194 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 3:33

HALAKHAH: “One does not interrupt curses.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said, do not be repelled by his reproach, do not split it into many thorns. Rebbi Levi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, said that it is not logical that My children be cursed and I praised. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not because of that reason but because one who stands up to read in the Torah needs to start with something good and conclude with something good. Levi bar Paṭi asked Rav Ḥuna: these curses which we read as one, should one recite a benediction before and after? He said to him, nothing needs a benediction before and after except the curses in Leviticus and the curses in Deuteronomy. Rebbi Jonathan the scribe of Gufta came down here; he saw Bar Abuna reading the Song of the Well and recite a benediction before and after. He said to him, does one do this? He answered him, you still are about this? All songs need a benediction before and after. Rebbi Simon was asked. Rebbi Simon told them in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, only the Song on the Sea, and the Ten Commandments, and the curses [in Leviticus and the curses] in Deuteronomy need a benediction before and after. Rebbi Abbahu said, I did not hear. It seems reasonable for the Ten Commandments. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: the eight verses in Deuteronomy need a benediction before and after. Without this do not the one who starts and the one who finishes recite the benediction before and after? But it is needed for a New Moon which falls on a Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 4:11

For Torah there is written a benediction before, but no benediction is written after. What is written before it? For I am invoking the name of the Eternal, attribute greatness to our God. For food there is written a benediction after, but no benediction is written before. What is written after it? You will eat and be satiated, then you must praise. From where that which is said about one on the other and vice-versa? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The Name is mentioned in both verses as parallel expressions. Just as the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction before, so the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction before. And just as the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction after, so the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction after. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. How following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an inference de minore ad majus. If food that needs no explicit benediction before, needs a benediction afterwards, regarding Torah which needs a benediction before, it is only logical that it should need a benediction afterwards. That works for Torah; what about food? If Torah which needs no benediction afterwards, needs a benediction before, regarding food which needs a benediction afterwards, it is only logical that it should need a benediction before. Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan say, For he will recite the benediction over the sacrifice and after that the invited guests will eat. Rebbi Nathan said, you shall serve the Eternal, your God, and give praise for your bread and your water; when is it called your bread and your water, before you eat. Rebbi said, if he has to give praise when he ate and is satiated, so much more at a time when he is hungry for food. That is for food, what about Torah? If food, which sustains only temporary life, needs a benediction before and after, Torah, which sustains eternal life, so much more.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 4:11

For Torah there is written a benediction before, but no benediction is written after. What is written before it? For I am invoking the name of the Eternal, attribute greatness to our God. For food there is written a benediction after, but no benediction is written before. What is written after it? You will eat and be satiated, then you must praise. From where that which is said about one on the other and vice-versa? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The Name is mentioned in both verses as parallel expressions. Just as the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction before, so the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction before. And just as the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction after, so the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction after. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. How following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an inference de minore ad majus. If food that needs no explicit benediction before, needs a benediction afterwards, regarding Torah which needs a benediction before, it is only logical that it should need a benediction afterwards. That works for Torah; what about food? If Torah which needs no benediction afterwards, needs a benediction before, regarding food which needs a benediction afterwards, it is only logical that it should need a benediction before. Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan say, For he will recite the benediction over the sacrifice and after that the invited guests will eat. Rebbi Nathan said, you shall serve the Eternal, your God, and give praise for your bread and your water; when is it called your bread and your water, before you eat. Rebbi said, if he has to give praise when he ate and is satiated, so much more at a time when he is hungry for food. That is for food, what about Torah? If food, which sustains only temporary life, needs a benediction before and after, Torah, which sustains eternal life, so much more.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:8

“The child.” Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting. They said, we have stated: Who is a child? Any who cannot ride on his father’s shoulder.” And can a child hear and can a child speak? They turned around and said, all your males, to include the child. Or should we say, to include the deaf-mute? So they should hear and learn, to exclude (the child) [the deaf-mute. Or should we say, so they should hear and learn, to exclude the child?] Rebbi Yose said, since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: May a deaf-mute child be liable? He said to him, come and see; the permanent dweller (in Heaven) [on earth] and the traveller in the highest Heaven? Since an adult deaf-mute is not liable, a child deaf-mute not a fortiori? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it would have been logical that a child who is no deaf-mute should be not liable. It is the decision of the verse, all your males, to include the child. I would say, but a (child) [adult] deaf-mute should be liable, not to split the practice of males. Therefore what Rebbi Yose said is necessary: since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:27

“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your (Master) [Creator] be empty.”

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:27

“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your (Master) [Creator] be empty.”

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:49

Rebbi Shiloh from Kefar-Tamarta in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: And you shall cover it with pure gold, etc. The Torah called it real estate. So far the golden altar. From where the altar of the elevation sacrifices? It is a logical argument. Since the golden altar which is one cubit square is called real estate, the altar of elevation sacrifices which is five cubits square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is real estate, also there it is real estate. Rebbi Hila said, the reason of the rabbis, the altar is of wood, three cubits its height, etc. The Torah called it movable. So far the altar of the elevation sacrifices. From where the golden altar? It is a logical argument. Since the the altar of the elevation sacrifices which is five cubit square is called soil, the golden altar which is one cubit square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is movable, also there it is movable. “But the Sages say, because they are covered.” But is it not cover which stands because of it? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Its thickness was that of a Gordian denar Rebbi La said, for its purpose it does not stand because of it. This parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, you shall make an altar for incense smoke is not written here but burning incense; the altar was burning the incense. But is it not like a table made to be moved and deposited? Does not Rebbi Immi say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: why is the table impure? Not because one was removing it and showing it to the pilgrims? But this one remains in its place. It also served as a vessel in the Sanctuary. Then it should be pure, why is it impure? Rebbi Mana said, as what we have stated there, “there are three baskets”. Rebbi Ze`ira said, because one uses it for its bales; so also here one uses it for its bales.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:49

Rebbi Shiloh from Kefar-Tamarta in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: And you shall cover it with pure gold, etc. The Torah called it real estate. So far the golden altar. From where the altar of the elevation sacrifices? It is a logical argument. Since the golden altar which is one cubit square is called real estate, the altar of elevation sacrifices which is five cubits square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is real estate, also there it is real estate. Rebbi Hila said, the reason of the rabbis, the altar is of wood, three cubits its height, etc. The Torah called it movable. So far the altar of the elevation sacrifices. From where the golden altar? It is a logical argument. Since the the altar of the elevation sacrifices which is five cubit square is called soil, the golden altar which is one cubit square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is movable, also there it is movable. “But the Sages say, because they are covered.” But is it not cover which stands because of it? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Its thickness was that of a Gordian denar Rebbi La said, for its purpose it does not stand because of it. This parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, you shall make an altar for incense smoke is not written here but burning incense; the altar was burning the incense. But is it not like a table made to be moved and deposited? Does not Rebbi Immi say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: why is the table impure? Not because one was removing it and showing it to the pilgrims? But this one remains in its place. It also served as a vessel in the Sanctuary. Then it should be pure, why is it impure? Rebbi Mana said, as what we have stated there, “there are three baskets”. Rebbi Ze`ira said, because one uses it for its bales; so also here one uses it for its bales.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:32

MISHNAH: Ammonites and Moabites are eternally forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. Egyptians and Edomites are forbidden only for three generations, both males and females. Rebbi Simeon said, is it not an argument de minore ad majus? If He permitted the females immediately in a case where the males are eternally forbidden, should we not permit the females in a case where He forbade the males only for three generations? They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument. He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice. Bastards and Gibeonites are eternally forbidden, both males and females.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:38

“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:49

HALAKHAH: “A congenital castrate priest,” etc. It was stated: He enables her to eat breast and thigh. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:50

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said the argument is about the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron the priest and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:32

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:40

“How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers. He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:19

Rebbi Eliezer says, the actions of an underage girl have no legal standing. He has no right to what she finds or earns, nor may he dissolve her vows; she is as if not his wife in any respect except that she needs repudiation from him. Rebbi Joshua said, he owns what she finds or earns, he may he dissolve her vows; she is his wife in all respects except that she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Ismael said, I looked around at all logical systems of Sages and did not find anybody who was consistent in the matter of an underage girl except Rebbi Eliezer, only that he requires repudiation from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:25

It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:14

There, we have stated: “A hyssop which was used to sprinkle is acceptable [to be used] to purify the sufferer from skin disease.” Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That [was stated] to exclude the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, as it was stated: If he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease. If he sprinkled with it for the sufferer from skin disease, it is disqualified for purifying. Rebbi Yose said, would that not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since for the sufferer from skin disease, for whose ceremony use does not disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease; purifying, for whose ceremony use does disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, is it not logical that it should be disqualified for purifying?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:37

“‘A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated.’ For it is written: ‘He shall not desecrate his seed in his clan.’ Not only that he desecrates his seed; from where [that he desecrates] herself? It is a conclusion of an argument. Since the seed who did not commit any sin is desecrated, she, who committed a sin, is it not logical that she should be desecrated? He himself gives a counter-argument since he sinned and is not desecrated. No. If you talk about the man who is not otherwise desecrated, what can you say about a woman who can be otherwise desecrated? Since she can be otherwise desecrated, it is an argument that she should be desecrated! If you wish, you can say, he shall not desecrate - “he shall not repeatedly desecrate,’” even to desecrate one who is enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:15

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:10

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:11

HALAKHAH: “It would have been logical: Since the first testimony,” etc. The first testimony is about being in a secluded place; the last testimony is about impurity. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Joshua, since Rebbi Joshua says, “he declares his jealousy and warns her by the testimony of two [witnesses], and makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].” Rebbi Mana said, it even follows the Tanna, about whom was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: He declares his jealousy before one witness or by himself, but makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:43

Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law for him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law for him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading “an adolescent”, not an adult. Read “an adolescent”, not a minor! “‘Because he mistreated her’, that includes a minor for a fine”, read ‘because he mistreaded her’, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Jacob won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: Why? He understood it from the following: “The man who had lain with her alone should die.” Did we not know that “the girl has not committed a capital crime”? Then why does the verse say: “Do not do anything to the girl, the girl has not committed a capital crime”? That includes him who comes to a preliminarily married underage girl that he is stoned and she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:26

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:5

Reading of Rashba (Novellae ad 49a): Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted a thick dish? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden soft dishes and permitted thick ones.” Since a dish which would be forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, regarding “cooked food” which permits roasted and scalded, is it not logical that he be permitted the thick dish? Are there arguments de minore ad majus in matters of vows? But it must be so: Since a dish which is forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, the cooked which is permitted roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:18

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:20

HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:16

Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:16

HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:40

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:13

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:13

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:6

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:7

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:8

By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:46

“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:125

It is said (Lev. 19:3): “Everybody must fear his mother and his father,” and it is said (Deut. 6:13): “You must fear the Eternal, your God, and serve Him.” This brackets the fear of father and mother with the fear of the Omnipresent. [It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” This brackets the honor of father and mother with the honor of the Omnipresent.] Is is said (Ex. 21:17): “He who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death,” and it is said (Lev. 24:19): “Everybody who curses his God must bear his sin.” This brackets cursing father and mother with cursing the Omnipresent. It is impossible to speak about hitting relative to the Deity. All this is logical since all three of them are partners in him.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:29

“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:48

MISHNAH: One man should not be alone with two women but one woman may be alone with two men. Rebbi Simeon says, he may be alone with two women as long as his wife is with him; he can sleep with them in a hostelry because his wife will watch over him. A man can be alone with his mother or his daughter and sleep with them with their skins touching; once they grew up each one sleeps in his garment. And a bachelor shall not be a school teacher; a woman shall not be a school teacher. Rebbi Eliezer says, also a man without a wife shall not be a school teacher. Rebbi Jehudah says, a bachelor shall not be a shepherd and two bachelors shall not sleep under one cover, but the Sages permit. Anybody whose occupation is with women should never be alone with women. And a man should not teach his son a craft for women. Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean and easy trade and pray to Him to Whom riches and properties belong since there is no trade in which poverty and riches are not found, for neither poverty nor riches come from the trade. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, did you ever see a wild animal or a bird which had a trade? And they sustain themselves without pain. But they were created only to serve me and sustain themselves without pain, and I was created to serve my Maker, it should be logical that I should be able to sustain myself without pain; only I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance. Abba Gorion from Sidon says in the name of Abba Shaul: A man should not teach his son to be a donkey driver, a camel driver, a hairdresser, a sailor, a potter, a shepherd, or a grocer, since their occupations are those of robbers. Rebbi Jehudah says in the latter’s name: Most donkey drivers are wicked, most camel drivers are in order, most sailors are pious; the best of physicians goes to hell, the qualified among the butchers is an associate of Amaleq.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:56

New paragraph. “Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean trade,” etc. What should a man do? A person should try and teach his son an unassuming trade and pray for mercy to Him to Whom riches belong since there is no trade in which poor and rich people are not found, for everything depends on a person’s merit. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Did you ever see a lion porter, a (lion) [deer] maker of fig cakes, a fox grocer, a wolf selling pots? And they sustain themselves without pain. Why were they created? Only to serve me, and I was created to serve my Maker. Is it not an argument de minore ad maius? Since they were created to serve me and sustain themselves so without pain, should it not be logical that I, who was created to serve my Maker, should be able to sustain myself without pain? What caused me to have to sustain myself with pain? One has to say, my sins. Because I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:19

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:19

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:24

“If an ox and its equipment fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment and was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment.” Samuel said, when it became disoriented because of the air, but if it hit the ground he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if it hit the ground, he is not liable: The Torah absolved from liability when it fell down. “An ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment. Since it looked logical: If a pit of damages, where one is not liable for death, one is liable for vessels; would it not be logical that for a pit ten handbreadths deep, for which one is liable for death, should one not be liable for vessels? The verse says, “an ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:24

“If an ox and its equipment fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment and was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment.” Samuel said, when it became disoriented because of the air, but if it hit the ground he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if it hit the ground, he is not liable: The Torah absolved from liability when it fell down. “An ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment. Since it looked logical: If a pit of damages, where one is not liable for death, one is liable for vessels; would it not be logical that for a pit ten handbreadths deep, for which one is liable for death, should one not be liable for vessels? The verse says, “an ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:2

HALAKHAH: “Some inherit and bequeath,” etc. It is written: “If a man die without a son, you shall transfer his estate to his daughter.” Rebbi Ismael stated: The verse distinguished this inheritance from all other inheritances mentioned in the Torah, since for all of them it is written “you shall give,” but here is written: “you shall transfer.” It is an extension of the law that the daughter shall inherit. The Gentile Sages say, son and daughter are equal, for they explain “if he have no son;” therefore, if he has one both are equal. One objected, is it not written “if he have no daughter;” therefore, if he has one are both equal? And you agree, if there is no child, here also, if there is no son. The Sadducees say, the son’s daughter and the daughter are equal, for they explain: Since my son’s daughter who comes by force of her father does inherit from me, would it not be logical that my daughter who comes by force of myself should inherit from me? One told them, no. If you mention the son’s daughter who only inherits by the power of the brothers, what could you say about the daughter who only inherits by the power of the old man? The verse says, “any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes.” How is it possible for a daughter to inherit from two tribes? But explain it if her father was from one tribe and her mother from another.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:3

So far the son [inherits from] the father. The father from the son? Since the son only inherits by the father’s power, is it not logical that the father on whom the son depends inherit from him? The verse says, “close”; the closer relative has precedence.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:3

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:3

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:69

“One who has sexual relations with a preliminarily married maiden.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: This is Rebbi Meïr’s. But for the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “Lad” is written defectively in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written a young woman; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, a lad is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned? What do the rabbis do with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it that he came to her as a male. Rebbi Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law of him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law of him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading an adolescent, not an adult. Read an adolescent, not a minor! Do you not agree with me that she has the right to a fine? He answered, because he mistreated her, that includes a minor for a fine. Read because he mistreated her, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Rebbi Jacob bar Abba won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abun in the name of (Rebbi) Samuel. Why? He understood it from the following: The man who had lain with her alone shall die. Do we not know that the girl has not committed a capital crime? Why does the verse say, do not do anything to the girl; the girl has not committed a capital crime? That includes him who has sexual relations with a [preliminarily married] underage girl; he is stoned and she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:7

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:81

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan. Bread is of the practices of obfuscation. [Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation?] Do I say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:81

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan. Bread is of the practices of obfuscation. [Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation?] Do I say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:81

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan. Bread is of the practices of obfuscation. [Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation?] Do I say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:81

Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan. Bread is of the practices of obfuscation. [Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation?] Do I say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 4:41

What is Rebbi Jonah’s reason? Because it already became impure when it was prepared by the grape harvest. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? They were pure by biblical standards. You are the one who decided that they be impure. The strength of Rebbi Yose is the following, as Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Hila It should be logical that one may (free) his ṭevel as it is written, you should give from it the Eternal’s heave to Aaron the priest. You have to give it to Aaron in his quality of priest. But here, since you cannot give it to Aaron the priest in his quality of priest, you may make it impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:4

It is written: He shall not desecrate his issue in his people. Not only his issue will be desecrated; from where also she? Is this not a logical inference? Since the issue, which did not sin, is desecrated, should she, who committed a sin, not logically be desecrated? He himself is a counter example, since he committed a sin but was not desecrated. No. If you argue about a man who is not desecrated in any circumstance, what can you say about a woman who is desecrated in many circumstances? Since she is desecrated in many circumstances, it is logical that she should be desecrated. If you wish you can say “not to desecrate”, not to desecrate, about somebody who was qualified and became desecrated.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:4

It is written: He shall not desecrate his issue in his people. Not only his issue will be desecrated; from where also she? Is this not a logical inference? Since the issue, which did not sin, is desecrated, should she, who committed a sin, not logically be desecrated? He himself is a counter example, since he committed a sin but was not desecrated. No. If you argue about a man who is not desecrated in any circumstance, what can you say about a woman who is desecrated in many circumstances? Since she is desecrated in many circumstances, it is logical that she should be desecrated. If you wish you can say “not to desecrate”, not to desecrate, about somebody who was qualified and became desecrated.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:35

And from where that he officiated in eight? Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants in his stead. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For greatness after him. And from where that he was asked in eight? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: And Aaron’s holy garments shall be for his descendants in his stead. Why does the verse say, in his stead? For holiness after him. In what was he asked? They brought it, רבבהו, a Mishnah of Bar Qappara came from the South which stated: He officiates neither in the four of a common priest nor in the eight of a High Priest. Rebbi Abba said, it would be logical that he officiate in four. Why did they say that he did not officiate? Lest people say, we saw a simple priest who sometimes officiated in eight like a High Priest. Rebbi Jonah said, would he not officiate inside and would he not be asked outside? Does one err between inside and outside? But did Rebbi Tarphon, the teacher of all of Israel, not err between blowing for assembly and the blowing for a sacrifice? As it is written: The descendants of Aaron, the priests, shall blow the trumpets, blameless ones, not with bodily defects, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons if I did not see Simeon, my mother’s brother, lame in one of his legs, standing in the Temple court with his trumpet in his hand and blowing! Rebbi Aqiba answered him, maybe you saw him only at the time of assembly; but I was saying, at the time of sacrifices. Rebbi Tarphon said to him, I would hit my sons but you did not deviate right or left. I am the one who heard but I could not explain. You derive it and agree with tradition. Therefore, anybody who separates from you is as if he separated himself from his life.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:16

And with regard to the Sukkah itself from where do we derive [that days includes nights]? From what our Rabbis have taught: You shall dwell in booths for seven days,” (Leviticus 23:42) “days” includes the nights. You say that “days’ includes the nights. But maybe it means “days” but not the nights. And this would be logical. For the word “days” is used here, and it is also used in connection with lulav; just as there it means days and not nights, so here also it must mean days and not nights.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:54

R. Judah says in the name of Ben Bathyra, of those who go before the ark, etc. A contradiction was pointed out (by quoting the following Mishnah): Until what time is one to pray for rain? R. Judah says, until Passover is over; R. Jose says, until after Nisan. Said R. Ḥisda, there is no contradiction, for the one passage of the Mishnah refers to praying, the other to mentioning; one may continue to pray until the end of Passover, but the mention of rain must cease on the first day. Said 'Ulla, what is here said by R. Ḥisda is "as vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes" (Prov., 10.26), for if one is allowed to mention the rain even when one is not allowed to pray for it, is it not logical that one should be allowed to mention it also at times when one is allowed to pray for it? 'Ulla therefore suggested that there existed two different recensions of R. Judah's statement. R. Joseph said, do you know what "until Passover is over" means? It means until the time for the first reader of the first day of the festival is over. 'Abbayi, however, objected: Is there any opportunity at all to mention rain in the holiday prayer? Yes, answered R. Joseph, the Interpreter prays for rain. Does the Interpreter ever pray for anything which is not needed by the congregation? 'Ulla's answer is, therefore, the best. Rabbah said, do you know what "until Passover is over" means? It means until the time for slaughtering the Pascal lamb is over, for the discontinuing of the reference to rain must be like the beginning thereof: Just as in the beginning one mentions the rain, although one does not pray for it, so also at the end of the season one should mention it though not pray for it. 'Abbayi objected: It is quite correct at the beginning of the season to mention the rain without praying for it, because the mention is to serve the purpose of propitiating (God) preparatory to praying, but at the end of the season, what need is there for propitiation (since it is not to be followed by praying)? It is therefore best to accept the answer of 'Ulla.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:271

He replied: If you would think that that text is for the purpose of excluding, then the text could simply omit the word. And should you say, we could then derive the rule [that he is to count seven days] by a logical deduction, such a deduction could be confuted by the case of the woman who counts day for day.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:61

Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:181

Abaye says, It is logical according to the opinion that the Torah speaks in the vernacular, so that his end should not be more stringent then his beginning. Just like in the beginning [when he murdered] if it was intentional he is executed and if it was inadvertent he is exiled, so too his end [when he leaves the city of refuge] if it was intentional he should be executed and if it was inadvertent he should be [re-]exiled.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:183

But I'd this logical?! Whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is a mitzvah [for the Goel HaDam to kill the murderer] or whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is permissible, is it permitted [for a son to kill his father]? But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and so too was taught in a baraisa of the academy of Rebbi Yishmael, For everything a son may not be made into an agent [of the court] against his father to hit him or curse him, except in the case of one who instigates [idolatry] upon which the Torah says (Deuteronomy 13,9) "do not spare him and do not conceal him".

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:281

Rava says, the apoion of Rebbi Yehuda is more logical, for it is written (Deuteronomy 25,3) "Do not add, lest you'll add". This harmonizes if you say those lacking intellect, that would be why we would need to warn them, but if you say those possessing superior intellect, then why must we warn them? And the Rabbis? [How would they respond to this?] We only motivate one who can be motivated.