liable
2925 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Phineas understood it from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable.” Because he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids. Therefore if [he ate edible food,] drank drinkable fluids he is liable. Did he not say, an oath that I shall not eat? That is understandable following our Mishnah, where we are saying, “an oath that I shall not eat.” But for Rebbi who said, an oath that I shall not eat and shall not drink?
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Phineas understood it from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable.” Because he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids. Therefore if [he ate edible food,] drank drinkable fluids he is liable. Did he not say, an oath that I shall not eat? That is understandable following our Mishnah, where we are saying, “an oath that I shall not eat.” But for Rebbi who said, an oath that I shall not eat and shall not drink?
Rebbi Ḥinena understood it from the following: [“If he ate and drank in one forgetting he is liable only once.”
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.
Following Rebbi Ismael? It shall be for you an eternal law, in the Seventh Month He joined work and deprivation. Since the work which I forbade to you is work for which one is liable to extirpation, also deprivation which I forbade to you is deprivation for which one is liable to extirpation.
Following Rebbi Ismael? It shall be for you an eternal law, in the Seventh Month He joined work and deprivation. Since the work which I forbade to you is work for which one is liable to extirpation, also deprivation which I forbade to you is deprivation for which one is liable to extirpation.
It is understandable if it did not come to his knowledge. If it did come to his knowledge? Was it not stated: “From where that those liable for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, remain liable, but those liable for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable?” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, whether it was known to him on it, or not known to him on it. [Why did he not say, if it was not known to him]. His words imply that even if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement, the Day of Atonement atones.
It is understandable if it did not come to his knowledge. If it did come to his knowledge? Was it not stated: “From where that those liable for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, remain liable, but those liable for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable?” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, whether it was known to him on it, or not known to him on it. [Why did he not say, if it was not known to him]. His words imply that even if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement, the Day of Atonement atones.
It is understandable if it did not come to his knowledge. If it did come to his knowledge? Was it not stated: “From where that those liable for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, remain liable, but those liable for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable?” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, whether it was known to him on it, or not known to him on it. [Why did he not say, if it was not known to him]. His words imply that even if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement, the Day of Atonement atones.
It is understandable if it did not come to his knowledge. If it did come to his knowledge? Was it not stated: “From where that those liable for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, remain liable, but those liable for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable?” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, whether it was known to him on it, or not known to him on it. [Why did he not say, if it was not known to him]. His words imply that even if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement, the Day of Atonement atones.
There, we have stated: “For these one is liable for extirpation in case of intentional transgression, or a purification sacrifice for unintentional transgression, and for what was not certainly known in their cases a suspended sacrifice.” But did not the day of Atonement already atone? Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi Levi from Sokho: The Mishnah refers to one who rebels on the Day of Atonement.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
“The following are liable for agio,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, even though his sheqel is not from the Torah, his agio is from the Torah. Rebbi Meir is of the opinion that one who gives his sheqel as a piece is not liable for the agio, Rebbi Meïr said, like a kind of coin made of fire did the Holy One, praise to Him, bring out from under the Throne of Glory and showed it to Moses. He said to him, this they shall give, like this they shall give.
“The following are liable for agio,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, even though his sheqel is not from the Torah, his agio is from the Torah. Rebbi Meir is of the opinion that one who gives his sheqel as a piece is not liable for the agio, Rebbi Meïr said, like a kind of coin made of fire did the Holy One, praise to Him, bring out from under the Throne of Glory and showed it to Moses. He said to him, this they shall give, like this they shall give.
“He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios.” Rebbi Eleazar said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, as Rebbi Meïr said, one for the sheqel which he gives and one for the tetradrachma which he takes. Rav said, it is everybody’s opinion, one for the sheqel which he [gives, one for the sheqel which he] takes, and one for the words of the Torah. In Rav’s opinion, are there three agios? There came Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac in the name of Rav: There are three agios, one for the sheqel which he gives, one for the sheqel which he takes, and one for the words of the Torah.
Brothers or partners who are liable for the agio and not liable for animal tithe,” if they distributed and then formed a partnership; “if they are liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio,” if they never distributed.
Brothers or partners who are liable for the agio and not liable for animal tithe,” if they distributed and then formed a partnership; “if they are liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio,” if they never distributed.
Brothers or partners who are liable for the agio and not liable for animal tithe,” if they distributed and then formed a partnership; “if they are liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio,” if they never distributed.
Brothers or partners who are liable for the agio and not liable for animal tithe,” if they distributed and then formed a partnership; “if they are liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio,” if they never distributed.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
MISHNAH: If one makes his sukkah between trees it is qualified. Agents for meritorious deeds are not liable in matters of sukkah. Sick persons and their caregivers are not liable in matters of sukkah. One eats and drinks casually outside the sukkah.
MISHNAH: If one makes his sukkah between trees it is qualified. Agents for meritorious deeds are not liable in matters of sukkah. Sick persons and their caregivers are not liable in matters of sukkah. One eats and drinks casually outside the sukkah.
Rebbi Mana said, not only persons dangerously sick but even sick persons not dangerously sick. It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, it happened that my eye was hurting in Caesarea and the great Rebbi Yose permitted me and all my caregivers to sleep outside the sukkah.” Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, the best men at a wedding and all participants in the wedding are not liable for sukkah.
It was stated: “Daytime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during daytime but are liable during nighttime. Nighttime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during nighttime but are liable during daytime. Watchmen during day and night are not liable for sukkah day and night.” This you are saying, about watchmen about troops. But watchmen about money they treated like watchmen of gardens and orchards.
It was stated: “Daytime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during daytime but are liable during nighttime. Nighttime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during nighttime but are liable during daytime. Watchmen during day and night are not liable for sukkah day and night.” This you are saying, about watchmen about troops. But watchmen about money they treated like watchmen of gardens and orchards.
It was stated: “Daytime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during daytime but are liable during nighttime. Nighttime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during nighttime but are liable during daytime. Watchmen during day and night are not liable for sukkah day and night.” This you are saying, about watchmen about troops. But watchmen about money they treated like watchmen of gardens and orchards.
It was stated: “Daytime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during daytime but are liable during nighttime. Nighttime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during nighttime but are liable during daytime. Watchmen during day and night are not liable for sukkah day and night.” This you are saying, about watchmen about troops. But watchmen about money they treated like watchmen of gardens and orchards.
It was stated: “Daytime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during daytime but are liable during nighttime. Nighttime watchmen of a city are not liable for the sukkah during nighttime but are liable during daytime. Watchmen during day and night are not liable for sukkah day and night.” This you are saying, about watchmen about troops. But watchmen about money they treated like watchmen of gardens and orchards.
MISHNAH: Originally the lulav was taken in the Temple for seven {days} and in the country one day. After the destruction of the Temple, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the lulav be taken in the country for seven {days} as remembrance of the Temple, and that the day of waving be entirely forbidden. If the first day of Tabernacles is a Sabbath, everybody brings their lulav to the synagogue. The next day they come in the morning and everybody recognizes his own and takes it, since they said that nobody can fulfill his obligation with another person’s lulav on the first day of Tabernacles; but on the other days of the holiday a person can fulfill his obligation with another person’s lulav. Rebbi Yose says, if somebody forgot and took the lulav into the public domain on the first day of Tabernacles which is a Sabbath he is not liable since he took it out with permission.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, also one who pours a libation of water on Tabernacles outside of the Temple is liable.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, the entire system of Rebbi Eleazar is the system of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, the water libation is a word from the Torah, so Rebbi Eleazar is saying, the water libation is a word from the Torah. There are Tannaim who state in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, it is necessary that the filling be for the holiday; there are Tannaim who state in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, it is not necessary that the filling be for the holiday. He who said, it is necessary that the filling be for the holiday, Rebbi Eleazar following Rebbi Aqiba; he who said, it is not necessary that the filling be for the holiday, Rebbi Eleazar following the rabbis. This you cannot say since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the entire system of Rebbi Eleazar is the system of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, the water libation is a word from the Torah, so Rebbi Eleazar is saying, the water libation is a word from the Torah. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Ze`ira said, only if he poured three log inside and three log outside. There are Tannaim who state, there is prescribed measure; there are Tannaim who state, there is no prescribed measure. He who said that there is prescribed measure, not liable; he who said there is no prescribed measure, liable.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, also one who pours a libation of water on Tabernacles outside of the Temple is liable.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, the entire system of Rebbi Eleazar is the system of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, the water libation is a word from the Torah, so Rebbi Eleazar is saying, the water libation is a word from the Torah. There are Tannaim who state in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, it is necessary that the filling be for the holiday; there are Tannaim who state in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, it is not necessary that the filling be for the holiday. He who said, it is necessary that the filling be for the holiday, Rebbi Eleazar following Rebbi Aqiba; he who said, it is not necessary that the filling be for the holiday, Rebbi Eleazar following the rabbis. This you cannot say since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the entire system of Rebbi Eleazar is the system of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, the water libation is a word from the Torah, so Rebbi Eleazar is saying, the water libation is a word from the Torah. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Ze`ira said, only if he poured three log inside and three log outside. There are Tannaim who state, there is prescribed measure; there are Tannaim who state, there is no prescribed measure. He who said that there is prescribed measure, not liable; he who said there is no prescribed measure, liable.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, also one who pours a libation of water on Tabernacles outside of the Temple is liable.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, the entire system of Rebbi Eleazar is the system of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, the water libation is a word from the Torah, so Rebbi Eleazar is saying, the water libation is a word from the Torah. There are Tannaim who state in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, it is necessary that the filling be for the holiday; there are Tannaim who state in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, it is not necessary that the filling be for the holiday. He who said, it is necessary that the filling be for the holiday, Rebbi Eleazar following Rebbi Aqiba; he who said, it is not necessary that the filling be for the holiday, Rebbi Eleazar following the rabbis. This you cannot say since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the entire system of Rebbi Eleazar is the system of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, the water libation is a word from the Torah, so Rebbi Eleazar is saying, the water libation is a word from the Torah. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Ze`ira said, only if he poured three log inside and three log outside. There are Tannaim who state, there is prescribed measure; there are Tannaim who state, there is no prescribed measure. He who said that there is prescribed measure, not liable; he who said there is no prescribed measure, liable.
“For demanding will demand, these are purification and reparation offerings. The Eternal, your God, this is dedication for the upkeep of the Temple. From with you, this is collecting single stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah. Or there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.” For otherwise what would we say? Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that you should not say, maybe the sacrifice will be found disqualified; therefore it was necessary to say, (do not tarry to fulfill it, and not its substitute) [there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.] The pronouncement of your lips you shall guard and execute. “You shall guard and execute, to alert the court that they should force you.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Avuna: From here the pledge. As you vowed to the Eternal, your God, a voluntary gift. Is there a vow which is called voluntary gift? But to make him liable for each single vow and every single voluntary gift. “What is the vow about which they spoke? He who says, on me is the obligation for an elevation offering. What is the voluntary gift about which they spoke? He who says, this one is for an elevation offering.” Rebbi Ḥama the colleague of the rabbis asked, if he said, “on me is the obligation”, and came back and said, “this one is”? Rebbi Ḥinena asked, would it not be reasonable if he said, “this one is”, and came back and said, “on me is the obligation”? A severe prohibition falls one a simple prohibition but a simple prohibition does not fall on a severe prohibition.
There, we have stated: “Any born from the first of Tishre until the 29 of Elul combine; five before New Year’s day and five after New Year’s day do not combine. Five before the threshing floor and five after the threshing floor do combine.” “Then why did they say, there are three threshing floors for animal tithe? Because up to the time of the threshing floor one is permitted to sell or slaughter. From the time of the threshing floor he may not slaughter, but if he slaughtered he is not liable.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that the rules of animal tithe are neither like those of germinating nor like those of a third. If you would say like germinating, it should state, all whose pregnancy starts from the 29th of Elul. If you would say like a third, it should state, up to the 22nd. Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: Like the third, they made it following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon said, {an animal} before its time enters the corral to be tithed. Rebbi Mana met Rebbi Shammai; he asked him, did you say that? But did we not state, “Ben Azzai says, those born in Elul are to be tithed separately.” Not even if it was born up to the 29th of Elul? Could you say that Ben Azzai follows Rebbi Simeon? You have to say, he follows the rabbis. Just as you say following the rabbis, he leaves them for the next year and they will be tithed with the others of their year, so you have to say following ben Azzai, he leaves them for the next threshing floor and they will be tithed with those from Elul. Rebbi Huna said, this implies that the days of a firstling while he still is before its time are counted for its year. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah understood this from the following: Any male firstling which isborn to your cattle and small cattle dedicate to the Eternal, your God.. How is this? You count its year from the moment it is born.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this {statement} by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis problematic for you? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support my teacher Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this {statement} by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis problematic for you? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support my teacher Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this {statement} by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis problematic for you? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support my teacher Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this {statement} by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis problematic for you? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support my teacher Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this {statement} by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis problematic for you? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support my teacher Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.
Samuel said, anybody who tightly closes the shutters on the holiday is liable because of building. This is difficult. Something which if it was done on the Sabbath makes him liable for a purification sacrifice the House of Hillel permit to restore? Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They permitted the end because of the start. For if you say that he cannot put them back he will not open. Don’t let him open! Then he detracts from the enjoyment of the holiday. Rebbi Aḥa said, he may put them back on condition that he not restore completely. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, if there is no door there. But if there is a door he uses the door.
Samuel said, anybody who tightly closes the shutters on the holiday is liable because of building. This is difficult. Something which if it was done on the Sabbath makes him liable for a purification sacrifice the House of Hillel permit to restore? Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They permitted the end because of the start. For if you say that he cannot put them back he will not open. Don’t let him open! Then he detracts from the enjoyment of the holiday. Rebbi Aḥa said, he may put them back on condition that he not restore completely. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, if there is no door there. But if there is a door he uses the door.
Samuel pounded on the side of the mortar. Rav said, anything that is pounded may be pounded in its ordinary way. Rav Huna, Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Garlic, and cress, and mustard seed are pounded in their ordinary way. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who makes oenanthium on a Sabbath is liable because of compounding. Is it therefore permitted on a holiday? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Making oenanthium on a holiday is forbidden because of compounding. Isaac Gold asked Rebbi Joḥanan, may one pound for spice wine on a holiday? He said to him, it is permitted. <rebbi isaac from atosha asked rebi simeon be laqish, may one pound to make spice wine on a holiday? he said to him, it is permitted;> give it to me and I shall drink. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Would one not act well in pounding it the day before? He said to him, yes. The argument of Rebbi Abbahu is inverted. Here he says permitted, and there he says forbidden. But since Rebbi Abbahu knew that Rebbi Ze`ira was restrictive, and that they are restrictive, therefore he agreed with them. Some want to say that so he said to him: If one wants that it be good he will not pound it the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira asked Kallidromos, the slave of Rebbi Judah the Prince, does your master pound to make spice wine on a holiday? He said to him yes, and all kinds of cuts of meat. Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Elazar in the name of Rebbi Immi, the father of Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris. Where do they disagree? For grilling. Put for the pot it is permitted. Rebbi Naḥum said, Rebbi Samuel bar Abba asked about noodle dough. To let it dry is forbidden, for the pot it is permitted, part and part is questionable.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jonah asked, if he did this on the Sabbath, in the opinion of the House of Shammai would he be liable? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? If he did it on the Sabbath would he not be liable according to the House of Hillel? And here he is liable. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah said it correctly. It is a problem only for the House of Shammai. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted on the holiday, nothing of the category of selecting was permitted on the Sabbath.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jonah asked, if he did this on the Sabbath, in the opinion of the House of Shammai would he be liable? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? If he did it on the Sabbath would he not be liable according to the House of Hillel? And here he is liable. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah said it correctly. It is a problem only for the House of Shammai. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted on the holiday, nothing of the category of selecting was permitted on the Sabbath.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jonah asked, if he did this on the Sabbath, in the opinion of the House of Shammai would he be liable? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? If he did it on the Sabbath would he not be liable according to the House of Hillel? And here he is liable. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah said it correctly. It is a problem only for the House of Shammai. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted on the holiday, nothing of the category of selecting was permitted on the Sabbath.
If one selected food out of food, Ḥizqiah said, one is liable; Rebbi Joḥanan said, one is not liable. A baraita disagrees with Ḥizqiah: He selects and eats, he selects and puts on the table. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: explain it if guests were eating what was served. But was it not stated: On condition that he did not select all of its kind? In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, because one who selects on the Sabbath is liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, because one who selects normally at another place is liable. In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, even rings among rings, even pomegranates among pomegranates. Or is it so, even people among people? How is this? Everybody agrees with that of Rebbi Immi. For Rebbi Immi had guests; he brought before them lupines and beans. He told them, be careful to eat the artichokes at the end.
If one selected food out of food, Ḥizqiah said, one is liable; Rebbi Joḥanan said, one is not liable. A baraita disagrees with Ḥizqiah: He selects and eats, he selects and puts on the table. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: explain it if guests were eating what was served. But was it not stated: On condition that he did not select all of its kind? In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, because one who selects on the Sabbath is liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, because one who selects normally at another place is liable. In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, even rings among rings, even pomegranates among pomegranates. Or is it so, even people among people? How is this? Everybody agrees with that of Rebbi Immi. For Rebbi Immi had guests; he brought before them lupines and beans. He told them, be careful to eat the artichokes at the end.
If one selected food out of food, Ḥizqiah said, one is liable; Rebbi Joḥanan said, one is not liable. A baraita disagrees with Ḥizqiah: He selects and eats, he selects and puts on the table. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: explain it if guests were eating what was served. But was it not stated: On condition that he did not select all of its kind? In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, because one who selects on the Sabbath is liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, because one who selects normally at another place is liable. In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, even rings among rings, even pomegranates among pomegranates. Or is it so, even people among people? How is this? Everybody agrees with that of Rebbi Immi. For Rebbi Immi had guests; he brought before them lupines and beans. He told them, be careful to eat the artichokes at the end.
If one selected food out of food, Ḥizqiah said, one is liable; Rebbi Joḥanan said, one is not liable. A baraita disagrees with Ḥizqiah: He selects and eats, he selects and puts on the table. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: explain it if guests were eating what was served. But was it not stated: On condition that he did not select all of its kind? In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, because one who selects on the Sabbath is liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, because one who selects normally at another place is liable. In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, even rings among rings, even pomegranates among pomegranates. Or is it so, even people among people? How is this? Everybody agrees with that of Rebbi Immi. For Rebbi Immi had guests; he brought before them lupines and beans. He told them, be careful to eat the artichokes at the end.
Rebbi Ze`ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Samuel: One who filters is liable because of selecting. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it is more reasonable that it should be because of sifting. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, at the start we were saying that Rebbi Ze`ira said it correctly, since as in sifting the flour is below and the farina on top, so in filtering wine the wine is at the bottom and the yeast on top; but we were not saying anything. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted, the category of filtering was permitted. The category of selecting was permitted: “he selects normally, on his chest, or from a pot”. Also the category of filtering was permitted, “on a holiday one puts into one which was hanging”. But the category of sifting was not permitted. As Rebbi Ḥanina bar Yaqe said in the name of Rav Jehudah, One does not re-sift the flour but one may pass it through the back of the sieve. If you say it is because of sifting, it should be forbidden. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, for it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, also preparations for making food are permitted. There is a question about the following: following the rabbis, may one re-sift the flour through the back of the sieve?
HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.
HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.
HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.
HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.
HALAKHAH: “One does not catch fish,” etc. Rebbi Ḥinena said, our Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “ one who catches a bird for a cage or a deer for a house is liable;” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we have stated: “one does not catch fish from vivaria and one does not feed them,” therefore for a garden or a vivarium he is not liable? The argument of the rabbis is inverted, as we have stated there: “but the Sages say, a bird for a cage and a deer for a garden, or a courtyard, or a vivarium,” and we have stated, “but one catches wild animals and fowl from vivaria and feeds them,” therefore not for a garden or a vivarium? One for a covered courtyard, the other for a courtyard which is not covered. But did we not state “a garden”? Can you say a covered garden? But here a large one, there a small one. Rebbi Ulla said, they asked before Rebbi Aḥa, how should one state? In any case where catching is still missing one is liable, but if catching is not missing one is not liable? He answered them, do we not deal with the case that he corrals them into it? But “in any case where catching is still missing it is forbidden, but if catching is not missing it is permitted”. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said: any which needs nets needs catching, what does not need nets does not need catching.
MISHNAH: One is liable on the holiday for everything classified as Sabbath rest, classified as obligatory, classified as meritorious. These are classified as Sabbath rest: One does not climb on a tree, nor ride on an animal, nor sail on water, nor clap the hands in anger, nor clap the hands in joy, nor dance. These are classified as obligatory, one does not judge, nor contract preliminary marriage, nor give ḥaliṣah, nor enter levirate marriage. These are classified as meritorious, one does not dedicate, nor dedicate one’s worth, nor dedicate as herem, nor collect heaves and tithes. All these were said regarding a holiday, so much more regarding the Sabbath. The only difference between holiday and Sabbath is preparation of food.
HALAKHAH: “Five things were said about burning charcoal and five about the flame. One commits larceny with the burning charcoal of the Temple; one may not use its flame but one cannot commit larceny with the latter. Burning charcoal of idolatry is forbidden, its flame is allowed. He who makes a vow not to use anything of another person may not use his burning charcoal but is allowed his flame. He who carries burning charcoal into the public domain is liable but for the flame he is free of punishment. One makes the benediction over the flame but not over glowing charcoal.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: If the charcoal was crackling one makes the benediction. Rebbi Joḥanan from Karṣion in the name of Rebbi Naḥum bar Simai: Only if {the flame} is jumping off.
If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.
HALAKHAH: One understands the dweller in a walled city whose time is later. Is the time of a village dweller who went to a walled city not earlier? Rebbi Yudan said, there is here no village dweller who went to a walled city. And it was stated in the House of Rebbi so: the dweller in a walled city who went to a village. Rebbi Yose said, also here if he will stay with them. Rebbi Yose said, only if he left before dawn, but if he left after dawn he already is not liable. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob asked, then a proselyte who circumcised after dawn already is not liable? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the village dweller who changed his abode in the night of the Fifteenth [is obligated here; and a dweller in a walled city who changed his abode in the night of the Fourteenth] is not liable at either place?
HALAKHAH: One understands the dweller in a walled city whose time is later. Is the time of a village dweller who went to a walled city not earlier? Rebbi Yudan said, there is here no village dweller who went to a walled city. And it was stated in the House of Rebbi so: the dweller in a walled city who went to a village. Rebbi Yose said, also here if he will stay with them. Rebbi Yose said, only if he left before dawn, but if he left after dawn he already is not liable. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob asked, then a proselyte who circumcised after dawn already is not liable? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the village dweller who changed his abode in the night of the Fifteenth [is obligated here; and a dweller in a walled city who changed his abode in the night of the Fourteenth] is not liable at either place?
HALAKHAH: One understands the dweller in a walled city whose time is later. Is the time of a village dweller who went to a walled city not earlier? Rebbi Yudan said, there is here no village dweller who went to a walled city. And it was stated in the House of Rebbi so: the dweller in a walled city who went to a village. Rebbi Yose said, also here if he will stay with them. Rebbi Yose said, only if he left before dawn, but if he left after dawn he already is not liable. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob asked, then a proselyte who circumcised after dawn already is not liable? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the village dweller who changed his abode in the night of the Fifteenth [is obligated here; and a dweller in a walled city who changed his abode in the night of the Fourteenth] is not liable at either place?
Ḥuldat hammulim is liable for mezuzah. A window, four by four {cubits} wide, in which slaves sit and make wind for their masters are liable for mezuzah. Coops one on top of the other are liable for mezuzah; one steps on the doorstep below. Rebbi Yose was sorry not to have seen the coop of Rebbi Ilai which he had made according to all rabbis.
Ḥuldat hammulim is liable for mezuzah. A window, four by four {cubits} wide, in which slaves sit and make wind for their masters are liable for mezuzah. Coops one on top of the other are liable for mezuzah; one steps on the doorstep below. Rebbi Yose was sorry not to have seen the coop of Rebbi Ilai which he had made according to all rabbis.
Ḥuldat hammulim is liable for mezuzah. A window, four by four {cubits} wide, in which slaves sit and make wind for their masters are liable for mezuzah. Coops one on top of the other are liable for mezuzah; one steps on the doorstep below. Rebbi Yose was sorry not to have seen the coop of Rebbi Ilai which he had made according to all rabbis.
“The child.” Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting. They said, we have stated: Who is a child? Any who cannot ride on his father’s shoulder.” And can a child hear and can a child speak? They turned around and said, all your males, to include the child. Or should we say, to include the deaf-mute? So they should hear and learn, to exclude (the child) [the deaf-mute. Or should we say, so they should hear and learn, to exclude the child?] Rebbi Yose said, since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: May a deaf-mute child be liable? He said to him, come and see; the permanent dweller (in Heaven) [on earth] and the traveller in the highest Heaven? Since an adult deaf-mute is not liable, a child deaf-mute not a fortiori? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it would have been logical that a child who is no deaf-mute should be not liable. It is the decision of the verse, all your males, to include the child. I would say, but a (child) [adult] deaf-mute should be liable, not to split the practice of males. Therefore what Rebbi Yose said is necessary: since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future.
“The child.” Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting. They said, we have stated: Who is a child? Any who cannot ride on his father’s shoulder.” And can a child hear and can a child speak? They turned around and said, all your males, to include the child. Or should we say, to include the deaf-mute? So they should hear and learn, to exclude (the child) [the deaf-mute. Or should we say, so they should hear and learn, to exclude the child?] Rebbi Yose said, since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: May a deaf-mute child be liable? He said to him, come and see; the permanent dweller (in Heaven) [on earth] and the traveller in the highest Heaven? Since an adult deaf-mute is not liable, a child deaf-mute not a fortiori? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it would have been logical that a child who is no deaf-mute should be not liable. It is the decision of the verse, all your males, to include the child. I would say, but a (child) [adult] deaf-mute should be liable, not to split the practice of males. Therefore what Rebbi Yose said is necessary: since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future.
“The child.” Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting. They said, we have stated: Who is a child? Any who cannot ride on his father’s shoulder.” And can a child hear and can a child speak? They turned around and said, all your males, to include the child. Or should we say, to include the deaf-mute? So they should hear and learn, to exclude (the child) [the deaf-mute. Or should we say, so they should hear and learn, to exclude the child?] Rebbi Yose said, since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: May a deaf-mute child be liable? He said to him, come and see; the permanent dweller (in Heaven) [on earth] and the traveller in the highest Heaven? Since an adult deaf-mute is not liable, a child deaf-mute not a fortiori? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it would have been logical that a child who is no deaf-mute should be not liable. It is the decision of the verse, all your males, to include the child. I would say, but a (child) [adult] deaf-mute should be liable, not to split the practice of males. Therefore what Rebbi Yose said is necessary: since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future.
“The child.” Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting. They said, we have stated: Who is a child? Any who cannot ride on his father’s shoulder.” And can a child hear and can a child speak? They turned around and said, all your males, to include the child. Or should we say, to include the deaf-mute? So they should hear and learn, to exclude (the child) [the deaf-mute. Or should we say, so they should hear and learn, to exclude the child?] Rebbi Yose said, since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: May a deaf-mute child be liable? He said to him, come and see; the permanent dweller (in Heaven) [on earth] and the traveller in the highest Heaven? Since an adult deaf-mute is not liable, a child deaf-mute not a fortiori? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it would have been logical that a child who is no deaf-mute should be not liable. It is the decision of the verse, all your males, to include the child. I would say, but a (child) [adult] deaf-mute should be liable, not to split the practice of males. Therefore what Rebbi Yose said is necessary: since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel explain the same verse. The House of Shammai are saying, one verse says your males, and another verse says, walking occasions. Take in between them the one able to ride on his father’s shoulder. But even a {very} small one can ride on his father’s shoulder; must he fulfill his obligation? But one who sees his father’s shoulder and runs to him. The House of Hillel explain: one verse says your males, and another verse says, walking occasions. Take in between them the one able to grab his father’s hand. But in matters of purity you are saying, if he grabs his father’s hand, in matters of doubt he is treated as intelligent being. If his father grabs his hand, [in case of doubt] he is treated as deaf-and-dumb. But here in both cases he is liable.
It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.
It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.
It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.