obligate

Bakers the sages did not obligate them to separate [from demai produce] any more than suffices for terumat maaser and for hallah. Grocers may not sell demai [produce]. All [merchants] who supply in large quantities may sell demai. Who are those who supply in large quantities? Those such as wholesalers and grain-sellers.

The same is true with a garden: in a place where the custom is to build a fence, they can obligate him to do so. However, in a valley, where it is not customary to build a fence, they cannot obligate him to do so. But if he wants to [build a fence] he must gather into his own portion and build, and he puts a finishing on the outside of the wall. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to him. If they acted with each other’s consent, they should build the wall in the middle and put a finishing on both sides. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to them both.

The same is true with a garden: in a place where the custom is to build a fence, they can obligate him to do so. However, in a valley, where it is not customary to build a fence, they cannot obligate him to do so. But if he wants to [build a fence] he must gather into his own portion and build, and he puts a finishing on the outside of the wall. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to him. If they acted with each other’s consent, they should build the wall in the middle and put a finishing on both sides. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to them both.

If a man’s land surrounded his fellow’s land on three sides, and he fenced it on the first and the second and the third sides, they do not obligate him [to share in the costs]. Rabbi Yose says: “If he rose and built a fence on the fourth side, they obligate him to share in all of the costs.”

If a man’s land surrounded his fellow’s land on three sides, and he fenced it on the first and the second and the third sides, they do not obligate him [to share in the costs]. Rabbi Yose says: “If he rose and built a fence on the fourth side, they obligate him to share in all of the costs.”

If the wall of a courtyard fell down they obligate each of the partners to help in building it up to a height of four cubits. He is presumed to have paid [his share] unless the other brings proof that he has not paid. [If the fence was built] four cubits or higher, they do not obligate him [to help in building it.] If [the one who did not contribute] built another wall near it, even if he did not put a roof upon it, they obligate him to share in all of the costs. He is presumed not to have paid [his share] unless he brings proof that he has.

If the wall of a courtyard fell down they obligate each of the partners to help in building it up to a height of four cubits. He is presumed to have paid [his share] unless the other brings proof that he has not paid. [If the fence was built] four cubits or higher, they do not obligate him [to help in building it.] If [the one who did not contribute] built another wall near it, even if he did not put a roof upon it, they obligate him to share in all of the costs. He is presumed not to have paid [his share] unless he brings proof that he has.

If the wall of a courtyard fell down they obligate each of the partners to help in building it up to a height of four cubits. He is presumed to have paid [his share] unless the other brings proof that he has not paid. [If the fence was built] four cubits or higher, they do not obligate him [to help in building it.] If [the one who did not contribute] built another wall near it, even if he did not put a roof upon it, they obligate him to share in all of the costs. He is presumed not to have paid [his share] unless he brings proof that he has.

MISHNAH: The sages did not obligate bakers to separate more than the heave of the tithe and ḥallah. Grocers are not permitted to sell demay. All who sell wholesale in large quantities may sell demay. The following sell wholesale in large quantities, for example grain buyers and sellers.

HALAKHAH: Also ḥallah? Is ḥallah due for demay? Did we not state: “Ḥallah of the unobservant and food containing heave are free from demay.” Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This is from the House of Shammai. We have stated accordingly: “Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon that the House of Shammai obligate for ḥallah and the House of Hillel exempt it.” Did the House of Shammai include seed goods? But he who buys for sowing or animal feed, flour for tanning or oil for lighting, is he not free from demay? But it must be for somebody who kneads his dough with fruit juice. Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina say that this follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Jehudah from Bartota, hence it does not follow the rabbis. But it agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, one case for him who works in purity and one case for him who works in impurity. But what following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, in both cases if he works in purity? It must be that he is a guest. Was it not stated: “He who is trustworthy for purities is trustworthy for tithes?” Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismaël stated and said: That is, if one is his guest, but for the public he is not trustworthy unless he accepts it publicly. And here we deal with the public.

“Even though it was kept to grow it is subject to tithes small or large.” Does this imply that if it was not kept to grow it is not subject to tithes small or large? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: To exclude the words of Rabban Gamliel as we have stated there: “Rabban Gamliel says, flower buds of fenugreek, mustard, and white beans are subject to tithes.” Rebbi Yasa said, did Rabban Gamliel obligate them because of food? If it were so, what about their greenery? But Rabban Gamliel says, they are important as food, but the rabbis say, they are not important as food. In addition, from what we are stating: “Rebbi Joshua said, I never wanted to tell anybody go, collect flower buds of fenugreek, mustard, and white beans and cook them, to free them from tithes.”

MISHNAH: If children hid figs for the Sabbath and he forgot to tithe them they may not be eaten after the Sabbath until they are tithed. A Sabbath basket the House of Shammai free but the House of Hillel obligate. Rebbi Jehudah says, also one who fills a harvesting basket to send to a friend may not eat from it unless he tithed. He who takes olives from the vat may dip them singly into salt and eat them, but if he salted them as a dish he is obligated. Rebbi Eliezer says, from a pure vat he is obligated but from an impure one he is free because he might put the leftovers back [into the vat]. One may drink from the winepress both warm or cold and is free, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq declares him obligated. But the Sages say, for warm drink he is obligated, cold he is free.

It was stated: If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it from him, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is free. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also the Sages did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. It was stated: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose says, from where that grain one-third ripe before New Year’s day may be brought in during the Sabbatical? The verse says (Lev. 25:3): “You shall gather its yield,” [even] in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, you follow the first third, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose said, you follow the first third. Rebbi Zeїra said to Rebbi Abina, you say two things which contradict one another. Here you teach that the Sages also did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. There, you teach that Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba then just as Rebbi Aqiba says the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose must say, the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the Sabbatical, in the Sabbatical it is forbidden as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical did not fall on it since it was grass on which the sanctity of the Sabbatical cannot fall. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the eighth year, in the eighth year it is permitted as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical falls on it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that the Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the order of years; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor.

It was stated: If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it from him, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is free. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also the Sages did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. It was stated: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose says, from where that grain one-third ripe before New Year’s day may be brought in during the Sabbatical? The verse says (Lev. 25:3): “You shall gather its yield,” [even] in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, you follow the first third, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose said, you follow the first third. Rebbi Zeїra said to Rebbi Abina, you say two things which contradict one another. Here you teach that the Sages also did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. There, you teach that Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba then just as Rebbi Aqiba says the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose must say, the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the Sabbatical, in the Sabbatical it is forbidden as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical did not fall on it since it was grass on which the sanctity of the Sabbatical cannot fall. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the eighth year, in the eighth year it is permitted as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical falls on it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that the Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the order of years; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor.

MISHNAH: Dough intended for Bismarcks and made into Bismarcks is free from ḥallah. If it was started as bread dough but made into Bismarcks, or started as Bismarck dough and used as bread dough, is obligated for ḥallah. Similarly, qenubqa’ot are obligated. The House of Shammai free parboiled dough but the House of Hillel obligate it. The House of Shammai obligate dumplings but the House of Hillel free it. The loaves for a thanksgiving sacrifice and those needed by the nazir, if he made them for himself they are exempt, to sell on the market obligated.

MISHNAH: Dough intended for Bismarcks and made into Bismarcks is free from ḥallah. If it was started as bread dough but made into Bismarcks, or started as Bismarck dough and used as bread dough, is obligated for ḥallah. Similarly, qenubqa’ot are obligated. The House of Shammai free parboiled dough but the House of Hillel obligate it. The House of Shammai obligate dumplings but the House of Hillel free it. The loaves for a thanksgiving sacrifice and those needed by the nazir, if he made them for himself they are exempt, to sell on the market obligated.

Come and look: If it is completely parboiled, the House of Shammai obligate, not completely parboiled, the House of Shammai exempt? Rebbi Assi in the name of Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two students stated this. Rebbi Ammi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For this matter I went to the elder Rebbi Hoshaia to Caesarea and he said to me, two students stated this.

MISHNAH: Two qabim and a qab of rice or heave between them do not combine. If a thing of which ḥallah was taken is between them, they do combine since already they are subject to ḥallah. If a qab of new grain and one of old bit one another, Rebbi Ismael says one should take from the middle but the Sages prohibit this. If somebody takes ḥallah from a single qab, Rebbi Aqiba declares it to be ḥallah but the Sages say, it is not ḥallah. If ḥallah of two qabim was taken separately, when he then combinrd them together into one dough, Rebbi Aqiba exempts but the Sages obligate; it turns out that the severity becomes a leniency.

They wanted to say what Rebbi Aqiba said, ḥallah may be taken from a qab from practice, not as a biblical standard. Since we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba exempts but the Sages obligate,” this implies that it is by biblical standards.

If he planted as a fence and then thought to use it for food, it goes after his thought. [If he first thought to use it] for food and then thought to use it as a fence, his [intent] cannot be accepted. If he planted as a fence the first year and afterwards thought to use it for food, since he thought to obligate it is obligated. But did we not state: “Rebbi Yose says, even if the inner part is for food, the outer part as fence, the inner part is obligated but the outer is exempt”? There, what is for food is always for food, for a fence always for a fence, but here, since he proceeded with a thought of obligation, it is obligated.

An exempt root exempts. But did we not state: “Rebbi Yose says, even if the inner part is for food, the outer part as fence, the inner part is obligated but the outer is exempt”? Should not the outer part make the inner exempt? Rebbi Zeïra said it anonymously, Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: He might think about it to obligate it.

If one bound it to an old tree it is exempt, to [a tree] outside the Land it is exempt. To a dedicated [tree] it is obligated, to the lower or upper part it is obligated. To a dedicated [tree] it is obligated because one might redeem it and make it obligated. To the lower part it is obligated because he might think about and obligate it.

Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Roots do not count. Rebbi Zeïra said to Rebbi Assi, did you hear that explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan or from his argument? As Rebbi Joḥanan said, moreover it was stated: “If someone dedicated and then planted, it is exempt from ‘orlah; planted and then dedicated, it is subject to ‘orlah.” You wanted to say, dedicated is exempt from ‘orlah, old is exempt from ‘orlah. But this is not comparable! Dedicated things can be redeemed and become obligated since he might think about it to obligate; can you [say] about an old tree that one might think about it to obligate?

Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Roots do not count. Rebbi Zeïra said to Rebbi Assi, did you hear that explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan or from his argument? As Rebbi Joḥanan said, moreover it was stated: “If someone dedicated and then planted, it is exempt from ‘orlah; planted and then dedicated, it is subject to ‘orlah.” You wanted to say, dedicated is exempt from ‘orlah, old is exempt from ‘orlah. But this is not comparable! Dedicated things can be redeemed and become obligated since he might think about it to obligate; can you [say] about an old tree that one might think about it to obligate?

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.

HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows,” etc. “All substitute names for vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names for vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names for oaths are like oaths. One reads that at the start of the first Chapter of Nedarim, up to: Rebbi Ismael stated: “any person who vows a vow of nazir”. From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” if another heard him and said: “I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,” if they are clever, they will shave one another; otherwise they have to shave other nezirim.

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” if another heard him and said: “I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,” if they are clever, they will shave one another; otherwise they have to shave other nezirim.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.

HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

MISHNAH: Similarly for a vegetable garden; a place which customarily is fenced in, he must fence in. But in an agricultural area, a place which customarily is not fenced in, one does not obligate him. But if he wishes, he builds inside his land and makes a façade to the outside; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones are his. But if they did it with mutual agreement they build the wall in the middle and make façades on both sides; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones belong to both of them.

MISHNAH: Somebody’s [property] surrounded another’s on three sides. If he fenced in the first, and the second, and the third sides, one does not hold [the other] liable. Rebbi Yose said, if the latter then fenced in the fourth side, one rolls everything over to him. If the wall of a courtyard collapsed, one obligates him to rebuild up to four cubits. There is a presumption that he gave, unless he brings proof that he did not give. Higher than four cubits one does not obligate him, but if he built an adjacent wall, even though he did not put on roofing, one rolls everything over to him. There is a presumption that he did not give, unless he brings proof that he gave.

Say then that two observations obligate him for a sacrifice but not uncleanness, whereas three means he is uncleanness also? Do not even think this, since it has been taught: “And the priest shall make atonement for him before the Lord from his issue” (Leviticus 15:15); [From his issue] implies that zavim bring a sacrifice and some zavim do not bring a sacrifice. How so? If he has three issues, he brings a sacrifice, if only two, he does not bring.

And both the midrash of R. Simai and the midrash on “from his issue” are necessary [to prove this point]. For if I had only R. Simai, I might have raised the above objection, and therefore it teaches us “from his issue.” And if I had only “from his issue,” I would not have known how many issues [obligate for a sacrifice]; therefore I have R. Simai.

I would think, since you can't obligate a friend, so too you can't obligate yourself. It comes to teach us [he does pay].

I would think, since you can't obligate a friend, so too you can't obligate yourself. It comes to teach us [he does pay].

And according Rebbi Akiva, if so then by liabilites of kares also, [we also should] say that a a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for kares [cannot also be liable to malkus]. Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi that this is what Avimi from Hagronia had said in the name of Rava, liabilities of kares do not need a scriptual warning [to obligate one with kares, thus freeing the warning to teach malkus], for the Pesach offering and circumcision are punished [with kares for not performing them] even though they have no scriptural warning.

But maybe the scriptural warning is necessary to obligate one to bring a conciliatory sacrifice, that Pesach and circumcision which don't have a scriptual warning also don't have a conciliatory sacrifice.