involving

These are the implements which a craftsman may not sell in the seventh year: A plow and all its [accompanying] implements, a yoke, a winnowing-fan, and a pickax. But he may sell a sickle used by hand, a scythe, and a cart with all its implements. This is the general principle: any tools designed for work involving a transgression [in the seventh year] is prohibited; but if for a forbidden and a permissible purpose, it may be [sold].

Fraud is four pieces of silver. A claim is [a minimum] of two pieces of silver. An admission is [a minimum] of that which is worth a perutah. There are five [rules involving] that which is worth a perutah: An admission is [a minimum] of that which is worth a perutah. A woman can be betrothed with that which is worth a perutah. Someone who benefits a perutah’s worth from that which belongs to the sanctuary has committed sacrilege. One who finds that which is worth a perutah must proclaim it [as a lost object]. One who steals that which is worth a perutah from his fellow and swears [falsely] to him [that he did not steal it], must go after him [to return it] even as far as Medea.

The sacrifices of non-Jews: one is not liable on their account for piggul, remnant, or defilement, and if [a priest] slaughters them outside [the Temple], he is not liable, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yose declares him liable. The things for which one is not liable on account of piggul, one is liable on account of remnant and defilement except blood. Rabbi Shimon declares one liable for anything which is normally eaten, but for wood, frankincense and incense, one is not liable for [transgressions involving] defilement.

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about prohibitions and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? For Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly payment in extirpation cases. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! They disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about prohibitions and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? For Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly payment in extirpation cases. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! They disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. Here are two cases, there it is one case.

They said before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated thus: Food you shall buy from them with money and eat, and also water you may acquire, etc. As water is not changed from its natural state, so anything which was not changed from its natural state. They objected: Are there not their dry beans, פנקריסין and קובטיות, roasted grain, and hot water permitted? One understands all of these because they can be soaked and return to their former state. What about roasted grain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav said: Any food which can be eaten alone raw is not in the category of Gentile cooking but one may use it for eruv tavšilin. How does Rebbi Ḥiyya explain food you shall buy from them? You shall buy with food. If you fed him you bought him. If he causes you trouble buy him with food or otherwise ply him with him money. They said, that is what Rebbi Jonathan did. When he saw that a superior came to his town, he sent him an honor gift. What did he say? If a suit involving an orphan or a widow came he would have a way to mollify him.

“He who binds into sheaves.” Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai asked, what are the derivatives of binding into sheaves? Rebbi Yose: I heard the reason following Rebbi Simeon from Rebbi Aḥa, but I do not remember what I heard. What about it? One who pounds rice, barley, groats, is liable because of threshing. He who spreads out ṣeli figs, raisins, מסוסלה, bucellata, is liable because of binding into sheaves. For anything involving food one is liable because of binding into sheaves, involving shells because of threshing.

“He who binds into sheaves.” Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai asked, what are the derivatives of binding into sheaves? Rebbi Yose: I heard the reason following Rebbi Simeon from Rebbi Aḥa, but I do not remember what I heard. What about it? One who pounds rice, barley, groats, is liable because of threshing. He who spreads out ṣeli figs, raisins, מסוסלה, bucellata, is liable because of binding into sheaves. For anything involving food one is liable because of binding into sheaves, involving shells because of threshing.

There, we have stated: “If there is a doubt, it is pure; Rebbi Yose declares it impure.” Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose declared it impure only because of proof. And Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose declares impure even (one place) [one miqweh]. The argument of Rebbi Yose seems inverted, as we have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, Autolas testified in the name of five Elders that in case of a doubt an eruv is qualified.” And here you are saying so? There in his own name, but here in the name of five Elders. They wanted to say that he who says there “pure” says here “permitted”; he who says there “impure” says here “prohibited”. But even he who says there “impure” agrees here that it is permitted. Rebbi Ḥinena said, do they not only disagree about their words? And a doubt about their words is for leniency. But an eruv is a word of Torah; and a doubt about a word of the Torah is for restriction But is eruv a word of the Torah? Rebbi Jonathan said before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Yose ben Laqonia: One whips because of Sabbath domains as word of the Torah. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder said to him, but for Sabbath there is only stoning or extirpation? He said to him, is there not written, do not eat from it raw? He said to him, is there written לֹא? No, it is written אַל! He said to him, is there not written, stay everybody where he is, no person shall leave his place on the Seventh day? He said to him, is there written לֹא? No, it is written אַל. Rebbi ben Rebbi Abun said, nevertheless each one kept to his tradition. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarta said, they treated eruv as a doubt involving a deaf-mute person. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, so far if it exists, or even if it was burned? Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed this following what Rebbi Hoshaia said: You must conclude that the boundaries of Sabbath domains are not clear in the words of the Torah. Rebbi Mana asked, it is accepted that 2’000 cubits is not clear. Are 4’000 cubits not clear? Rebbi Simeon bar Carsana in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: The only clear case among all of them is the domain of twelve mil of the camp of Israel.

“The only difference between Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that in the first case its intentional desecration is punished by man and in the second case by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment. What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abuna said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so the Day of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaim about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: Rebbi Tarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there can be no whipping connected to extirpation, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no whipping in a case involving extirpation. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters an animal and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

What about it? Rebbi Yose said, about any incest prohibition which for a Jewish court is a capital crime, a descendant of Noah is forewarned; and about any incest prohibition which for a court is not a capital crime, a descendant of Noah is not forewarned. They objected: Is not a case involving the sister a capital crime for a Jewish court and the descendants of Noah are not forewarned? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Because of these abominations, the Eternal, your God, uproots them before you.” This teaches that the Holy One, praise to Him, does not punish if He did not warn.

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said: There, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Pappus sent and asked Rebbi Yose about two cases from Alexandria, one involving an unmarried woman, the other a married woman. About the married woman, he wrote him: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” About the unmarried woman he wrote, be inventive, for your are not forewarned about the holy daughters of Israel. He said to Rebbi Mana, take and sign; he signed. He said to Rebbi Berekhiah, take and sign, but he did not agree. After they ended the session Rebbi Mana was standing with Rebbi Berekhiah and asked him, why did you not sign? He answered, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say that there, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman? He said, praised be the Merciful that I had not heard this doctrine, for if I had heard this doctrine I would not have signed and people would have said that the student disagrees with his teacher. Mar Uqban said, here, you say that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies from an unmarried woman, but about a married woman, nothing was said. The next morning he came and wanted to sign. He said to him, there is no space.

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?

They said before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated thus: Food you shall buy from them with money and eat, etc. As water is not changed from its natural state, so anything which was not changed from its natural state. They objected: Are there not their dry beans, פנקריסין and קובטיות, roasted grain, and hot water permitted? One understands all of these because they can be soaked and return to their former state. But roasted grain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: Any food which can be eaten alone raw is not in the category of Gentile cooking. (With bread it is in the category of Gentile cooking.) How does Rebbi Ḥiyya explain food you shall buy from them? You shall buy with food. If you fed him you bought him. If he causes you trouble buy him with food or otherwise trade (ply him) with him money. They said, that is what Rebbi Jonathan did. When a superior came to [his] town, he sent him an honor gift, that if a suit involving an orphan or a widow came he would have a way to mollify him.

It was taught by the school of R. Ishmael : If thou seest a scholar committing an offence at night, do not criticise him for it by day ; perhaps he has repented by then. Dost thou imagine perhaps he has repented? Nay, he has certainly repented. This refers only to an offence concerned with his person ; but in a matter involving money, [he may be criticised] until he refunds it to its owner.

It is different here ; for it is written, "And hide thyself from them." May one, then, conclude from this? We cannot draw an inference about a prohibition from a case involving only financial loss.

"So the forcing of wrath bringeth forth strife" — a disciple with whom his master is the first and second time angry but he remains silent [under the rebuke] is worthy to distinguish between suits involving money and suits involving life. For there is a Mishnaic teaching: R. Ishmael says : Who wishes to grow wise should study money-suits, for there is no branch of Torah more [complex] than these ; they are like a well.

"So the forcing of wrath bringeth forth strife" — a disciple with whom his master is the first and second time angry but he remains silent [under the rebuke] is worthy to distinguish between suits involving money and suits involving life. For there is a Mishnaic teaching: R. Ishmael says : Who wishes to grow wise should study money-suits, for there is no branch of Torah more [complex] than these ; they are like a well.

So here too, there is the question of quarrels, involving him or his teacher.

If so then a prohibition not involving an action should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "to perform" is written.

But let the argument return, and derive it from a common characteristic! Because you could refute it, [by saying] What comparison can be made to the common characteristic, as it has in it something involving the alter?

MISHNA: If one commits a sin involving two prohibitions and they evaluated him once, then he gets flogged and is exonerated. But if not, then he is flogged, allowed to recuperate, and flogged again.