object
362 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
"A doubt concerning an object of uncleanness that floated upon water:" [It is clean] whether the water was in vessels or in the ground. Rabbi Shimon says: if in vessels he is deemed unclean but if in the ground he is deemed clean. Rabbi Judah says: if the doubt arose when the man went down into the water he is deemed unclean, but if when he came up he is deemed clean. Rabbi Yose says: even if there is only enough room for a man and the uncleanness the former remains clean.
One who said, "I touched an object but I do not know whether it was unclean or clean," or "I touched one but I do not know which of the two I touched": Rabbi Akiva rules that he is unclean, But the sages rule that he is clean. Rabbi Yose says that he is unclean in every case and clean only in that of the path, since it is the usual custom for people to walk but it is not their usual practice to touch.
There are four cases of doubt which Rabbi Joshua ruled are unclean and the sages rule are clean. How so? If an unclean man stood and a clean man passed by or the clean man stood and the unclean one passed by; or if an unclean object was in a private domain and a clean one in the public domain or the clean object was in the private domain and the unclean one in the public domain, and there is doubt whether there was contact or not, or whether there was overshadowing or not, or whether there was shifting or not: Rabbi Joshua rules that the clean becomes unclean, But the sages rule that the clean remains clean.
There are four cases of doubt which Rabbi Joshua ruled are unclean and the sages rule are clean. How so? If an unclean man stood and a clean man passed by or the clean man stood and the unclean one passed by; or if an unclean object was in a private domain and a clean one in the public domain or the clean object was in the private domain and the unclean one in the public domain, and there is doubt whether there was contact or not, or whether there was overshadowing or not, or whether there was shifting or not: Rabbi Joshua rules that the clean becomes unclean, But the sages rule that the clean remains clean.
If a tree standing in a public domain had within it an object of uncleanness and a man climbed to the top of it, and a doubt arose as to whether he did or did not touch the object of uncleanness, such a condition of doubt is unclean. If one put his hand into a hole [in the wall] in which there was an object of uncleanness and there is doubt whether he did or did not touch it, such a condition of doubt is unclean. If a shop that was unclean was open toward a public domain and there is doubt whether a man did or did not enter it, such a condition of doubt is clean. If there is doubt whether he did or did not touch anything, such a condition of doubt is deemed clean. If there were two shops, the one unclean and the other clean, and a man entered into one of them, and a doubt arose as to whether he entered the unclean, or the clean one, such a condition of doubt is deemed unclean.
If a tree standing in a public domain had within it an object of uncleanness and a man climbed to the top of it, and a doubt arose as to whether he did or did not touch the object of uncleanness, such a condition of doubt is unclean. If one put his hand into a hole [in the wall] in which there was an object of uncleanness and there is doubt whether he did or did not touch it, such a condition of doubt is unclean. If a shop that was unclean was open toward a public domain and there is doubt whether a man did or did not enter it, such a condition of doubt is clean. If there is doubt whether he did or did not touch anything, such a condition of doubt is deemed clean. If there were two shops, the one unclean and the other clean, and a man entered into one of them, and a doubt arose as to whether he entered the unclean, or the clean one, such a condition of doubt is deemed unclean.
If a tree standing in a public domain had within it an object of uncleanness and a man climbed to the top of it, and a doubt arose as to whether he did or did not touch the object of uncleanness, such a condition of doubt is unclean. If one put his hand into a hole [in the wall] in which there was an object of uncleanness and there is doubt whether he did or did not touch it, such a condition of doubt is unclean. If a shop that was unclean was open toward a public domain and there is doubt whether a man did or did not enter it, such a condition of doubt is clean. If there is doubt whether he did or did not touch anything, such a condition of doubt is deemed clean. If there were two shops, the one unclean and the other clean, and a man entered into one of them, and a doubt arose as to whether he entered the unclean, or the clean one, such a condition of doubt is deemed unclean.
However many doubts and doubts about doubts that you can multiply, a condition of doubt in a private domain is unclean, and in a public domain it is deemed clean. How so? If a man entered an alley and an unclean object was in the courtyard, and a doubt arose as to whether he entered or did not enter [the courtyard]; Or if an object of uncleanness was in a house and there is doubt whether he entered or not; Or even if he entered, there is doubt whether the uncleanness was there or not; Or even if it was there, there is doubt whether it consisted of the prescribed minimum or not; Or even if it consisted of the prescribed minimum, there is doubt whether it was unclean or clean; Or even if it was unclean, there is doubt whether he touched it or not; Any such condition of doubt is deemed unclean. Rabbi Elazar says: if there is a doubt whether he entered, he is clean, but if there is a doubt whether he touched it, he is unclean.
However many doubts and doubts about doubts that you can multiply, a condition of doubt in a private domain is unclean, and in a public domain it is deemed clean. How so? If a man entered an alley and an unclean object was in the courtyard, and a doubt arose as to whether he entered or did not enter [the courtyard]; Or if an object of uncleanness was in a house and there is doubt whether he entered or not; Or even if he entered, there is doubt whether the uncleanness was there or not; Or even if it was there, there is doubt whether it consisted of the prescribed minimum or not; Or even if it consisted of the prescribed minimum, there is doubt whether it was unclean or clean; Or even if it was unclean, there is doubt whether he touched it or not; Any such condition of doubt is deemed unclean. Rabbi Elazar says: if there is a doubt whether he entered, he is clean, but if there is a doubt whether he touched it, he is unclean.
A woman who aborted a shapeless object: If there was blood with it, she is unclean, If not, she is clean. Rabbi Judah says: in either case she is unclean.
If a woman miscarried an object that was like a rind, like a hair, like earth, like red flies, let her put it in water: If it dissolves she is unclean, But if it does not she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of fishes, locusts, or any forbidden things or creeping things: If there was blood with them she is unclean, If not, she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of a beast, a wild animal or a bird, whether clean or unclean: If it was a male she sits in uncleanness as she would for a male; And if it was a female she sits in uncleanness as she would for a female. But if the sex is unknown she sits in uncleanness for both male and female, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: anything that has not the shape of a human being cannot be regarded as a human child.
If a woman miscarried an object that was like a rind, like a hair, like earth, like red flies, let her put it in water: If it dissolves she is unclean, But if it does not she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of fishes, locusts, or any forbidden things or creeping things: If there was blood with them she is unclean, If not, she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of a beast, a wild animal or a bird, whether clean or unclean: If it was a male she sits in uncleanness as she would for a male; And if it was a female she sits in uncleanness as she would for a female. But if the sex is unknown she sits in uncleanness for both male and female, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: anything that has not the shape of a human being cannot be regarded as a human child.
If a woman miscarried an object that was like a rind, like a hair, like earth, like red flies, let her put it in water: If it dissolves she is unclean, But if it does not she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of fishes, locusts, or any forbidden things or creeping things: If there was blood with them she is unclean, If not, she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of a beast, a wild animal or a bird, whether clean or unclean: If it was a male she sits in uncleanness as she would for a male; And if it was a female she sits in uncleanness as she would for a female. But if the sex is unknown she sits in uncleanness for both male and female, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: anything that has not the shape of a human being cannot be regarded as a human child.
If three women slept in one bed, and blood was found under the middle one, they are all unclean. If it was found under the inner one, the two inner ones are unclean while the outer one is clean. If it was found under the outer one, the two outer ones are unclean while the inner one is clean. Rabbi Judah said: when is this so? When they passed by way of the foot of the bed, but if they passed across it, they are all unclean. If one of them examined herself and was found clean, she remains clean while the two others are unclean. If two examined themselves and were found to be clean they remain clean while the third is unclean. If the three examined themselves and were found to be clean, they are all unclean. To what may this be compared? To an unclean heap that was mixed up with two clean heaps: If they examined one of them and found it to be clean, it is clean while the two others are unclean; If they examined two of the heaps and found them to be clean, they are clean while the third one is unclean; And if they examined the three and they were all found to be clean, they are all unclean, the words of Rabbi Meir, For Rabbi Meir used to say: any object that is presumed to be unclean remains unclean until it is known to you where the uncleanness is. But the sages say: one continues the examination of the heap until one reaches bedrock or virgin soil.
Ten cloaks one on top of the other, if he sat on the uppermost one, all are unclean. A zav who was on one scale of a balance and in the other scale opposite there were objects fit to sit or lie upon: If the zav pushed them up, they are clean. But if they pushed him up, they are unclean. Rabbi Shimon says: if there was one object it becomes unclean, but if there were many they remain clean, since none of them had borne the greater part [of the zav's weight].
If an unclean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, or a clean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, it becomes unclean. If part of an unclean person rests on an object fit to lie upon, or part of a clean person rests upon an object fit to lie upon, it remains clean. Thus we find that impurity enters it and goes out of it by its lesser part. Similarly, if a loaf of terumah was placed upon an object fit to lie upon [that was unclean] and there paper in between, whether it was above or below, it remains clean. Similarly, in the case of a stone with scale disease it remains clean. Rabbi Shimon pronounced such a case unclean.
If an unclean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, or a clean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, it becomes unclean. If part of an unclean person rests on an object fit to lie upon, or part of a clean person rests upon an object fit to lie upon, it remains clean. Thus we find that impurity enters it and goes out of it by its lesser part. Similarly, if a loaf of terumah was placed upon an object fit to lie upon [that was unclean] and there paper in between, whether it was above or below, it remains clean. Similarly, in the case of a stone with scale disease it remains clean. Rabbi Shimon pronounced such a case unclean.
If an unclean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, or a clean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, it becomes unclean. If part of an unclean person rests on an object fit to lie upon, or part of a clean person rests upon an object fit to lie upon, it remains clean. Thus we find that impurity enters it and goes out of it by its lesser part. Similarly, if a loaf of terumah was placed upon an object fit to lie upon [that was unclean] and there paper in between, whether it was above or below, it remains clean. Similarly, in the case of a stone with scale disease it remains clean. Rabbi Shimon pronounced such a case unclean.
If an unclean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, or a clean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, it becomes unclean. If part of an unclean person rests on an object fit to lie upon, or part of a clean person rests upon an object fit to lie upon, it remains clean. Thus we find that impurity enters it and goes out of it by its lesser part. Similarly, if a loaf of terumah was placed upon an object fit to lie upon [that was unclean] and there paper in between, whether it was above or below, it remains clean. Similarly, in the case of a stone with scale disease it remains clean. Rabbi Shimon pronounced such a case unclean.
If an unclean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, or a clean person rests upon part of an object fit to lie upon, it becomes unclean. If part of an unclean person rests on an object fit to lie upon, or part of a clean person rests upon an object fit to lie upon, it remains clean. Thus we find that impurity enters it and goes out of it by its lesser part. Similarly, if a loaf of terumah was placed upon an object fit to lie upon [that was unclean] and there paper in between, whether it was above or below, it remains clean. Similarly, in the case of a stone with scale disease it remains clean. Rabbi Shimon pronounced such a case unclean.
He who touches a zav, or a zavah, a menstruant, or a woman after childbirth, or a metzora, or any object on which these had been sitting or lying, conveys uncleanness at two [removes] and disqualifies [terumah] at one [further remove]. If he separated, he still conveys uncleanness at one [remove], and disqualifies [terumah] at one [further remove]. This is true whether he had touched, or had shifted, or had carried, or was carried.
He who touches a dead sheretz, or semen, or he that has suffered corpse uncleanness, or a metzora during his days of counting, or hatat waters of insufficient quantity with which to perform the sprinkling, or carrion, or an object ridden upon [by a zav], defiles at one [remove] and disqualifies [terumah] at one [more remove]. This is the general principle: anyone who touches anything that according to the Torah is a "father of uncleanness" defiles at one [remove] and disqualifies [terumah] at one [more remove], except [for the corpse] of a human. If he had become separated, he defiles at one [remove] and renders [terumah] unfit at one [more remove].
The Jerusalem Talmud
Women from where? (Deut. 11:19) “And you should teach them to your sons”, and not to your daughters. Anyone who is obliged to study Torah is obliged for tefillin, women who are not obliged to study Torah are not obliged for tefillin. They objected, but did not Michal, the daughter of the Kushi, wear tefillin, and did not the wife of Jonah make the pilgrimage to the Temple, and the sages did not object. Rebbi Ḥisqiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Jonah’s wife was turned back, the sages forbade it to Michal the daughter of Kushi.
“By its place, if it was standing beside the wine press or beside a breach in the fence.” This Mishnah follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, it is not a forgotten sheaf. Rebbi Yose said, it is everybody’s opinion. There a stationary object is beside a stationary one, but here a movable object is beside a stationary one.
“By its place, if it was standing beside the wine press or beside a breach in the fence.” This Mishnah follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, it is not a forgotten sheaf. Rebbi Yose said, it is everybody’s opinion. There a stationary object is beside a stationary one, but here a movable object is beside a stationary one.
HALAKHAH: The rabbis object to Rebbi Eliezer: How did they acquire? He said to them, do you not agree with me that if they agreed among themselves, tithes go to the workers? Even if they made a condition, how did they acquire? If there is nothing said, it is as if somebody said: Harvest from this land so that its tithes should be yours. They said to him, there is no stipulation here; if nothing is said there is no stipulation. It is as if he said, harvest this land on condition that you take one tenth for yourselves.
It is a condition of Joshua that one may collect grasses everywhere except in a field of fenugreek. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: The Mishnah deals with him who sowed for sheaves. But did we not state: “One is not required to weed … fenugreek in which grasses appeared?” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in his own name: “When it grew for seeds.” Rebbi Yose said, did Joshua come only to help sinners? If he committed a sin, it is forbidden as robbery, if he did not commit a sin it is permitted in respect to robbery. Hence, there is no difference whether he sowed for seeds or for sheaves. But did we not state: “One is not required to weed … fenugreek in which grasses appeared?” If he intends to use the grasses, one should oblige him to weed! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Miasha: He would be happy if they were torn out and lying before him. Rebbi Yose did not say so, but in the end he approves that they should be torn out and lying before him. But then, if somebody found kilaim in a vineyard, they should be forbidden as robbery since in the end he desires that they should be torn out and lie before him! There, he has the means to bring it in, here he does not have the means to bring it in. Rav Naḥman said that Rebbi Mana asked: Think about it, if he had another field of fenugreek close by, then he has the means to bring it in! The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Zeriqan said in the name of the House of Yannai: All aftergrowth is forbidden except for that which appears on a fallow field, a field ready to be ploughed under, and a vineyard. He should have added, except for a field of fenugreek sown for the production of seeds! Rebbi Yose said, the words of Rebbi Joḥanan support me. It happened that somebody bought a garden plot of vegetables from a Gentile. He came and asked Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, go, harvest and sell at the going rate. Rebbi Abbahu objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Did we not state: “or the threshing place on which many kinds are appearing?” He said to him, that place proves that he does not want them to exist. Could he not have answered, the one is like robbery, the other is permitted with respect to robbery? How can you object based on a scenario where it is forbidden as robbery to a decision in a case which is permitted with respect to robbery? It is as Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answers. Or it is as Rebbi Nasa said, like a person who has two reasons but he answers only with one of them.
Why did they not object to him: If someone keeps single fresh stalks growing to produce seeds, must he not clear around them a bet rova‘ or fence them in by a fence of ten hand-breadths? For a row one is more lenient. Since they did not object to him, it follows that Rebbi Yose thinks that row and square are the same. For Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose the Galilean said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: He who keeps a single fresh stalk growing to produce seeds must clear around it a bet rova‘ or fence it in by a fence of ten hand-breadths, even if it is the same kind. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya objected before Rebbi Zeïra, did we not state: “If coriander was sown for its seeds, its greens are exempt?” He answered him, coriander is a special case since both the plant and its seeds are eaten.
Why did they not object to him: If someone keeps single fresh stalks growing to produce seeds, must he not clear around them a bet rova‘ or fence them in by a fence of ten hand-breadths? For a row one is more lenient. Since they did not object to him, it follows that Rebbi Yose thinks that row and square are the same. For Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose the Galilean said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: He who keeps a single fresh stalk growing to produce seeds must clear around it a bet rova‘ or fence it in by a fence of ten hand-breadths, even if it is the same kind. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya objected before Rebbi Zeïra, did we not state: “If coriander was sown for its seeds, its greens are exempt?” He answered him, coriander is a special case since both the plant and its seeds are eaten.
“ It turns out that concerning kilaim everything less than three hand-breadths is considered closed. From three to four, if what is standing is more than what is torn down it is permitted, but if what is torn down is more than what is standing, it is forbidden. From four hand-breadths to ten cubits, if what is standing is more than what is torn down, it is permitted; but if what is torn down is more than what is standing it is permitted where it is standing, forbidden where it is torn down. Concerning the Sabbath, everything less than three hand-breadths is considered closed. From three to four, and from four hand-breadths to ten cubits, it is permitted if what is standing is more than what is torn down, but forbidden if what is torn down is more than what is standing. More than ten, it is forbidden even though what is standing is more than what is torn down.” Rebbi Ḥananiah, Rebbi Judah bar Pazi, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no “from three to four.” There is a hole of three and no place of four! Rebbi Mana objected: Did we not state: “One surrounds with reeds,” does a reed form a place? He said to him, do not object to me from a breach less than three hand-breadths, since anything less than three is considered closed! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: In any case, since what is standing is more than what is torn down, it is permitted.
It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, a tree that buds before the fifteenth of Ševaṭ is tithed for the past [year]; after the fifteenth of Ševaṭ it is tithed for the coming [year].” It was stated: “Rebbi Neḥemiah said, when has this been said? For a tree producing two threshing floors a year. But trees making only one threshing floor per year, such as olive trees, date palms and carob trees, even if they budded before this day, belong to the future.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, people use to follow Rebbi Neḥemiah for carobs. Rebbi Simeon objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Did we not state that “the Sabbatical of white figs is the second year since they produce after three years”? According to you, those ripened in the Sabbatical year should be Sabbatical! He accepted that. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, I wonder how Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish could bring this objection before Rebbi Joḥanan and he accepted it. Could he not object: I am speaking about carobs and you about white figs, I am speaking about custom and you about practice, I am speaking about Rebbi Neḥemiah and you about the rabbis! It follows that the rules are equal for carobs and white figs, custom and practice, Rebbi Neḥemiah and the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This is one of three obvious inferences in the Torah. (Num. 18:12): “All the best of olive oil, all the best of cider and grain.” Where do we hold? Is it to conclude that one may give heave from cider for grain and from grain for cider? One must object that cider and olive oil come from two different species of tree and one may not give heave or tithe from one for the other! This means that cider and olive oil are paradigms for two species of trees, in which case one may not give heave or tithe from one for the other. Then I have to add two species of grain, two kinds of produce of which one may not give heave or tithe from one for the other.
Rebbi Aqiba says an unripe cedrat is not a fruit, but the Sages say it is a fruit. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It follows that Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his teacher, Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said it is not a fruit, so Rebbi Simeon said it is not a fruit. Rebbi Yasa said, is everything usable for lulab subject to tithes and everything not usable for lulab not subject to tithes? Did they not object, there is the spotted one, there is one that grew in a form or one shaped like a ball; it is not usable for lulab but subject to tithes! It is reasonable [to hold that] Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba but Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba since it is written (Lev. 23:40) “fruit” and it is not a fruit. Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon, there is the spotted one, one that grew in a form, or one shaped like a ball; it is not usable for lulab but subject to tithes.
HALAKHAH: May he himself eat? Rav said, he is forbidden to eat; Ulla ben Rebbi Ismael said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, this one is permitted to eat. Rav follows Rebbi Meїr, Rebbi Eleazar the rabbis. Does Rav follow Rebbi Meїr? Then even his children and domestics should be forbidden! But Rav follows Rebbi, Rebbi Eleazar the rabbis. As Rebbi Simon said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, Rebbi Yose ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi: The Sages say, one eats from what is going to the muqẓeh only in its place. Rebbi Jacob ben Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: one eats from what is going to the muqẓeh in its place and in other places. Rebbi Yose ben Shaul objected to Rebbi: Did we not state, “carob pods until he collected them on top of his roof?” He said to him, do not object to me about carobs; carobs are animal feed.
They heard before Rebbi Joḥanan that he said to them, practice follows all of them restrictively. Why do they not say it in his name? That not a word of Rebbi Joḥanan should disagree with another word of his. It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Aqiba, one where one person opens and another one locks it is free; two partners but not two tenants.” What is the difference between a partner and a tenant? Just as a partner may object so a tenant may object! Rebbi Jonah said, the Mishnah refers to a landlord and his tenant. The landlord may object to the tenant, the tenant may not object to the landlord. About that they heard before Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Jonah said, Zeïra and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Immi said, the house of Rebbi Yannai instructed that practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba.
They heard before Rebbi Joḥanan that he said to them, practice follows all of them restrictively. Why do they not say it in his name? That not a word of Rebbi Joḥanan should disagree with another word of his. It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Aqiba, one where one person opens and another one locks it is free; two partners but not two tenants.” What is the difference between a partner and a tenant? Just as a partner may object so a tenant may object! Rebbi Jonah said, the Mishnah refers to a landlord and his tenant. The landlord may object to the tenant, the tenant may not object to the landlord. About that they heard before Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Jonah said, Zeïra and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Immi said, the house of Rebbi Yannai instructed that practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba.
They heard before Rebbi Joḥanan that he said to them, practice follows all of them restrictively. Why do they not say it in his name? That not a word of Rebbi Joḥanan should disagree with another word of his. It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Aqiba, one where one person opens and another one locks it is free; two partners but not two tenants.” What is the difference between a partner and a tenant? Just as a partner may object so a tenant may object! Rebbi Jonah said, the Mishnah refers to a landlord and his tenant. The landlord may object to the tenant, the tenant may not object to the landlord. About that they heard before Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Jonah said, Zeïra and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Immi said, the house of Rebbi Yannai instructed that practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba.
They heard before Rebbi Joḥanan that he said to them, practice follows all of them restrictively. Why do they not say it in his name? That not a word of Rebbi Joḥanan should disagree with another word of his. It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Aqiba, one where one person opens and another one locks it is free; two partners but not two tenants.” What is the difference between a partner and a tenant? Just as a partner may object so a tenant may object! Rebbi Jonah said, the Mishnah refers to a landlord and his tenant. The landlord may object to the tenant, the tenant may not object to the landlord. About that they heard before Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Jonah said, Zeïra and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Immi said, the house of Rebbi Yannai instructed that practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Aqiba.
Rebbi Huna said, the reason of Rebbi Simeon is that he says the pesaḥ sacrifice cannot be substituted; if he substituted a second time it still is a pesaḥ. If he substituted, it is a well-being sacrifice! Rebbi Mana said to him, did my teacher not compare the following? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if well-being sacrifices bought with tithe money developed a blemish and he redeemed them, it does not return to its original status to make it a second. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Hila, both in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina, one said if well-being sacrifices were bought with tithe money, the holiness of tithe broke away from them. If heave was bought with tithe money, the holiness of tithe did not break away from it. The Mishnah breaks: Can you object from a case in which the holiness of tithe broke away to a case in which the holiness of tithe did not break away? The other one said, this does not mean one objects from a case in which its holiness broke away to a case in which its holiness did not break away; he says to him, it is one immersion.
How does Rebbi Eliezer explain the reason of Rebbi Aqiba, (Num. 15:17) “To the Land into which I am bringing you?” The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: So did Rebbi Aqiba object to Rebbi Eliezer: Do you not agree that when Israel entered the Land and found there coarse and fine flour that this was subject to ḥallah? Did it not grow while exempt? He accepted that. Rebbi Yose said, I am wondering how could Rebbi Aqiba object to Rebbi Eliezer and how could the latter accept it? There, before they entered they had inherited it retroactively, as Rebbi Huna said in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman: It is not written “to your posterity I shall give” but (Gen. 15:18): “to your posterity I gave”, I already gave it.
How does Rebbi Eliezer explain the reason of Rebbi Aqiba, (Num. 15:17) “To the Land into which I am bringing you?” The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: So did Rebbi Aqiba object to Rebbi Eliezer: Do you not agree that when Israel entered the Land and found there coarse and fine flour that this was subject to ḥallah? Did it not grow while exempt? He accepted that. Rebbi Yose said, I am wondering how could Rebbi Aqiba object to Rebbi Eliezer and how could the latter accept it? There, before they entered they had inherited it retroactively, as Rebbi Huna said in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman: It is not written “to your posterity I shall give” but (Gen. 15:18): “to your posterity I gave”, I already gave it.
The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The disagreement: (Deut. 11:24) “Any place your foot will tread on shall be yours,” the general statement contains only the detail, and following Rebbi Jehudah. They object to Rebbi Jehudah: If this is about the boundaries of the Land of Israel, is there not written: (Jos. 1:4) “From the prairie and this Lebanon up to the great river, the Euphrates, all the land of the Hittites and to the great ocean at sunset shall be your borders.” If it cannot deal with the border regions of the Land of Israel, consider it for the border regions outside the Land. Then, what David was conquering in Aram of the rivers and Aram Ẓova should be subject to ḥallah! There is a difference, because David was neglecting the border regions of the Land of Israel and conquering the border regions outside the Land.
Does the house not combine them together? Things which one objects to being mixed the house will not combine together; if one would not object to their being mixed the house will combine them. The status of impure and pure dough is that one is assumed to object to their being mixed.
Does the house not combine them together? Things which one objects to being mixed the house will not combine together; if one would not object to their being mixed the house will combine them. The status of impure and pure dough is that one is assumed to object to their being mixed.
If he took from it for another place to make it sour, both are forbidden. If he added to the first [dough] and made it insignificant, the main object will be derivative and the derivative the main object. “Heave sourdough which fell into a dough and was lifted, if the dough became sour afterwards, is permitted. Similarly, if a heave fig fell into 100 [figs], one was lifted, and afterwards the heave was recognized, should it be permitted? There, the prohibited [dough] was not identified; here, the prohibited [fig] is identified.
If he took from it for another place to make it sour, both are forbidden. If he added to the first [dough] and made it insignificant, the main object will be derivative and the derivative the main object. “Heave sourdough which fell into a dough and was lifted, if the dough became sour afterwards, is permitted. Similarly, if a heave fig fell into 100 [figs], one was lifted, and afterwards the heave was recognized, should it be permitted? There, the prohibited [dough] was not identified; here, the prohibited [fig] is identified.
“Neither is liable.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Ḥizqiah, the rabbis in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In the category of two people performing one work. Rav asked Rebbi, if another person put a bundle on his back, when he forgot and brought it out? On the occasion of the second repetition he told him, he is liable because it does not compare to this. Rebbi is of the opinion that when he started to walk it is as if he had taken up the object. In the opinion of Rebbi, if he stood in the public domain and threw but ran and caught it in a private domain, what? But is that not Rebbi since Rebbi made the airspace enclosed by walls like its essence? It is only necessary in case he stood in the private domain and threw but ran and and caught it in a public domain, what? It was found stated: Rebbi declares him not liable until the moment it comes to rest.
Rebbi Abba bat Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is forbidden to move a tarkos. Rebbi Immi instructed: it is permitted. Rebbi Jeremiah saw them moving it at the great assembly and did not object to them. In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, up to three it is a chair, more than this a ladder. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he who permits follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “A person may not drag a bed, or a chair, or a footstool, or a fauteuil, because he makes a groove, but Rebbi Simeon permits.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: The Sages admit to Rebbi Simeon that a chair whose legs are stuck in mud one is permitted to move on the Sabbath. Since you are saying, it is permitted to move it, similarly it is permitted to return it. Rebbi Yose said, we also have stated: “and they may be removed on the Sabbath.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a Mishnah says so, “one may not drag any vessel except a carriage because it presses.”
Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Therefore, in the case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work even Rebbi Eliezer should agree with Rebbi Aqiba that he is liable only once. But then Rebbi Aqiba should have objected, is there not the case of intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work, where there are many ramifications or many purification sacrifices and you are instructing that he is liable only once! Since he did not object in this way it implies that one case is like the other case.
Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Therefore about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Rebbi Eliezer that he is liable for every single one. Then Rebbi Eliezer should have objected to him, is there not error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the works where there are not many ramifications and many purification sacrifices and you are agreeing with me that he is liable for every single one. Since he did not object in this way it implies that one case is like the other case.
Is there no difference, whether according to his opinion or that of the rabbis, only if it came to rest from a public domain into a private domain? In Rebbi’s opinion, even if it did not come to rest; in the rabbis’ opinion, only if it came to rest. For Rebbi Abba bar Ḥuna said in the name of Rav: Rebbi declared liable only for a private domain which was roofed. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implies, even if it was not roofed, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Ila said, about the Sabbath it is written: You shall not do any work; it may make itself automatically. But here he shall deliver into her hand, into her domain.
MISHNAH: If a stick used to stir olives has a knot at its top it is an object of impurity, otherwise it is impervious to impurity. In any case it may be used on the Sabbath.
HALAKHAH: “If one had two children,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s who said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The word of Rebbi Meïr is, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Passover sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these [“children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah tought us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not] specify how many Passover sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Zeˋira said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount … only if there remains another baby to circumcise. Rebbi Yose said, the words of the rabbis make the case like something which is not a fixed amount: only if there remains another baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Huna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahavah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.
Concerning the Sabbath, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed. From three to four, and from four [hand-breadths] to ten [cubits], it is permitted if what is standing is more than what is torn down, but forbidden if what is torn down is more than what is standing. More than ten, it is forbidden even though what is standing is more than what is torn down. Rebbi Ḥananiah, Rebbi Judah bar Pazi, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no “from three to four.” There is a hole of three and no place of four! Rebbi Mana objected: Did we not state: “One surrounds with sticks,” does a stick form a place? He said to him, do not object to me from a breach less than three hand-breadths, since anything less than three is considered closed! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: In any case, since what is standing is more than what is torn down, it is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “One may surround by three ropes,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira said, they said this only about ten or more than ten; therefore no less than ten. But was it stated thus? If one brought a wall of seven hand-breadths and raised it less than three from the ground, is it permitted? There you are saying, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed, and here you should be saying, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed. If you want to object, object to the following: If one brought a wall of slightly more than (four) [seven] hand-breadths and raised it less than two hand-breadths from the ground, should it come following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, what is standing and empty space combine for four hand-breadths, on condition that what is standing be more than the empty space.
HALAKHAH: “One may surround by three ropes,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira said, they said this only about ten or more than ten; therefore no less than ten. But was it stated thus? If one brought a wall of seven hand-breadths and raised it less than three from the ground, is it permitted? There you are saying, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed, and here you should be saying, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed. If you want to object, object to the following: If one brought a wall of slightly more than (four) [seven] hand-breadths and raised it less than two hand-breadths from the ground, should it come following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, what is standing and empty space combine for four hand-breadths, on condition that what is standing be more than the empty space.
It was stated: “One may use anything to reduce, stones, bricks, a Tyrian or an Egyptian ladder if it was fastened.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even if it was not fastened. But was it not stated “if it was fastened”? Rebbi Abba said, if it was dedicated for this purpose. Rebbi La instructed following this Tanna, only if it was fastened. Both Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose, one in the name of Mar Uqban, and one in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: It is necessary that between two steps there be less than three [hand-breadths] and each be four hand-breadths wide; the posts complement the four. Yasa said, a block in which he carved steps reduces. In any case, the posts do not complement ten; it is like a high step. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: It must be stretched four hand-breadths from the wall as separate place. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The step which reduces from ten must be stretched four hand-breadths from the wall as a separate place. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked: If one brought a board of seven hand-breadths and raised it less than three from the ground, is it permitted? There you are saying, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed, and here you should be saying, everything less than four [handbreadths] is considered closed. If you want to object, object to the following: If one brought a wall of slightly more than four hand-breadths and raised it less than two hand-breadths from the ground, should it come following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, what is standing and empty space combine for four hand-breadths, on condition that what is standing be more than the empty space?
It was stated: “One may use anything to reduce, stones, bricks, a Tyrian or an Egyptian ladder if it was fastened.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even if it was not fastened. But was it not stated “if it was fastened”? Rebbi Abba said, if it was dedicated for this purpose. Rebbi La instructed following this Tanna, only if it was fastened. Both Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose, one in the name of Mar Uqban, and one in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: It is necessary that between two steps there be less than three [hand-breadths] and each be four hand-breadths wide; the posts complement the four. Yasa said, a block in which he carved steps reduces. In any case, the posts do not complement ten; it is like a high step. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: It must be stretched four hand-breadths from the wall as separate place. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The step which reduces from ten must be stretched four hand-breadths from the wall as a separate place. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked: If one brought a board of seven hand-breadths and raised it less than three from the ground, is it permitted? There you are saying, everything less than three [handbreadths] is considered closed, and here you should be saying, everything less than four [handbreadths] is considered closed. If you want to object, object to the following: If one brought a wall of slightly more than four hand-breadths and raised it less than two hand-breadths from the ground, should it come following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, what is standing and empty space combine for four hand-breadths, on condition that what is standing be more than the empty space?
Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.
Women from where? And you should teach them to your sons, but not to your daughters. Anyone who is obliged to study Torah is obliged for tefillin, women who are not obliged to study Torah are not obliged for tefillin They objected, but did not Michal, the daughter of Saul, wear tefillin, and did not the wife of Jonah make the pilgrimage to the Temple, and the Sages did not object?. Rebbi Ḥisqiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Jonah’s wife was turned back, the Sages objected to Michal the daughter of Saul.
Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yudan. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan that if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, would that not be piggufl? If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If one slaughtered for its purpose and to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified, since on the act of receiving he is thinking. Therefore, if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If at the moment of burning he does not think, then if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. He told him, do not object to me about disqualification because of piggul, since Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification.
Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, explain it following him who said, from the doorstep of Jerusalem and outside. Would one object from outside Jerusalem to something inside Jerusalem?
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Meïr are, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these “children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah taught us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Yannai said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount, even if there is no (one) [other] baby to circumcise. If you are treating it like something which is not a fixed amount, only if there remains (one) [another] baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Ḥuna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahawah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
HALAKHAH: “He who pays the sheqel,” etc. We have stated, “if the sums were disbursed.” In the House of Rebbi it was stated, “if the animal was sacrificed.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if the animal was sacrificed”? Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon said, he receives his money immediately, the priests are quick. It is difficult. If somebody stole another’s elevation offering and slaughtered it without special mention, is it not without special mention atoning for the original owner? Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if it was a definite object, like that of the House of Rabban Gamliel who was taking aim throwing it into the chest. But should one not worry that maybe it will become part of the remainder; is there me`ilah for the remainder? But it must follow Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, there is me`ilah for the remainder. Still if it was a definite object, like that of the House of Rabban Gamliel who was taking aim and disbursed it in his name.
HALAKHAH: “He who pays the sheqel,” etc. We have stated, “if the sums were disbursed.” In the House of Rebbi it was stated, “if the animal was sacrificed.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if the animal was sacrificed”? Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon said, he receives his money immediately, the priests are quick. It is difficult. If somebody stole another’s elevation offering and slaughtered it without special mention, is it not without special mention atoning for the original owner? Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if it was a definite object, like that of the House of Rabban Gamliel who was taking aim throwing it into the chest. But should one not worry that maybe it will become part of the remainder; is there me`ilah for the remainder? But it must follow Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, there is me`ilah for the remainder. Still if it was a definite object, like that of the House of Rabban Gamliel who was taking aim and disbursed it in his name.
Concerning the Sabbath, everything less than three {hand-breadths} is considered closed. From three to four, and from four {hand-breadths} to ten {cubits}, it is permitted if what is standing is more than what is torn down, but forbidden if what is torn down is more than what is standing. More than ten, it is forbidden even though what is standing is more than what is torn down. Rebbi Ḥananiah, Rebbi Judah bar Pazi, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no “from three to four.” There is a hole of three and no place of four! Rebbi Mana objected: Did we not state: “One surrounds with sticks,” does a stick form a place? He said to him, do not object to me from a breach less than three hand-breadths, since anything less than three is considered closed! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: In any case, since what is standing is more than what is torn down, it is permitted.
The argument of Rabban Gamliel is inverted. As it was stated, Tabi, Rabban Gamliel’s slave, put on tefillin and the Sages did not object to him. And here they objected? In order not to push aside the Sages. If in order not to push aside the Sages, he could sit outside the sukkah. Tabi, Rabban Gamliel’s slave, wanted to hear the words of the Sages.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Aqiba says an unripe cedrat is not a fruit, but the Sages say it is a fruit. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It follows that Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his teacher, Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said it is not a fruit, so Rebbi Simeon said it is not a fruit. Rebbi Yose said, is everything qualified for lulav subject to tithes and everything disqualified for lulav not subject to tithes? Did they not object, there is the spotted one, one that grew in a form, or one shaped like a ball, which are disqualified for lulav but subject to tithes! It is reasonable {to hold that} Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba but Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Aqiba since it is written fruit and it is not a fruit. Rebbi Aqiba does not agree with Rebbi Simeon, there is the spotted one, one that grew in a form, or one shaped like a ball, which are disqualified for lulav but subject to tithes.
“One does not judge.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It is forbidden to judge money matters on Friday. Does not a Mishnah object: “Therefore one does not judge <criminal matters> on Sabbath eve or holiday eve”? Hence, one judges money matters! Also, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: One judges money matters on Friday but not criminal matters. One is for practice, the other for words of the Torah.
Does the document prove? Do we not have to believe what she says? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, one does not suspect him to vilify her in the eyes of Heaven; he is suspect to vilify her in the eyes of the court. Since he knows that if he were to come [and object, his objection] would not be accepted, he has [the bill of divorce] signed by witnesses in good standing. And here, since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful.
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, who stated “the one waiting for her levir”? Rebbi Aqiba! For Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law. Rebbi Ilai said to him, why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 Elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man, her levir shall come to her”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! Could he not object: Why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. A woman waiting for her levir who whored, Rebbi Eleazar said she is permitted to her house, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said she is forbidden to her house. What do the rabbis say? Rebbi Mana said, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to [the levir], since we have stated: “This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.”
HALAKHAH: “As it was said further,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who is not in the position of those [men] who had the power to object, should not object. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as it is a commandment to speak on things that will be done, so it is a commandment not to talk about things that would not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to burn or to suspend, always prefer burning to suspension since nothing is more beloved in the Torah than burned oxen and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked: Does one infer something which is not commanded from something which is commanded?
HALAKHAH: “As it was said further,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who is not in the position of those [men] who had the power to object, should not object. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as it is a commandment to speak on things that will be done, so it is a commandment not to talk about things that would not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to burn or to suspend, always prefer burning to suspension since nothing is more beloved in the Torah than burned oxen and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked: Does one infer something which is not commanded from something which is commanded?
Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.
Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It is forbidden to judge money matters on Friday. Does not a Mishnah object: “Therefore, one does not judge criminal matters on Friday or any day before a holiday”? Therefore, one judges money matters! Also, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: One judges money matters on Friday but not criminal matters. One is for practice, the other for Torah study.
MISHNAH: If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s in Judea without chaperones cannot claim missing virginity since he is alone with her. Both for an Israel widow as a Cohanim widow the ketubah is a mina. The court of priests collected 400 zuz for a virgin, to which the Sages did not object.
HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?
HALAKHAH: “If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially,” etc. It was stated: “She sells and writes ‘this I sold for ketubah’ and ‘this I sold for sustenance,’ the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said, she sells and writes non-specifically; in this she is empowered.” If a loan before witnesses [comes due], she says, I sold for sustenance. If a loan by contract [comes due], she says, I sold for my ketubah. And even if a loan before witnesses [comes due], she sells for sustenance and turns around and forecloses it for her ketubah; could one not say to her, show your sale? Explain it, if the object increased in value.
Everybody agrees that a person who vows to forbid gourd to himself is permitted vegetables, as it was stated: A person who makes a vow to abstain from a main object is forbidden the peripherals; if he vows from the peripherals, he is permitted the main object. One who vows to abstain from meat is forbidden sinews, he who vows to abstain from sinews is permitted meat. Where do they disagree? About Egyptian gourd. But everybody agrees that Greek gourds are vegetables. Rebbi Crispus in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All sorts of gourd and cabbage which we eat are Greek gourds. Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṣeradia says, qarmals are vegetables. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose asked, are qarmals subject to tithes? Bar Qappara stated, qarmals are free from tithes. That is, as long as they did not form gourds; but when they formed gourds they are like vegetables. Rebbi Yose instructed that it is forbidden to sip water from colocasia leaves because they are food for deer.
Everybody agrees that a person who vows to forbid gourd to himself is permitted vegetables, as it was stated: A person who makes a vow to abstain from a main object is forbidden the peripherals; if he vows from the peripherals, he is permitted the main object. One who vows to abstain from meat is forbidden sinews, he who vows to abstain from sinews is permitted meat. Where do they disagree? About Egyptian gourd. But everybody agrees that Greek gourds are vegetables. Rebbi Crispus in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All sorts of gourd and cabbage which we eat are Greek gourds. Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṣeradia says, qarmals are vegetables. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose asked, are qarmals subject to tithes? Bar Qappara stated, qarmals are free from tithes. That is, as long as they did not form gourds; but when they formed gourds they are like vegetables. Rebbi Yose instructed that it is forbidden to sip water from colocasia leaves because they are food for deer.
Rebbi Illa said: He himself, who touched the corpse, is guilty. He said it and gave its reason: “who became impure,” that refers to the impurity of a human. But is there not a third? As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person a man is guilty for impurity in the Sanctuary. They objected: If objects touch the corpse, a human the objects, and objects the human. For impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The Tanna there disagrees with Rebbi Illa: “For an object made half of cement־earth and half of dung one is not guilty for coming to the Sanctuary” Because it is half of earth and half of dung; but if it were totally of earth, one would be guilty. Who is guilty? Not the one who touches it? Is he not the second who touches the first? Rebbi Phineas said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he threw it. He answered him, about him who threw it we stated: For washing his body he is subject to extirpation, for washing his garments to the forty. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, do we not have the Mishnah in support of that first Tanna, as is stated: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” For the first, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for the second, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we were of the opinion that they disagree about a sacrifice, but one whips even the third, even the fourth. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah in opposition to Rebbi Jeremiah: “For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Joḥanan: It is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty.
There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: The extortionist, and the robber, and the thief? He answered, it is assumed that the owners do not deal with the dead animal. From where that the owners do not deal with the dead animal? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double,” but not dead animals. That refers to theft; for robbery? Rebbi Abun said, “he shall return the robbed object which he robbed,” as it was.
Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Does one estimate for the extortionist, the thief, and the robber? He anwered him: one estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber. From where that one does not estimate for them? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double;” alive, not dead. That refers to theft; from where for robbery? Rebbi Abin said, “he shall return the robbed object in the state in which he robbed it.”
HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.
It was stated: “It was stolen from the man’s house”, but not from the woman’s house? Is not “his neighbor” only written in respect of the borrower? But one has to say that “he who steals from a thief does not pay [double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay] quadruple or quintuple restitution. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him; [when in the end the stolen object was found, to whom does he pay? To the first owner, to the second, to both of them? If something was stolen which then was stolen from him]; the owners apprehended the second thief who swore to them. If you say that one takes it away from the second, he has to bring a sacrifice for the oath. If you say that one does not take it away from the second, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for his oath. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him and the second thief decides to return it, if you say that he has to return it to the owners, they might not inform the first thief. If you say that he has to return it to the first thief, that one might not inform the owners. What does he have to do? He returns it to the owners in the presence of the thief.
Because it became pregnant at his place and calved he pays its value at the time of the robbery. Who stated this? Rebbi Jacob, as it was stated: “This is the principle about which Rebbi Jacob said: About any robbed object which exists as before and was not changed from the state in which it was created, he tells him: Here is your property before you. And the thief always pays the value at the time of theft.”
Simeon ben Shetaḥ was working with linen. His students said to him, Rabbi, in order to make it easier for you we want to buy a donkey, then you will not have to work so hard. They went and bought a donkey from a Saracen; a pearl was hanging on its neck. They came to him saying, because of this you will not have to work anymore. He said to them, why? They told him, we bought for you a donkey from a Saracen and a pearl is hanging on its neck. He asked them, does its owner know about this? They answered, no. He told them, go and return it. But did not Rav Huna, Bevay bar Gozlan, in the name of Rav say, they objected before Rebbi: Even according to him who says that an object robbed from a Gentile is forbidden, everybody agrees that what he lost is permitted. Do you think that Simeon ben Shetaḥ was a barbarian? Simeon ben Shetaḥ wanted to hear: Praised be the God of the Jews, more than any gain in this world.
MISHNAH: If one described the lost object but not its identifying marks, he should not deliver. To the swindler one should not deliver even if he describes its identifying marks, since it is said: “Until investigating your brother about it,” until you investigate your brother whether he be a swindler or no swindler.
HALAKHAH: “If one described the lost object,” etc. What is a swindler? He shows himself as one who returns finds and uses this for a big coup. How does he make a big coup? He shows himself to people as one who returns finds so they will give him valuables in trust. He takes all of them and disappears. But some say, he goes to one synagogue and hears about distinguishing marks; then he goes to another synagogue, describes the indentifying marks and takes [the finds] away.
HALAKHAH: “If one deposited an animal or vessels with another,” etc. From where does he bring this? “If the stolen object be found in his hand.” Do we not know that if the thief is found that he has to pay double? Why does the verse say, “double he shall pay”? If the verse is not needed for the case, use it for the following subject. Rebbi [ ] went to the “term” of Rebbi Yudan and asked this question before him. He answered, refer to what is stated afterwards: “If the other had sworn and did not pay, in case the thief was found, he pays double restitution; if he had slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. To whom does he pay? To the owner of the deposit.” Should he not pay to the person with whom it was deposited? Rebbi Nasa in the name of Rebbi Jonah: “Alive, double he shall pay.” To the place where the capital goes, there the double fine goes. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar; Rebbi Nasa adds in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Not only when he paid, but even when he stated his willingness to pay it is as if he had paid.
If he said, I am paying, one may suspect that possibly he took it for himself. If he said, I am swearing, but then he saw that other oaths were added and he said, I am paying, one is suspicious. Rebbi Yose said, the Torah did not impose an oath on him to restrict him but to ease for him; for if he wants to pay, he shall pay, and if he wants to swear, he shall swear. If he had witnesses that it was forcibly stolen, to that case refers what Rebbi Eleazar said: If somebody sells his claims of fines to someone else, he did not do anything. If he had witnesses that it was stolen because of negligence, he comes under the category of “he shall pay”. If afterwards the stolen object was found, to whom does [the thief] pay? To the first, or to the second, or to both of them?
MISHNAH: Just as there is cheating in trade so there is cheating by words. One should not say to another: how much for this object, if he is not interested in buying. If somebody was a repentant sinner, one should not say to him: remember your earlier deeds. If somebody was the son of a proselyte, one may not say to him: remember the deeds of your forefathers, for it is written: “A sojourner you may neither cheat nor oppress, for you were sojourners in the Land of Egypt.” One does not mix produce, not even new with new; no need to say new with old. In truth they permitted to mix strong wine with weak since it improves it. One does not mix wine lees with wine but one delivers the lees with the wine. If water became mixed with somebody’s wine, he should not sell it in the store unless he declares it, and not to a trader for that one would only use it to trick people; at a place where they usually put water into the wine they may do so. The trader may buy from five threshing floors and put into one chest, wine from five wine presses and put into one barrel, on condition that he not intend to mix. Rebbi Jehudah says, a store owner should not distribute roasted kernels and nuts to children because he induces them to come to him, but the Sages permit. He should not reduce the price, but the Sages say, may he be remembered as a benefactor. He should not clean the groats following Abba Shaul, but the Sages permit it. However, they agree that he may not clean the upper layer of the chest since that gives a dishonest impression. One may not put makeup on humans, animals, or vessels.
“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent. But did one not object to [Rav] Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate.
It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, one invests in improving a field and does not worry about interest. How is this? One leased a field for ten kor of wheat and said to him, give me a tetradrachma and I shall give you twelve kor at threshing time, it is permitted.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because the field may bring an extraordinary yield. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is as if he increased the rent for the field. What is the difference between them? A store or a ship. According to him who said, because the field may bring an extraordinary yield, one invests in a store or a ship. According to him who said, it is as if he increased the rent for the field, one may not invest in a store or a ship. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Joḥanan said, one invests in a store or a ship. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not invest in a store or a ship, nor in anything which is not invested in the object itself.
MISHNAH: Two vegetable gardens, one on top of the other and vegetables growing between them. Rebbi Meїr says, it is the upper’s. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the lower’s. Said Rebbi Meїr: If the upper’s owner wanted to remove his earth, there would be no vegetables. Said Rebbi Jehudah: If the lower’s wanted to fill up his vegetable garden with earth, there would be no vegetables. Said Rebbi Meїr: Since both of them may object to one another one looks from where these vegetables grow. Rebbi Simeon says, any which the upper’s may take by stretching out his hand are his; the remainder is the lower’s.