matter
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The Mishnah
Rabbi Shimon says: one may not anoint oneself with oil of second tithe in Jerusalem. But the sages allow it. They said to Rabbi Shimon: if a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah which is a grave matter, should we not also adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe which is a light matter? He said to them: No; a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah though it is a grave matter, because in terumah we have adopted a lenient ruling also with regard to vetches and fenugreek, but how can we adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe though it is a light matter, when we have not adopted a lenient ruling in second tithe with regard to vetches and fenugreek?
Rabbi Shimon says: one may not anoint oneself with oil of second tithe in Jerusalem. But the sages allow it. They said to Rabbi Shimon: if a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah which is a grave matter, should we not also adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe which is a light matter? He said to them: No; a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah though it is a grave matter, because in terumah we have adopted a lenient ruling also with regard to vetches and fenugreek, but how can we adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe though it is a light matter, when we have not adopted a lenient ruling in second tithe with regard to vetches and fenugreek?
Rabbi Shimon says: one may not anoint oneself with oil of second tithe in Jerusalem. But the sages allow it. They said to Rabbi Shimon: if a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah which is a grave matter, should we not also adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe which is a light matter? He said to them: No; a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah though it is a grave matter, because in terumah we have adopted a lenient ruling also with regard to vetches and fenugreek, but how can we adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe though it is a light matter, when we have not adopted a lenient ruling in second tithe with regard to vetches and fenugreek?
[The produce of] a vineyard in its fourth year was brought up to Jerusalem within a distance of one day’s journey on each side. And what is the border [of a day’s journey on each side]? Eilat to the south, Akrabat on the north, Lod to the west, and the Jordan [river] to the east. When produce increased, it was decreed that it can be redeemed even if the vineyard was close to the wall. And there was a stipulation on this matter, that whenever it was so desired, the arrangement would be restored as it had been before. Rabbi Yose says: this was the stipulation after the Temple was destroyed, and the stipulation was that when the Temple should be rebuilt the arrangement would be restored as it had been before.
A shard, as much as is needed for placing between one board and another, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: enough to scoop out the coals with it. Rabbi Yose says: large enough to contain a revi’it. Rabbi Meir said: even though there is no proof of the matter, there is a hint: “So that no shard is left in its breakage to scoop coals from a brazier” (Isaiah 30:1. Rabbi Yose said to him: proof [of my view] is from there [as well]: “Or to take ladle water from a puddle” (ibid).
If one stores something for planting, for a sample, or for medicine, and [then] carries it out on Shabbat, he is liable no matter the size. But all others are not liable except for its standard measure. If he carries it back again, he is liable only for its standard measure.
He who plows any amount, or who weeds, or who prunes [trees], or who cuts off young shoots, no matter the amount, is liable. He who gathers wood: if in order to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for lighting a fire, as much as is required for boiling a light egg. He who collects grasses: if to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for an animal, as much as fits in a kid’s mouth.
They need not fear that a weasel may have dragged [chametz] from one room to another or from one place to another, for if so, [they must also fear] from courtyard to courtyard and from town to town, and there would be no end to the matter.
[With regard to] the dough in the cracks of the kneading trough: if there is as much as an olive in one place, he must remove [it]; but if not, it is nullified through the smallness of its quantity. And it is likewise in the matter of uncleanness: if he objects to it, it makes a break; but if he desires its preservation, it is like the kneading-trough. [With regard to] “deaf” dough, if there is [a dough] similar to it which has become chametz, it is forbidden.
Seven days before Yom HaKippurim they remove the high priest from his house to the chamber of the counselors and they set up another priest to take his place lest something should occur to him to disqualify him [from being able to worship]. Rabbi Judah said: they even prepare another wife for him in case his wife should die, as it says “And he shall make atonement for himself and for his house” (Leviticus 16:6): “his house” this refers to his wife. They said to him: if so there would be no end to the matter.
“And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand Israel prevailed” etc. (Exodus 17:1. Did the hands of Moses wage war or break [Israel’s ability] to wage war? Rather this teaches that as long as Israel would look upwards and subject their hearts to their Father in heaven they prevailed, and if not they fell. Similarly, “Make for yourself a fiery serpent and mount it on a pole. And if anyone who is bitten shall look at it, he shall live” (Numbers 21:8). Did the serpent kill or did the serpent keep alive? Rather, when Israel would look upwards and subject their hearts to their Father in heaven, they were healed, and if not their [flesh] would melt away. A deaf-mute, a lunatic and a minor cannot cause others to fulfill their religious obligation. This is the general principle: one who is not himself obligated in the matter cannot perform it on behalf of others.
Originally they used to accept testimony with regard to the new moon during the whole day. On one occasion the witnesses were late in arriving, and the Levites went wrong in the daily hymn. They therefore decreed that testimony should be accepted only until the afternoon [sacrifice]. If witnesses came after the afternoon sacrifice that day should be kept as holy and also the next day. After the destruction of the temple Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that testimony with regard to the new moon should be received during the whole day. Rabbi Joshua ben Korha said: this further did Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai decree, that not matter where the head of the court might be, the witnesses should have to go only to the place of the assembly.
It happened in the days of Rabbi Halafta and Rabbi Hanina ben Tradyon that a man passed before the ark [as shaliah tzibbur] and completed the entire benediction and they did not respond, “amen.” [The hazzan called out]: Sound a tekiah, priests, sound a tekiah. [The shaliah tzibbur continued]: He who answered Abraham on Mt. Moriah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Then [the hazzan called out]: Sound a teru'ah, sons of Aaron, sound a teru'ah. [The shaliah tzibbur continued]: He who answered our fathers at the Sea of Reeds, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. And when the matter came up before the sages, they said: they only practiced in this way at the eastern gates on the Temple Mount.
There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except in the matter of setting foot [on his property] and of vessels which are not used for [preparing] food. There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings.
The whole night is valid for reaping the Omer and for burning fat and limbs [on the altar]. This is the general principle: any matter whose commandment is during the day, is valid all day and any matter whose commandment is at night is valid all night.
The whole night is valid for reaping the Omer and for burning fat and limbs [on the altar]. This is the general principle: any matter whose commandment is during the day, is valid all day and any matter whose commandment is at night is valid all night.
A man died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs and he also had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others: Rabbi Tarfon says: It shall be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: We do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
If he left produce that was detached from the ground, whoever seizes it first acquires possession. If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt, the balance: Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor and has nothing to eat, he may give it [the food] to a third party, and he is permitted to use it. It happened to one in Beth Horon that his father was forbidden to benefit from him. Now he [the son] was giving his son in marriage and he said to his neighbor, “The courtyard and the banquet are give to you as a gift, but they are yours only that my father may come and feast with us at the banquet.” He said to him, “If they are mine, let them be dedicated to heaven!” [The son] responded, “But I did not give you my property to dedicate it to heaven.” [The other] responded, “You gave me yours so that you and your father might eat and drink together and become reconciled to one another, while the sin [of a broken vow] should devolve upon his (i.e. head.” When the matter came before the Sages, they ruled: every gift which is not [so given] that if he [the recipient] dedicates it, it is dedicated, is no gift [at all].
Rabbi Eliezer says: They release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother but the Sages forbid. Rabbi Zadok said: Instead of releasing through the honor of his father and mother, they should release [by reference] to the honor of God. If so, there would be no vows! But the Sages admit to Rabbi Eliezer that in a matter concerning himself and his father and mother one may release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother.
If one vowed to be a nazirite and went to bring his animal [for the sacrifice] and found that it had been stolen: If he had taken the nazirite vow before his animal was stolen, he is [still] a nazirite. But if he had taken the nazirite vow after his animal was stolen, he is not a nazirite. It was this mistake that Nahum the Mede made. When nazirites arrived [in Jerusalem] from the Diaspora and found the Temple destroyed, Nahum the Mede said to them, “Had you known that the Temple would be destroyed, would you have become nazirites?” They answered, no, and Nahum the Mede released them [from their vow]. When the matter came before the sages they said to him: whoever vowed a nazirite vow before the destruction of the Temple is a nazirite, but if after the destruction of the temple, he is not a nazirite.
Any matter of doubt regarding [leprous affliction] at the outset is clean before a decision is made [to declare it] unclean. Once a decision has been made [to declare it] unclean, any matter of doubt is regarded as unclean. A person suffering from gonorrhea (a is examined regarding seven things, before it has been decided that it is gonorrhea: With regard to food, drink, carrying things, jumping, sickness, something seen, or an impure thought. Once gonorrhea is established, he is no longer examined. [Any flux resulting] from an accident to him, doubtful [flux] and his semen are unclean, for there are grounds for this assumption. If a one strikes his fellow, and they expected him to die and he partially recovered and then grew worse and died [the other] is liable [for murder]. Rabbi Nehemiah exempts him, for there are grounds for this assumption.
Any matter of doubt regarding [leprous affliction] at the outset is clean before a decision is made [to declare it] unclean. Once a decision has been made [to declare it] unclean, any matter of doubt is regarded as unclean. A person suffering from gonorrhea (a is examined regarding seven things, before it has been decided that it is gonorrhea: With regard to food, drink, carrying things, jumping, sickness, something seen, or an impure thought. Once gonorrhea is established, he is no longer examined. [Any flux resulting] from an accident to him, doubtful [flux] and his semen are unclean, for there are grounds for this assumption. If a one strikes his fellow, and they expected him to die and he partially recovered and then grew worse and died [the other] is liable [for murder]. Rabbi Nehemiah exempts him, for there are grounds for this assumption.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
If the murderer was discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it goes free and grazes with the herd; But if after the heifer’s neck was broken, it is buried in that place because it came there from the outset in connection with a matter of doubt, and atoned for the doubt which is now gone. If the heifer’s neck was broken and afterwards the murderer is discovered, behold he is executed.
Rabbi Judah says: From Rekem eastwards, Rekem being like the east; from Ashkelon southwards, Ashkelon being like the south; and from Acco northwards, Acco being like the north. Rabbi Meir says: Acco counts as the land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce.
Rabbi Meir says: every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit.
If a man dug a pit in a private domain and opened it into the public domain, or if he dug it in the public domain and opened it into a private domain, or if he dug it in a private domain and opened it into another private domain, he is liable [if any is injured by the pit]. If he dug a pit in the public domain and an ox or ass fell into and died, he is liable. No matter whether he digs a pit, trench, or cavern, or ditches or channels he is liable. If so, why does it say “a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? Just as a pit which is deep enough to cause death is ten handbreadths deep, so anything is deep enough to cause death if it is ten handbreadths deep. If they were less than ten handbreadths deep and an ox or an ass fell in and died, the owner is not liable; but if it was damaged he is liable.
If he had paid him the value and had sworn [falsely] to him concerning the [added] fifth, he must pay a fifth on the fifth [and so on] until the value [of the added fifth] becomes less than a perutah’s worth. So too with a deposit, as it says: “In a matter of deposit or a pledge or through robbery, or by defrauding his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21-2, such a one must pay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering. [If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is lost,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he consumed it, he need pay [only] the value. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.
If one hired craftsmen and they deceived each other, they have no legally valid complaint against each other, but only cause for complaint. If one hired a donkey-driver or a wagon-driver to bring litter-bearers or pipers for a bride or for the dead, or laborers to take his flax out of the steep, or any matter that would be lost if delayed, and they retracted, if it was a place where there were no others [who could be hired for the same wage] he may hire others at their (the original workers) expense or he may deceive them.
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
If a man sold his fellow a place to build him a house, so, too, if a man contracted with his fellow to build him a bridal-house for his son, or a widow’s house for his daughter, he must build it four cubits by six cubits (80 inches x 120 inches), according to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: “This is a cattle-shed”. He who wants to build a cattle-shed, should build it four cubits by six. A small house six by eight (120 x. A large house eight by ten (160 x. An eating hall ten by ten (200 x. The height should be [the sum] of half its length and half its breadth. Proof of the matter is the sanctuary. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Should all [houses] be according to the building of the Sanctuary?”
[Cases concerning offenses punishable by] beating [are decided] by three. In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said twenty-three. The intercalation of the month and intercalation of the year [are decided] by three, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “The matter is begun by three, discussed by five, and decided upon by seven. But if they decided upon it with three, the intercalation is valid.”
How do they check the witnesses? They bring them in and warn them, and then they take them out and leave behind the most important of [the witnesses]. And they would say to him: “State [for us], how do you know that this one is in debt to this one?” If he said, “He said to me, ‘I am in debt to him’, or ‘So-and-so said to me that he was in debt to him’”, he has said nothing. He must be able to say, “In our presence he acknowledged to the other one that he owed him 200 zuz.” Afterward they bring in the second witness and check him. If their words were found to agree, the judges discuss the matter. If two say, “He is not guilty” and one says, “He is guilty”, he is not guilty. If two say, “He is guilty” and one says, “He is not guilty”, he is guilty. If one says, “He is not guilty”, and one says, “He is guilty”, and even if two declared him not guilty or declared him guilty while one said, “I do not know”, they must add more judges.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.
If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.
If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?
1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?
Rabbi Judah said: Rabbi Ishmael put this question to Rabbi Joshua as they were walking on the way, “Why have they forbidden the cheese of non-Jews?” He replied, because they curdle it with the rennet of a nevelah (an animal that was not properly slaughtered.” He (Rabbi Ishmael) said: “but is not the rennet of a burnt-offering more strictly forbidden than the rennet of a nevelah? [and yet] it was said that a priest who is not fastidious may suck it out raw.” (Though the Sages disagreed with this opinion, and they said that no benefit may be derived from it, although one who consumed it did not trespass [temple property). Rabbi Joshua responded: “The reason then is because they curdle it with the rennet from calves sacrificed to idols.” He (Rabbi Ishmael) said to him: “if that be so, why do they not extend the prohibition to any benefit derived from it?” He (Rabbi Joshua) diverted him to another matter, saying: “Ishmael, how do you read for your [masc.] love is more delightful than wine” or “your [fem.] love etc. (Song of Songs 1:2” He replied: “your [fem.] love is better …” He said to him: this is not so, as it is proved by its fellow [-verse]: your ointments [masc.] have a goodly fragrance … [therefore do the maidens love you] (Song of Songs 1:3).”
If the court ruled that an entire principle has to be uprooted; if they said that [the law concerning the] menstruant is not found in the Torah or the [law concerning the] Sabbath is not found in the torah or [the law concerning] idolatry is not found in the torah, they are exempt. If, however, they ruled that a part [of a commandment] was to be annulled and a part fulfilled, they are liable. How is this so? If they said: [the law concerning the] menstruant occurs in the Torah but if a man has relations with a woman that awaits a day corresponding to a day he is exempt, [or that the law concerning the] Sabbath occurs in the Torah but if a man carries anything from a private domain to a public domain he is exempt, [or that the law of] idolatry occurs in the Torah, but if a man only bows down to an idol he is exempt, they are liable, for it says, “And if some matter escapes [the notice of the congregation]” (Leviticus 4:13), “some matter” but not the entire principle.
If the court ruled that an entire principle has to be uprooted; if they said that [the law concerning the] menstruant is not found in the Torah or the [law concerning the] Sabbath is not found in the torah or [the law concerning] idolatry is not found in the torah, they are exempt. If, however, they ruled that a part [of a commandment] was to be annulled and a part fulfilled, they are liable. How is this so? If they said: [the law concerning the] menstruant occurs in the Torah but if a man has relations with a woman that awaits a day corresponding to a day he is exempt, [or that the law concerning the] Sabbath occurs in the Torah but if a man carries anything from a private domain to a public domain he is exempt, [or that the law of] idolatry occurs in the Torah, but if a man only bows down to an idol he is exempt, they are liable, for it says, “And if some matter escapes [the notice of the congregation]” (Leviticus 4:13), “some matter” but not the entire principle.
The [court] is not obligated [to bring a sacrifice] except where ignorance of the law was accompanied by an unwitting action, and so it is with the anointed priest. Nor [is obligation incurred] in the case of idolatry unless ignorance of the law was accompanied by an unwitting action. The court is not obligated unless they ruled concerning a prohibition the punishment for which is kareth, if it was transgressed intentionally, and a sin offering if transgressed unwittingly, and so it is with the anointed priest. Nor [is obligation incurred] in the case of idolatry unless they ruled concerning a matter the punishment for which is kareth, if it was transgressed intentionally, and a sin offering if transgressed unwittingly.
If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted?
Just as the altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it, so does the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for it; And just as the altar and the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for them, so do vessels sanctify. Vessels for liquids sanctify liquids, And the measures sanctify dry material. A liquid vessel does not sanctify dry matter, nor does a dry [measure] sanctify a liquid. If holy vessels were perforated and they can be used for the same purpose as when whole, they sanctify [what is placed in them]; if not, they do not sanctify. And all these sanctify only in the holy place.
How would they do it [reap the omer]? The agents of the court used to go out on the day before the festival and tie the unreaped grain in bunches to make it the easier to reap. All the inhabitants of the towns near by assembled there, so that it might be reaped with a great demonstration. As soon as it became dark he says to them: “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.” On the Sabbath he says to them, “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.” He repeated every matter three times, and they answer, “yes, yes, yes.” And why all of this? Because of the Boethusians who held that the reaping of the omer was not to take place at the conclusion of the [first day of the] festival.
If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor slaughtered while others watched them, one must cover up the blood; but if they were alone, they are exempt from covering it up. Similarly for the matter of “it and its young”: if they slaughtered while others watched them, it is forbidden to slaughter after them [the mother/young], but if they were alone: Rabbi Meir permits to slaughter after them [the mother/young]. But the rabbis forbid it. They agree, that if a person did slaughter [after them], he has not incurred forty lashes.
If one who is not an expert sees a first born and it was slaughtered by his instructions, in such a case it shall be buried and he shall make reparation from his own pocket. If a [non-expert] judge gave a judgment and declared innocent a person who was really liable or made liable a person who was really innocent, declared unclean a thing which was clean or declared clean a thing which was really unclean, his decision stands but he has to make reparation from his own pocket. If the judge was an expert [sanctioned by the] court, he is exempt from making reparation. It happened once that a cow's womb was removed and Rabbi Tarfon gave it [the cow] to the dogs to eat. The matter came before the sages at Yavneh and they permitted the animal. Todos the physician said: no cow or pig leaves Alexandria of Egypt before its womb is removed in order that it may not breed. Rabbi Tarfon said: “There goes your donkey, Tarfon.” Rabbi Akiva said to him: you are exempt, for you are an expert and whoever is an expert sanctioned by the court is exempt from reparation.
If one makes a slit in the ear of a firstborn animal, he may never slaughter it, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: when another blemish appears, he may slaughter it on account of it. It happened that a quaestor (a Roman official) saw an old male lamb with its long wool hanging down and asked: what is the meaning of this? They replied: “It is a first born and is not to be slaughtered until it has a blemish,” [The quaestor] took a dagger and slit its ear. The matter came before the sages and they permitted it. After they had permitted, he went and sliced the ears of other [first borns]. The [sages] forbade them. Once children were once playing in a field. They tied the tails of sheep one to the other and one tail which belonged to a first born was severed. The matter came before the rabbis and they permitted [the first born]. When the children saw that they had permitted [the first born to be slaughtered], they proceeded to tie the tails of other first borns. The [sages] forbade [the other first borns]. This is the rule: wherever the blemish is caused with the knowledge and consent [of the owner] it is forbidden, but, if it is not with his knowledge and consent, it is permitted.
If one makes a slit in the ear of a firstborn animal, he may never slaughter it, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: when another blemish appears, he may slaughter it on account of it. It happened that a quaestor (a Roman official) saw an old male lamb with its long wool hanging down and asked: what is the meaning of this? They replied: “It is a first born and is not to be slaughtered until it has a blemish,” [The quaestor] took a dagger and slit its ear. The matter came before the sages and they permitted it. After they had permitted, he went and sliced the ears of other [first borns]. The [sages] forbade them. Once children were once playing in a field. They tied the tails of sheep one to the other and one tail which belonged to a first born was severed. The matter came before the rabbis and they permitted [the first born]. When the children saw that they had permitted [the first born to be slaughtered], they proceeded to tie the tails of other first borns. The [sages] forbade [the other first borns]. This is the rule: wherever the blemish is caused with the knowledge and consent [of the owner] it is forbidden, but, if it is not with his knowledge and consent, it is permitted.
If a first born was running after him and he kicked it and thereby blemished it, he may slaughter it on account of this. Any blemish which might have been made by a person, Israelite shepherds are trustworthy whereas shepherds who are priests are not trustworthy. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he is trustworthy with regard to somebody else's first born, but he is not trustworthy with regard to his own. Rabbi Meir says: one who is suspected of neglecting a religious matter must not issue judgment on it or give evidence concerning it.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
The law is different with a certain asham: If before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was slaughtered, it shall be buried; If after the blood was tossed, the flesh must be removed to the place of burning. The law is also different regarding an ox to be stoned: If before it was stoned, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was stoned, it is permitted for use. The law is also different regarding the heifer whose neck is to be broken: If before its neck was broken, it may go out to pasture among the flock. If after its neck was broken, it shall be buried on the spot, for it was from the outset brought in a matter of doubt, it has atoned for the doubt, and so has served its purpose.
If a woman is liable to a bird hatat brought in a case of doubt and Yom Kippur intervenes, she is still bound to offer it after Yom Kippur, because it renders her fit to eat sacrifices. If a hatat of a bird was brought for a matter of doubt and, after the pinching of its neck it became known [that there was no need for it], it must be buried.
If an oven was half filled with earth, the part from the earth downwards contracts impurity by contact only while the part from the earth upwards contracts impurity [also] from its air-space. If he put the oven over the mouth of a cistern or over that of a cellar and he put a stone at its side: Rabbi Judah says: if when heated below it becomes also heated above it is susceptible to impurity. But the sages say: since it was heated, no matter how, it is susceptible to impurity.
A rod above a doorway, even if one hundred cubits higher, forms a passage for the uncleanness no matter its width, the words of Rabbi Joshua. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: don't be more stringent than the case of a projection.
One was carrying his water on his shoulder and he ruled in a matter of law, or showed others the way, or killed a snake or a scorpion, or picked up food in order to store it, it [the water] is invalid; But [if he picked up] food to eat, it is valid. [And if he killed] a snake or a scorpion that hindered him, it remains valid. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: If the act was is in the nature of work, the mixture is invalid whether the man stopped or not, If it was not in the nature of work: If he stopped, it is invalid; But if he did not stop it remains valid.
They are believed when they say, "we buried miscarriages there," or "we did not bury them." They are believed when they say concerning a beast whether it had given birth to a firstling or had not given birth to one. They are believed when giving information on the marking of graves. But they are not believed either in regard to overhanging branches, or protruding stones or a bet ha-peras. This is the general rule: in any matter in which they are under suspicion they are not believed.
There are seven ways in which a zav is examined as long as he had not become subject to zivah: With regard to food, drink, as [to what] he had carried, whether he had jumped, whether he had been ill, what he had seen, or what he had thought. [It doesn't matter] whether he had thoughts before seeing [a woman], or whether he had seen [a woman] before his thoughts. Rabbi Judah says: even if he had watched beasts, wild animals or birds having intercourse with each other, and even when he had seen a woman's dyed garments. Rabbi Akiva says: even if he had eaten any kind of food, be it good or bad, or had drunk any kind of liquid. They said to him: Then there will be no zavim in the world!’ He replied to them: you are not held responsible for the existence of zavim!’ Once he had become subject to zivah, no further examination takes place. [Zov] resulting from an accident, or that was at all doubtful, or an issue of semen, these are unclean, since there are grounds for the assumption [that it is zivah]. If he had at a first [issue] they examine him; On the second [issue] they examine him, but on the third [issue] they don't examine him. Rabbi Eliezer says: even on the third [issue] they examine him because of the sacrifice.
If a person puts his hands inside a house with scale disease, his hands have first degree uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Akiba. But the sages say: his hands have second degree uncleanness. Whoever defiles garments: at the time when he touches [the uncleanness], he defiles hands so that they have first degree uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Akiba. But the sages say: such that they have second degree of uncleanness. They said to Rabbi Akiba: where do we find anywhere that hands have first degree uncleanness? He said to them: but how is it possible for them to become unclean with first degree uncleanness without his whole body becoming unclean? Only in these cases [can they have first degree uncleanness]. Foods and vessels which have been defiled by liquids convey second degree of uncleanness to the hands, the words of Rabbi Joshua. But the sages say: that which has been defiled by a father of uncleanness conveys uncleanness to the hands, but that which has been defiled by an offspring of uncleanness does not defiled the hands. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: it happened that a certain woman came before my father and said to him, "My hands went into the air-space inside an earthenware vessel." He said to her: "My daughter, what was the cause of its uncleanness?" But I did not hear what she said to him. The sages said: the matter is clear that which has been defiled by a father of uncleanness conveys uncleanness to the hands, but that which has been rendered unclean by an offspring of uncleanness does not defiled the hands.
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Excrement until it is hardened like bone, urine all the time it makes moist. Ganiva said: All the time that its impression is visible. Samuel said: Until its surface is hardened. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Until its surface is hardened. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Zeïra in the name of Rav: Excrement is forbidden even if it is hard like bone. Samuel said: Until its surface is hardened. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Until its surface is hardened. Ḥizqiah said: Rebbi Abba is more restrictive for urine than for excrement? Rebbi Mana said to him: From that of Ganiva; he said to him: Even if it is hard like bone it is forbidden because its matter exists; urine’s matter no longer exists
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Excrement until it is hardened like bone, urine all the time it makes moist. Ganiva said: All the time that its impression is visible. Samuel said: Until its surface is hardened. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Until its surface is hardened. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Zeïra in the name of Rav: Excrement is forbidden even if it is hard like bone. Samuel said: Until its surface is hardened. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Until its surface is hardened. Ḥizqiah said: Rebbi Abba is more restrictive for urine than for excrement? Rebbi Mana said to him: From that of Ganiva; he said to him: Even if it is hard like bone it is forbidden because its matter exists; urine’s matter no longer exists
Rebbi Tanḥum the scholar prayed: May it please You, o Eternal, my God and God of my fathers, that You may break and remove the yoke of evil inclinations from our hearts since so You created us to do Your will, and we are required to do Your will. You desire it and we desire it, who obstructs? The sour matter in the dough! It is obvious and known that we have no power to resist. But may it be Your pleasure, o Eternal, my God and God of my fathers, that You may remove it from us, subdue it, so that we may do Your will as our own with a willing heart.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired with guaranteed property, by money, document, or possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Madon was in Jerusalem, rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place, but here the real estate even was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
It was stated: “All of these, if he gave a name to their heave of the tithe or Second Tithe, what he did is done.” Rebbi Eleazar said, with the exception of the remainders of flour sacrifices. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the rest is in dispute. Rebbi Yose asked, what dispute? Where are we standing, if according to Rebbi Meïr, both for tithes and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything. If according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah who was sitting there, stating: “If a priest marries by means of his share in the holiest sacrifices or simple holy sacrifices, the marriage is not valid.” Rebbi Eleazar said, that is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. I said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this, and he said, from Rebbi Jeremiah. I said, this explains the matter! Rebbi Jeremiah, who heard that Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, he says it is in dispute. Rebbi Yose, who did not hear that, asked which dispute? If according to Rebbi Meïr, both for Second Tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything, if according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done.
Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi permitted Beth Shean on the testimony of Joshua ben Zeruz, the son of Rebbi Meïr’s father-in-law, who said, I saw Rebbi Meïr buy vegetables from a garden in the Sabbatical year. He permitted all of it! Rebbi Zeïra said, this implies that nobody should act in public; I say that this garden was a particular case for him; should he have permitted it completely? Rebbi permitted Beth Shean, permitted Caesarea, permitted Bet Guvrin, permitted Kefar Ẓemaḥ. Rebbi permitted to buy vegetables after the end of the Sabbatical year and all were saying bad things about him. He said to them, come and let us discuss the matter. It is written (2Kings 18:4): “He smashed the brass snake.” Was there no just person between Moses and Hezekiah to remove it? But the Holy One, praise to Him, reserved that crown to him so he could crown himself with it. We also had this crown reserved by the Holy One, praise to Him, to crown ourselves with it.
Rebbi Yose of Kefar Dan in the name of Rebbi from Meadiah, the kinds forbidden in Beth Shean: Nigella, sesame, mustard, garlic, bulbs, black peas, commercial onions, local ones that are sold by weight, Egyptian beans bound with bast, mint bundled separately, carrot always, leeks from Pentecost to Ḥanukkah. Rebbi Zeïra said, from Pentecost to Ḥanukkah the forbidden ones outnumber the permitted ones, from Ḥanukkah to Pentecost the permitted ones outnumber the forbidden ones. In the matter of aftergrowth, from New Year’s Day to Ḥanukkah prohibition of aftergrowth, from Ḥanukkah to Pentecost permission of aftergrowth, from Pentecost to New Year’s Day questionable. Zucchini, squash, water melon, apple melon, wine, oil, Ephesian dates, somebody also says lupines. Bread always requires hallah. These are Sabbatical in a Sabbatical year. In the other years of the cycle? Rebbi Jonah said, demay; Rebbi Yose said, certain. They have no disagreement over tithes; Rebbi Jonah said demay for him who buys from a person making house calls, Rebbi Yose said certain for him who bought from the garden.
Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Simeon agrees that one must separate tithes as a matter of practice. Hence, Rebbi Simeon says that one separates, and the rabbis say that one saparates
.What is the difference between them? Rebbi Simeon says, he separates and takes money from the tribe. The rabbis say that he separates and does not take money from the tribe. But is it not even like heave from outside the Land, does he not take money from the tribe? Maybe it was said on the principle of ṭevel for produce of the Gentile? Since we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from the tithes imposed on it. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya. in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Simeon agrees that nevertheless he must separate tithes as a matter of practice.
So far, if he has nothing of the same kind. Even if he has of the same kind, that is a matter of preference.
It was stated: “He who enters a town and does not know anybody there, or stands by a threshing floor and does not know anybody there, may ask either a ḥaver or an am haäreẓ, the words of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi says, about heave one only may ask a ḥaver.” It turns out that Rebbi follows Rebbi Meïr and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows his own reasoning. As we have stated there: “About any bodily defects that may be caused by humans, laymen shepherds are trustworthy, Cohen shepherds are not. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he is trustworthy about another’s flock but not his own. Rebbi Meïr said, whoever is suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it.” Rebbi Jonah said, they disagree only if it is a matter of taking, but in distributing even Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel agrees. What is the difference between taking and distributing? A distribution is public knowledge.
It was stated: “He who enters a town and does not know anybody there, or stands by a threshing floor and does not know anybody there, may ask either a ḥaver or an am haäreẓ, the words of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi says, about heave one only may ask a ḥaver.” It turns out that Rebbi follows Rebbi Meïr and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows his own reasoning. As we have stated there: “About any bodily defects that may be caused by humans, laymen shepherds are trustworthy, Cohen shepherds are not. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he is trustworthy about another’s flock but not his own. Rebbi Meïr said, whoever is suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it.” Rebbi Jonah said, they disagree only if it is a matter of taking, but in distributing even Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel agrees. What is the difference between taking and distributing? A distribution is public knowledge.
“What is here on this side is profane ṭevel.” Why does he not say, what is here on this side is tithe? He would precede. Why does he not say, that on this side is heave? It would turn out that either he diminishes or increases the heave. Since he says, what is here on this side is profane ṭevel, whether he diminishes or increases the heave does not matter.
Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He who buys loose produce from a Gentile separates heave and heave of the tithe as a matter of practice, gives it to the tribe, and receives money from the tribe. But he who buys produce still in the ground from a Gentile separates heave and heave of the tithe as a matter of practice, gives it to the tribe, and does not take money from the tribe. What is the reason? (Num. 18:26) “If you remove the tithe from the Children of Israel.” From the Children of Israel you remove the tithe, but not from the acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. From the Children of Israel you remove the tithe, but not from the hand of a Gentile.
Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He who buys loose produce from a Gentile separates heave and heave of the tithe as a matter of practice, gives it to the tribe, and receives money from the tribe. But he who buys produce still in the ground from a Gentile separates heave and heave of the tithe as a matter of practice, gives it to the tribe, and does not take money from the tribe. What is the reason? (Num. 18:26) “If you remove the tithe from the Children of Israel.” From the Children of Israel you remove the tithe, but not from the acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. From the Children of Israel you remove the tithe, but not from the hand of a Gentile.
In addition, from the following: Rebbi Zeïra said, Abba the Anatolian bought produce from an Aramean; he came before Rebbi Judah ben Levi who sent his son Menaḥem to put it in order; he gave him his tithes. When he returned, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi met him and said, who else but your father would do such a thing? The arguments of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are inverted. There, he says that he who buys loose produce from a Gentile, separates heave and heave of the tithe as a matter of practice, gives them to the tribe, and receives money from the tribe; and here he says so! Rebbi Abba bar Zamina said before Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Simon does not say so, but when he returned, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi met him and said, this does not belong to your father. Rebbi Zeïra was offended.
Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Jeremiah: Is our Mishnah from Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose? As it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose says in the name of his father that one may take heave from wine on vinegar but not from vinegar on wine. If somebody transgressed, his heave is heave. Rebbi says that wine and vinegar are two distinct kinds and one does not give heave nor does one tithe from one on the other.” He was looking at him. He said to him, what are you staring at me? Bring a lash for yourself; there it is for tithing, here it is for kilaim. Rebbi Jonah said, he should not have stared at him since the earlier rabbis wanted to understand this matter and understood that there it refers to tithing but here to kilaim.
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? I say that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But one does not follow this.
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? I say that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But one does not follow this.
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? I say that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But one does not follow this.
“They also said before him.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that a fellow is forbidden to marry the daughter of a vulgar. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi Eliezer used to permit the leavened matter of a Samaritan immediately after Passover.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan bar Pazi and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting and saying: We did state “after they conceded”; who conceded to whom? The House of Shammai to the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel to the House of Shammai? They said, let us go out and study. The went out and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jehudah bar Ḥanina: We never find the House of Shammai conceding to the House of Hillel except in this matter. Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abbai understood it from the following: “If someone pours from vessel to vessel and a ṭevul yom touches it, it should be lifted by 101.” If you say that the House of Hillel conceded to the House of Shammai that it cannot be lifted, who is the Tanna here, neither the House of Shammai nor the House of Hillel! Rebbi Ḥanina the son of Rebbi Hillel said, we might say that the House of Hillel stated that before they conceded. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said so: “After they conceded, Rebbi Eliezer said it should be lifted and burned”, and is Rebbi Eliezer not a follower of Shammai? Rebbi Ḥinena said, the Mishnah said so, after they conceded one to another, the House of Shammai recused themselves and the others teach us. Rebbi Abin says, there is another answer, following what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Since pure [heave], which for outsiders is forbidden as deadly sin, can be lifted, certainly also impure [heave] which is [prohibited] as positive commandment for Cohanim.
Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”
[It happened that] the daughter of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya punched holes into figs so that the fellows should not eat them but (his) [her] father Rebbi Ḥiyya ate from them. Is that not forbidden? He knew of the matter. Is it not forbidden anyhow, have we not stated: “If somebody saw a bird pecking at a fig or a rat nibbling at a watermelon, it is forbidden for I say, they ate from the place of a pecking hole.” She had been watching.
A pious person happened to be insistent in [the matter of] uncovered wine. Once he was smitten with a fever. They saw him sitting and giving a sermon on the Day of Atonement with a flask of water in his hand.
HALAKHAH: Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi Simeon. If it follows Rebbi Joḥanan, even a full meal! But since Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Simeon agrees that nevertheless he must separate tithes as a matter of practice; therefore we have to say that this follows Rebbi Simeon.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lifts out plants from his own property”, etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Aqiba’s. As we have stated there, “He may take from the threshing floor and sow and it is free from tithes until he smoothes, the words of Rebbi Aqiba.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is the opinion of everybody. The Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the matter of young plants. What is the difference between wheat and young plants? For wheat, it was the end of processing; for plants it is not the end of processing. Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages in the matter of turnips and radishes because they spoil. Does wheat not also spoil? Wheat admits another threshing floor, these have no other threshing floor.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lifts out plants from his own property”, etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Aqiba’s. As we have stated there, “He may take from the threshing floor and sow and it is free from tithes until he smoothes, the words of Rebbi Aqiba.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is the opinion of everybody. The Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the matter of young plants. What is the difference between wheat and young plants? For wheat, it was the end of processing; for plants it is not the end of processing. Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages in the matter of turnips and radishes because they spoil. Does wheat not also spoil? Wheat admits another threshing floor, these have no other threshing floor.
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? Do I say that at a place where Jewish bread is available, Gentile bread should be forbidden but they obfuscated about it and permitted it or that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But we do not follow this.
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This also belongs to the practices of obfuscation. Rebbi Yose said, I objected before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Why should it belong to the practices of obfuscation? Do I say that at a place where Jewish bread is available, Gentile bread should be forbidden but they obfuscated about it and permitted it or that at a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. Rebbi Mana said: Does there exist obfuscation for prohibition? Is bread not like Gentile cooking? So we say: At a place where no Jewish cooking is to be found it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted, but they obfuscated the matter and forbade it. But so it was: At a place where no Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden, but they obfuscated the matter and permitted it as a necessity of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa [hold] with the one who permits, but only from a store. But we do not follow this.