kal

And in the one hundredth year [of the life] of Abraham there was a king in the East whose name was “ Kimrés.’”’ He built Shemesht (Samosata), after the name of his son Shemesht6, and Klawdiya (Claudias), after the name of his daughter Kalédh, and Pirin after the name of his son Pérén.

An Ammonite and a Moabite are forbidden [to enter into the congregation of the Lord] and their prohibition is for ever. However, their women are permitted at once. An Egyptian and an Edomite are forbidden only until the third generation, whether they are males or females. Rabbi Shimon permits their women immediately. Said Rabbi Shimon: This is a kal vehomer: if where the males are forbidden for all time the females are permitted immediately, where the males are forbidden only until the third generation how much more should the females be permitted immediately. They said to him: If this is a halakhah, we shall accept it; but if it is only a logical reference, there is a refutation. He replied: This is not so, I am in fact saying a halakhah. Mamzerim and nethinim are forbidden, and their prohibition is forever, whether they be males or females.

Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.

One who learns from his fellow one chapter, or one halakhah, or one verse, or one word, or even one letter, is obligated to treat him with honor; for so we find with David, king of Israel, who learned from Ahitophel no more than two things, yet called him his master, his guide and his beloved friend, as it is said, “But it was you, a man mine equal, my guide and my beloved friend” (Psalms 55:14). Is this not [an instance of the argument] “from the less to the greater” (kal vehomer)? If David, king of Israel who learned from Ahitophel no more than two things, nevertheless called him his master, his guide and his beloved friend; then in the case of one who learns from his fellow one chapter, or one halakhah, or one verse, or one word, or even one letter, all the more so he is under obligation to treat him with honor. And “honor’” means nothing but Torah, as it is said, “It is honor that sages inherit” (Proverbs 3:35). “And the perfect shall inherit good” (Proverbs 28:10), and “good” means nothing but Torah, as it is said, “For I give you good instruction; do not forsake my Torah” (Proverbs 4:2).

The hides of less holy sacrifices belong to their owners. The hides of most holy sacrifices belong to the priest. This is a kal vehomer: if with an olah, even though they do not acquire its flesh they do acquire its hide, is it not logical that they acquire the hides of most holy sacrifices, when they do acquire their flesh? The altar does not refute [this argument], for it does not acquire the hide in any instance.

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!

[An Israelite] who buys a fetus of a donkey belonging to a non-Jew or who sells one to him, although this is not permitted, or who forms a partnership with him, or who receives [an animal] from him to look after or who gives [his donkey] to him to look after, is exempt from the [law of the] bekhor, for it says: [“I sanctified to me all the firstborn] in Israel,” (Numbers 3:13) but not in non-Jews. Priests and levites are exempt through [an argument made by a] kal vehomer: if they exempted the first-born belonging to the Israelites in the wilderness, it follows all the more so that they should exempt their own.

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal vehomer).

Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer.

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.

A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.

Why [is the Tigris called] Hiddekel (Gen. ii. 14). Rab Ashe said : Its waters are sharp [had] and swift [kal]. Why [is the Euphrates called] Perat? Because its waters are fruitful [parah] and multiply.

“And the land shall mourn, every family apart; the family of the house of David apart, and their wives apart” (Zechariah 12:12). They said: Is there not an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument? If in the future when they will be engaged in mourning and the evil inclination will have no power over them, the Torah nevertheless says, men separately and women separately, how much more so now when they are engaged in rejoicing and the evil inclination has sway over them.

Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!

Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!

And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn [re'shia bar re'shia]? He learns it out from a kal v'chomer (fortiori), That it was taught in a barasia, Rabbi Akiva says, I asked Raban Gmaliel ad Rebbi Yehosua [while] in the meat market of Iemus, (that they had traveled to to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel's son), If one had [inadvertently] cohabited with his sister, who was his father's sister, who his mother's sister, what would the halacha be? Would he only be liable one sacrifice for all of them, or would he be liable [a separate sacrifice] for each one?

They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?

And [the rabbis, who learn re'shia bar re'shia from kares b'achoso] would say that it is a flawed kal v'chomer, because what comparison can you make to niddah which involves separte bodies?

And according to [Rebbi Yitzchak] also it is definitely a flawed kal v'chomer, rather then [Rebbi Yitzchak] learns out [re'shia bar re'shia] from achoso d'seifa [the extra repeated word 'sister' at the end of the verse].

And why do the Rabbis need achoso d'seifa? To make one liable for his sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter [his full sister], to teach that we can't derive punishment from a kal v'chomer [specifically that we don't derive it from the prohibitions on both half sisters].

Yes this is indeed so, but Oneis comes and is derived from this. With what is it derived? Whether by a Kal V'chomer or by a Mah Matzhino, I can ask as I have previously asked, what comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which [is less] as it involves no action?

Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating bikorim] outside the wall [of Jerusalem, then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser, which is more lenient, that if one incurs malkus by eating the more lenient example of maiser outside of the wall, then wouldn't one certainly incur malkus for eating bikorim outside of the wall? Rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats bikorim before the verses are recited incurs malkus.

(Deutermany 12, 17) "and your voluntary gifts", this refers to the Todah and Sh'lamim offerings. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem, then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from the Todah or the Sh'lamim before the z'rika [the sprinkling of the blood] incurs malkus.

(Deutermany 12, 17) "And your firstborn", this refers to a Bechor offering. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Bechor even after the z'rika incurs malkus.

(Deutermany 12, 17) "And your firstborn", this refers to a Bechor offering. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Bechor even after the z'rika incurs malkus.

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Chatos or an Asham even after the z'rika, but outside of the [Temple] curtains incurs malkus.

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Chatos or an Asham even after the z'rika, but outside of the [Temple] curtains incurs malkus.

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Chatos or an Asham even after the z'rika, but outside of the [Temple] curtains incurs malkus.

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor; if to [make one liable for eating them] outside the [Temple] curtain, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Chatos and Asham rather the Torah comes

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor; if to [make one liable for eating them] outside the [Temple] curtain, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Chatos and Asham rather the Torah comes

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor; if to [make one liable for eating them] outside the [Temple] curtain, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Chatos and Asham rather the Torah comes

If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor; if to [make one liable for eating them] outside the [Temple] curtain, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Chatos and Asham rather the Torah comes

But, can we even derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer? That even according to the opinion that we can derive a punishment from a kal v'chomer, we still cannot derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer. Rebbi Shimon just means to learn out a prohibition [but not malkus]

But, can we even derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer? That even according to the opinion that we can derive a punishment from a kal v'chomer, we still cannot derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer. Rebbi Shimon just means to learn out a prohibition [but not malkus]

But, can we even derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer? That even according to the opinion that we can derive a punishment from a kal v'chomer, we still cannot derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer. Rebbi Shimon just means to learn out a prohibition [but not malkus]

"To do justly", this refers to laws. "To love mercy", this refers to kind deeds. "And to walk discreetly with your God" this refers to bringing out the dead and bringing in the bride. And is it not a kal v'chomer? If matters which are usually not done discretely [like funeral and bridal processions], the Torah says to perform them with discretion, then matters which usually are done discreetly [like charity], how much more so [should they be performed discreetly.