opinion
1882 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel,” etc. Who protests? Rav Ḥisda said, the husband protests. Rebbi Yose said, the buyers protest, lest she repossess from them. Rebbi asked: So far a protest which does not concern the text of the bill. A protest which concerns the text of the bill is in dispute between Rebbi Joḥanan and the rabbis there. In the opinion of the rabbis there, there is no difference to a protest concerning or not concerning the body of the bill. A protest not concerning the text of the bill is void, a protest concerning the text of the bill is valid.
HALAKHAH: “Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid,” etc. They are suspected about money; about money they were disqualified.They are not suspected about incest and adultery. And testimony in capital criminal cases has the same status as testimony about incest and adultery. Then even if both of them are Samaritans? There is a difference, for they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Then even one Samaritan witness should be disqualified! Rebbi Abin said, explain it if a Jew signed last. Rebbi Yose said, that is according to the opinion that the witnesses may sign separately, not in the presence of each other. But according to him who says that witnesses may sign only in the presence of each other, it is valid even if the Samaritan signed last.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.
If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.
If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.
Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.
Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Does he disagree? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.
The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.” Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married.
The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.” Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married.
The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.” Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married.
The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.” Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married.
The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There, he says that death is frequent but here, he says that death is not frequent. There in public, here in private, as it was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says there was no chest for nests in Jerusalem because of the mixing, maybe one of them would die and money for purification offerings destined to die would be mixed in with them.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
A person gave money for a ship when the canal dried up. The case came before Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: There is the ship, bring the canal! Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Abba was praying that the canal should dry up and he could recover his money. He said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Abba are of the same opinion as Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. If she cut off, she hindered. If her hand (?) was cut off, it is not as if she hindered.
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. Rebbi Ḥanina says, bronze remained in its place, silver increased or decreased in value. Rebbi Mana said, silver remained in its place, bronze increased or decreased in value. In Rebbi Ḥanina’s opinion, with one as six women always can contract a preliminary marriage. In Rebbi Mana’s opinion, sometimes six, sometimes eight.
Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. Rebbi Ḥanina says, bronze remained in its place, silver increased or decreased in value. Rebbi Mana said, silver remained in its place, bronze increased or decreased in value. In Rebbi Ḥanina’s opinion, with one as six women always can contract a preliminary marriage. In Rebbi Mana’s opinion, sometimes six, sometimes eight.
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
Rav Jehudah sent asking from Rebbi Eleazar: If brothers split [the estate] and then one of them entered a levirate marriage? He answered, the property of the deceased is like common property. Ulla bar Ismael said, it is found that in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion there is no difference whether they split and then one of them entered a levirate marriage or one of them entered a levirate marriage and then they split, but all of them share in the property of the deceased. Why did he not say so? He answered what was asked of him. And why did he not ask? Because of what Rebbi Abinna said in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a first-born shared as a common son, it is prima facie evidence that he renounced his prerogative.
“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Jonathan were sitting together. There came a man and kissed Rebbi Jonathan’s foot. Rebbi Yannai said to him: What kindness did he pay you back for from former days? He said to him: He once came and complained to me about his son that he should support him and I told him, go, assemble a congregation and humiliate him. He said to him, why did you not force him? He said to him, does one force him? He said to him, you still have questions about that? One said, Rebbi Jonathan changed his opinion and fixed it as a tradition in his own name. The result is: Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan, one forces the son to feed his father. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if only all my traditions were so clear to me as this one: One forces the son to feed his father.
Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.
Ben Azai preached: “A dead fly will permanently spoil perfumer’s oil.” Does not one dead fly spoil perfumer’s oil? And this person by one sin spoiled all merits he had. Rebbi Aqiba preached: “ So the abyss opened wide and its mouth swallowed the one without law.” It does not say “without laws”, but “without law”, him who has not a single merit that should help him on the scale of merit. That is, for the Future World. But in this world, even if 999 angels plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? “If there is for him one angel out of a thousand, to tell a man his straightness. He will act with him in grace and say, let him be redeemed, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if you find a saying of Rebbi Eliezer, son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, bend your ear like this funnel and listen, since Rebbi Joḥanan reported that Rebbi Eliezer, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, said: Even if 999 angles plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. Not only this entire angel, but if 999 aspects of that angel plead for conviction and one aspect for acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? It does not say, “if there is for him one angel of a thousand,” but “one out of a thousand”, one aspect out of a thousand aspects of that angel. What is written afterwards? “He will act with him in grace and say, let him be hurt, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” “Let him be hurt,” by suffering. “I found weregilt,” he found means to redeem himself. That is, in this world. But in the Future World, if he has a majority of merits, he inherits paradise; a majority of sins, he inherits hell. If he was 50–50. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “he carries his iniquity.” Rebbi Abbahu said, it is written: “He carries.” What does the Holy One, praise to Him, do? He grabs one of his demerits, and the merits decide. Rebbi Eleazar said: “You, Eternal, are acting in grace, for You will complete for everybody according to his deeds.” And if he has none, You will give him from Yours. That is Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, for Rebbi Eleazar said, “You, Eternal, are acting in grace,” this teaches that He turns to the aspect of grace.
The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.
The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The baraita if he said to her, by the deposit you are holding for me. But if he said, by everything which I deposited with you, she is not preliminarily married unless all of it is available. What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was given to be spent; this was not given to be spent. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.” Then even if a peruṭah’ s worth was left, she should not be preliminarily married unless all of them were available! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Abun said, were we not of the opinion to say, who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Jehudah imply comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Just as he says there, comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices, so he says here, comprehensive one preliminary marriage, in detail three preliminary marriages.
Here also, in the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira the husband becomes the wife’s agent to benefit the poor. Rebbi Hila said, the poor person acquired it for the wife from her husband and afterwards acquired it for himself.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. There, we have stated: “One may sell a firstling unblemished alive, blemished alive or slaughtered, and one may use it for preliminarily marrying a woman.”
Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Alive, but not slaughtered. And Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, Rebbi Meïr learns all sacrifices from animal tithe. Just as one may not become betrothed to a woman with animal tithe, so no sacrifices may be used to become betrothed to a woman. Rebbi Jehudah learns all dedicated things from the firstling. Just as one may become betrothed to a woman with a firstling, so all sacrifices may be used to become betrothed to a woman. The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi is inverted. There, he says, alive or slaughtered. But here, he says alive, but not slaughtered. There in his own name, here in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. Even if you say there and here in his own name; if he becomes betrothed while it is still alive and with what is scheduled to fall to him. After slaughter, what is the reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi? (Num. 18:18): “Their meat shall be for you, like the breast of weaving.” And what is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi? “Shall be for you”, even after slaughtering. How does Rebbi Joshua ben Levi uphold “shall be for you”? He added another being that it should be eaten during two days and one night.
It was stated: “Concerning all of these, if he gave a name to their heave of the tithe or Second Tithe, what he did is done.” Rebbi Eleazar said, with the exception of the remainders of flour sacrifices. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the rest is in dispute. Rebbi Yose asked, what dispute? Where are we standing, if according to Rebbi Meïr, both for Second Tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything. If according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah who was sitting there, stating: “If [a priest] preliminarily marries by means of his share in the holiest sacrifices or simple holy sacrifices, she is not married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, that is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. I said to him, from whom did you hear this, and he said, from Rebbi Jeremiah. I said, this explains the matter! Rebbi Jeremiah, who heard that Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, he says it is in dispute. Rebbi Yose, who did not hear that, asked which dispute? If according to Rebbi Meïr, both for tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything; if according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done.
It was stated: “Concerning all of these, if he gave a name to their heave of the tithe or Second Tithe, what he did is done.” Rebbi Eleazar said, with the exception of the remainders of flour sacrifices. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the rest is in dispute. Rebbi Yose asked, what dispute? Where are we standing, if according to Rebbi Meïr, both for Second Tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything. If according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah who was sitting there, stating: “If [a priest] preliminarily marries by means of his share in the holiest sacrifices or simple holy sacrifices, she is not married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, that is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. I said to him, from whom did you hear this, and he said, from Rebbi Jeremiah. I said, this explains the matter! Rebbi Jeremiah, who heard that Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, he says it is in dispute. Rebbi Yose, who did not hear that, asked which dispute? If according to Rebbi Meïr, both for tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything; if according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done.
They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’
A student asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he gave it to her in the morning on condition that he divorce her in the afternoon? A certain David was of the opinion that anything acquires; Rebbi Ze‘ira said that after thirty days he acquires absolutely. But if the second one added absolute acquisition, I am reading for her: “Her first husband who had sent her away cannot return to take her back.”
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.
Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.
If he performed a preliminary marriage during the validity of the symphōn, this is unconditional preliminary marriage. If he divorced, the students of Rebbi Jonah said, divorce touched her; Rebbi Jonah said, divorce did not touch her. When Rebbi Jonah died, his students acted following him. They said, since after 30 [days] she would leave without a bill of divorce, how can you say that divorce touched her? But divorce did not touch her. If he died during the time stipulated in the symphōn, Rebbi Abbahu said, she is permitted to marry; Rebbi Abba said, she is not permitted to marry. Rebbi Mana asked the family of Rebbi Yose’s father: How did your master usually act? He said to him, when it was a long time, he said that she should go and marry immediately. If the time was short, he said, what is the hurt if she waits? If he sent things during the validity of the symphōn, Rebbi Mana said, [it follows the rules of] symphōn; Rebbi Abba said, [it follows the rules of] preliminary marriage. The rabbis take note of Rebbi Mana’s opinion.
MISHNAH: If a person contracts a preliminary marriage with a woman and then says, I was of the opinion that she was a Cohenet but she is a Levite, a Levite but she is a Cohenet, poor but she is rich, rich but she is poor, she is preliminarily married since she did not trick him.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.
There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.
There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.
There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.
There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.
[In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard?] Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah thought that this disqualified converts from any of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl and marries her to him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on either side.”
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.
HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.
HALAKHAH: “Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: This refers to cattle and pit. But he did not state “fire”. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the fire set up for damage claims? Rebbi Yose said, if the fire were [more than] damage claims, should he not accept warning according to this opinion and be whipped? How is this? The fire in setting up for damage claims he accepts [responsibility] for damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
HALAKHAH: “He who brings a flock into a corral,” etc. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Yannai: In disagreement. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi La said, Rebbi Eleazar’s statement is convincing since watching the animal itself is written only for “horn”. What about it? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, in disagreement. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Some say, it follows Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob who said, in no case is he liable.