362 occurrences across the corpus

The Writings of Origen

Against Celsus, Book IV 77:1

In the next place, forgetting that his object is to accuse both Jews and Christians, he quotes against himself an iambic verse of Euripides, which is opposed to his view, and joining issue with the words, charges them with being an erroneous statement. His words are as follow: “But if you will quote the saying of Euripides, that

Against Celsus, Book IV 78:1

He next proceeds further to object against himself what is said on behalf of man, viz. that the irrational animals were created on his account, saying: “If one were to call us the lords of the animal creation because we hunt the other animals and live upon their flesh, we would say, Why were not we rather created on their account, since they hunt and devour us? Nay, we require nets and weapons, and the assistance of many persons, along with dogs, when engaged in the chase; while they are immediately and spontaneously provided by nature with weapons which easily bring us under their power.” And here we may observe, that the gift of understanding has been bestowed upon us as a mighty aid, far superior to any weapon which wild beasts may seem to possess. We, indeed, who are far weaker in bodily strength than the beasts, and shorter in stature than some of them, yet by means of our understanding obtain the mastery, and capture the huge elephants. We subdue by our gentle treatment those animals whose nature it is to be tamed, while with those whose nature is different, or which do not appear likely to be of use to us when tamed, we take such precautionary measures, that when we desire it, we keep such wild beasts shut up; and when we need the flesh of their bodies for food, we slaughter them, as we do those beasts which are not of a savage nature. The Creator, then, has constituted all things the servants of the rational being and of his natural understanding. For some purposes we require dogs, say as guardians of our sheep-folds, or of our cattle-yards, or goat-pastures, or of our dwellings; and for other purposes we need oxen, as for agriculture; and for others, again, we make use of those which bear the yoke, or beasts of burden. And so it may be said that the race of lions, and bears, and leopards, and wild boars, and such like, has been given to us in order to call into exercise the elements of the manly character that exists within us.

Against Celsus, Book V 1:1

It is not, my reverend Ambrosius, because we seek after many words—a thing which is forbidden, and in the indulgence of which it is impossible to avoid sin—that we now begin the fifth book of our reply to the treatise of Celsus, but with the endeavour, so far as may be within our power, to leave none of his statements without examination, and especially those in which it might appear to some that he had skilfully assailed us and the Jews. If it were possible, indeed, for me to enter along with my words into the conscience of every one without exception who peruses this work, and to extract each dart which wounds him who is not completely protected with the “whole armour” of God, and apply a rational medicine to cure the wound inflicted by Celsus, which prevents those who listen to his words from remaining “sound in the faith,” I would do so. But since it is the work of God alone, in conformity with His own Spirit, and along with that of Christ, to take up His abode invisibly in those persons whom He judges worthy of being visited; so, on the other hand, is our object to try, by means of arguments and treatises, to confirm men in their faith, and to earn the name of “workmen needing not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.” And there is one thing above all which it appears to us we ought to do, if we would discharge faithfully the task enjoined upon us by you, and that is to overturn to the best of our ability the confident assertions of Celsus. Let us then quote such assertions of his as follow those which we have already refuted (the reader must decide whether we have done so successfully or not), and let us reply to them. And may God grant that we approach not our subject with our understanding and reason empty and devoid of divine inspiration, that the faith of those whom we wish to aid may not depend upon human wisdom, but that, receiving the “mind” of Christ from His Father, who alone can bestow it, and being strengthened by participating in the word of God, we may pull down “every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God,” and the imagination of Celsus, who exalts himself against us, and against Jesus, and also against Moses and the prophets, in order that He who “gave the word to those who published it with great power” may supply us also, and bestow upon us “great power,” so that faith in the word and power of God may be implanted in the minds of all who will peruse our work.

Against Celsus, Book V 23:1

We, therefore, do not maintain that the body which has undergone corruption resumes its original nature, any more than the grain of wheat which has decayed returns to its former condition. But we do maintain, that as above the grain of wheat there arises a stalk, so a certain power is implanted in the body, which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in incorruption. The philosophers of the Porch, however, in consequence of the opinions which they hold regarding the unchangeableness of things after a certain cycle, assert that the body, after undergoing complete corruption, will return to its original condition, and will again assume that first nature from which it passed into a state of dissolution, establishing these points, as they think, by irresistible arguments. We, however, do not betake ourselves to a most absurd refuge, saying that with God all things are possible; for we know how to understand this word “all” as not referring either to things that are “non-existent” or that are inconceivable. But we maintain, at the same time, that God cannot do what is disgraceful, since then He would be capable of ceasing to be God; for if He do anything that is disgraceful, He is not God. Since, however, he lays it down as a principle, that “God does not desire what is contrary to nature,” we have to make a distinction, and say that if any one asserts that wickedness is contrary to nature, while we maintain that “God does not desire what is contrary to nature,”—either what springs from wickedness or from an irrational principle,—yet, if such things happen according to the word and will of God, we must at once necessarily hold that they are not contrary to nature. Therefore things which are done by God, although they may be, or may appear to some to be incredible, are not contrary to nature. And if we must press the force of words, we would say that, in comparison with what is generally understood as “nature,” there are certain things which are beyond its power, which God could at any time do; as, e.g., in raising man above the level of human nature, and causing him to pass into a better and more divine condition, and preserving him in the same, so long as he who is the object of His care shows by his actions that he desires [the continuance of His help].

Against Celsus, Book V 27:1

Any one, indeed, who chooses, may relate how the various quarters of the earth, being distributed among certain governing powers, are administered by those who superintend them; but let him tell us also how what is done among each nation is done rightly when agreeable to the wishes of the superintendents. Let him, for example, tell us whether the laws of the Scythians, which permit the murder of parents, are right laws; or those of the Persians, which do not forbid the marriages of sons with their mothers, or of daughters with their own fathers. But what need is there for me to make selections from those who have been engaged in the business of enacting laws among the different nations, and to inquire how the laws are rightly enacted among each, according as they please the superintending powers? Let Celsus, however, tell us how it would be an act of impiety to get rid of those ancestral laws which permit the marriages of mothers and daughters; or which pronounce a man happy who puts an end to his life by hanging, or declare that they undergo entire purification who deliver themselves over to the fire, and who terminate their existence by fire; and how it is an act of impiety to do away with those laws which, for example, prevail in the Tauric Chersonese, regarding the offering up of strangers in sacrifice to Diana, or among certain of the Libyan tribes regarding the sacrifice of children to Saturn. Moreover, this inference follows from the dictum of Celsus, that it is an act of impiety on the part of the Jews to do away with those ancestral laws which forbid the worship of any other deity than the Creator of all things. And it will follow, according to his view, that piety is not divine by its own nature, but by a certain [external] arrangement and appointment. For it is an act of piety among certain tribes to worship a crocodile, and to eat what is an object of adoration among other tribes; while, again, with others it is a pious act to worship a calf, and among others, again, to regard the goat as a god. And, in this way, the same individual will be regarded as acting piously according to one set of laws, and impiously according to another; and this is the most absurd result that can be conceived!

Against Celsus, Book V 44:1

But as Celsus would compare the venerable customs of the Jews with the laws of certain nations, let us proceed to look at them. He is of opinion, accordingly, that there is no difference between the doctrine regarding “heaven” and that regarding “God;” and he says that “the Persians, like the Jews, offer sacrifices to Jupiter upon the tops of the mountains,”—not observing that, as the Jews were acquainted with one God, so they had only one holy house of prayer, and one altar of whole burnt-offerings, and one censer for incense, and one high priest of God. The Jews, then, had nothing in common with the Persians, who ascend the summits of their mountains, which are many in number, and offer up sacrifices which have nothing in common with those which are regulated by the Mosaic code,—in conformity to which the Jewish priests “served unto the example and shadow of heavenly things,” explaining enigmatically the object of the law regarding the sacrifices, and the things of which these sacrifices were the symbols. The Persians therefore may call the “whole circle of heaven” Jupiter; but we maintain that “the heaven” is neither Jupiter nor God, as we indeed know that certain beings of a class inferior to God have ascended above the heavens and all visible nature: and in this sense we understand the words, “Praise God, ye heaven of heavens, and ye waters that be above the heavens; let them praise the name of the Lord.”

Against Celsus, Book V 65:1

But since he asserts that “you may hear all those who differ so widely saying, ‘The world is crucified to me, and I unto the world,’” we shall show the falsity of such a statement. For there are certain heretical sects which do not receive the epistles of the Apostle Paul, as the two sects of Ebionites, and those who are termed Encratites. Those, then, who do not regard the apostle as a holy and wise man, will not adopt his language, and say, “The world is crucified to me, and I unto the world.” And consequently in this point, too, Celsus is guilty of falsehood. He continues, moreover, to linger over the accusations which he brings against the diversity of sects which exist, but does not appear to me to be accurate in the language which he employs, nor to have carefully observed or understood how it is that those Christians who have made progress in their studies say that they are possessed of greater knowledge than the Jews; and also, whether they acknowledge the same Scriptures, but interpret them differently, or whether they do not recognise these books as divine. For we find both of these views prevailing among the sects. He then continues: “Although they have no foundation for their doctrine, let us examine the system itself; and, in the first place, let us mention the corruptions which they have made through ignorance and misunderstanding, when in the discussion of elementary principles they express their opinions in the most absurd manner on things which they do not understand, such as the following.” And then, to certain expressions which are continually in the mouths of the believers in Christianity, he opposes certain others from the writings of the philosophers, with the object of making it appear that the noble sentiments which Celsus supposes to be used by Christians have been expressed in better and clearer language by the philosophers, in order that he might drag away to the study of philosophy those who are caught by opinions which at once evidence their noble and religious character. We shall, however, here terminate the fifth book, and begin the sixth with what follows.

Against Celsus, Book VI 1:1

In beginning this our sixth book, we desire, my reverend Ambrosius, to answer in it those accusations which Celsus brings against the Christians, not, as might be supposed, those objections which he has adduced from writers on philosophy. For he has quoted a considerable number of passages, chiefly from Plato, and has placed alongside of these such declarations of Holy Scripture as are fitted to impress even the intelligent mind; subjoining the assertion, that “these things are stated much better among the Greeks [than in the Scriptures], and in a manner which is free from all exaggerations and promises on the part of God, or the Son of God.” Now we maintain, that if it is the object of the ambassadors of the truth to confer benefits upon the greatest possible number, and, so far as they can, to win over to its side, through their love to men, every one without exception—intelligent as well as simple—not Greeks only, but also barbarians (and great, indeed, is the humanity which should succeed in converting the rustic and the ignorant), it is manifest that they must adopt a style of address fitted to do good to all, and to gain over to them men of every sort. Those, on the other hand, who turn away from the ignorant as being mere slaves, and unable to understand the flowing periods of a polished and logical discourse, and so devote their attention solely to such as have been brought up amongst literary pursuits, confine their views of the public good within very strait and narrow limits.

Against Celsus, Book VI 11:1

After this Celsus continues: “If these (meaning the Christians) bring forward this person, and others, again, a different individual [as the Christ], while the common and ready cry of all parties is, ‘Believe, if thou wilt be saved, or else begone,’ what shall those do who are in earnest about their salvation? Shall they cast the dice, in order to divine whither they may betake themselves, and whom they shall join?” Now we shall answer this objection in the following manner, as the clearness of the case impels us to do. If it had been recorded that several individuals had appeared in human life as sons of God in the manner in which Jesus did, and if each of them had drawn a party of adherents to his side, so that, on account of the similarity of the profession [in the case of each individual] that he was the Son of God, he to whom his followers bore testimony to that effect was an object of dispute, there would have been ground for his saying, “If these bring forward this person, and others a different individual, while the common and ready cry of all parties is, ‘Believe, if thou wilt be saved, or else begone,’” and so on; whereas it has been proclaimed to the entire world that Jesus Christ is the only Son of God who visited the human race: for those who, like Celsus, have supposed that [the acts of Jesus] were a series of prodigies, and who for that reason wished to perform acts of the same kind, that they, too, might gain a similar mastery over the minds of men, were convicted of being utter nonentities. Such were Simon, the Magus of Samaria, and Dositheus, who was a native of the same place; since the former gave out that he was the power of God that is called great, and the latter that he was the Son of God. Now Simonians are found nowhere throughout the world; and yet, in order to gain over to himself many followers, Simon freed his disciples from the danger of death, which the Christians were taught to prefer, by teaching them to regard idolatry as a matter of indifference. But even at the beginning of their existence the followers of Simon were not exposed to persecution. For that wicked demon who was conspiring against the doctrine of Jesus, was well aware that none of his own maxims would be weakened by the teaching of Simon. The Dositheans, again, even in former times, did not rise to any eminence, and now they are completely extinguished, so that it is said their whole number does not amount to thirty. Judas of Galilee also, as Luke relates in the Acts of the Apostles, wished to call himself some great personage, as did Theudas before him; but as their doctrine was not of God, they were destroyed, and all who obeyed them were immediately dispersed. We do not, then, “cast the dice in order to divine whither we shall betake ourselves, and whom we shall join,” as if there were many claimants able to draw us after them by the profession of their having come down from God to visit the human race. On these points, however, we have said enough.

Against Celsus, Book VI 16:1

In the next place, with regard to the declaration of Jesus against rich men, when He said, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God,” Celsus alleges that this saying manifestly proceeded from Plato, and that Jesus perverted the words of the philosopher, which were, that “it was impossible to be distinguished for goodness, and at the same time for riches.” Now who is there that is capable of giving even moderate attention to affairs—not merely among the believers on Jesus, but among the rest of mankind—that would not laugh at Celsus, on hearing that Jesus, who was born and brought up among the Jews, and was supposed to be the son of Joseph the carpenter, and who had not studied literature—not merely that of the Greeks, but not even that of the Hebrews—as the truth-loving Scriptures testify regarding Him, had read Plato, and being pleased with the opinion he expressed regarding rich men, to the effect that “it was impossible to be distinguished for goodness and riches at the same time,” had perverted this, and changed it into, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God!” Now, if Celsus had not perused the Gospels in a spirit of hatred and dislike, but had been imbued with a love of truth, he would have turned his attention to the point why a camel—that one of animals which, as regards its physical structure, is crooked—was chosen as an object of comparison with a rich man, and what signification the “narrow eye of a needle” had for him who saw that “strait and narrow was the way that leadeth unto life;” and to this point also, that this animal, according to the law, is described as “unclean,” having one element of acceptability, viz. that it ruminates, but one of condemnation, viz. that it does not divide the hoof. He would have inquired, moreover, how often the camel was adduced as an object of comparison in the sacred Scriptures, and in reference to what objects, that he might thus ascertain the meaning of the Logos concerning the rich men. Nor would he have left without examination the fact that “the poor” are termed “blessed” by Jesus, while “the rich” are designated as “miserable;” and whether these words refer to the rich and poor who are visible to the senses, or whether there is any kind of poverty known to the Logos which is to be deemed “altogether blessed,” and any rich man who is to be wholly condemned. For even a common individual would not thus indiscriminately have praised the poor, many of whom lead most wicked lives. But on this point we have said enough.

Against Celsus, Book VI 16:1

In the next place, with regard to the declaration of Jesus against rich men, when He said, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God,” Celsus alleges that this saying manifestly proceeded from Plato, and that Jesus perverted the words of the philosopher, which were, that “it was impossible to be distinguished for goodness, and at the same time for riches.” Now who is there that is capable of giving even moderate attention to affairs—not merely among the believers on Jesus, but among the rest of mankind—that would not laugh at Celsus, on hearing that Jesus, who was born and brought up among the Jews, and was supposed to be the son of Joseph the carpenter, and who had not studied literature—not merely that of the Greeks, but not even that of the Hebrews—as the truth-loving Scriptures testify regarding Him, had read Plato, and being pleased with the opinion he expressed regarding rich men, to the effect that “it was impossible to be distinguished for goodness and riches at the same time,” had perverted this, and changed it into, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God!” Now, if Celsus had not perused the Gospels in a spirit of hatred and dislike, but had been imbued with a love of truth, he would have turned his attention to the point why a camel—that one of animals which, as regards its physical structure, is crooked—was chosen as an object of comparison with a rich man, and what signification the “narrow eye of a needle” had for him who saw that “strait and narrow was the way that leadeth unto life;” and to this point also, that this animal, according to the law, is described as “unclean,” having one element of acceptability, viz. that it ruminates, but one of condemnation, viz. that it does not divide the hoof. He would have inquired, moreover, how often the camel was adduced as an object of comparison in the sacred Scriptures, and in reference to what objects, that he might thus ascertain the meaning of the Logos concerning the rich men. Nor would he have left without examination the fact that “the poor” are termed “blessed” by Jesus, while “the rich” are designated as “miserable;” and whether these words refer to the rich and poor who are visible to the senses, or whether there is any kind of poverty known to the Logos which is to be deemed “altogether blessed,” and any rich man who is to be wholly condemned. For even a common individual would not thus indiscriminately have praised the poor, many of whom lead most wicked lives. But on this point we have said enough.

Against Celsus, Book VI 20:1

Now, to those who are capable of understanding him, the apostle manifestly presents to view “things which are the objects of perception,” calling them “things seen;” while he terms “unseen,” things which are the object of the understanding, and cognisable by it alone. He knows, also, that things “seen” and visible are “temporal,” but that things cognisable by the mind, and “not seen,” are “eternal;” and desiring to remain in the contemplation of these, and being assisted by his earnest longing for them, he deemed all affliction as “light” and as “nothing,” and during the season of afflictions and troubles was not at all bowed down by them, but by his contemplation of [divine] things deemed every calamity a light thing, seeing we also have “a great High Priest,” who by the greatness of His power and understanding “has passed through the heavens, even Jesus the Son of God,” who has promised to all that have truly learned divine things, and have lived lives in harmony with them, to go before them to the things that are supra-mundane; for His words are: “That where I go, ye may be also.” And therefore we hope, after the troubles and struggles which we suffer here, to reach the highest heavens, and receiving, agreeably to the teaching of Jesus, the fountains of water that spring up unto eternal life, and being filled with the rivers of knowledge, shall be united with those waters that are said to be above the heavens, and which praise His name. And as many of us as praise Him shall not be carried about by the revolution of the heaven, but shall be ever engaged in the contemplation of the invisible things of God, which are no longer understood by us through the things which He hath made from the creation of the world, but seeing, as it was expressed by the true disciple of Jesus in these words, “then face to face;” and in these, “When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part will be done away.”

Against Celsus, Book VI 27:1

After the matter of the Diagram, he brings forward certain monstrous statements, in the form of question and answer, regarding what is called by ecclesiastical writers the “seal,” statements which did not arise from imperfect information; such as that “he who impresses the seal is called father, and he who is sealed is called young man and son;” and who answers, “I have been anointed with white ointment from the tree of life,”—things which we never heard to have occurred even among the heretics. In the next place, he determines even the number mentioned by those who deliver over the seal, as that “of seven angels, who attach themselves to both sides of the soul of the dying body; the one party being named angels of light, the others ‘archontics;’” and he asserts that the “ruler of those named ‘archontics’ is termed the ‘accursed’ God.” Then, laying hold of the expression, he assails, not without reason, those who venture to use such language; and on that account we entertain a similar feeling of indignation with those who censure such individuals, if indeed there exist any who call the God of the Jews—who sends rain and thunder, and who is the Creator of this world, and the God of Moses, and of the cosmogony which he records—an “accursed” divinity. Celsus, however, appears to have had in view, in employing these expressions, not a rational object, but one of a most irrational kind, arising out of his hatred towards us, which is so unlike a philosopher. For his aim was, that those who are unacquainted with our customs should, on perusing his treatise, at once assail us as if we called the noble Creator of this world an “accursed divinity.” He appears to me, indeed, to have acted like those Jews who, when Christianity began to be first preached, scattered abroad false reports of the gospel, such as that “Christians offered up an infant in sacrifice, and partook of its flesh;” and again, “that the professors of Christianity, wishing to do the ‘works of darkness,’ used to extinguish the lights [in their meetings], and each one to have sexual intercourse with any woman whom he chanced to meet.” These calumnies have long exercised, although unreasonably, an influence over the minds of very many, leading those who are aliens to the gospel to believe that Christians are men of such a character; and even at the present day they mislead some, and prevent them from entering even into the simple intercourse of conversation with those who are Christians.

Against Celsus, Book VI 28:1

With some such object as this in view does Celsus seem to have been actuated, when he alleged that Christians term the Creator an “accursed divinity;” in order that he who believes these charges of his against us, should, if possible, arise and exterminate the Christians as the most impious of mankind. Confusing, moreover, things that are distinct, he states also the reason why the God of the Mosaic cosmogony is termed “accursed,” asserting that “such is his character, and worthy of execration in the opinion of those who so regard him, inasmuch as he pronounced a curse upon the serpent, who introduced the first human beings to the knowledge of good and evil.” Now he ought to have known that those who have espoused the cause of the serpent, because he gave good advice to the first human beings, and who go far beyond the Titans and Giants of fable, and are on this account called Ophites, are so far from being Christians, that they bring accusations against Jesus to as great a degree as Celsus himself; and they do not admit any one into their assembly until he has uttered maledictions against Jesus. See, then, how irrational is the procedure of Celsus, who, in his discourse against the Christians, represents as such those who will not even listen to the name of Jesus, or admit even that He was a wise man, or a person of virtuous character! What, then, could evince greater folly or madness, not only on the part of those who wish to derive their name from the serpent as the author of good, but also on the part of Celsus, who thinks that the accusations with which the Ophites are charged, are chargeable also against the Christians! Long ago, indeed, that Greek philosopher who preferred a state of poverty, and who exhibited the pattern of a happy life, showing that he was not excluded from happiness although he was possessed of nothing, termed himself a Cynic; while these impious wretches, as not being human beings, whose enemy the serpent is, but as being serpents, pride themselves upon being called Ophites from the serpent, which is an animal most hostile to and greatly dreaded by man, and boast of one Euphrates as the introducer of these unhallowed opinions.

Against Celsus, Book VI 41:1

In the next place, as if he had forgotten that it was his object to write against the Christians, he says that, “having become acquainted with one Dionysius, an Egyptian musician, the latter told him, with respect to magic arts, that it was only over the uneducated and men of corrupt morals that they had any power, while on philosophers they were unable to produce any effect, because they were careful to observe a healthy manner of life.” If, now, it had been our purpose to treat of magic, we could have added a few remarks in addition to what we have already said on this topic; but since it is only the more important matters which we have to notice in answer to Celsus, we shall say of magic, that any one who chooses to inquire whether philosophers were ever led captive by it or not, can read what has been written by Moiragenes regarding the memoirs of the magician and philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, in which this individual, who is not a Christian, but a philosopher, asserts that some philosophers of no mean note were won over by the magic power possessed by Apollonius, and resorted to him as a sorcerer; and among these, I think, he especially mentioned Euphrates and a certain Epicurean. Now we, on the other hand, affirm, and have learned by experience, that they who worship the God of all things in conformity with the Christianity which comes by Jesus, and who live according to His gospel, using night and day, continuously and becomingly, the prescribed prayers, are not carried away either by magic or demons. For verily “the angel of the Lord encamps round about them that fear Him, and delivereth them” from all evil; and the angels of the little ones in the church, who are appointed to watch over them, are said always to behold the face of their Father who is in heaven, whatever be the meaning of “face” or of “behold.”

Against Celsus, Book VI 49:1

Let us notice now what follows, where, expressing in a single word his opinion regarding the Mosaic cosmogony, without offering, however, a single argument in its support, he finds fault with it, saying: “Moreover, their cosmogony is extremely silly.” Now, if he had produced some credible proofs of its silly character, we should have endeavoured to answer them; but it does not appear to me reasonable that I should be called upon to demonstrate, in answer to his mere assertion, that it is not “silly.” If any one, however, wishes to see the reasons which led us to accept the Mosaic account, and the arguments by which it may be defended, he may read what we have written upon Genesis, from the beginning of the book up to the passage, “And this is the book of the generation of men,” where we have tried to show from the Holy Scriptures themselves what the “heaven” was which was created in the beginning; and what the “earth,” and the “invisible part of the earth,” and that which was “without form;” and what the “deep” was, and the “darkness” that was upon it; and what the “water” was, and the “Spirit of God” which was “borne over it;” and what the “light” which was created, and what the “firmament,” as distinct from the “heaven” which was created in the beginning; and so on with the other subjects that follow. Celsus has also expressed his opinion that the narrative of the creation of man is “exceedingly silly,” without stating any proofs, or endeavouring to answer our arguments; for he had no evidence, in my judgment, which was fitted to overthrow the statement that “man has been made in the image of God.” He does not even understand the meaning of the “Paradise” that was planted by God, and of the life which man first led in it; and of that which resulted from accident, when man was cast forth on account of his sin, and was settled opposite the Paradise of delight. Now, as he asserts that these are silly statements, let him turn his attention not merely to each one of them [in general], but to this in particular, “He placed the cherubim, and the flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life,” and say whether Moses wrote these words with no serious object in view, but in the spirit of the writers of the old Comedy, who have sportively related that “Prœtus slew Bellerophon,” and that “Pegasus came from Arcadia.” Now their object was to create laughter in composing such stories; whereas it is incredible that he who left behind him laws for a whole nation, regarding which he wished to persuade his subjects that they were given by God, should have written words so little to the purpose, and have said without any meaning, “He placed the cherubim, and the flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life,” or made any other statement regarding the creation of man, which is the subject of philosophic investigation by the Hebrew sages.

Against Celsus, Book VI 49:1

Let us notice now what follows, where, expressing in a single word his opinion regarding the Mosaic cosmogony, without offering, however, a single argument in its support, he finds fault with it, saying: “Moreover, their cosmogony is extremely silly.” Now, if he had produced some credible proofs of its silly character, we should have endeavoured to answer them; but it does not appear to me reasonable that I should be called upon to demonstrate, in answer to his mere assertion, that it is not “silly.” If any one, however, wishes to see the reasons which led us to accept the Mosaic account, and the arguments by which it may be defended, he may read what we have written upon Genesis, from the beginning of the book up to the passage, “And this is the book of the generation of men,” where we have tried to show from the Holy Scriptures themselves what the “heaven” was which was created in the beginning; and what the “earth,” and the “invisible part of the earth,” and that which was “without form;” and what the “deep” was, and the “darkness” that was upon it; and what the “water” was, and the “Spirit of God” which was “borne over it;” and what the “light” which was created, and what the “firmament,” as distinct from the “heaven” which was created in the beginning; and so on with the other subjects that follow. Celsus has also expressed his opinion that the narrative of the creation of man is “exceedingly silly,” without stating any proofs, or endeavouring to answer our arguments; for he had no evidence, in my judgment, which was fitted to overthrow the statement that “man has been made in the image of God.” He does not even understand the meaning of the “Paradise” that was planted by God, and of the life which man first led in it; and of that which resulted from accident, when man was cast forth on account of his sin, and was settled opposite the Paradise of delight. Now, as he asserts that these are silly statements, let him turn his attention not merely to each one of them [in general], but to this in particular, “He placed the cherubim, and the flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life,” and say whether Moses wrote these words with no serious object in view, but in the spirit of the writers of the old Comedy, who have sportively related that “Prœtus slew Bellerophon,” and that “Pegasus came from Arcadia.” Now their object was to create laughter in composing such stories; whereas it is incredible that he who left behind him laws for a whole nation, regarding which he wished to persuade his subjects that they were given by God, should have written words so little to the purpose, and have said without any meaning, “He placed the cherubim, and the flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life,” or made any other statement regarding the creation of man, which is the subject of philosophic investigation by the Hebrew sages.

Against Celsus, Book VI 51:1

On the present occasion, however, it is not our object to enter into an explanation of the subject of intelligent and sensible beings, nor of the manner in which the different kinds of days were allotted to both sorts, nor to investigate the details which belong to the subject, for we should need whole treatises for the exposition of the Mosaic cosmogony; and that work we had already performed, to the best of our ability, a considerable time before the commencement of this answer to Celsus, when we discussed with such measure of capacity as we then possessed the question of the Mosaic cosmogony of the six days. We must keep in mind, however, that the Word promises to the righteous through the mouth of Isaiah, that days will come when not the sun, but the Lord Himself, will be to them an everlasting light, and God will be their glory. And it is from misunderstanding, I think, some pestilent heresy which gave an erroneous interpretation to the words, “Let there be light,” as if they were the expression of a wish merely on the part of the Creator, that Celsus made the remark: “The Creator did not borrow light from above, like those persons who kindle their lamps at those of their neighbours.” Misunderstanding, moreover, another impious heresy, he has said: “If, indeed, there did exist an accursed god opposed to the great God, who did this contrary to his approval, why did he lend him the light?” So far are we from offering a defence of such puerilities, that we desire, on the contrary, distinctly to arraign the statements of these heretics as erroneous, and to undertake to refute, not those of their opinions with which we are unacquainted, as Celsus does, but those of which we have attained an accurate knowledge, derived in part from the statements of their own adherents, and partly from a careful perusal of their writings.

Against Celsus, Book VI 58:1

There is next to be answered the following query: “And how is it that he repents when men become ungrateful and wicked; and finds fault with his own handwork, and hates, and threatens, and destroys his own offspring?” Now Celsus here calumniates and falsifies what is written in the book of Genesis to the following effect: “And the Lord God, seeing that the wickedness of men upon the earth was increasing, and that every one in his heart carefully meditated to do evil continually, was grieved He had made man upon the earth. And God meditated in His heart, and said, I will destroy man, whom I have made, from the face of the earth, both man and beast, and creeping thing, and fowl of the air, because I am grieved that I made them;” quoting words which are not written in Scripture, as if they conveyed the meaning of what was actually written. For there is no mention in these words of the repentance of God, nor of His blaming and hating His own handwork. And if there is the appearance of God threatening the catastrophe of the deluge, and thus destroying His own children in it, we have to answer that, as the soul of man is immortal, the supposed threatening has for its object the conversion of the hearers, while the destruction of men by the flood is a purification of the earth, as certain among the Greek philosophers of no mean repute have indicated by the expression: “When the gods purify the earth.” And with respect to the transference to God of those anthropopathic phrases, some remarks have been already made by us in the preceding pages.

Against Celsus, Book VI 60:1

But after this investigation of his assertions, as if his object were to swell his book by many words, he repeats, in different language, the same charges which we have examined a little ago, saying: “By far the most silly thing is the distribution of the creation of the world over certain days, before days existed: for, as the heaven was not yet created, nor the foundation of the earth yet laid, nor the sun yet revolving, how could there be days?” Now, what difference is there between these words and the following: “Moreover, taking and looking at these things from the beginning, would it not be absurd in the first and greatest God to issue the command, Let this [first thing] come into existence, and this second thing, and this [third]; and after accomplishing so much on the first day, to do so much more again on the second, and third, and fourth, and fifth, and sixth?” We answered to the best of our ability this objection to God’s “commanding this first, second, and third thing to be created,” when we quoted the words, “He said, and it was done; He commanded, and all things stood fast;” remarking that the immediate Creator, and, as it were, very Maker of the world was the Word, the Son of God; while the Father of the Word, by commanding His own Son—the Word—to create the world, is primarily Creator. And with regard to the creation of the light upon the first day, and of the firmament upon the second, and of the gathering together of the waters that are under the heaven into their several reservoirs on the third (the earth thus causing to sprout forth those [fruits] which are under the control of nature alone), and of the [great] lights and stars upon the fourth, and of aquatic animals upon the fifth, and of land animals and man upon the sixth, we have treated to the best of our ability in our notes upon Genesis, as well as in the foregoing pages, when we found fault with those who, taking the words in their apparent signification, said that the time of six days was occupied in the creation of the world, and quoted the words: “These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens.”

Against Celsus, Book VI 69:1

Celsus, however, asserts that the answer which we give is based upon a probable conjecture, admitting that he describes our answer in the following terms: “Since God is great and difficult to see, He put His own Spirit into a body that resembled ours, and sent it down to us, that we might be enabled to hear Him and become acquainted with Him.” But the God and Father of all things is not the only being that is great in our judgment; for He has imparted [a share] of Himself and His greatness to His only-begotten and first-born of every creature, in order that He, being the image of the invisible God, might preserve, even in His greatness, the image of the Father. For it was not possible that there could exist a well-proportioned, so to speak, and beautiful image of the invisible God, which did not at the same time preserve the image of His greatness. God, moreover, is in our judgment invisible, because He is not a body, while He can be seen by those who see with the heart, that is, the understanding; not indeed with any kind of heart, but with one which is pure. For it is inconsistent with the fitness of things that a polluted heart should look upon God; for that must be itself pure which would worthily behold that which is pure. Let it be granted, indeed, that God is “difficult to see,” yet He is not the only being who is so; for His Only-begotten also is “difficult to see.” For God the Word is “difficult to see,” and so also is His wisdom, by which God created all things. For who is capable of seeing the wisdom which is displayed in each individual part of the whole system of things, and by which God created every individual thing? It was not, then, because God was “difficult to see” that He sent God His Son to be an object “easy to be seen.” And because Celsus does not understand this, he has represented us as saying, “Because God was ‘difficult to see,’ He put His own Spirit in a body resembling ours, and sent it down to us, that we might be enabled to hear Him and become acquainted with Him.” Now, as we have stated, the Son also is “difficult to see,” because He is God the Word, through whom all things were made, and who “tabernacled amongst us.”

Against Celsus, Book VI 70:1

If Celsus, indeed, had understood our teaching regarding the Spirit of God, and had known that “as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God,” he would not have returned to himself the answer which he represents as coming from us, that “God put His own Spirit into a body, and sent it down to us;” for God is perpetually bestowing of His own Spirit to those who are capable of receiving it, although it is not by way of division and separation that He dwells in [the hearts of] the deserving. Nor is the Spirit, in our opinion, a “body,” any more than fire is a “body,” which God is said to be in the passage, “Our God is a consuming fire.” For all these are figurative expressions, employed to denote the nature of “intelligent beings” by means of familiar and corporeal terms. In the same way, too, if sins are called “wood, and straw, and stubble,” we shall not maintain that sins are corporeal; and if blessings are termed “gold, and silver, and precious stones,” we shall not maintain that blessings are “corporeal;” so also, if God be said to be a fire that consumes wood, and straw, and stubble, and all substance of sin, we shall not understand Him to be a “body,” so neither do we understand Him to be a body if He should be called “fire.” In this way, if God be called “spirit,” we do not mean that He is a “body.” For it is the custom of Scripture to give to “intelligent beings” the names of “spirits” and “spiritual things,” by way of distinction from those which are the objects of “sense;” as when Paul says, “But our sufficiency is of God, who hath also made us able ministers of the New Testament; not of the letter, but of the spirit; for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life,” where by the “letter” he means that “exposition of Scripture which is apparent to the senses,” while by the “spirit” that which is the object of the “understanding.” It is the same, too, with the expression, “God is a Spirit.” And because the prescriptions of the law were obeyed both by Samaritans and Jews in a corporeal and literal manner, our Saviour said to the Samaritan woman, “The hour is coming, when neither in Jerusalem, nor in this mountain, shall ye worship the Father. God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.” And by these words He taught men that God must be worshipped not in the flesh, and with fleshly sacrifices, but in the spirit. And He will be understood to be a Spirit in proportion as the worship rendered to Him is rendered in spirit, and with understanding. It is not, however, with images that we are to worship the Father, but “in truth,” which “came by Jesus Christ,” after the giving of the law by Moses. For when we turn to the Lord (and the Lord is a Spirit), He takes away the veil which lies upon the heart when Moses is read.

Against Celsus, Book VI 73:1

He proceeds to repeat himself, and after saying a great deal which he had said before, and ridiculing the birth of God from a virgin,—to which we have already replied as we best could,—he adds the following: “If God had wished to send down His Spirit from Himself, what need was there to breathe it into the womb of a woman? For as one who knew already how to form men, He could also have fashioned a body for this person, without casting His own Spirit into so much pollution; and in this way He would not have been received with incredulity, if He had derived His existence immediately from above.” He has made these remarks, because he knows not the pure and virgin birth, unaccompanied by any corruption, of that body which was to minister to the salvation of men. For, quoting the sayings of the Stoics, and affecting not to know the doctrine about “things indifferent,” he thinks that the divine nature was cast amid pollution, and was stained either by being in the body of a woman, until a body was formed around it, or by assuming a body. And in this he acts like those who imagine that the sun’s rays are polluted by dung and by foul-smelling bodies, and do not remain pure amid such things. If, however, according to the view of Celsus, the body of Jesus had been fashioned without generation, those who beheld the body would at once have believed that it had not been formed by generation; and yet an object, when seen, does not at the same time indicate the nature of that from which it has derived its origin. For example, suppose that there were some honey [placed before one] which had not been manufactured by bees, no one could tell from the taste or sight that it was not their workmanship, because the honey which comes from bees does not make known its origin by the senses, but experience alone can tell that it does not proceed from them. In the same way, too, experience teaches that wine comes from the vine, for taste does not enable us to distinguish [the wine] which comes from the vine. In the same manner, therefore, the visible body does not make known the manner of its existence. And you will be induced to accept this view, by [regarding] the heavenly bodies, whose existence and splendour we perceive as we gaze at them; and yet, I presume, their appearance does not suggest to us whether they are created or uncreated; and accordingly different opinions have existed on these points. And yet those who say that they are created are not agreed as to the manner of their creation, for their appearance does not suggest it, although the force of reason may have discovered that they are created, and how their creation was effected.

Against Celsus, Book VII 15:1

After assuming that some things were foretold which are impossible in themselves, and inconsistent with the character of God, he says: “If these things were predicted of the Most High God, are we bound to believe them of God simply because they were predicted?” And thus he thinks he proves, that although the prophets may have foretold truly such things of the Son of God, yet it is impossible for us to believe in those prophecies declaring that He would do or suffer such things. To this our answer is that the supposition is absurd, for it combines two lines of reasoning which are opposed to each other, and therefore mutually destructive. This may be shown as follows. The one argument is: “If any true prophets of the Most High say that God will become a slave, or suffer sickness, or die, these things will come to God; for it is impossible that the prophets of the great God should utter lies.” The other is: “If even true prophets of the Most High God say that these same things shall come to pass, seeing that these things foretold are by the nature of things impossible, the prophecies are not true, and therefore those things which have been foretold will not happen to God.” When, then, we find two processes of reasoning in both of which the major premiss is the same, leading to two contradictory conclusions, we use the form of argument called “the theorem of two propositions,” to prove that the major premiss is false, which in the case before us is this, “that the prophets have foretold that the great God should become a slave, suffer sickness, or die.” We conclude, then, that the prophets never foretold such things; and the argument is formally expressed as follows: 1st, Of two things, if the first is true, the second is true; 2d, if the first is true, the second is not true, therefore the first is not true. The concrete example which the Stoics give to illustrate this form of argument is the following: 1st, If you know that you are dead, you are dead; 2d, if you know that you are dead, you are not dead. And the conclusion is—“you do not know that you are dead.” These propositions are worked out as follows: If you know that you are dead, that which you know is certain; therefore you are dead. Again, if you know that you are dead, your death is an object of knowledge; but as the dead know nothing, your knowing this proves that you are not dead. Accordingly, by joining the two arguments together, you arrive at the conclusion—“you do not know that you are dead.” Now the hypothesis of Celsus which we have given above is much of the same kind.

Against Celsus, Book VII 32:1

Celsus next assails the doctrine of the resurrection, which is a high and difficult doctrine, and one which more than others requires a high and advanced degree of wisdom to set forth how worthy it is of God; and how sublime a truth it is which teaches us that there is a seminal principle lodged in that which Scripture speaks of as the “tabernacle” of the soul, in which the righteous “do groan, being burdened, not for that they would be unclothed, but clothed upon.” Celsus ridicules this doctrine because he does not understand it, and because he has learnt it from ignorant persons, who were unable to support it on any reasonable grounds. It will be profitable, therefore, that in addition to what we have said above, we should make this one remark. Our teaching on the subject of the resurrection is not, as Celsus imagines, derived from anything that we have heard on the doctrine of metempsychosis; but we know that the soul, which is immaterial and invisible in its nature, exists in no material place, without having a body suited to the nature of that place. Accordingly, it at one time puts off one body which was necessary before, but which is no longer adequate in its changed state, and it exchanges it for a second; and at another time it assumes another in addition to the former, which is needed as a better covering, suited to the purer etherial regions of heaven. When it comes into the world at birth, it casts off the integuments which it needed in the womb; and before doing this, it puts on another body suited for its life upon earth. Then, again, as there is “a tabernacle” and “an earthly house” which is in some sort necessary for this tabernacle, Scripture teaches us that “the earthly house of this tabernacle shall be dissolved,” but that the tabernacle shall “be clothed upon with a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.” The men of God say also that “the corruptible shall put on incorruption,” which is a different thing from “the incorruptible;” and “the mortal shall put on immortality,” which is different from “the immortal.” Indeed, what “wisdom” is to “the wise,” and “justice” to “the just,” and “peace” to “the peaceable,” the same relation does “incorruption” hold to “the incorruptible,” and “immortality” to “the immortal.” Behold, then, to what a prospect Scripture encourages us to look, when it speaks to us of being clothed with incorruption and immortality, which are, as it were, vestments which will not suffer those who are covered with them to come to corruption or death. Thus far I have taken the liberty of referring to this subject, in answer to one who assails the doctrine of the resurrection without understanding it, and who, simply because he knew nothing about it, made it the object of contempt and ridicule.

Against Celsus, Book VII 45:1

But let us see further what the things are which he proposes to teach us, if indeed we can comprehend them, since he speaks of us as being “utterly wedded to the flesh;” although if we live well, and in accordance with the teaching of Jesus, we hear this said of us: “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.” He says also that we look upon nothing that is pure, although our endeavour is to keep even our thoughts free from all defilement of sin, and although in prayer we say, “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me,” so that we may behold Him with that “pure heart” to which alone is granted the privilege of seeing Him. This, then, is what he proposes for our instruction: “Things are either intelligible, which we call substance—being; or visible, which we call becoming: with the former is truth; from the latter arises error. Truth is the object of knowledge; truth and error form opinion. Intelligible objects are known by the reason, visible objects by the eyes; the action of the reason is called intelligent perception, that of the eyes vision. As, then, among visible things the sun is neither the eye nor vision, but that which enables the eye to see, and renders vision possible, and in consequence of it visible things are seen, all sensible things exist, and itself is rendered visible; so among things intelligible, that which is neither reason, nor intelligent perception, nor knowledge, is yet the cause which enables the reason to know, which renders intelligent perception possible; and in consequence of it knowledge arises, all things intelligible, truth itself and substance have their existence; and itself, which is above all these things, becomes in some ineffable way intelligible. These things are offered to the consideration of the intelligent; and if even you can understand any of them, it is well. And if you think that a Divine Spirit has descended from God to announce divine things to men, it is doubtless this same Spirit that reveals these truths, and it was under the same influence that men of old made known many important truths. But if you cannot comprehend these things, then keep silence; do not expose your own ignorance, and do not accuse of blindness those who see, or of lameness those who run, while you yourselves are utterly lamed and mutilated in mind, and lead a merely animal life—the life of the body, which is the dead part of our nature.”

Against Celsus, Book VII 53:1

After these remarks of Celsus, which we have done our best to refute, he goes on to address us thus: “Seeing you are so eager for some novelty, how much better it would have been if you had chosen as the object of your zealous homage some one of those who died a glorious death, and whose divinity might have received the support of some myth to perpetuate his memory! Why, if you were not satisfied with Hercules or Æsculapius, and other heroes of antiquity, you had Orpheus, who was confessedly a divinely inspired man, who died a violent death. But perhaps some others have taken him up before you. You may then take Anaxarchus, who, when cast into a mortar, and beaten most barbarously, showed a noble contempt for his suffering, and said, ‘Beat, beat the shell of Anaxarchus, for himself you do not beat,’—a speech surely of a spirit truly divine. But others were before you in following his interpretation of the laws of nature. Might you not, then, take Epictetus, who, when his master was twisting his leg, said, smiling and unmoved, ‘You will break my leg;’ and when it was broken, he added, ‘Did I not tell you that you would break it?’ What saying equal to these did your god utter under suffering? If you had said even of the Sibyl, whose authority some of you acknowledge, that she was a child of God, you would have said something more reasonable. But you have had the presumption to include in her writings many impious things, and set up as a god one who ended a most infamous life by a most miserable death. How much more suitable than he would have been Jonah in the whale’s belly, or Daniel delivered from the wild beasts, or any of a still more portentous kind!”

Against Celsus, Book VII 56:1

Celsus then adds, for what reason I know not, that instead of calling Jesus the Son of God, we had better have given that honour to the Sibyl, in whose books he maintains we have interpolated many impious statements, though he does not mention what those interpolations are. He might have proved his assertion by producing some older copies which are free from the interpolations which he attributes to us; but he does not do so even to justify his statement that these passages are of an impious character. Moreover, he again speaks of the life of Jesus as “a most infamous life,” as he has done before, not once or twice, but many times, although he does not stay to specify any of the actions of His life which he thinks most infamous. He seems to think that he may in this way make assertions without proving them, and rail against one of whom he knows nothing. Had he set himself to show what sort of infamy he found in the actions of Jesus, we should have repelled the several charges brought against Him. Jesus did indeed meet with a most sad death; but the same might be said of Socrates, and of Anaxarchus, whom he had just mentioned, and a multitude of others. If the death of Jesus was a miserable one, was not that of the others so too? And if their death was not miserable, can it be said that the death of Jesus was? You see from this, then, that the object of Celsus is to vilify the character of Jesus; and I can only suppose that he is driven to it by some spirit akin to those whose power has been broken and vanquished by Jesus, and which now finds itself deprived of the smoke and blood on which it lived, whilst deceiving those who sought for God here upon earth in images, instead of looking up to the true God, the Governor of all things.

Against Celsus, Book VII 57:1

After this, as though his object was to swell the size of his book, he advises us “to choose Jonah rather than Jesus as our God;” thus setting Jonah, who preached repentance to the single city of Nineveh, before Jesus, who has preached repentance to the whole world, and with much greater results. He would have us to regard as God a man who, by a strange miracle, passed three days and three nights in the whale’s belly; and he is unwilling that He who submitted to death for the sake of men, He to whom God bore testimony through the prophets, and who has done great things in heaven and earth, should receive on that ground honour second only to that which is given to the Most High God. Moreover, Jonah was swallowed by the whale for refusing to preach as God had commanded him; while Jesus suffered death for men after He had given the instructions which God wished Him to give. Still further, he adds that Daniel rescued from the lions is more worthy of our adoration than Jesus, who subdued the fierceness of every opposing power, and gave to us “authority to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy.” Finally, having no other names to offer us, he adds, “and others of a still more monstrous kind,”—thus casting a slight upon both Jonah and Daniel; for the spirit which is in Celsus cannot speak well of the righteous.

Against Celsus, Book VII 63:1

To this our answer is, that if the Scythians, the nomadic tribes of Libya, the Seres, who according to Celsus have no god, if those other most barbarous and impious nations in the world, and if the Persians even cannot bear the sight of temples, altars, and images, it does not follow because we cannot suffer them any more than they, that the grounds on which we object to them are the same as theirs. We must inquire into the principles on which the objection to temples and images is founded, in order that we may approve of those who object on sound principles, and condemn those whose principles are false. For one and the same thing may be done for different reasons. For example, the philosophers who follow Zeno of Citium abstain from committing adultery, the followers of Epicurus do so too, as well as others again who do so on no philosophical principles; but observe what different reasons determine the conduct of these different classes. The first consider the interests of society, and hold it to be forbidden by nature that a man who is a reasonable being should corrupt a woman whom the laws have already given to another, and should thus break up the household of another man. The Epicureans do not reason in this way; but if they abstain from adultery, it is because, regarding pleasure as the chief end of man, they perceive that one who gives himself up to adultery, encounters for the sake of this one pleasure a multitude of obstacles to pleasure, such as imprisonment, exile, and death itself. They often, indeed, run considerable risk at the outset, while watching for the departure from the house of the master and those in his interest. So that, supposing it possible for a man to commit adultery, and escape the knowledge of the husband, of his servants, and of others whose esteem he would forfeit, then the Epicurean would yield to the commission of the crime for the sake of pleasure. The man of no philosophical system, again, who abstains from adultery when the opportunity comes to him, does so generally from dread of the law and its penalties, and not for the sake of enjoying a greater number of other pleasures. You see, then, that an act which passes for being one and the same—namely, abstinence from adultery—is not the same, but differs in different men according to the motives which actuate it: one man refraining for sound reasons, another for such bad and impious ones as those of the Epicurean, and the common person of whom we have spoken.

Against Celsus, Book VII 63:1

To this our answer is, that if the Scythians, the nomadic tribes of Libya, the Seres, who according to Celsus have no god, if those other most barbarous and impious nations in the world, and if the Persians even cannot bear the sight of temples, altars, and images, it does not follow because we cannot suffer them any more than they, that the grounds on which we object to them are the same as theirs. We must inquire into the principles on which the objection to temples and images is founded, in order that we may approve of those who object on sound principles, and condemn those whose principles are false. For one and the same thing may be done for different reasons. For example, the philosophers who follow Zeno of Citium abstain from committing adultery, the followers of Epicurus do so too, as well as others again who do so on no philosophical principles; but observe what different reasons determine the conduct of these different classes. The first consider the interests of society, and hold it to be forbidden by nature that a man who is a reasonable being should corrupt a woman whom the laws have already given to another, and should thus break up the household of another man. The Epicureans do not reason in this way; but if they abstain from adultery, it is because, regarding pleasure as the chief end of man, they perceive that one who gives himself up to adultery, encounters for the sake of this one pleasure a multitude of obstacles to pleasure, such as imprisonment, exile, and death itself. They often, indeed, run considerable risk at the outset, while watching for the departure from the house of the master and those in his interest. So that, supposing it possible for a man to commit adultery, and escape the knowledge of the husband, of his servants, and of others whose esteem he would forfeit, then the Epicurean would yield to the commission of the crime for the sake of pleasure. The man of no philosophical system, again, who abstains from adultery when the opportunity comes to him, does so generally from dread of the law and its penalties, and not for the sake of enjoying a greater number of other pleasures. You see, then, that an act which passes for being one and the same—namely, abstinence from adultery—is not the same, but differs in different men according to the motives which actuate it: one man refraining for sound reasons, another for such bad and impious ones as those of the Epicurean, and the common person of whom we have spoken.

Against Celsus, Book VII 64:1

As, then, this act of self-restraint, which in appearance is one and the same, is found in fact to be different in different persons, according to the principles and motives which lead to it; so in the same way with those who cannot allow in the worship of the Divine Being altars, or temples, or images. The Scythians, the nomadic Libyans, the godless Seres, and the Persians, agree in this with the Christians and Jews, but they are actuated by very different principles. For none of these former abhor altars and images on the ground that they are afraid of degrading the worship of God, and reducing it to the worship of material things wrought by the hands of men. Neither do they object to them from a belief that the demons choose certain forms and places, whether because they are detained there by virtue of certain charms, or because for some other possible reason they have selected these haunts, where they may pursue their criminal pleasures, in partaking of the smoke of sacrificial victims. But Christians and Jews have regard to this command, “Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve Him alone;” and this other, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me: thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them;” and again, “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve.” It is in consideration of these and many other such commands, that they not only avoid temples, altars, and images, but are ready to suffer death when it is necessary, rather than debase by any such impiety the conception which they have of the Most High God.

Against Celsus, Book VII 70:1

His next remark was, “Have not these inferior powers had assigned to them by God different departments, according as each was deemed worthy?” But this is a question which requires a very profound knowledge. For we must determine whether the Word of God, who governs all things, has appointed wicked demons for certain employments, in the same way as in states executioners are appointed, and other officers with cruel but needful duties to discharge; or whether as among robbers, who infest desert places, it is customary for them to choose out of their number one who may be their leader,—so the demons, who are scattered as it were in troops in different parts of the earth, have chosen for themselves a chief under whose command they may plunder and pillage the souls of men. To explain this fully, and to justify the conduct of the Christians in refusing homage to any object except the Most High God, and the First-born of all creation, who is His Word and God, we must quote this from Scripture, “All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers; but the sheep did not hear them;” and again, “The thief cometh not but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy;” and other similar passages, as, “Behold, I have given you authority to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy; and nothing shall by any means hurt you;” and again, “Thou shalt tread upon the lion and adder: the young lion and the dragon shalt thou trample under feet.” But of these things Celsus knew nothing, or he would not have made use of language like this: “Is not everything which happens in the universe, whether it be the work of God, of angels, of other demons, or of heroes, regulated by the law of the Most High God? Have these not had assigned to them various departments of which they were severally deemed worthy? Is it not just, therefore, that he who serves God should serve those also to whom God has assigned such power?” To which he adds, “It is impossible, they say, for a man to serve many masters.” This last point we must postpone to the next book; for this, which is the seventh book which we have written in answer to the treatise of Celsus, is already of sufficient length.

Against Celsus, Book VIII 19:1

And if, further, temples are to be compared with temples, that we may prove to those who accept the opinions of Celsus that we do not object to the erection of temples suited to the images and altars of which we have spoken, but that we do refuse to build lifeless temples to the Giver of all life, let any one who chooses learn how we are taught, that our bodies are the temple of God, and that if any one by lust or sin defiles the temple of God, he will himself be destroyed, as acting impiously towards the true temple. Of all the temples spoken of in this sense, the best and most excellent was the pure and holy body of our Saviour Jesus Christ. When He knew that wicked men might aim at the destruction of the temple of God in Him, but that their purposes of destruction would not prevail against the divine power which had built that temple, He says to them, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it again.... This He said of the temple of His body.” And in other parts of holy Scripture where it speaks of the mystery of the resurrection to those whose ears are divinely opened, it says that the temple which has been destroyed shall be built up again of living and most precious stones, thereby giving us to understand that each of those who are led by the word of God to strive together in the duties of piety, will be a precious stone in the one great temple of God. Accordingly, Peter says, “Ye also, as lively stones, are built up a spiritual house, an holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ;” and Paul also says, “Being built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ our Lord being the chief corner-stone.” And there is a similar hidden allusion in this passage in Isaiah, which is addressed to Jerusalem: “Behold, I will lay thy stones with carbuncles, and lay thy foundations with sapphires. And I will make thy battlements of jasper, and thy gates of crystal, and all thy borders of pleasant stones. And all thy children shall be taught of the Lord; and great shall be the peace of thy children. In righteousness shalt thou be established.”

Against Celsus, Book VIII 20:1

There are, then, among the righteous some who are carbuncles, others sapphires, others jaspers, and others crystal, and thus there is among the righteous every kind of choice and precious stone. As to the spiritual meaning of the different stones,—what is their nature, and to what kind of soul the name of each precious stone especially applies,—we cannot at present stay to examine. We have only felt it necessary to show thus briefly what we understand by temples, and what the one Temple of God built of precious stones truly means. For as if in some cities a dispute should arise as to which had the finest temples, those who thought their own were the best would do their utmost to show the excellence of their own temples and the inferiority of the others,—in like manner, when they reproach us for not deeming it necessary to worship the Divine Being by raising lifeless temples, we set before them our temples, and show to such at least as are not blind and senseless, like their senseless gods, that there is no comparison between our statues and the statues of the heathen, nor between our altars, with what we may call the incense ascending from them, and the heathen altars, with the fat and blood of the victims; nor, finally, between the temples of senseless gods, admired by senseless men, who have no divine faculty for perceiving God, and the temples, statues, and altars which are worthy of God. It is not therefore true that we object to building altars, statues, and temples, because we have agreed to make this the badge of a secret and forbidden society; but we do so, because we have learnt from Jesus Christ the true way of serving God, and we shrink from whatever, under a pretence of piety, leads to utter impiety those who abandon the way marked out for us by Jesus Christ. For it is He who alone is the way of piety, as He truly said, “I am the way, the truth, the life.”

Against Celsus, Book VIII 50:1

But since he reproaches us with too great an anxiety about the body, let him know that when that feeling is a wrong one we do not share in it, and when it is indifferent we only long for that which God has promised to the righteous. But Celsus considers that we are inconsistent with ourselves when we count the body worthy of honour from God, and therefore hope for its resurrection, and yet at the same time expose it to tortures as though it were not worthy of honour. But surely it is not without honour for the body to suffer for the sake of godliness, and to choose afflictions on account of virtue: the dishonourable thing would be for it to waste its powers in vicious indulgence. For the divine word says: “What is an honourable seed? The seed of man. What is a dishonourable seed? The seed of man.” Moreover, Celsus thinks that he ought not to reason with those who hope for the good of the body, as they are unreasonably intent upon an object which can never satisfy their expectations. He also calls them gross and impure men, bent upon creating needless dissensions. But surely he ought, as one of superior humanity, to assist even the rude and depraved. For society does not exclude from its pale the coarse and uncultivated, as it does the irrational animals, but our Creator made us on the same common level with all mankind. It is not an undignified thing, therefore, to reason even with the coarse and unrefined, and to try to bring them as far as possible to a higher state of refinement—to bring the impure to the highest practicable degree of purity—to bring the unreasoning multitude to reason, and the diseased in mind to spiritual health.

Against Celsus, Book VIII 67:1

And to regard these myths in a figurative sense, and consider Minerva as representing prudence, let any one show what were the actual facts of her history, upon which this allegory is based. For, supposing honour was given to Minerva as having been a woman of ancient times, by those who instituted mysteries and ceremonies for their followers, and who wished her name to be celebrated as that of a goddess, much more are we forbidden to pay divine honours to Minerva, if we are not permitted to worship so glorious an object as the sun, although we may celebrate its glory. Celsus, indeed, says that “we seem to do the greater honour to the great God when we sing hymns in honour of the sun and Minerva;” but we know it to be the opposite of that. For we sing hymns to the Most High alone, and His Only-begotten, who is the Word and God; and we praise God and His Only-begotten, as do also the sun, the moon, the stars, and all the host of heaven. For these all form a divine chorus, and unite with the just among men in celebrating the praises of the Most High God and His Only-begotten. We have already said that we must not swear by a human king, or by what is called “the fortune of the king.” It is therefore unnecessary for us again to refute these statements: “If you are commanded to swear by a human king, there is nothing wrong in that. For to him has been given whatever there is upon earth; and whatever you receive in this life, you receive from him.” We deny, however, that all things which are on the earth have been given to the king, or that whatever we receive in this life we receive from him. For whatever we receive rightly and honourably we receive from God, and by His providence, as ripe fruits, and “corn which strengtheneth man’s heart, and the pleasant vine, and wine which rejoiceth the heart of man.” And moreover, the fruit of the olive-tree, to make his face to shine, we have from the providence of God.

The Book of the Cave of Treasures

The Book of the Cave of Treasures 10:2

is called “‘babbaghah’’-(i.e. parrot)—first bringeth a large mirror and placeth between himself and the bird. He then beginneth to talk to the bird, and immediately the parrot heareth the voice of the man, it turneth round, and when it seeth its own form [reflected] in the mirror, it becometh pleased straightway, because it imagineth that a fellow parrot is talking to it. Then it inclineth its ear with pleasure, and listeneth to the words of the man who is talking to it, and it becometh eager to learn, and to speak Greek. In this manner (i.e. with the object of making Eve believe that it was the serpent that spoke to her) did Satan enter in and dwell in the serpent, and he watched for the opportunity, and [when] he saw Eve by herself, he called her by her name. And when she turned round towards him, she saw her own form [reflected] in him, and she talked to him; and Satan led her astray with his lying words, because the nature of woman is soft (or, yielding).

The Mishnah

Mishnah Shabbat 1:1

The carryings out of Shabbat are two which are four from the inside, and two which are four from the outside. How is this so? The poor man stands outside and the householder stands inside: If the poor man reaches his hand inside and places [something] into the hand of the householder, or if he takes [something] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the householder is exempt. If the householder reaches his hand outside and places [an object] in the poor man's hand, or takes [something] and carries it in, the master is liable, while the poor man is exempt. If the poor man reaches his hand inside and the master takes [an object] from it, or places [an object] in it and he carries it out, both are exempt; If the householder stretches his hand outside and the poor man takes [an object] from it, or places [an article] in it and he carries it inside, both are exempt.

Mishnah Shabbat 1:1

The carryings out of Shabbat are two which are four from the inside, and two which are four from the outside. How is this so? The poor man stands outside and the householder stands inside: If the poor man reaches his hand inside and places [something] into the hand of the householder, or if he takes [something] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the householder is exempt. If the householder reaches his hand outside and places [an object] in the poor man's hand, or takes [something] and carries it in, the master is liable, while the poor man is exempt. If the poor man reaches his hand inside and the master takes [an object] from it, or places [an object] in it and he carries it out, both are exempt; If the householder stretches his hand outside and the poor man takes [an object] from it, or places [an article] in it and he carries it inside, both are exempt.

Mishnah Shabbat 1:1

The carryings out of Shabbat are two which are four from the inside, and two which are four from the outside. How is this so? The poor man stands outside and the householder stands inside: If the poor man reaches his hand inside and places [something] into the hand of the householder, or if he takes [something] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the householder is exempt. If the householder reaches his hand outside and places [an object] in the poor man's hand, or takes [something] and carries it in, the master is liable, while the poor man is exempt. If the poor man reaches his hand inside and the master takes [an object] from it, or places [an object] in it and he carries it out, both are exempt; If the householder stretches his hand outside and the poor man takes [an object] from it, or places [an article] in it and he carries it inside, both are exempt.

Mishnah Shabbat 1:1

The carryings out of Shabbat are two which are four from the inside, and two which are four from the outside. How is this so? The poor man stands outside and the householder stands inside: If the poor man reaches his hand inside and places [something] into the hand of the householder, or if he takes [something] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the householder is exempt. If the householder reaches his hand outside and places [an object] in the poor man's hand, or takes [something] and carries it in, the master is liable, while the poor man is exempt. If the poor man reaches his hand inside and the master takes [an object] from it, or places [an object] in it and he carries it out, both are exempt; If the householder stretches his hand outside and the poor man takes [an object] from it, or places [an article] in it and he carries it inside, both are exempt.

Mishnah Shabbat 10:4

If one intends to carry out [an object] in front of him, but it comes around behind him, he is not liable. Behind him, but it comes around in front of him, he is liable. In truth they said: a woman who wraps herself with an apron whether in front of her or behind her, is liable, because it is normal for it to reverse itself. Rabbi Judah said: also those who receive notes.

Mishnah Shabbat 11:4

If one throws in the sea four cubits, he is exempt. If there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable. And how deep is a pool of water? Less than ten handbreadths. [For] if there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable.

Mishnah Shabbat 11:4

If one throws in the sea four cubits, he is exempt. If there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable. And how deep is a pool of water? Less than ten handbreadths. [For] if there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable.

Mishnah Eruvin 2:6

Rabbi Ilai said: I heard from Rabbi Eliezer, even if it is as large as a bet kor. I also heard from him that if one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eruv, his house is forbidden to him for taking in or taking out any object but it is permitted to them. I also heard from him that people may fulfill their duty [for bitter herbs] at Pesach by eating hart’s tongue (akrevanim). I went round among all his disciples seeking a fellowstudent but I found none.

Mishnah Eruvin 6:3

If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eruv, his house is forbidden both to him and to them for the taking in or for the taking out of any object. But their houses are permitted both to him and to them. If they gave their part [of the courtyard] to him, he is permitted but they are forbidden. If there were two [who forgot to join in the eruv], they restrict each other, because one may give his part and also acquire the part [of others] but two may give their parts but may not acquire the parts [of others].

Mishnah Eruvin 6:4

When must they give away their share [courtyard or alley]? Bet Shammai says: while it is yet day, And Bet Hillel says: after dusk. One who gave away his share and then carried out an object, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he restricts [the others from carrying in the courtyard or alley], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if he acted with intention he restricts [the others], but if unwittingly he does not restrict.

Mishnah Megillah 1:10

There is no difference between a great altar and a small altar except for the pesach offering. This is the general principle: any animal which can be brought as a vow-offering or a freewill offering may be brought on a [small] altar, any animal which is not the object of a vow or a freewill-offering may not be brought on a [small] altar.

Mishnah Chagigah 1:7

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is “a twisted thing that cannot be made straight?” He who has intercourse with a forbidden relation and bears by her a mamzer. Should you say that it applies to a thief or robber, he is able to restore [the stolen object] and make straight. Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai says: They only call something “twisted” if it was straight at first and then became twisted. And who is this? A disciple of the sages who forsakes the Torah.

Mishnah Ketubot 2:8

Rabbi Judah says: one does not raise [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Elazar says: When is this true? When there are people who object; but when there are no people who object, one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the assistant chief of priests: one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.

Mishnah Ketubot 2:8

Rabbi Judah says: one does not raise [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Elazar says: When is this true? When there are people who object; but when there are no people who object, one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the assistant chief of priests: one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.

Mishnah Nedarim 2:1

And these [vows] are not binding: [One who says] “What I eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”; “As the flesh of the swine”; “As an object of idolatrous worship”; “As hides pierced at the heart”; “As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”; “As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”--[in all these cases the vow is] not binding. If one says to his wife, “Behold! You are like my mother to me”, he must be given an opening on other grounds, in order that he should not act lightly in such matters. [If one says,] “Konam if I sleep”; “If I speak”; or “If I walk”; or if one says to his wife, “Konam if I cohabit with you,” he is liable to [the biblical prohibition] “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:. [If he says,] “I swear] an oath not to sleep”, or, “talk,” or, “walk,” he is forbidden [to do so].

Mishnah Gittin 3:5

If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another. But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another.

Mishnah Kiddushin 1:6

Whatever can be used as payment for another object, as soon as this one takes possession [of the object], the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, as soon as this one takes possession, the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. The sanctuary’s title to property [is acquired] by money; the title of an ordinary person to property by hazakah. Dedication to the sanctuary is equal to delivery to an ordinary person.

Mishnah Kiddushin 1:6

Whatever can be used as payment for another object, as soon as this one takes possession [of the object], the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, as soon as this one takes possession, the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. The sanctuary’s title to property [is acquired] by money; the title of an ordinary person to property by hazakah. Dedication to the sanctuary is equal to delivery to an ordinary person.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:1

How is the leg [of a beast] an attested danger to break [what it tramples upon] as it walks along? A beast is an attested danger [only] in so far as it goes along in its usual way and breaks [an object]. If it kicked, or if small stones were tossed out from beneath its feet and it thus broke other vessels, one pays half damages. If it trampled upon a vessel and broke it, and this [broken vessel] fell upon another vessel and broke it, for the first one pays full damages and for the other half damages. Fowls (chickens and roosters) are an attested danger in so far as they go along in their usual way and break [objects]. But if the fowl had its feet entangled, or if it was jumping and it thereby broke any vessel one pays half damages.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 9:1

If a man stole wood and made it into utensils, or wool and made it into garments, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft. If he stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth, or a sheep ready to be sheared, and he then sheared it, he repays the value of a cow about to bear young, or a sheep ready to be sheared. If he stole a cow, and while it was with him it was impregnated and bore young, or [if he stole a sheep] and while it was with him it grew wool and he sheared it, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft. This is the general rule: all robbers make restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 9:1

If a man stole wood and made it into utensils, or wool and made it into garments, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft. If he stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth, or a sheep ready to be sheared, and he then sheared it, he repays the value of a cow about to bear young, or a sheep ready to be sheared. If he stole a cow, and while it was with him it was impregnated and bore young, or [if he stole a sheep] and while it was with him it grew wool and he sheared it, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft. This is the general rule: all robbers make restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 9:1

If a man stole wood and made it into utensils, or wool and made it into garments, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft. If he stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth, or a sheep ready to be sheared, and he then sheared it, he repays the value of a cow about to bear young, or a sheep ready to be sheared. If he stole a cow, and while it was with him it was impregnated and bore young, or [if he stole a sheep] and while it was with him it grew wool and he sheared it, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft. This is the general rule: all robbers make restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft.

Mishnah Bava Metzia 2:3

If a man found pigeons tied together behind a fence or a hedge or on footpaths in the fields, he may not touch them. If he found an object in the dungheap and it was covered up he may not touch it, but if it was exposed he should take it and proclaim. If he found it in a pile of stones or in an old wall it belongs to him. If he found it in a new wall and it was on the outside [of the wall] it belongs to him. If it was on the inner side it belongs to the householder. But if the house had been hired to others, even if a man found something within the house, it belongs to him.

Mishnah Bava Metzia 3:6

If a man deposited produce with his fellow, even if it should perish he may not touch it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may sell it before a court of law, since he is like someone who returns a lost object to its owners.”

Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:7

Fraud is four pieces of silver. A claim is [a minimum] of two pieces of silver. An admission is [a minimum] of that which is worth a perutah. There are five [rules involving] that which is worth a perutah: An admission is [a minimum] of that which is worth a perutah. A woman can be betrothed with that which is worth a perutah. Someone who benefits a perutah’s worth from that which belongs to the sanctuary has committed sacrilege. One who finds that which is worth a perutah must proclaim it [as a lost object]. One who steals that which is worth a perutah from his fellow and swears [falsely] to him [that he did not steal it], must go after him [to return it] even as far as Medea.

Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:10

Just as the laws of fraud apply to buying and selling, so to do they apply to the spoken word. One may not say, “How much is this object?, if he does not wish to buy it. If one had repented, another should not say to him, “Remember your earlier deeds”. If one descended from converts, another should not say to him, “Remember the deeds of your ancestors”. For it is said (Exodus 22:21), “And a stranger you shall not wrong or oppress.”

Mishnah Bava Batra 2:2

One may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space of four cubits above it. If he sets it up in the upper room, the flooring beneath it must be three handbreadths deep, or for a stove one handbreadth. And if it causes damage [to the floor] he must pay for the damage caused. Rabbi Shimon says: “They only mentioned these measurements so that if the object caused damage he would be exempt.”

Mishnah Shevuot 4:5

“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.

Mishnah Shevuot 4:5

“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.

Mishnah Shevuot 4:5

“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.

Mishnah Shevuot 4:5

“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:3

If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:3

If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.

Mishnah Shevuot 6:1

The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:2

One who finds fragments of images, behold they are permitted. If one found the figure of a hand or the figure of a foot, behold it is prohibited because such an object is worshipped.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:5

If idolaters worship mountains and hills these are permitted; but what is upon them is prohibited, as it is says, “you shall not covet the silver or the gold that is on them and take them” (Deut. 7:25). Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: [it says] “their gods on the mountains” (Deut. 12:, not their mountains which are their gods; “their gods on the hills” (ibid.), not their hills which are their gods. And why is an asherah prohibited? Because there was manual labour connected with it, and whatever has manual labour connected with it is prohibited. Rabbi Akiba said: let me expound and decide [the interpretation] before you: wherever you find a high mountain or elevated hill or green tree, know that an idolatrous object is there.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:6

If [a Jew] has a house next to an idolatrous shrine and it collapsed, he is forbidden to rebuild it. What should he do? He withdraws a distance of four cubits into his own ground and build there. [If the wall] belonged both to him and the shrine, it is judged as being half and half. Its stones, timber and rubbish defile like a creeping thing, as it says, “you shall utterly detest it” (Deut. 7:26). ] Rabbi Akiba says: [it defiles] like a menstruous woman, as it says, “[and you will treat as unclean the silver overlay of your images and the golden plating of your idols]. You will cast them away like a menstruous woman. Out, you will call to them” (Isaiah 30:22), just as a menstruous woman impurifies [an object] by carrying it, so also an idolatrous object defiles by its being carried.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:6

If [a Jew] has a house next to an idolatrous shrine and it collapsed, he is forbidden to rebuild it. What should he do? He withdraws a distance of four cubits into his own ground and build there. [If the wall] belonged both to him and the shrine, it is judged as being half and half. Its stones, timber and rubbish defile like a creeping thing, as it says, “you shall utterly detest it” (Deut. 7:26). ] Rabbi Akiba says: [it defiles] like a menstruous woman, as it says, “[and you will treat as unclean the silver overlay of your images and the golden plating of your idols]. You will cast them away like a menstruous woman. Out, you will call to them” (Isaiah 30:22), just as a menstruous woman impurifies [an object] by carrying it, so also an idolatrous object defiles by its being carried.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 5:9

The following are prohibited and render prohibited by the smallest quantity: [a cask of] yen nesekh; an idolatrous object; skins of animals which have holes over the heart; an ox which has been sentenced to be stoned; a heifer whose neck was broken; birds brought as an offering by a leper; the hair-offering of a nazirite; the first born of a donkey; meat cooked in milk; the scapegoat; and non-consecrated animals slaughtered in the Temple court. Behold these are prohibited and render prohibited by the smallest quantity.

Mishnah Arakhin 7:5

If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.

Mishnah Kelim 1:3

Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.

Mishnah Kelim 1:3

Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.

Mishnah Kelim 1:3

Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.

Mishnah Kelim 1:3

Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.

Mishnah Kelim 1:3

Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.

Mishnah Kelim 17:8

The olive of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size the egori. The barleycorn of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size the midbarit The lentil of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size--the egyptian kind. "Any movable object conveys uncleanness if it is of the thickness of an ox goad" it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size. What is meant by "one of moderate size?" One whose circumference is just a handbreadth.

Mishnah Kelim 23:3

What is the practical difference between [the uncleanness of an object used for] riding upon and [one used for] sitting upon? In the case of the former the effect of contact with it is different from the effect of carrying it, but in the case of the latter there is no difference between the effect of coming in contact with it or carrying it. The pack-frame of a donkey on which a zav sat is clean; But if the size of the spaces has been changed or if they have been broken one into another it is susceptible to uncleanness.

Mishnah Kelim 27:1

Cloth is susceptible to five categories of uncleanness; Sack-cloth is susceptible to four; Leather to three; Wood to two; And an earthenware vessel to one. An earthenware vessel is susceptible to uncleanness [only] as a receptacle; any earthen vessel that has no inner part is not susceptible to uncleanness from its outer part. Wood is subject to an additional form of uncleanness in that it is also susceptible to uncleanness as a seat. Similarly a tablet which has no rim is susceptible to uncleanness if it is a wooden object and insusceptible if it is an earthenware one. Leather is susceptible to an additional form of uncleanness in that it is also susceptible to the uncleanness of a tent. Sack-cloth has an additional form of uncleanness in that it is susceptible to uncleanness as woven work. Cloth has an additional form of uncleanness in that it is susceptible to uncleanness when it is only three by three fingerbreadths.

Mishnah Kelim 28:5

If a head-wrap that had contracted midras uncleanness was wrapped around a scroll, it is released from midras uncleanness but it remains susceptible to corpse uncleanness. A skin that was made into a rug or a rug that was made into a skin becomes clean. A skin that was made into a [shepherd's] wallet or a [shepherd's] wallet that was made into a skin; Or a cushion cover that was made into a sheet or a sheet that was made into a cushion cover; Or a sheet cover that was made into a plain sheet or a plain sheet that was made into a sheet cover, remains unclean. This is the general rule: any object that has been changed into one of the same class remains unclean, but if into one of another class it becomes clean.

Mishnah Oholot 3:1

All objects that defile by overshadowing which were divided and then brought into a house: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares clean. But the sages declare [it] unclean. What is the case? One who touches two pieces of nevelah, each the size of half an olive, or carries them, Or, in the case of a corpse, if he touches a piece the size of half an olive and overshadows [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him, Or if he overshadows two [pieces, each] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean, And the sages declare him unclean. But if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, he is clean. Rabbi Meir says: Even here Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean and the sages declare him unclean. Every [case] is unclean except [a case of] contact [combined] with carriage or of carriage [combined] with overshadowing. This is the general principle: every object [whose defilement] proceeds from one cause is unclean, from two causes is clean.

Mishnah Oholot 3:1

All objects that defile by overshadowing which were divided and then brought into a house: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares clean. But the sages declare [it] unclean. What is the case? One who touches two pieces of nevelah, each the size of half an olive, or carries them, Or, in the case of a corpse, if he touches a piece the size of half an olive and overshadows [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him, Or if he overshadows two [pieces, each] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean, And the sages declare him unclean. But if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, he is clean. Rabbi Meir says: Even here Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean and the sages declare him unclean. Every [case] is unclean except [a case of] contact [combined] with carriage or of carriage [combined] with overshadowing. This is the general principle: every object [whose defilement] proceeds from one cause is unclean, from two causes is clean.

Mishnah Oholot 3:1

All objects that defile by overshadowing which were divided and then brought into a house: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares clean. But the sages declare [it] unclean. What is the case? One who touches two pieces of nevelah, each the size of half an olive, or carries them, Or, in the case of a corpse, if he touches a piece the size of half an olive and overshadows [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him, Or if he overshadows two [pieces, each] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean, And the sages declare him unclean. But if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, he is clean. Rabbi Meir says: Even here Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean and the sages declare him unclean. Every [case] is unclean except [a case of] contact [combined] with carriage or of carriage [combined] with overshadowing. This is the general principle: every object [whose defilement] proceeds from one cause is unclean, from two causes is clean.

Mishnah Oholot 3:7

[An object] one handbreadth square and one handbreadth high conveys uncleanness and blocks uncleanness. How does it [block uncleanness]? In the case of a covered drain beneath a house, if it has a space a handbreadth wide and its outlet was a handbreadth wide, and there is uncleanness inside it, the house remains clean; And when there is uncleanness in the house, that which is within [the drain] remains clean, for the manner of the uncleanness is to go out and not to go in. If it had a space one handbreadth wide but its outlet was not one handbreadth wide, when there is uncleanness in it, the house becomes unclean; But when there is uncleanness in the house, that which is within it remains clean, for the manner of the uncleanness is to go out and not to go in. If it did not have a space one handbreadth wide and its outlet was not one handbreadth wide, when there is uncleanness within it, the house becomes unclean; And when there is uncleanness in the house, it [also] becomes unclean. It makes no difference if the cavity was carved out by water or by a sheretz or if it had been eaten out by salt. And similarly [if it is in] a row of stones or a pile of beams. Rabbi Judah says: any "tent" not made by a person is not considered a tent’. But he agrees that crevices and crags [can be considered as ‘tents’].

Mishnah Oholot 5:6

How so? If there was a cistern or a cellar in a house and a large basket was placed over it, [the contents of the cistern or cellar] remain clean. But if it was a well [with its upper edge] level [with the ground] or a deficient beehive upon which the basket was placed, [the contents] become unclean. If it was a smooth board or netting without rims, [the contents] remain clean. For vessels cannot protect along with walls of an ohel unless they themselves have walls. How much must the wall be? A handbreadth. If there was half a handbreadth on one side and half a handbreadth on the other, it is not [considered] a wall, as there must be a whole handbreadth on one object.

Mishnah Oholot 16:2

How so? A spindle stuck into the wall, with [a portion of corpse] of half an olive-size above it and [a portion of corpse] of half an olive-size below it. Even though one [portion] is not directly [above] the other, [the spindle] becomes unclean. Hence it is found that [a movable object] conveys uncleanness to come upon itself whatever its thickness. A pot seller passes by a grave with a yoke over his shoulder, one end of which overshadows a grave, vessels on the other side remain clean. If the yoke is one handbreadth wide, they become unclean. Mounds which are near to a city or to a road, whether they are new or old, are unclean. [As for those that are] far away, new ones are clean but old ones are unclean. What counts as near? Fifty cubits. And old? Sixty years old, the words of Rabbi Meir. R. Judah says: Near means there is none nearer than it, and old means that no one remembers [when it was made].

Mishnah Negaim 9:1

A boil or a burn may become unclean in a week and by two signs: by white hair or by a spreading. What is a "boil"? An injury received from wood, stone, peat, or the waters of Tiberias, of from any other object whose heat is not due to fire is a boil. What exactly is a "burn"? A burn caused by a live coal, hot embers, or any object whose heat is due to fire is a burning.

Mishnah Negaim 9:1

A boil or a burn may become unclean in a week and by two signs: by white hair or by a spreading. What is a "boil"? An injury received from wood, stone, peat, or the waters of Tiberias, of from any other object whose heat is not due to fire is a boil. What exactly is a "burn"? A burn caused by a live coal, hot embers, or any object whose heat is due to fire is a burning.

Mishnah Negaim 11:11

Any object that is susceptible to corpse uncleanness, though not susceptible to midras uncleanness, is still susceptible to negaim uncleanness. For instance: the sail of a ship, a curtain, the forehead band of a hair-net, the wrappings of scrolls, a coiled belt, the straps of a shoe or sandal that are at least as wide as a split bean, Behold these are susceptible to the uncleanness of negaim. A thick cloak on which a nega appeared: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: unless it appears on the texture and on the stuffing. A skin bottle or a shepherd's leather wallet are inspected in the position in which they are used, and a nega may effectively spread from its inner side to its outer side and from its outer side to its inner side.

Mishnah Parah 10:1

Any object that is susceptible to midras uncleanness is for the purpose of the hatat waters deemed to have madaf uncleanness, whether it was otherwise unclean or clean. A person too is subject to the same rule. Any object that is susceptible to corpse uncleanness, whether it is otherwise unclean or clean: Rabbi Eliezer says: it does not have madaf uncleanness. Rabbi Joshua says: it has madaf uncleanness; And the sages say: that which was unclean has madaf uncleanness, and that which was clean does not have madaf uncleanness.

Mishnah Parah 10:1

Any object that is susceptible to midras uncleanness is for the purpose of the hatat waters deemed to have madaf uncleanness, whether it was otherwise unclean or clean. A person too is subject to the same rule. Any object that is susceptible to corpse uncleanness, whether it is otherwise unclean or clean: Rabbi Eliezer says: it does not have madaf uncleanness. Rabbi Joshua says: it has madaf uncleanness; And the sages say: that which was unclean has madaf uncleanness, and that which was clean does not have madaf uncleanness.

Mishnah Tahorot 4:1

One who throws an unclean object from one place to another: [for instance] a loaf among keys or a key among loaves, [that which was clean remains] clean. Rabbi Judah says: if a loaf was thrown among keys the former becomes unclean, but if a key was thrown among loaves the latter remain clean.

Mishnah Tahorot 4:7

These are the cases of doubtful uncleanness that the sages declared to be clean: A doubt concerning drawn water for a mikveh, A doubt concerning an object of uncleanness that floated upon the water. A doubt concerning liquids as to whether they have contracted uncleanness it is deemed unclean, but if it was whether uncleanness has been conveyed it is deemed clean. A doubt concerning the hands as to whether they have contracted uncleanness, have conveyed uncleanness or have attained cleanness, they are deemed clean. A doubt that arose in a public domain; A doubt concerning an ordinance of the scribes; A doubt concerning non-sacred food; A doubt concerning a sheretz; A doubt concerning negaim; A doubt concerning a nazirite vow; A doubt concerning a first-born; A doubt concerning sacrifices.