194 occurrences across the corpus

The Writings of Origen

De Principiis, Book I 1:8

But perhaps these declarations may seem to have less weight with those who wish to be instructed in divine things out of the holy Scriptures, and who seek to have it proved to them from that source how the nature of God surpasses the nature of bodies. See, therefore, if the apostle does not say the same thing, when, speaking of Christ, he declares, that “He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature.” Not, as some suppose, that the nature of God is visible to some and invisible to others: for the apostle does not say “the image of God invisible” to men or “invisible” to sinners, but with unvarying constancy pronounces on the nature of God in these words: “the image of the invisible God.” Moreover, John in his Gospel, when asserting that “no one hath seen God at any time,” manifestly declares to all who are capable of understanding, that there is no nature to which God is visible: not as if He were a being who was visible by nature, and merely escaped or baffled the view of a frailer creature, but because by the nature of His being it is impossible for Him to be seen. And if you should ask of me what is my opinion regarding the Only-begotten Himself, whether the nature of God, which is naturally invisible, be not visible even to Him, let not such a question appear to you at once to be either absurd or impious, because we shall give you a logical reason. It is one thing to see, and another to know: to see and to be seen is a property of bodies; to know and to be known, an attribute of intellectual being. Whatever, therefore, is a property of bodies, cannot be predicated either of the Father or of the Son; but what belongs to the nature of deity is common to the Father and the Son. Finally, even He Himself, in the Gospel, did not say that no one has seen the Father, save the Son, nor any one the Son, save the Father; but His words are: “No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; nor any one the Father, save the Son.” By which it is clearly shown, that whatever among bodily natures is called seeing and being seen, is termed, between the Father and the Son, a knowing and being known, by means of the power of knowledge, not by the frailness of the sense of sight. Because, then, neither seeing nor being seen can be properly applied to an incorporeal and invisible nature, neither is the Father, in the Gospel, said to be seen by the Son, nor the Son by the Father, but the one is said to be known by the other.

De Principiis, Book I 5:3

After the enumeration, then, of so many and so important names of orders and offices, underlying which it is certain that there are personal existences, let us inquire whether God, the creator and founder of all things, created certain of them holy and happy, so that they could admit no element at all of an opposite kind, and certain others so that they were made capable both of virtue and vice; or whether we are to suppose that He created some so as to be altogether incapable of virtue, and others again altogether incapable of wickedness, but with the power of abiding only in a state of happiness, and others again such as to be capable of either condition. In order, now, that our first inquiry may begin with the names themselves, let us consider whether the holy angels, from the period of their first existence, have always been holy, and are holy still, and will be holy, and have never either admitted or had the power to admit any occasion of sin. Then in the next place, let us consider whether those who are called holy principalities began from the moment of their creation by God to exercise power over some who were made subject to them, and whether these latter were created of such a nature, and formed for the very purpose of being subject and subordinate. In like manner, also, whether those which are called powers were created of such a nature and for the express purpose of exercising power, or whether their arriving at that power and dignity is a reward and desert of their virtue. Moreover, also, whether those which are called thrones or seats gained that stability of happiness at the same time with their coming forth into being, so as to have that possession from the will of the Creator alone; or whether those which are called dominions had their dominion conferred on them, not as a reward for their proficiency, but as the peculiar privilege of their creation, so that it is something which is in a certain degree inseparable from them, and natural. Now, if we adopt the view that the holy angels, and the holy powers, and the blessed seats, and the glorious virtues, and the magnificent dominions, are to be regarded as possessing those powers and dignities and glories in virtue of their nature, it will doubtless appear to follow that those beings which have been mentioned as holding offices of an opposite kind must be regarded in the same manner; so that those principalities with whom we have to struggle are to be viewed, not as having received that spirit of opposition and resistance to all good at a later period, or as falling away from good through the freedom of the will, but as having had it in themselves as the essence of their being from the beginning of their existence. In like manner also will it be the case with the powers and virtues, in none of which was wickedness subsequent or posterior to their first existence. Those also whom the apostle termed rulers and princes of the darkness of this world, are said, with respect to their rule and occupation of darkness, to fall not from perversity of intention, but from the necessity of their creation. Logical reasoning will compel us to take the same view with regard to wicked and malignant spirits and unclean demons. But if to entertain this view regarding malignant and opposing powers seem to be absurd, as it is certainly absurd that the cause of their wickedness should be removed from the purpose of their own will, and ascribed of necessity to their Creator, why should we not also be obliged to make a similar confession regarding the good and holy powers, that, viz., the good which is in them is not theirs by essential being, which we have manifestly shown to be the case with Christ and the Holy Spirit alone, as undoubtedly with the Father also? For it was proved that there was nothing compound in the nature of the Trinity, so that these qualities might seem to belong to it as accidental consequences. From which it follows, that in the case of every creature it is a result of his own works and movements, that those powers which appear either to hold sway over others or to exercise power or dominion, have been preferred to and placed over those whom they are said to govern or exercise power over, and not in consequence of a peculiar privilege inherent in their constitutions, but on account of merit.

De Principiis, Book I 7:1

The subjects considered in the previous chapter have been spoken of in general language, the nature of rational beings being discussed more by way of intelligent inference than strict dogmatic definition, with the exception of the place where we treated, to the best of our ability, of the persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We have now to ascertain what those matters are which it is proper to treat in the following pages according to our dogmatic belief, i.e. in agreement with the creed of the church. All souls and all rational natures, whether holy or wicked, were formed or created, and all these, according to their proper nature, are incorporeal; but although incorporeal, they were nevertheless created, because all things were made by God through Christ, as John teaches in a general way in his Gospel, saying, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made.” The Apostle Paul, moreover, describing created things by species and numbers and orders, speaks as follows, when showing that all things were made through Christ: “And in Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by Him, and in Him: and He is before all, and He is the head.” He therefore manifestly declares that in Christ and through Christ were all things made and created, whether things visible, which are corporeal, or things invisible, which I regard as none other than incorporeal and spiritual powers. But of those things which he had termed generally corporeal or incorporeal, he seems to me, in the words that follow, to enumerate the various kinds, viz. thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, influences. These matters now have been previously mentioned by us, as we are desirous to come in an orderly manner to the investigation of the sun, and moon, and stars by way of logical inference, and to ascertain whether they also ought properly to be reckoned among the principalities on account of their being said to be created in Ἀρχὰς, i.e. for the government of day and night; or whether they are to be regarded as having only that government of day and night which they discharge by performing the office of illuminating them, and are not in reality chief of that order of principalities.

De Principiis, Book II 2:2

If, however, it is impossible for this point to be at all maintained, viz. that any other nature than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can live without a body, the necessity of logical reasoning compels us to understand that rational natures were indeed created at the beginning, but that material substance was separated from them only in thought and understanding, and appears to have been formed for them, or after them, and that they never have lived nor do live without it; for an incorporeal life will rightly be considered a prerogative of the Trinity alone. As we have remarked above, therefore, that material substance of this world, possessing a nature admitting of all possible transformations, is, when dragged down to beings of a lower order, moulded into the crasser and more solid condition of a body, so as to distinguish those visible and varying forms of the world; but when it becomes the servant of more perfect and more blessed beings, it shines in the splendour of celestial bodies, and adorns either the angels of God or the sons of the resurrection with the clothing of a spiritual body, out of all which will be filled up the diverse and varying state of the one world. But if any one should desire to discuss these matters more fully, it will be necessary, with all reverence and fear of God, to examine the sacred Scriptures with greater attention and diligence, to ascertain whether the secret and hidden sense within them may perhaps reveal anything regarding these matters; and something may be discovered in their abstruse and mysterious language, through the demonstration of the Holy Spirit to those who are worthy, after many testimonies have been collected on this very point.

De Principiis, Book II 10:1

But since the discourse has reminded us of the subjects of a future judgment and of retribution, and of the punishments of sinners, according to the threatenings of holy Scripture and the contents of the church’s teaching—viz., that when the time of judgment comes, everlasting fire, and outer darkness, and a prison, and a furnace, and other punishments of like nature, have been prepared for sinners—let us see what our opinions on these points ought to be. But that these subjects may be arrived at in proper order, it seems to me that we ought first to consider the nature of the resurrection, that we may know what that [body] is which shall come either to punishment, or to rest, or to happiness; which question in other treatises which we have composed regarding the resurrection we have discussed at greater length, and have shown what our opinions were regarding it. But now, also, for the sake of logical order in our treatise, there will be no absurdity in re-stating a few points from such works, especially since some take offence at the creed of the church, as if our belief in the resurrection were foolish, and altogether devoid of sense; and these are principally heretics, who, I think, are to be answered in the following manner. If they also admit that there is a resurrection of the dead, let them answer us this, What is that which died? Was it not a body? It is of the body, then, that there will be a resurrection. Let them next tell us if they think that we are to make use of bodies or not. I think that when the Apostle Paul says, that “it is sown a natural body, it will arise a spiritual body,” they cannot deny that it is a body which arises, or that in the resurrection we are to make use of bodies. What then? If it is certain that we are to make use of bodies, and if the bodies which have fallen are declared to rise again (for only that which before has fallen can be properly said to rise again), it can be a matter of doubt to no one that they rise again, in order that we may be clothed with them a second time at the resurrection. The one thing is closely connected with the other. For if bodies rise again, they undoubtedly rise to be coverings for us; and if it is necessary for us to be invested with bodies, as it is certainly necessary, we ought to be invested with no other than our own. But if it is true that these rise again, and that they arise “spiritual” bodies, there can be no doubt that they are said to rise from the dead, after casting away corruption and laying aside mortality; otherwise it will appear vain and superfluous for any one to arise from the dead in order to die a second time. And this, finally, may be more distinctly comprehended thus, if one carefully consider what are the qualities of an animal body, which, when sown into the earth, recovers the qualities of a spiritual body. For it is out of the animal body that the very power and grace of the resurrection educe the spiritual body, when it transmutes it from a condition of indignity to one of glory.

De Principiis, Book III 6:1

And now the subject of human temptations must not, in my opinion, be passed over in silence, which take their rise sometimes from flesh and blood, or from the wisdom of flesh and blood, which is said to be hostile to God. And whether the statement be true which certain allege, viz. that each individual has as it were two souls, we shall determine after we have explained the nature of those temptations, which are said to be more powerful than any of human origin, i.e. which we sustain from principalities and powers, and from the rulers of the darkness of this world, and from spiritual wickedness in high places, or to which we are subjected from wicked spirits and unclean demons. Now, in the investigation of this subject, we must, I think, inquire according to a logical method whether there be in us human beings, who are composed of soul and body and vital spirit, some other element, possessing an incitement of its own, and evoking a movement towards evil. For a question of this kind is wont to be discussed by some in this way: whether, viz., as two souls are said to co-exist within us, the one is more divine and heavenly and the other inferior; or whether, from the very fact that we inhere in bodily structures which according to their own proper nature are dead, and altogether devoid of life (seeing it is from us, i.e. from our souls, that the material body derives its life, it being contrary and hostile to the spirit), we are drawn on and enticed to the practice of those evils which are agreeable to the body; or whether, thirdly (which was the opinion of some of the Greek philosophers), although our soul is one in substance, it nevertheless consists of several elements, and one portion of it is called rational and another irrational, and that which is termed the irrational part is again separated into two affections—those of covetousness and passion. These three opinions, then, regarding the soul, which we have stated above, we have found to be entertained by some, but that one of them, which we have mentioned as being adopted by certain Grecian philosophers, viz. that the soul is tripartite, I do not observe to be greatly confirmed by the authority of holy Scripture; while with respect to the remaining two there is found a considerable number of passages in the holy Scriptures which seem capable of application to them.

De Principiis, Book III 7:3

But this is the objection which they generally raise: they say, “If the world had its beginning in time, what was God doing before the world began? For it is at once impious and absurd to say that the nature of God is inactive and immoveable, or to suppose that goodness at one time did not do good, and omnipotence at one time did not exercise its power.” Such is the objection which they are accustomed to make to our statement that this world had its beginning at a certain time, and that, agreeably to our belief in Scripture, we can calculate the years of its past duration. To these propositions I consider that none of the heretics can easily return an answer that will be in conformity with the nature of their opinions. But we can give a logical answer in accordance with the standard of religion, when we say that not then for the first time did God begin to work when He made this visible world; but as, after its destruction, there will be another world, so also we believe that others existed before the present came into being. And both of these positions will be confirmed by the authority of holy Scripture. For that there will be another world after this, is taught by Isaiah, who says, “There will be a new heavens, and a new earth, which I shall make to abide in my sight, saith the Lord;” and that before this world others also existed is shown by Ecclesiastes, in the words: “What is that which hath been? Even that which shall be. And what is that which has been created? Even this which is to be created: and there is nothing altogether new under the sun. Who shall speak and declare, Lo, this is new? It hath already been in the ages which have been before us.” By these testimonies it is established both that there were ages before our own, and that there will be others after it. It is not, however, to be supposed that several worlds existed at once, but that, after the end of this present world, others will take their beginning; respecting which it is unnecessary to repeat each particular statement, seeing we have already done so in the preceding pages.

De Principiis, Book III 7:7

I know not, indeed, how the heretics, not understanding the meaning of the apostle in these words, consider the term “subjection” degrading as applied to the Son; for if the propriety of the title be called in question, it may easily be ascertained from making a contrary supposition. Because if it be not good to be in subjection, it follows that the opposite will be good, viz. not to be in subjection. Now the language of the apostle, according to their view, appears to indicate by these words, “And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him,” that He, who is not now in subjection to the Father, will become subject to Him when the Father shall have first subdued all things unto Him. But I am astonished how it can be conceived to be the meaning, that He who, while all things are not yet subdued to Him, is not Himself in subjection, should—at a time when all things have been subdued to Him, and when He has become King of all men, and holds sway over all things—be supposed then to be made subject, seeing He was not formerly in subjection; for such do not understand that the subjection of Christ to the Father indicates that our happiness has attained to perfection, and that the work undertaken by Him has been brought to a victorious termination, seeing He has not only purified the power of supreme government over the whole of creation, but presents to the Father the principles of the obedience and subjection of the human race in a corrected and improved condition. If, then, that subjection be held to be good and salutary by which the Son is said to be subject to the Father, it is an extremely rational and logical inference to deduce that the subjection also of enemies, which is said to be made to the Son of God, should be understood as being also salutary and useful; as if, when the Son is said to be subject to the Father, the perfect restoration of the whole of creation is signified, so also, when enemies are said to be subjected to the Son of God, the salvation of the conquered and the restoration of the lost is in that understood to consist.

De Principiis, Book IV 1:15

But as if, in all the instances of this covering (i.e. of this history), the logical connection and order of the law had been preserved, we would not certainly believe, when thus possessing the meaning of Scripture in a continuous series, that anything else was contained in it save what was indicated on the surface; so for that reason divine wisdom took care that certain stumbling-blocks, or interruptions, to the historical meaning should take place, by the introduction into the midst [of the narrative] of certain impossibilities and incongruities; that in this way the very interruption of the narrative might, as by the interposition of a bolt, present an obstacle to the reader, whereby he might refuse to acknowledge the way which conducts to the ordinary meaning; and being thus excluded and debarred from it, we might be recalled to the beginning of another way, in order that, by entering upon a narrow path, and passing to a loftier and more sublime road, he might lay open the immense breadth of divine wisdom. This, however, must not be unnoted by us, that as the chief object of the Holy Spirit is to preserve the coherence of the spiritual meaning, either in those things which ought to be done or which have been already performed, if He anywhere finds that those events which, according to the history, took place, can be adapted to a spiritual meaning, He composed a texture of both kinds in one style of narration, always concealing the hidden meaning more deeply; but where the historical narrative could not be made appropriate to the spiritual coherence of the occurrences, He inserted sometimes certain things which either did not take place or could not take place; sometimes also what might happen, but what did not: and He does this at one time in a few words, which, taken in their “bodily” meaning, seem incapable of containing truth, and at another by the insertion of many. And this we find frequently to be the case in the legislative portions, where there are many things manifestly useful among the “bodily” precepts, but a very great number also in which no principle of utility is at all discernible, and sometimes even things which are judged to be impossibilities. Now all this, as we have remarked, was done by the Holy Spirit in order that, seeing those events which lie on the surface can be neither true nor useful, we may be led to the investigation of that truth which is more deeply concealed, and to the ascertaining of a meaning worthy of God in those Scriptures which we believe to be inspired by Him.

De Principiis, Book IV 2:1

Since, in our investigation of matters of such importance, not satisfied with the common opinions, and with the clear evidence of visible things, we take in addition, for the proof of our statements, testimonies from what are believed by us to be divine writings, viz. from that which is called the Old Testament, and that which is styled the New, and endeavour by reason to confirm our faith; and as we have not yet spoken of the Scriptures as divine, come and let us, as if by way of an epitome, treat of a few points respecting them, laying down those reasons which lead us to regard them as divine writings. And before making use of the words of the writings themselves, and of the things which are exhibited in them, we must make the following statement regarding Moses and Jesus Christ,—the lawgiver of the Hebrews, and the Introducer of the saving doctrines according to Christianity. For, although there have been very many legislators among the Greeks and Barbarians, and teachers who announced opinions which professed to be the truth, we have heard of no legislator who was able to imbue other nations with a zeal for the reception of his words; and although those who professed to philosophize about truth brought forward a great apparatus of apparent logical demonstration, no one has been able to impress what was deemed by him the truth upon other nations, or even on any number of persons worth mentioning in a single nation. And yet not only would the legislators have liked to enforce those laws which appeared to be good, if possible, upon the whole human race, but the teachers also to have spread what they imagined to be truth everywhere throughout the world. But as they were unable to call men of other languages and from many nations to observe their laws, and accept their teaching, they did not at all attempt to do this, considering not unwisely the impossibility of such a result happening to them. Whereas all Greece, and the barbarous part of our world, contains innumerable zealots, who have deserted the laws of their fathers and the established gods, for the observance of the laws of Moses and the discipleship of the words of Jesus Christ; although those who clave to the law of Moses were hated by the worshippers of images, and those who accepted the words of Jesus Christ were exposed, in addition, to the danger of death.

Against Celsus, Book IV 26:1

But if it is on account of those opinions of the Christians and Jews which displease Celsus (and which he does not at all appear to understand) that they are to be regarded as worms and ants, and the rest of mankind as different, let us examine the acknowledged opinions of Christians and Jews, and compare them with those of the rest of mankind, and see whether it will not appear to those who have once admitted that certain men are worms and ants, that they are the worms and ants and frogs who have fallen away from sound views of God, and, under a vain appearance of piety, worship either irrational animals, or images, or other objects, the works of men’s hands; whereas, from the beauty of such, they ought to admire the Maker of them, and worship Him: while those are indeed men, and more honourable than men (if there be anything that is so), who, in obedience to their reason, are able to ascend from stocks and stones, nay, even from what is reckoned the most precious of all matter—silver and gold; and who ascend up also from the beautiful things in the world to the Maker of all, and entrust themselves to Him who alone is able to satisfy all existing things, and to overlook the thoughts of all, and to hear the prayers of all; who send up their prayers to Him, and do all things as in the presence of Him who beholds everything, and who are careful, as in the presence of the Hearer of all things, to say nothing which might not with propriety be reported to God. Will not such piety as this—which can be overcome neither by labours, nor by the dangers of death, nor by logical plausibilities—be of no avail in preventing those who have obtained it from being any longer compared to worms, even if they had been so represented before their assumption of a piety so remarkable? Will they who subdue that fierce longing for sexual pleasures which has reduced the souls of many to a weak and feeble condition, and who subdue it because they are persuaded that they cannot otherwise have communion with God, unless they ascend to Him through the exercise of temperance, appear to you to be the brothers of worms, and relatives of ants, and to bear a likeness to frogs? What! is the brilliant quality of justice, which keeps inviolate the rights common to our neighbour, and our kindred, and which observes fairness, and benevolence, and goodness, of no avail in saving him who practises it from being termed a bird of the night? And are not they who wallow in dissoluteness, as do the majority of mankind, and they who associate promiscuously with common harlots, and who teach that such practices are not wholly contrary to propriety, worms who roll in mire?—especially when they are compared with those who have been taught not to take the “members of Christ,” and the body inhabited by the Word, and make them the “members of a harlot;” and who have already learned that the body of the rational being, as consecrated to the God of all things, is the temple of the God whom they worship, becoming such from the pure conceptions which they entertain of the Creator, and who also, being careful not to corrupt the temple of God by unlawful pleasure, practise temperance as constituting piety towards God!

Against Celsus, Book IV 53:1

I do not know, indeed, how he could conjoin things that do not admit of union, and which cannot exist together at the same time in human nature, in saying, as he did, that “the above treatise deserved to be treated both with pity and hatred.” For every one will admit that he who is the object of pity is not at the same moment an object of hatred, and that he who is the object of hatred is not at the same time a subject of pity. Celsus, moreover, says that it was not his purpose to refute such statements, because he thinks that their absurdity is evident to all, and that, even before offering any logical refutation, they will appear to be bad, and to merit both pity and hatred. But we invite him who peruses this reply of ours to the charges of Celsus to have patience, and to listen to our sacred writings themselves, and, as far as possible, to form an opinion from their contents of the purpose of the writers, and of their consciences and disposition of mind; for he will discover that they are men who strenuously contend for what they uphold, and that some of them show that the history which they narrate is one which they have both seen and experienced, which was miraculous, and worthy of being recorded for the advantage of their future hearers. Will any one indeed venture to say that it is not the source and fountain of all blessing [to men] to believe in the God of all things, and to perform all our actions with the view of pleasing Him in everything whatever, and not to entertain even a thought unpleasing to Him, seeing that not only our words and deeds, but our very thoughts, will be the subject of future judgment? And what other arguments would more effectually lead human nature to adopt a virtuous life, than the belief or opinion that the supreme God beholds all things, not only what is said and done, but even what is thought by us? And let any one who likes compare any other system which at the same time converts and ameliorates, not merely one or two individuals, but, as far as in it lies, countless numbers, that by the comparison of both methods he may form a correct idea of the arguments which dispose to a virtuous life.

Against Celsus, Book VI 1:1

In beginning this our sixth book, we desire, my reverend Ambrosius, to answer in it those accusations which Celsus brings against the Christians, not, as might be supposed, those objections which he has adduced from writers on philosophy. For he has quoted a considerable number of passages, chiefly from Plato, and has placed alongside of these such declarations of Holy Scripture as are fitted to impress even the intelligent mind; subjoining the assertion, that “these things are stated much better among the Greeks [than in the Scriptures], and in a manner which is free from all exaggerations and promises on the part of God, or the Son of God.” Now we maintain, that if it is the object of the ambassadors of the truth to confer benefits upon the greatest possible number, and, so far as they can, to win over to its side, through their love to men, every one without exception—intelligent as well as simple—not Greeks only, but also barbarians (and great, indeed, is the humanity which should succeed in converting the rustic and the ignorant), it is manifest that they must adopt a style of address fitted to do good to all, and to gain over to them men of every sort. Those, on the other hand, who turn away from the ignorant as being mere slaves, and unable to understand the flowing periods of a polished and logical discourse, and so devote their attention solely to such as have been brought up amongst literary pursuits, confine their views of the public good within very strait and narrow limits.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Pesachim 6:2

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Mishnah Pesachim 6:2

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Mishnah Pesachim 6:2

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Mishnah Pesachim 6:5

If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.

Mishnah Yevamot 8:3

An Ammonite and a Moabite are forbidden [to enter into the congregation of the Lord] and their prohibition is for ever. However, their women are permitted at once. An Egyptian and an Edomite are forbidden only until the third generation, whether they are males or females. Rabbi Shimon permits their women immediately. Said Rabbi Shimon: This is a kal vehomer: if where the males are forbidden for all time the females are permitted immediately, where the males are forbidden only until the third generation how much more should the females be permitted immediately. They said to him: If this is a halakhah, we shall accept it; but if it is only a logical reference, there is a refutation. He replied: This is not so, I am in fact saying a halakhah. Mamzerim and nethinim are forbidden, and their prohibition is forever, whether they be males or females.

Mishnah Nedarim 10:6

If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi Akiva) said to him (Rabbi Joshua): the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband.

Mishnah Sotah 6:3

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

Mishnah Sotah 6:3

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

Mishnah Sotah 6:3

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:6

If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!

Mishnah Zevachim 7:4

If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted?

Mishnah Zevachim 7:6

If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

Mishnah Zevachim 8:12

If the blood of a hatat was received in two goblets and one of them went outside [the Temple courtyard], the inside one is fit. If one of them entered within [the Sanctuary]: Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares the outer one fit. The sages disqualify it. Rabbi Yose the Galilean: if the place where an intention [directed to it] disqualifies, i.e. without, you do not treat what is left [inside] as what went out; then the place where an intention [directed to it] does not disqualify, i.e. within, is it not logical that we do not treat what is left [outside] as what entered within? If it entered within to make atonement, even if he [the priest] did not make atonement, it is unfit, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon said: [it is not unfit] unless he makes atonement. Rabbi Judah said: if he took it in unwittingly, it is fit. For all unfit blood which was put on the altar, the head plate [of the high priest] does not propitiate, save for the unclean, for the headplate propitiates for that which is unclean, but does not propitiate for what goes out.

Mishnah Zevachim 12:3

The hides of less holy sacrifices belong to their owners. The hides of most holy sacrifices belong to the priest. This is a kal vehomer: if with an olah, even though they do not acquire its flesh they do acquire its hide, is it not logical that they acquire the hides of most holy sacrifices, when they do acquire their flesh? The altar does not refute [this argument], for it does not acquire the hide in any instance.

Mishnah Menachot 8:5

The first oil of the first crop, there is none better than it. The second oil of the first crop and the first oil of the second crop are equal. The third oil of the first crop, the second oil of the second crop and the first oil of the third crop are equal. The third oil of the second crop and the second oil of the third crop are equal. As to the third oil of the third crop, there is none worse than it. It would have been logical by the following argument that menahot should also require the purest olive oil: if the candlestick, whose [oil] is not for eating, requires pure olive oil, how much more should menahot, whose oil is for eating, require pure olive oil! But the text states, “Pure olive oil of beaten olives for lighting” (Exodus 27:20), but not “pure olive oil of beaten olives for menahot.”

Mishnah Chullin 2:7

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!

Mishnah Bekhorot 9:1

The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, [It applies] to hullin (non-sacred) animals only but not to consecrated animals. It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing].

Mishnah Keritot 3:9

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Mishnah Negaim 10:2

Yellow thin hair causes uncleanness whether it is clustered together or dispersed, whether it is encompassed or unencompassed, or whether it came after the scall or before it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: it causes uncleanness only when it came after the scall. Rabbi Shimon said: Is it not logical: if white hair, against which other hair affords no protection, causes uncleanness only when it comes after the nega, how much more should yellow thin hair, against which other hair does afford protection, cause uncleanness only when it comes after the scall? Rabbi Judah says: Whenever it was necessary to say, "it turns" Scripture says, "it turns." But the scall, since about it Scripture says, "there is no yellow hair in it," it causes uncleanness whether it came before or after it.

Mishnah Negaim 10:9

If one had a scall the size of a split bean and it spread over all his head he becomes clean. The head and the beard do not prevent [one another], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they do prevent. Rabbi Shimon said: Is there not a logical inference: if the skin of the face and the skin of the body, between which something intervenes, do prevent [one another], the head and the beard, between which nothing intervenes, should they not also prevent [one another]? The head and the beard do not combine, nor is a spreading from one to the other effective. What exactly counts as the beard? From the joint of the jaw to the thyroid cartilage.

Mishnah Negaim 13:10

If he was standing inside, and he stretched his hands outside, with his rings on his hands, if he stayed [inside] as much time as is required for the eating of half a loaf, they become unclean. If he was standing outside, stretching his hands inside, with his rings on his hands: Rabbi Judah says that they are unclean immediately, But the sages say: only after he leaves them there as much time as is required for the eating of half a loaf. They said to Rabbi Judah: if when all his body is unclean he does not render that which is on him unclean unless he stayed there long enough to eat half a loaf, when all of his body is not unclean, is it not logical that he should not render that which is on him unclean unless he stayed there long enough to eat half a loaf?

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 1:8

Rebbi Yose bar Abun investigated: If you say that two (stars) present a doubt, if someone saw two stars on Friday night, was warned, and did forbidden work, he also saw two stars on Saturday night, was warned, and did forbidden work, then it is logical to assert that if the first period was daytime the last period was also daytime and he would be guilty for the later work; if the last period was nighttime then the first period was also nighttime and he would be guilty for the first work. If someone saw two stars on Friday night and harvested about (the volume of) half a fig, in the morning he harvested about half a fig, and he saw two stars on Saturday night and harvested about half a fig, then it is logical to assert that if the first period was daytime the last period was also daytime and one would combine daytime with Saturday night and he would be guilty for his last work; if the last period was nighttime then the first period was also nighttime and one would combine daytime with Friday night and he would be guilty for his first work.

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 1:8

Rebbi Yose bar Abun investigated: If you say that two (stars) present a doubt, if someone saw two stars on Friday night, was warned, and did forbidden work, he also saw two stars on Saturday night, was warned, and did forbidden work, then it is logical to assert that if the first period was daytime the last period was also daytime and he would be guilty for the later work; if the last period was nighttime then the first period was also nighttime and he would be guilty for the first work. If someone saw two stars on Friday night and harvested about (the volume of) half a fig, in the morning he harvested about half a fig, and he saw two stars on Saturday night and harvested about half a fig, then it is logical to assert that if the first period was daytime the last period was also daytime and one would combine daytime with Saturday night and he would be guilty for his last work; if the last period was nighttime then the first period was also nighttime and one would combine daytime with Friday night and he would be guilty for his first work.

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 1:58

There it was stated (Tamid Mishnah 5:1): “The official in charge told them: recite one benediction! and they recited one benediction.” What benediction did they recite? Rav Mattanah in the name of Samuel: that is the benediction for the Torah. “Then they recited the Ten Commandments and the three sections of Shema‘.” Rebbi Ammi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: that means that the benedictions are no obstacle. Rebbi Abba said: From here you cannot draw any inference because the Ten Commandments contain the essence of Shema‘. Rav Mattanah and Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman both say that it would have been logical to require that the Ten Commandments should be recited every day. Why does one not recite them? Because of the arguments of the Christians, that they should not say that only these were given to Moses at Sinai.

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 1:59

Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Yehudah bar Zebida: It would have been logical that one also would have to recite the chapter of Balaq and Balaam every day. Why does one not recite it? Not to incommodate the public too much. Rebbi Ḥuna said, because it mentions lying down and standing up. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, because it contains the Exodus and God’s kingdom. Rebbi Eleazar said, because it is written in the Torah, in the Prophets, and in the Hagiographs.

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 7:6

For Torah there is written a benediction before, but no benediction is written after. What is written before it? (Deut. 32:3) “For I am invoking the name of the Eternal, attribute greatness to our God.” For food there is written a benediction after, but no benediction is written before. What is written after it? (Deut. 8:10): “You will eat and be satiated, then you must praise”. From where that which is said about one on the other and vice-versa? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The Name is mentioned in both verses as parallel expressions. Just as the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction before, so the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction before. And just as the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction after, so the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction after. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. What following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an inference from the lesser to the greater. If food that needs no explicit benediction before, needs a benediction afterwards, regarding Torah that needs a benediction before, it is only logical that it should need a benediction afterwards. That works for Torah; what about food? If Torah that needs no benediction afterwards, needs a benediction before, regarding food that needs a benediction afterwards, it is only logical that it should need a benediction before. Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan say, (1Sam. 9:13): “For he will recite the benediction over the sacrifice and after that the invited guests will eat.” Rebbi Nathan said, (Ex. 23:24) “you shall serve the Eternal, your God and give praise for your bread and your water”; when is it called your bread and your water, before you eat. Rebbi said, if he has to give praise when he ate and is satiated, somuch more at a time when he is hungry for food. That is for food, what about Torah? If food, which sustains only temporary life, needs a benediction before and after, Torah, which sustains eternal life, so much more.

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 7:6

For Torah there is written a benediction before, but no benediction is written after. What is written before it? (Deut. 32:3) “For I am invoking the name of the Eternal, attribute greatness to our God.” For food there is written a benediction after, but no benediction is written before. What is written after it? (Deut. 8:10): “You will eat and be satiated, then you must praise”. From where that which is said about one on the other and vice-versa? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The Name is mentioned in both verses as parallel expressions. Just as the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction before, so the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction before. And just as the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction after, so the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction after. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. What following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an inference from the lesser to the greater. If food that needs no explicit benediction before, needs a benediction afterwards, regarding Torah that needs a benediction before, it is only logical that it should need a benediction afterwards. That works for Torah; what about food? If Torah that needs no benediction afterwards, needs a benediction before, regarding food that needs a benediction afterwards, it is only logical that it should need a benediction before. Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan say, (1Sam. 9:13): “For he will recite the benediction over the sacrifice and after that the invited guests will eat.” Rebbi Nathan said, (Ex. 23:24) “you shall serve the Eternal, your God and give praise for your bread and your water”; when is it called your bread and your water, before you eat. Rebbi said, if he has to give praise when he ate and is satiated, somuch more at a time when he is hungry for food. That is for food, what about Torah? If food, which sustains only temporary life, needs a benediction before and after, Torah, which sustains eternal life, so much more.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 1:27

It is said (Lev. 19:3): “Everybody must fear his mother and his father,” and it is said (Deut. 6:13): “You must fear the Eternal, your God, and serve Him.” This brackets the fear of father and mother with the fear of Heaven. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” This brackets the honor of father and mother with the honor of the Omnipresent. Is is said (Ex. 21:17): “He who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death,” and it is said (Lev. 24:19): “Everybody who curses his God must bear his sin.” This brackets cursing father and mother with cursing the Omnipresent. It is impossible to speak about hitting relative to the Deity. All this is logical since all three of them are partners in his creation.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 6:30

MISHNAH: A sheaf containing two seah that was forgotten is not a “forgotten sheaf.” Two sheaves that together are two seah, Rabban Gamliel says, they are for the proprietor, but the Sages say, they are for the poor. Rabban Gamliel said to them: Does large size of the sheaves increase or decrease the power of the proprietor? They said to him, it increases it. He said to them: Since a sheaf containing two seah that was forgotten is not “forgotten sheaf,” it is only logical that two sheaves that together are two seah should not be “forgotten sheaf” either. They said to him, if they said that about one sheaf that is like a stack, do you want to say the same about two sheaves that are like bundles? Standing produce of two seah which was forgotten is not “forgotten sheaf.” If it does not have two seah but it might bring two seah, even if it were oats it is considered like barley grains.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 6:37

Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as standing produce saves the sheaf, so the sheaf saves the standing produce. This is logical: If standing produce, on which the power of the poor is enhanced, saves if any of it was forgotten, it is only logical that the sheaf should save, since on it the power of the poor is reduced. Rebbi answered him: If standing produce, on which the power of the poor is enhanced, saves if any of it was forgotten, is it logical that the sheaf, on which the power of the poor is reduced, if any of it was forgotten should save? From the words of both of them we infer that sheaf is saved by sheaf, but standing produce is not saved by standing produce.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 6:37

Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as standing produce saves the sheaf, so the sheaf saves the standing produce. This is logical: If standing produce, on which the power of the poor is enhanced, saves if any of it was forgotten, it is only logical that the sheaf should save, since on it the power of the poor is reduced. Rebbi answered him: If standing produce, on which the power of the poor is enhanced, saves if any of it was forgotten, is it logical that the sheaf, on which the power of the poor is reduced, if any of it was forgotten should save? From the words of both of them we infer that sheaf is saved by sheaf, but standing produce is not saved by standing produce.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 6:37

Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as standing produce saves the sheaf, so the sheaf saves the standing produce. This is logical: If standing produce, on which the power of the poor is enhanced, saves if any of it was forgotten, it is only logical that the sheaf should save, since on it the power of the poor is reduced. Rebbi answered him: If standing produce, on which the power of the poor is enhanced, saves if any of it was forgotten, is it logical that the sheaf, on which the power of the poor is reduced, if any of it was forgotten should save? From the words of both of them we infer that sheaf is saved by sheaf, but standing produce is not saved by standing produce.

Jerusalem Talmud Demai 1:19

There, we have stated: “Heave, the heave of the tithe, and the heave of the tithe of demay.” And here you say so! Rebbi Zeïra said, there we have stated heave of the tithe of demay but here Second Tithe of demay. Rebbi Immi said, the Mishnah does not stop to deal with the heave of the tithe of demay. What is that? There it is Rebbi Meïr, but here the rabbis. Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of the rabbis: It would have been logical that for the heave of the tithe of demay one would not have to add a fifth; why did they say that one has to add a fifth? Because of a fence for it, for if you tell him that he does not have to add, he will not treat it as holy. It would have been logical that for the Second Tithe of demay one would have to add a fifth; why did they say that one does not have to add a fifth? Because of a fence for it, for if you tell him that he has to add, he will not separate it at all.

Jerusalem Talmud Demai 1:19

There, we have stated: “Heave, the heave of the tithe, and the heave of the tithe of demay.” And here you say so! Rebbi Zeïra said, there we have stated heave of the tithe of demay but here Second Tithe of demay. Rebbi Immi said, the Mishnah does not stop to deal with the heave of the tithe of demay. What is that? There it is Rebbi Meïr, but here the rabbis. Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of the rabbis: It would have been logical that for the heave of the tithe of demay one would not have to add a fifth; why did they say that one has to add a fifth? Because of a fence for it, for if you tell him that he does not have to add, he will not treat it as holy. It would have been logical that for the Second Tithe of demay one would have to add a fifth; why did they say that one does not have to add a fifth? Because of a fence for it, for if you tell him that he has to add, he will not separate it at all.

Jerusalem Talmud Demai 2:38

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “If one buys from the baker, how does he tithe?” There you say, the buyer separates, and here you say, the baker separates. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. One says, here if he works in purity, there if he works in impurity. The other says, here in retail, there in wholesale. We did not know who said what. Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of purity, it follows that Rebbi Eleazar is the one who said, here in retail, there in wholesale. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he works in purity, let him separate everything. It would be logical that he should not give anything because one does not deliver certain grain to the am haäreẓ. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if it is in retail, let him separate everything. Grocers are not permitted to sell demay!

Jerusalem Talmud Demai 5:4

We have stated ḥallah between First and Second Tithes. Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: This means that ḥallah is not subject to “do not give too late.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: The Mishnah is not formulated in sequence, do we not deal with demay? Did not Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya, say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that the Mishnah deals with demay; hence, not with certain produce? And here we deal with demay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Also for certain. On that, Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Zeïra said, this means that ḥallah is not subject to “do not give too late.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: The Mishnah is not formulated in sequence, should not ḥallah precede the First Tithe? Then ḥallah should be subject to tithes but not tithes to ḥallah, because everything that precedes another, the other is obligated for it. And we have stated in this respect: “He who makes dough from ṭevel, whether he takes ḥallah before heave or heave before ḥallah, what he did is done. Ḥallah should not be eaten until he take heave for it, heave should not be eaten until he separate ḥallah for it.” But why does First Tithe have precedence? Because it started at the threshing floor. But does the Second Tithe not start at the threshing floor? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it would have been logical that ḥallah should precede everything else. Why does First Heave have precedence? Because it started at the threshing floor and it is called “beginning.” Second Tithe, even though it started at the threshing floor, is not called “beginning.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 8:19

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? I say that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But one does not follow this.

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 8:19

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? I say that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But one does not follow this.

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 8:19

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? I say that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But one does not follow this.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:3

Who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell heave which is forbidden to lay people, since Second Tithe is permitted to lay people, one should certainly be permitted to sell it. No, if you assert this for heave which does not need an enclosure, what can you imply for Second Tithe which needs an enclosure? First Fruits shall prove it which need an enclosure and one may sell them! No, if you assert this for First Fruits which do not implicate their monetary substitute, what can you imply for Second Heave which implicates its monetary substitute! The Sabbatical shall prove it which implicates its monetary substitute and it is permitted to sell it! Rebbi Yudan said, from this? The sale of Sabbatical produce is its redemption.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:4

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 1:4

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 2:16

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Spices, water, or salt a woman borrowed from a friend for her dough, goes after both their feet.” Rebbi Abba said, for eruv they went according to the logical rule. You should know that this is so since they say there in the name of Rav Ḥisda, but we know not whether from a tradition or a Mishnah, “even logs!” Did we want to say that logs have no credible importance? A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a tithe dish is prepared with profane spices, the increase belongs to Second Tithe.” Explain it if the improvement cannot be tasted. But was it not stated: “If a profane dish is prepared with Second Tithe spices, the tithe cannot escape redemption”? According to Rebbi Joḥanan, if the volume was increased. According to Rebbi Simeon ber Laqish if the improvement was clearly recognizable.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 3:3

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? Do I say that at a place where Jewish bread is available, Gentile bread should be forbidden but they obfuscated about it and permitted it or that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But we do not follow this.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 3:3

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? Do I say that at a place where Jewish bread is available, Gentile bread should be forbidden but they obfuscated about it and permitted it or that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But we do not follow this.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 3:3

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? Do I say that at a place where Jewish bread is available, Gentile bread should be forbidden but they obfuscated about it and permitted it or that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But we do not follow this.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 3:15

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this means they made Jerusalem like a secure courtyard. Just as a secure courtyard induces ṭevel, this also induces ṭevel. Rebbi Jonah said, it would have been logical that even its houses would not induce ṭevel since they are property of all of Israel. But it means they made Jerusalem like a secure courtyard. Just as a secure courtyard grabs, so this grabs. Rebbi [Jonah] said, this means if a heap was ṭevel for First and Second [Tithes] and he was warned [only] about the Second he is whipped. Rebbi Mana objected: Did we not state, the House of Shammai say, the Second Tithe should return and be eaten in Jerusalem? Can you say that he is whipped according to the House of Shammai? But enclosures are more important; here also, enclosures are more important.

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 1:11

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This is from Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, as Rebbi Joḥanan stated; “Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, I could think you could bring spelt, foxtail and oats. But is it not logical: If wheat which is usable for all other cereal offerings is not acceptable for the ‘omer offering, spelt, foxtail and oats which are not usable for any other cereal offerings certainly are not acceptable for the ‘omer offering. No; you might say about barley from which the offering of the straying wife is brought; what can you say about spelt, foxtail and oats which are not usable for the offering of the straying wife? Wheat is excluded by the verse; spelt, foxtail and oats are excluded by a reasoning a minore ad majus.”

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:44

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. Rebbi Zeïra said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted are not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Zeïra: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from seeds to grape skins he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? That means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; is it not logical that for all prohibitions of the Torah, whose prohibition is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition cannot be lifted, that we treat taste like the thing itself? From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Zeïra who says everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here he says, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 3:9

A baraita supports both of them. The baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar. “(Ex. 13:3) ‘Sour bread shall not be eaten’, to make the feeder equal to the eater. You say for this, or is it only to forbid its usufruct? Since it says (Deut. 16:3): ‘You shall not eat sour bread with it,’ we learned that usufruct is forbidden. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? To make the feeder equal to the eater, the words of Rebbi Josia. Rebbi Isaac says, this is unnecessary. Since for crawling things, a minor prohibition, He made the feeder equal to the eater; regarding sour bread which is a major prohibition it should only be logical that he feeder be equal to the eater. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? The verse comes only to forbid its usufruct.” Since it is written “sour bread shall not be eaten.” Therefore, from “you shall not eat” one cannot infer anything. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:55

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: this is of the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation? Do we say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it would be logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:55

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: this is of the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation? Do we say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it would be logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:55

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: this is of the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation? Do we say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it would be logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:55

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: this is of the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation? Do we say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it would be logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it would be logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 16:9

“Gospels and books of heretics, some Tannaim say, one tears out the Names and burns them; some Tannaim say, one burns them with their Names. Rebbi Tarphon said, I would hit my sons; if they came into my house I would burn them together with their Names. For if a persecutor would persecute me I would seek asylum in a pagan temple but would not seek asylum in heretics’ houses, for the worshippers of idolatry do not know about Him, how could they disavow Him? But the heretics know Him and disavow Him; about them David said, Your haters,o Eternal, I shall hate, etc. This homily they preached: If in order to bring peace between a man and his wife the verse commands that the Name written in holiness be erased, it is only logical that the books of heretics which propagate ill will and quarrel between Israel and their Father in Heaven should be burned with their Names.”

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:10

A baraita supports both of them. The baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar. Sour bread shall not be eaten, to make the feeder equal to the eater. And you say for this, or is it only to forbid its usufruct? Since it says: You shall not eat sour bread with it, we learned that usufruct is forbidden. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? To make the feeder equal to the eater, the words of Rebbi Josia. Rebbi Isaac says, this is unnecessary. Since for crawling things, a minor prohibition, He made the feeder equal to the eater; regarding sour bread which is a major prohibition it should only be logical that we consider the feeder to be equal to the eater. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? The verse serves only to forbid its usufruct. Since it is written, sour bread shall not be eaten, therefore from you shall not eat one cannot infer anything. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan .

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:12

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:13

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:14

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 5:14

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 5:14

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:2

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 6:34

MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:42

If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:42

If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:46

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:54

Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Nehemiah and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa both said the same, as it was stated: “it was burned because of deep mourning? Was it not burned only because of impurity? But it was not burned because of impurity, since if it had been burned because of mourning, all three of them should have been burned. Another opinion, was not Phineas with them? Another opinion, would it not have been permitted to be eaten in the evening?” In the opinion of Rebbi Nehemiah it should be burned but be counted. Rebbi Nehemiah is of the opinion that all three of them were burned. Should not Phineas have eaten? He was not yet appointed {High} Priest. Should not Aaron have eaten in the evening? Rebbi Nehemiah is of the opinion that deeo mourning in the night is from the Torah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, also Rebbi Yose the Galilean is with them. And we have stated there: “A purification sacrifice whose blood was received in two cups, of which one was brought outside; the one inside is qualified. If one of them was brought to the interior, Rebbi Yose the Galilean declares qualified but the Sages declare disqualified. [Rebbi Yose the Galilean said, since in a case where intent disqualifies outside the remainder was not made equal to what was brought outside, in a case where intent does not disqualify in the interior is it not logical that we not make the remainder to what was brought inside? If it was brought into the interior to atone, even if it did not atone it is disqualified, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Simeon says, only if it atones. Rebbi Jehudah says, if it was brought into the interior in error, it remains qualified. Of all disqualified blood which one gave on the altar, the diadem only makes the impure acceptable; for the diadem makes the impure acceptable but not what was brought outside.”] Rebbi Eleazar said, you have to know that for Rebbi Yose the Galilean it is disqualification of the enabler since the other part is outside and it is qualified. You have to know that for the rabbis it is disqualification of the body since it is within its enclosure and it is disqualified. The rabbis explain, since nothing of the blood was brought to the interior, you shall certainly eat it. Therefore if some of the blood had been brought to the interior, you [would have done well] in burning it. Rebbi Yose the Galilean explains, since not all of the blood was brought to the interior, [you shall certainly eat it. Therefore if all of the blood had been brought inside,] you would have done well in burning it. What is the rabbis’ reason? Any purification offering of whose blood was brought; even part of the blood. What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? Behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary. [This fits with] what was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, the entire matter only speaks of bulls to be burned and goats to be burned, to prohibit eating them and to teach that if they are disqualified they are burned inside the citadel. They asked him, from where that a purification sacrifice becomes disqualified if some of its blood is brought inside? Not from this verse, behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary? There it does not say of whose blood but all of its blood. An answer to Rebbi Aqiba who was saying, of whose blood, not all of its blood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:25

And from where that he was asked in eight? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants [in his stead]. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For greatness after him. And from where that he officiated in eight? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For sanctity after him. Rebbi Jonah said to him, I was with you; he did not say “officiated” but “was asked”. [In how many was he asked?] Rav Hoshaia brought a Mishnah of Bar Qappara from the South which stated: He officiates neither in the eight of a High Priest nor in the four of a common priest. Rebbi Abba said, it would be logical that he officiate in four. Why did they say that he did not officiate? Lest people say, we saw a High Priest who sometimes officiated in four like a simple priest. Rebbi Jonah said, would he not officiate inside and would he not be asked outside? Does one err between inside and outside? But did Rebbi Tarphon, the father of all of Israel, not err between blowing for assembly and the blowing for a sacrifice? As it is written: The descendants of Aaron, the priests, shall blow the trumpets, blameless ones, not with bodily defects, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons if I did not see my mother’s brother, lame in one of his legs, standing in the Temple court with his trumpet in his hand and blowing! Rebbi Aqiba answered him, Rebbi, maybe you saw him only at the time of assembly; but I was saying, at the time of sacrifices. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons but you did not deviate right or left. I am the one who heard but I could not explain. You derive it and agree with tradition. Therefore, anybody who separates from you is as if he separated himself from his life.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 3:20

HALAKHAH: It is written about the daily sacrifice in the morning, and it is written about wood in the morning. Something about which is written in the morning, in the morning, shall precede something about which in the morning is written only once. Then even before its blood? Rebbi Hila said, you shall do, preceded action for it. It is written about the daily sacrifice in the morning, and it is written about incense in the morning, in the morning. Something about which is written in the morning, in the morning, shall precede something about which only [one] in the morning is written. Where do we hold? If about limbs, are they not like wood? But we are holding, even for its blood. It is written about wood in the morning, in the morning, and it is written about incense in the morning, in the morning, and I do not know which of the two is preceding. Which one is enabling what? Wood enables the incense; the wood shall precede the incense. Come and see, wood precedes the blood and blood precedes incense, and you are saying so? Rebbi Hila said, no. Since I could not prove by a logical argument that wood enables the incense, you needed that baraita. They wanted to say, what enables the incense? Charcoal. Rebbi Eleazar said, smoke-creating herb.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:44

It was stated: “Rebbi Ismael said, if the remainder blood of purification sacrifices which does not atone is given on the base, the start of an elevation sacrifice which is atoning it is only logical that it be given on the base. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, No. If you said that the remainder blood of purification sacrifices which does not atone and is not able to atone are given on the base, the start of an elevation sacrifice which is atoning and is able to atone is only logical that it be given on the base.” He who said “does not atone”, they do not atone during all other days of the year; therefore on the Day of Atonement they atone. He who says “does not atone and is not able to atone”, they do not atone either on New Year’s Day and not on the Day of Atonement. Where do we hold? If for a commandment, it is a commandment to give on the base. But if it cannot refer to the commandment, let it refer to obstruction.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:44

It was stated: “Rebbi Ismael said, if the remainder blood of purification sacrifices which does not atone is given on the base, the start of an elevation sacrifice which is atoning it is only logical that it be given on the base. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, No. If you said that the remainder blood of purification sacrifices which does not atone and is not able to atone are given on the base, the start of an elevation sacrifice which is atoning and is able to atone is only logical that it be given on the base.” He who said “does not atone”, they do not atone during all other days of the year; therefore on the Day of Atonement they atone. He who says “does not atone and is not able to atone”, they do not atone either on New Year’s Day and not on the Day of Atonement. Where do we hold? If for a commandment, it is a commandment to give on the base. But if it cannot refer to the commandment, let it refer to obstruction.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 6:40

Rebbi Shammai asked, if the parts were lost, may one pour the blood for the meat? He had not heard what Rebbi Eleazar had said, since he neither intended as food for humans nor as food for the altar. Rebbi Zakkai stated:A non-Cohen who burned makes garments impure. One only has to ask, is it qualified during nighttime? It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since burning of the parts which is not qualified for a non-Cohen may be done in the night, for these which are qualified for a non-Cohen it is logical that it should be qualified during nighttime.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 7:24

Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: It would have been logical that one commit larceny with them, but they decided that one does not commit larceny with them. But did we not state: “it is ḥattat, this teaches that one commits larceny with it. [With it one commits larceny,] with its ashes one does not commit larceny.” Rebbi Abbahu said, at the beginning they were using it as a disinfectant and were putting it on their wounds and therefore they decided that one would commit larceny with it. When they were fenced in, they decided that one does not commit larceny with it.

Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If they do not know him,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, so should the Mishnah be stated: Originally one accepted testimony about the new moon from everybody. If they do not know him, one sends another one with him to testify about him. Rebbi Yose said, even as in the Mishnah it is acceptable: If they do not know him, one sends another one with him to testify about him. Why? Because originally one accepted testimony about the new moon from anybody. May a single witness be believed? They gave you from your own. It should be logical that no witnesses should be needed. But they said that witnesses were needed, and they said that a single witness may be believed.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:16

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the holiday falls on a Friday,” etc. It is written, what you baked bake, and what you cooked cook. Rebbi Eliezer says, one bakes on the basis of the baked, and one cooks on the basis of the cooked. Rebbi Joshua says, one bakes and cooks on the basis of the cooked. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? What you baked bake, and what you cooked cook. What is the reason of Rebbi Joshua? What you will bake and what you will cook cook. Rebbi Eliezer said, this follows him who said that the Sabbath was given at Mara. But following him who said that at Alush the Sabbath was given, they are at Alush and the warning is given at Alush. Come and look, from the Torah it is forbidden and an eruv tavshilin makes it permitted? Rebbi Abbahu said, it would be logical that one should bake and cook on the holiday for the Sabbath. If you would say so, one would bake and cook on the holiday for a weekday. Come and look, one makes the beds on the holiday for the Sabbath, but one does not bake and cook on the holiday for the Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, why may one make the beds on the holiday for the Sabbath? Since one may make the beds on Friday night for the Sabbath day. Could one bake and cook on the holiday for the Sabbath? One may not bake and cook on the night of the Sabbath for the Sabbath day.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 2:17

“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your Creator be empty.”

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 2:17

“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your Creator be empty.”

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 5:28

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba said, for eruv they went according to the logical rule. You should know that this is so since they say there in the name of Rav Ḥisda, but they do not know whether from a tradition or a Mishnah, ‘even logs.’ Did we want to say that logs have no stability?

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:67

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya, it should have been logical that one should fast on the Tenth, since on it our God’s Temple was burned. Why on the Ninth? Because the calamity started on it. So it was stated, on the Seventh they entered, on the Eighth they were misbehaving in it, on the Ninth they started the fire, and on the Tenth it was burned. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi fasted Ninth and Tenth. Rebbi Abun fasted Ninth and Tenth. Rebbi Levi fasted on the Ninth and the night of the Tenth. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi wanted to uproot the Ninth of Av but they did not let him. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, I was with you but it was not said so, but Rebbi wanted to uproot the Ninth of Av which fell on a Sabbath but they did not let him. He said, because it was pushed aside, let it be pushed aside. They said to him, let it be pushed to the next day. In a similar case, that which we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says, God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply, etc.” Rebbi Eleazar in the Name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said to him, I was with you and it was only said, if she asks to be married the law is on her side. He said about them, two are better than one.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:25

“And the Ninth of Av.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya, it should have been logical that one should fast on the Tenth, since on it it was burned. Why on the Ninth? Because the calamity started on it. So it was stated, on the Seventh they entered, on the Eighth they were misbehaving in it, on the Ninth they started the fire, and on the Tenth it was burned. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi fasted Ninth and Tenth. Rebbi Levi fasted on the Ninth and the night of the Tenth. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi wanted to uproot the Ninth of Av but they did not let him. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, I was with you but it was not said so, but Rebbi wanted to uproot the Ninth of Av which fell on a Sabbath but they did not let him. He said, because it was pushed aside, let it be pushed aside. They said to him, let it be pushed to the next day. In a similar case, that which we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says, God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply, etc.” Rebbi Eleazar in the Name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said to him, I was with you and it was only said, if she asks to be married the law is on her side. He said about them, two are better than one.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:55

If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:55

If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:83

And from where that he was asked in eight? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants in his stead. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For greatness after him. And from where that he officiated in eight? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For greatness after him. Rebbi Jonah said to him, I was with you; he did not say “officiated” but “was asked”. Rav Hoshaia brought a Mishnah of Bar Qappara from the South which stated: But the Sages are saying that he is qualified neither in the four of a common priest nor in the eight of a High Priest. Rebbi Abba said, it would be logical that he officiate in four. Why did they say that he does not officiate? Lest people say, we saw a High Priest, sometimes he officiates in four, sometimes he officiates in eight. Rebbi Jonah said, would he not officiate inside and would he not be asked outside? Does one err between inside and outside? But did Rebbi Tarphon, the father of all of Israel, not err between blowing for assembly and the blowing for a sacrifice? As it is stated: The descendants of Aaron, the priests, shall blow the trumpets, blameless ones, not with bodily defects, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons if I did not see Simeon, my mother’s brother, lame in one of his legs, standing in the Temple court with his trumpet in his hand and blowing! Rebbi Aqiba answered him, maybe you saw him only at the time of assembly; but I was saying, at the time of sacrifices. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons but you did not deviate right or left. I am the one who saw the act and forgot. You derive it and agree with tradition. Therefore, anybody who separates from you is as if he separated himself from his life.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 3:26

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not interrupt between Purim and cow. Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina: One does not interrupt between cow and this month. Rebbi Levi said, a sign for these paragraphs, “between these cups, he may drink if he wants to drink; between the third and the fourth he may not drink.” Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina, it would have been logical that this month should precede cow since the Tabernacle was erected on the First of Nisan and the cow was burned on the Second. Why does cow precede? Because it is the purification of all of Israel.