha, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for tertiary [impurity] for tithes, even according to Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Hilai: Even according to Rebbi Aqiba one does not whip. Why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Since the ṭevul yom has no touch for profane food, also secondary impurity has no touch for profane food. Rebbi Eleazar said, as the count for profane food so is the count of tithes. This corresponds to what Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Immi, said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We deal with somebody who ate profane food, and that Chapter deals with tithe. Rebbi Yose said, even its primary [impurity] is not clear. Not “I will not eat” is written, but “I did not eat.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, since it is written “following all Your commandments which You commanded me,” is it as if it were not clear?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:15

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:15

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:15

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:15

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:15

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:8

MISHNAH: But the following must be said in the holy language: The recitation for the first fruits, ḥalîṣah, blessings and curses, the priestly blessing, the benedictions of the High Priest, the portion about the king, the portion about the calf whose neck was broken, the [priest] anointed for war at the time he speaks to the people. The recitation for the first fruits, how? “You shall begin and say before the Eternal, your God” but further on it says, “the Levites shall begin and say to all the men of Israel in an elevated voice”. Since “beginning” further on means in the holy language, so also here in the holy language. Ḥalîṣah how? “She shall begin and say: So shall be done to the man” but further on it says, “the Levites shall begin and say to all the men of Israel in an elevated voice”. Since “beginning” further on means in the holy language, so also here in the holy language. Rebbi Jehudah says, “She shall begin and say so,” [it is invalid] unless she says exactly that text.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:54

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:6

So is the Mishnah: “Because he did only add for the love of the first night, when he had intercourse with her.” If he slept with her, divorced her, and took her back, the love of the first night is still there. If he slept with her, died, and she became available to the levir, the love of the first night is still there. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Alexis in the name of Ḥizqiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah who said, if they were divorced or widowed after a preliminary marriage she collects 200, after the definitive marriage she collects everything. Rebbi Ḥanania said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Abbai said, they said to Rebbi Ḥanania, get outside to recite. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Yosa, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Yose said, we had a rule that Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Jonathan said the same thing. As it was stated: If somebody’s son went overseas and one heard that he died, [the father] went and wrote his property to somebody else, and after that, the son returned. The gift remains valid; Rebbi Simeon ben Menasia says that the gift is invalid since he would not have written the deed if he had known that his son was alive. And Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, and the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Menasia; and Rebbi Yannai said, they said to Rebbi Ḥanania, get outside to recite. And Rebbi Yose bar Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. An actual case was judged according to Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:6

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:6

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:7

MISHNAH: Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties: Properties known to the husband she shall not sell and if she sold or gave away it is invalid. Those unknown to the husband she shall not sell but if she sold or gave away it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:7

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:7

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:7

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:17

MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid unless there would have been left a field [for sowing] nine qab, and in a garden half a qab, or following the words of Rebbi Aqiba, a fourth. If her ketubah was 400 zuz and she sold to one person worth 100, to a second 100, to a third 100, and to the last the value of a mina and a denar for a mina, the last transaction is invalid but all others are valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:18

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:19

MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender, even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:21

“And one announces mornings and evenings,” at the time when [agricultural] workers go out or come back, and he mentions the field and its description. Rebbi Yose said, if they do not get their estimated price, they can conclude the sale. Is that the Mishnah, “if the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid”? Becausethey sold too low or too high, but if they found their estimate they close the deal. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: What can you say, we deal with the case that they did not announce in public! From what is said afterwards: “Except if they offered public tender.” What is public tender? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, announcement.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:29

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:29

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:3

Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:3

Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:32

One does not intercalate for a year before New Year’s Day; if they did intercalate it would be invalid. But for an urgent need one may intercalate immediately after New Year’s Day. Nevertheless, only Adar is intercalated. Rebbi says, Nisan never was lengthened. But did we not state: “If the New Moon appeared in time”? If it would appear, it did not appear. Rav said, Tishre was never lengthened. But did we not state: “If the month was long”? If it would be, it never was.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:26

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:55

MISHNAH: If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the elevation or well-being offerings not in their names but then brought his sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him. But if he shaved for all three and one of them is valid, his shaving is valid and he has to repeat the other sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:55

MISHNAH: If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the elevation or well-being offerings not in their names but then brought his sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him. But if he shaved for all three and one of them is valid, his shaving is valid and he has to repeat the other sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:55

MISHNAH: If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the elevation or well-being offerings not in their names but then brought his sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him. But if he shaved for all three and one of them is valid, his shaving is valid and he has to repeat the other sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:55

MISHNAH: If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the elevation or well-being offerings not in their names but then brought his sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him. But if he shaved for all three and one of them is valid, his shaving is valid and he has to repeat the other sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:14

Rebbi Simeon said: On the next day, he brings his reparation sacrifice and a log of oil with it and says: If I was impure, this is my obligatory offering, otherwise it is my doubtful offering. He slaughters in the North, it needs giving on the thumbs, and it is eaten by male Cohanim at any place during the day and the following night until midnight. But the Sages did [not] agree with Rebbi Simeon because he causes sacrifices to become invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:20

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are Ben Zoma’s words, but the words of the Sages: Forever is he definitively [impure] until he heave the reparation sacrifice. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Why is he definitively [impure] until he heave the reparation sacrifice? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? We find several reparation sacrifices which are pushed aside because of doubts! As we have stated there: “If a reparation sacrifice was mixed up with a well-being sacrifice, Rebbi Simeon says that both should be slaughtered in the North and eaten following the more restrictive rules. They said to him, one does not cause sacrifices to become invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:7

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:7

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:23

MISHNAH: Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid, except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. It happened that they brought before Rabban Gamliel at Kefar Othnay a bill of divorce whose witnesses were Samaritans and he declared it valid. All documents confirmed by a Gentile recorder’s office are valid, even if they are signed by Gentiles, except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. Rebbi Simeon says, all are valid; they said it only when they were made by private persons.