2925 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:23

It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:23

It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:23

It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:33

MISHNAH: Someone who did not bring his holiday sacrifice on the first day of the holiday may bring it during the entire festival including the last day of the festival. Once the festival has passed he is not liable for its warranty. On that it was said, the distorted cannot be repaired and the deficient cannot be made whole.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:22

There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:13

MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:15

“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:15

“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:15

“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:18

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:18

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:15

“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:15

“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:11

MISHNAH: He who pours out water in the public domain is liable for the damage if another person is hurt because of this. He who puts away a thorn, or glass, or who fences his fence with thorns, or [owns] a fence which collapsed into the public domain, is liable for the damage if other persons are hurt because of this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:11

MISHNAH: He who pours out water in the public domain is liable for the damage if another person is hurt because of this. He who puts away a thorn, or glass, or who fences his fence with thorns, or [owns] a fence which collapsed into the public domain, is liable for the damage if other persons are hurt because of this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:12

HALAKHAH: “He who pours out water in the public domain,” etc. Rav Huna said, when he was falling to the ground. But if his garments were dirtied, one is liable. Rav said, even if his garments were dirtied, he is not liable. The word of Rav implies one is not liable for ‘pit’ damages of vessels.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:12

HALAKHAH: “He who pours out water in the public domain,” etc. Rav Huna said, when he was falling to the ground. But if his garments were dirtied, one is liable. Rav said, even if his garments were dirtied, he is not liable. The word of Rav implies one is not liable for ‘pit’ damages of vessels.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:12

HALAKHAH: “He who pours out water in the public domain,” etc. Rav Huna said, when he was falling to the ground. But if his garments were dirtied, one is liable. Rav said, even if his garments were dirtied, he is not liable. The word of Rav implies one is not liable for ‘pit’ damages of vessels.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:13

“If somebody hides a thorn or [a piece of] glass in another person’s wall; if the owner of the wall then tears it down and a third person is hurt, he is liable. The pious people of earlier times used to take them out into their fields, lower than three handbreadths so that the plough would not lift them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:15

“A fence which collapsed into the public domain.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, one is liable for damage caused by inaction. This is the following: “If he was given a deadline by which to cut the tree or demolish the wall and they collapsed, if it happened within the term, he is not liable; after the term, he is liable.” How much is a term? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: 30 days.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:15

“A fence which collapsed into the public domain.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, one is liable for damage caused by inaction. This is the following: “If he was given a deadline by which to cut the tree or demolish the wall and they collapsed, if it happened within the term, he is not liable; after the term, he is liable.” How much is a term? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: 30 days.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:15

“A fence which collapsed into the public domain.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, one is liable for damage caused by inaction. This is the following: “If he was given a deadline by which to cut the tree or demolish the wall and they collapsed, if it happened within the term, he is not liable; after the term, he is liable.” How much is a term? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: 30 days.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:16

MISHNAH: If somebody take out his straw and his pressed olives into the public domain to compost, he is liable for any damages another person might incur because of this. Anybody may take it and acquire it. If somebody turns over cow droppings in the public domain, he is liable for any damages another person might incur because of this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:16

MISHNAH: If somebody take out his straw and his pressed olives into the public domain to compost, he is liable for any damages another person might incur because of this. Anybody may take it and acquire it. If somebody turns over cow droppings in the public domain, he is liable for any damages another person might incur because of this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:19

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:20

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:20

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:20

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:20

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:20

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:20

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:21

MISHNAH: Two potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and the second stumbled over the first; the first is liable for the damage done to the second. One came with an amphora, the other came with a beam. If the jug of the one was broken by the other’s beam he is not liable since each of them had the right to walk there.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:21

MISHNAH: Two potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and the second stumbled over the first; the first is liable for the damage done to the second. One came with an amphora, the other came with a beam. If the jug of the one was broken by the other’s beam he is not liable since each of them had the right to walk there.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:22

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:23

“One came with an amphora, another came with a beam.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If they changed and caused damage, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “Five people sat on a couch; another came, saton it, and it broke. He pays for all of them. But if it broke because of all of them, they are all liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:26

MISHNAH: Two were walking in the public domain, or one was running and one was walking, or both were running. If they caused damage one to the other, neither of them is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:27

HALAKHAH: “Two were walking” etc. “Yose the Babylonian said: If one ran in the public domain and caused damage, he is liable. Late Friday evening he is not liable.” They said, Yose the Babylonian is Yose ben Jehudah, is Yose the small one. Why is he called Yose the small one? Because he was the last of the pious.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:27

HALAKHAH: “Two were walking” etc. “Yose the Babylonian said: If one ran in the public domain and caused damage, he is liable. Late Friday evening he is not liable.” They said, Yose the Babylonian is Yose ben Jehudah, is Yose the small one. Why is he called Yose the small one? Because he was the last of the pious.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:28

MISHNAH: If somebody split [wood] in a private domain and caused damage in the public domain, in the public domain and caused damage in a private domain, in a private domain and caused damage in another private domain, he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:29

HALAKHAH: “If somebody split [wood] in a private domain,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard when a worker entered to claim his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and damaged him, he is liable. If he died he does not go into exile. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose said, if he had seen him, but what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, if he had not seen him. If he had not seen him, once he said to him: enter, {should he not be liable? But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some want to say, since he told him to enter it} becomes like the courtyard of partners, about which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say: If he filled the entire public domain? And did this fill the entire public domain? They said, since he walks in the entire courtyard, it is as if he had filled the entire courtyard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:29

HALAKHAH: “If somebody split [wood] in a private domain,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard when a worker entered to claim his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and damaged him, he is liable. If he died he does not go into exile. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose said, if he had seen him, but what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, if he had not seen him. If he had not seen him, once he said to him: enter, {should he not be liable? But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some want to say, since he told him to enter it} becomes like the courtyard of partners, about which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say: If he filled the entire public domain? And did this fill the entire public domain? They said, since he walks in the entire courtyard, it is as if he had filled the entire courtyard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:29

HALAKHAH: “If somebody split [wood] in a private domain,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard when a worker entered to claim his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and damaged him, he is liable. If he died he does not go into exile. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose said, if he had seen him, but what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, if he had not seen him. If he had not seen him, once he said to him: enter, {should he not be liable? But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some want to say, since he told him to enter it} becomes like the courtyard of partners, about which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say: If he filled the entire public domain? And did this fill the entire public domain? They said, since he walks in the entire courtyard, it is as if he had filled the entire courtyard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:29

HALAKHAH: “If somebody split [wood] in a private domain,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard when a worker entered to claim his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and damaged him, he is liable. If he died he does not go into exile. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose said, if he had seen him, but what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, if he had not seen him. If he had not seen him, once he said to him: enter, {should he not be liable? But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some want to say, since he told him to enter it} becomes like the courtyard of partners, about which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say: If he filled the entire public domain? And did this fill the entire public domain? They said, since he walks in the entire courtyard, it is as if he had filled the entire courtyard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:29

HALAKHAH: “If somebody split [wood] in a private domain,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard when a worker entered to claim his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and damaged him, he is liable. If he died he does not go into exile. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose said, if he had seen him, but what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, if he had not seen him. If he had not seen him, once he said to him: enter, {should he not be liable? But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some want to say, since he told him to enter it} becomes like the courtyard of partners, about which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say: If he filled the entire public domain? And did this fill the entire public domain? They said, since he walks in the entire courtyard, it is as if he had filled the entire courtyard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:33

MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:34

HALAKHAH: : “Two tame bulls,” etc. Ben Pedaia said: Spoilers are not liable except for one making a fire and one causing a wound. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one making a fire only if he needs the ashes; one causing a wound only if he needs the blood. But did we not state: “His bull”? His bull needs ashes.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:35

MISHNAH: If a bull was pursuing another bull which was damaged. This one says, your bull did the damage, but the other one says, it was hurt by a rock; the burden of proof is on the claimant. If two [bulls] were pursuing another [bull]; each of them says: your bull did the damage; neither of them is liable. But if they belonged to one owner, he is liable for both of them. If one was large, the other small. The person sustaining the damage says that the large one did the damage but the person causing the damage says that the small one did the damage, the burden of proof is on the claimant. If two were damaged, one large and one small, and the [bulls] doing the damage were two, one large and one small. The person sustaining the damage says that the large one damaged the large one and the small one the small; but the person causing the damage says that the small one did damage the large one and the large one the small. [Or] one tame and one notorious, the person sustaining the damage says that the notorious one damaged the large one and the tame one the small; but the person causing the damage says that the tame one did damage the large one and the notorious one the small. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:35

MISHNAH: If a bull was pursuing another bull which was damaged. This one says, your bull did the damage, but the other one says, it was hurt by a rock; the burden of proof is on the claimant. If two [bulls] were pursuing another [bull]; each of them says: your bull did the damage; neither of them is liable. But if they belonged to one owner, he is liable for both of them. If one was large, the other small. The person sustaining the damage says that the large one did the damage but the person causing the damage says that the small one did the damage, the burden of proof is on the claimant. If two were damaged, one large and one small, and the [bulls] doing the damage were two, one large and one small. The person sustaining the damage says that the large one damaged the large one and the small one the small; but the person causing the damage says that the small one did damage the large one and the large one the small. [Or] one tame and one notorious, the person sustaining the damage says that the notorious one damaged the large one and the tame one the small; but the person causing the damage says that the tame one did damage the large one and the notorious one the small. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:36

HALAKHAH: “A person may be liable for the action of his bull,” etc. Rebbi Yudan asked: How is the court trial? Let us hear from the following: “Two persons threw two pebbles and broke two jugs, one full of wine and one full of oil. Each of them said, I broke the one full of wine. Both of them pay for the wine. One empty and one full; each of them said, I broke the empty one. Both of them pay for the empty one. If they broke one amphora. Each of them said, you broke it. Neither of them is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:36

HALAKHAH: “A person may be liable for the action of his bull,” etc. Rebbi Yudan asked: How is the court trial? Let us hear from the following: “Two persons threw two pebbles and broke two jugs, one full of wine and one full of oil. Each of them said, I broke the one full of wine. Both of them pay for the wine. One empty and one full; each of them said, I broke the empty one. Both of them pay for the empty one. If they broke one amphora. Each of them said, you broke it. Neither of them is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:13

MISHNAH: The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of Temple property or the bull of Temple property which gored a bull of an Israel are not liable since it was said “his neighbor’s bull”, not a bull of Temple property. The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable; the bull of a non-Jew which gored a bull of an Israel pays full damages, whether tame or notorious.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:13

MISHNAH: The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of Temple property or the bull of Temple property which gored a bull of an Israel are not liable since it was said “his neighbor’s bull”, not a bull of Temple property. The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable; the bull of a non-Jew which gored a bull of an Israel pays full damages, whether tame or notorious.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:14

HALAKHAH: “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew,” etc. Rav said, “He saw and permitted Gentiles,” He permitted the Gentiles’ money. Ḥizqiah said, “He appeared from Mont Paran,” He appeared in front of the Gentiles; Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, He made them poor. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, following their laws. Rebbi La said, this was not said referring to this topic, but to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If a Gentile’s bull gored another Gentile’s bull, even though they accepted to be judged by the laws of Israel, he is liable for full damages whether tame or notorious. On that it was said that Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, following their laws.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:15

It happened that the [Roman] government sent two officials to study Torah with Rabban Gamliel. They learned from him Bible, Mishnah, Talmud, practice, and homilies. At the end, they told him: All of your teachings are beautiful and commendable except two things which you say: “A Jewish woman shall not act as midwife to a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may act as midwife for a Jewish woman; a Jewish woman shall not nurse the child of a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may nurse for a Jewish woman with her consent; what was robbed from a Jew is forbidden but from a Gentile it is permitted.” At that moment did Rabban Gamliel decide that what was robbed from a Gentile be forbidden because of desecration of the Name. “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable,” etc. But we shall not inform the government of this. Nevertheless, by the time they reached the Tyrian ladder they had forgotten everything.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:16

MISHNAH: If a bull of a sane person gored the bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person, he is liable. If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored the bull of a sane person, he is not liable. If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian. If the deaf-mute became hearing, the insane normal, the underaged of age, it returns to be tame, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. A bull of the stadion is not to be killed since it is said: “if it gores,” not that others train it to gore.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:16

MISHNAH: If a bull of a sane person gored the bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person, he is liable. If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored the bull of a sane person, he is not liable. If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian. If the deaf-mute became hearing, the insane normal, the underaged of age, it returns to be tame, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. A bull of the stadion is not to be killed since it is said: “if it gores,” not that others train it to gore.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:18

Did we not state: “If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian”? So far if testimony was taken in the presence of the owner and he delivered to the guardian. If testimony was taken in the presence of the guardian and he delivered to the owner? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame but it turned out to be notorious, the owner pays half of the damages and the borrower pays half of the damages.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. But if this is Rebbi Yose’s, he should pay in full. If he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame. But if he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame, he should not have to pay anything. If he knew that it was apt to gore. It was stated: “If it killed while at the borrower’s, who handed it back to the owners, before judgment was rendered he is not liable, after judgment was rendered he is liable. Rebbi Jacob said, even after judgment was rendered but before it was stoned, he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:18

Did we not state: “If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian”? So far if testimony was taken in the presence of the owner and he delivered to the guardian. If testimony was taken in the presence of the guardian and he delivered to the owner? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame but it turned out to be notorious, the owner pays half of the damages and the borrower pays half of the damages.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. But if this is Rebbi Yose’s, he should pay in full. If he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame. But if he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame, he should not have to pay anything. If he knew that it was apt to gore. It was stated: “If it killed while at the borrower’s, who handed it back to the owners, before judgment was rendered he is not liable, after judgment was rendered he is liable. Rebbi Jacob said, even after judgment was rendered but before it was stoned, he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:18

Did we not state: “If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian”? So far if testimony was taken in the presence of the owner and he delivered to the guardian. If testimony was taken in the presence of the guardian and he delivered to the owner? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame but it turned out to be notorious, the owner pays half of the damages and the borrower pays half of the damages.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. But if this is Rebbi Yose’s, he should pay in full. If he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame. But if he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame, he should not have to pay anything. If he knew that it was apt to gore. It was stated: “If it killed while at the borrower’s, who handed it back to the owners, before judgment was rendered he is not liable, after judgment was rendered he is liable. Rebbi Jacob said, even after judgment was rendered but before it was stoned, he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:22

MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt, if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed. The same holds for a son or a daughter. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas, whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold denar.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:23

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:28

If somebody sells a bull to another person and it turns out to be goring. Rav said, it is an acquisition in error, but Samuel says, he can tell him: I sold it to you to be slaughtered. “He shall give weregilt for his person.” Some Tannaїm state: The attacker’s person. Some Tannaїm state: The person suffering the damage. Following him who said, the person suffering the damage, [assume] the first one injured him fatally and then the second came and kept him in confusion. If you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays damages and the second pays the weregilt. If you say that damages are not fully required, the first one pays weregilt but the second is not liable. Following him who said, the attacker’s person, if you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays weregilt and the second is not liable. If you say that damages are not fully required, neither one is liable.