1882 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:2

HALAKHAH: “He who brings a flock into a corral,” etc. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Yannai: In disagreement. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi La said, Rebbi Eleazar’s statement is convincing since watching the animal itself is written only for “horn”. What about it? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, in disagreement. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Some say, it follows Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob who said, in no case is he liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:9

“If it entered in due course, he pays for what it damaged.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, on that field itself he is not liable, but for another field he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But what is the rule if it fell into a garden and then entered another garden? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina who said, on that field itself he is not liable, here he will be liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered, or it entered a place into which it could have fallen? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, that is the Mishnah; it fell into a place into which it only could have fallen. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered? Each case is problematic for one of them. One needs the first case, that he pays what it profited; the other needs the other case, that he pays what it damaged.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:9

“If it entered in due course, he pays for what it damaged.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, on that field itself he is not liable, but for another field he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But what is the rule if it fell into a garden and then entered another garden? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina who said, on that field itself he is not liable, here he will be liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered, or it entered a place into which it could have fallen? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, that is the Mishnah; it fell into a place into which it only could have fallen. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered? Each case is problematic for one of them. One needs the first case, that he pays what it profited; the other needs the other case, that he pays what it damaged.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:19

HALAKHAH: “He who sets a fire which consumes wood,” etc. Since thorns are flammable, do I only include flammable material? The verse says, “a stack”. Since a stack of sheaves is particular in that it was harvested, do I only include harvested material? The verse says, “standing grain.” Since all of these are particular in that they are flammable, do I only include flammable material? If it swept his furrow or damaged his stone, from where? The verse says, “or the field.” Should it only have mentioned thorns, standing grain, and stack, but not mentioned field? In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah this is acceptable since he says, he pays for everything inside. But according to the rabbis, who say that he only pays for a stack of wheat or barley sheaves, why did it mention “field”, why did it mention “stack”?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 1:18

HALAKHAH: “One who found documents of indebtedness,” etc. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Both based on a document containing an alienation clause or a document containing no alienation clause, he collects from unincumbered property. Following this opinion of Rebbi Meïr, to what purpose does he return it? To cover the mouth of his pitcher. Rav said, an heir is like the holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan executed before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. Samuel said, what was received cannot be foreclosed on mortgaged property, but on free property it can be foreclosed. Here you say, it can be collected, but there you say, it cannot be collected. There is no comparison between one who agreed to a small lien and one who never agreed to a lien.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:2

HALAKHAH: “Silver acquires gold,” etc. This is a summary of the matter: Anything worth less that the other acquires the other. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, who stated this? Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi. His father told him, change your opinion and state the following: “Gold acquires silver.” He told him, I do not change my opinion since when your faculties were unimpaired, you instructed me to state: “Silver acquires gold.” The word of Rebbi implies that gold is like produce. The Mishnah implies that silver is like produce. [Rebbi Ḥiyya’s baraita implies that gold is like produce, but his word implies that silver is like produce, as in the following:] The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter lent denars to Rav. She came and asked her father, who told her: Take from him good and full weight denars. Do we learn from Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter? Rebbi Idi said, also Abba, Samuel’s father, asked before Rebbi: May one lend denars against denars? He answered him, it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, also Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both instruct: It is permitted to lend denars against denars. Qerat against qerat is permitted, lekan against lekan is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:2

HALAKHAH: “Silver acquires gold,” etc. This is a summary of the matter: Anything worth less that the other acquires the other. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, who stated this? Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi. His father told him, change your opinion and state the following: “Gold acquires silver.” He told him, I do not change my opinion since when your faculties were unimpaired, you instructed me to state: “Silver acquires gold.” The word of Rebbi implies that gold is like produce. The Mishnah implies that silver is like produce. [Rebbi Ḥiyya’s baraita implies that gold is like produce, but his word implies that silver is like produce, as in the following:] The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter lent denars to Rav. She came and asked her father, who told her: Take from him good and full weight denars. Do we learn from Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter? Rebbi Idi said, also Abba, Samuel’s father, asked before Rebbi: May one lend denars against denars? He answered him, it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, also Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both instruct: It is permitted to lend denars against denars. Qerat against qerat is permitted, lekan against lekan is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:12

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “or buying from your neighbor’s hand”, from you neighbor’s hand you need an act of acquisition; you do not need an act of acquisition from the Gentile’s hand. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, why does one deliver a person to “Him Who exacted retribution”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it follows the Tanna who stated: “Nobody dealing in words only may one deliver to “Him Who exacted retribution”.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:5

“He told him, deliver my wheat, for I want to sell it.” How did he acquire? Rav Naḥman bar Jacob was of the opinion that he had to deliver (to the other person) [by law. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His money acquired for him by biblical law.]

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 6:6

HALAKHAH: “If somebody hired tradesmen,” etc. Rav said, “because the Children of Israel are My servants,” Jews cannot buy one another. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was stated about a Hebrew slave. In Rav’s opinion, both a worker and an employer can back out; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion the worker can back out but not the employer.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 6:6

HALAKHAH: “If somebody hired tradesmen,” etc. Rav said, “because the Children of Israel are My servants,” Jews cannot buy one another. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was stated about a Hebrew slave. In Rav’s opinion, both a worker and an employer can back out; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion the worker can back out but not the employer.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 7:4

In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Matthew, a man who goes to another place to preliminarily marry a woman has to stipulate with her and tell her, on condition that you work so and so much and eat for such and such costs.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 9:16

HALAKHAH: “One who contracts with another for a field,” etc. One understands that for barley he may not sow wheat; for wheat, may he not sow barley? It follows Rebbi La or is the opinion of everybody at a place where the yield of barley is not twice that of wheat. But at a place where barley produces twice as much as wheat he may sow barley.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:19

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A vegetable bed which is six by six [handbreadths] and has its own name is not sold. Rebbi Joḥanan said: There is disagreement between Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose and the rabbis about one who bought an anvil sycamore on another’s property. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose says, he acquired the land. The rabbis say, he did not acquire. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked: If somebody sold all trees but reserved for himself an anvil sycamore. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, he acquired the land. In the opinion of the rabbis, he did not acquire the land. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebelai asked: If somebody sold all trees and an olive tree at place X, are all olive trees at that place sold? Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael asked: If somebody bought three groups of reeds, did he buy the greatest cedar in the Land of Israel?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 4:19

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A vegetable bed which is six by six [handbreadths] and has its own name is not sold. Rebbi Joḥanan said: There is disagreement between Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose and the rabbis about one who bought an anvil sycamore on another’s property. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose says, he acquired the land. The rabbis say, he did not acquire. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked: If somebody sold all trees but reserved for himself an anvil sycamore. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, he acquired the land. In the opinion of the rabbis, he did not acquire the land. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebelai asked: If somebody sold all trees and an olive tree at place X, are all olive trees at that place sold? Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael asked: If somebody bought three groups of reeds, did he buy the greatest cedar in the Land of Israel?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 9:3

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the words of the Sages are, until they reach adulthood or are married. That is both a leniency and a restriction. Sometimes they are close to adulthood, sometimes far from adulthood. They asked before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, I did not hear anything from him concerning this matter except what Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: what if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since they started with permission, they started.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 9:26

Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: The holder of documents is disadvantaged. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the Mishnah: “If [in the document] it was not written ‘bedridden’ but he says, I was bedridden,” etc. Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” etc. A young man was selling his properties. The case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, the presumption is that they signed for a mentally capable person. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since he undertook to uproot the properties from the family, he has to bring proof. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the holder of documents is advantaged. Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, how about Rebbi, since Rebbi said, the holder of documents is disadvantaged? He told him, everybody agrees that the holder of documents is advantaged. But how could you say that a case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph who said, the presumption is that they signed for a mentally capable person. And you said, since he undertook to uproot the properties from the family to another family, he has to bring proof! He told him, I never said this. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, even if Rebbi Joḥanan wants to deny it, did not Rebbi Yannai say in the name of Rebbi: The holder of documents is disadvantaged. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not the Mishnah? This is the opinion of the Sages who follow Rebbi.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:13

Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Benjamin bar Jephet had a lawsuit before Rebbi Isaac; the judgment was for Rebbi Benjamin. Rebbi Abba wanted to complain; Rebbi Immi came and taught: If an expert forced his opinion as a judgment, his judgment stands.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:43

Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: You shall sanctify the Fiftieth Year. You shall sanctify years but not months. But did we not state: “The president of the court says: sanctified”? What means sanctified? Confirmed. It was stated: For sanctifying months one starts with the most senior person. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the Mishnah says this: “The president of the court says: sanctified.” It was stated, for intercalation of the (month) [year] one starts from the side. Rebbi Zebida said, but this lower house do not proceed in this way, for they did not hear what Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius and Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For lengthening the month one starts with the most senior person, for intercalating the year one starts from the side. When Rebbi Joḥanan was participating as the most junior person, they told him, say: “this year is sanctified in its intercalation.” He said, “this year is sanctified in intercalation.” Rebbi Jonathan said, look at the language which the smith’s son taught us. If he had said, “in its intercalation,” I would have said that this refers to the eleven days by which the solar year exceeds the lunar one, but [he said] “in intercalation”, that the Sages added thirty days to it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For intercalation one follows the date of ordination. In the Academy one follows usage; each one gives his opinion at his place and sums up. For example, Rebbi Ḥanina started, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqisch summed up. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda started, Rebbi Yasa and Rebbi Immi summed up. Rebbi Ḥaggai started, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose summed up. Rebbi Cahana was ordained before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, but Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa participated in intercalation before Rebbi Cahana was invited. He said, the person who formulated the tradition does not respect it for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:62

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, led and recited following Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “on the first, on the second”? Rav Abba in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:96

“And Moses was presiding.” Moses found a way to settle things. When the Holy One, praise to Him, told him, count all male firstborns among the Children of Israel, he said, who will consent voluntarily to give five sheqel per head? What did he do? He took 22’000 tickets and wrote on them “Levite” and 273 on which he wrote “five sheqel” and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a ticket saying “Levite” he said, a Levite already redeemed you. To anybody who drew a slip saying “five sheqel” he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven; Rebbi Jehudah. But Rebbi Nehemiah the Tanna objected to the colleagues: If you had given me the possibility of a Levite, it would have come up for me. But the following is what he did. He took 22’000 tickets and wrote on them “Levite” and two hundred seventy three on which he wrote “five sheqel” and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Levite” he said, a Levite already redeemed you. The anybody who drew a ticket saying “five sheqel” he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven. The Tanna objected to the colleagues: Think of it, if all came up as “Levite”? They told him, it was miraculous and they came up alternatingly. Rebbi Samuel said, in the opinion of the second Tanna, it was a miracle. In the opinion of the first Tanna, it was not a miracle. They told him, it was a miracle in any case since they came up alternatingly.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:96

“And Moses was presiding.” Moses found a way to settle things. When the Holy One, praise to Him, told him, count all male firstborns among the Children of Israel, he said, who will consent voluntarily to give five sheqel per head? What did he do? He took 22’000 tickets and wrote on them “Levite” and 273 on which he wrote “five sheqel” and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a ticket saying “Levite” he said, a Levite already redeemed you. To anybody who drew a slip saying “five sheqel” he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven; Rebbi Jehudah. But Rebbi Nehemiah the Tanna objected to the colleagues: If you had given me the possibility of a Levite, it would have come up for me. But the following is what he did. He took 22’000 tickets and wrote on them “Levite” and two hundred seventy three on which he wrote “five sheqel” and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Levite” he said, a Levite already redeemed you. The anybody who drew a ticket saying “five sheqel” he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven. The Tanna objected to the colleagues: Think of it, if all came up as “Levite”? They told him, it was miraculous and they came up alternatingly. Rebbi Samuel said, in the opinion of the second Tanna, it was a miracle. In the opinion of the first Tanna, it was not a miracle. They told him, it was a miracle in any case since they came up alternatingly.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:98

Similarly. the Eternal said to Moses, assemble for Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel. Moses said, if I am taking six per tribe, there will be 72, ten of six each and two of five, which tribe will agree to be discriminated against? What did he do? He took 70 tickets and wrote on them “Elder”, two he left blank, and put them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Elder” he said, from Heaven they appointed you. To anybody who drew a blank slip he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven; Rebbi Jehudah. But Rebbi Nehemiah the Tanna objected to the colleagues: If you had given me the possibility of an Elder, it would have come up for me. But the following is what he did. He took 72 tickets and wrote on them “Elder” and two blank ones and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Elder” he said, from Heaven they appointed you. The anybody who drew a blank slip he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven. The Tanna objected to the colleagues: Think of it, if all came up as “Elder”? They told him, it was miraculous and they came up alternatingly. Rebbi Samuel said, I objected before Rebbi Abbahu: in the opinion of the second Tanna, it was a miracle. In the opinion of the first Tanna, it was not a miracle. He told him, it was a miracle in any case since they came up alternatingly.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:98

Similarly. the Eternal said to Moses, assemble for Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel. Moses said, if I am taking six per tribe, there will be 72, ten of six each and two of five, which tribe will agree to be discriminated against? What did he do? He took 70 tickets and wrote on them “Elder”, two he left blank, and put them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Elder” he said, from Heaven they appointed you. To anybody who drew a blank slip he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven; Rebbi Jehudah. But Rebbi Nehemiah the Tanna objected to the colleagues: If you had given me the possibility of an Elder, it would have come up for me. But the following is what he did. He took 72 tickets and wrote on them “Elder” and two blank ones and put all of them in an urn. He told them, come and take your ticket. To any one who drew a slip saying “Elder” he said, from Heaven they appointed you. The anybody who drew a blank slip he said, what can I do, it is from Heaven. The Tanna objected to the colleagues: Think of it, if all came up as “Elder”? They told him, it was miraculous and they came up alternatingly. Rebbi Samuel said, I objected before Rebbi Abbahu: in the opinion of the second Tanna, it was a miracle. In the opinion of the first Tanna, it was not a miracle. He told him, it was a miracle in any case since they came up alternatingly.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:8

MISHNAH: If somebody said, I am accepting my father; I am accepting your father; I am accepting three cowboys; Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion. If one was obligated to swear to another, who asked him to make a vow “by his life”, Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:8

MISHNAH: If somebody said, I am accepting my father; I am accepting your father; I am accepting three cowboys; Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion. If one was obligated to swear to another, who asked him to make a vow “by his life”, Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:8

MISHNAH: If somebody said, I am accepting my father; I am accepting your father; I am accepting three cowboys; Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion. If one was obligated to swear to another, who asked him to make a vow “by his life”, Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:8

MISHNAH: If somebody said, I am accepting my father; I am accepting your father; I am accepting three cowboys; Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion. If one was obligated to swear to another, who asked him to make a vow “by his life”, Rebbi Meïr says, he may change his opinion, but the Sages say, he may not change his opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:15

Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that statement in Sanhedrin Rebbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. So said Rebbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “This is the principle: Any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified for.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rebbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Huna said: It follows Rebbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? When he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is disqualified only from that particular testimony. It turns out that Rebbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rebbi Meïr Rebbi Eliezer.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:23

If somebody improved [his field] today, what is the rule? Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion that when the reason disappeared, the ordinance is void. Rebbi Yose was of the opinion that even if the reason disappeared, the ordinance stands until another court abolishes it. Similarly, how does an owner acquire his own produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put it into his vessel. Rebbi Yose was of the opinion that even if he put it into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that it is his but it is not his.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:23

If somebody improved [his field] today, what is the rule? Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion that when the reason disappeared, the ordinance is void. Rebbi Yose was of the opinion that even if the reason disappeared, the ordinance stands until another court abolishes it. Similarly, how does an owner acquire his own produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put it into his vessel. Rebbi Yose was of the opinion that even if he put it into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that it is his but it is not his.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:23

If somebody improved [his field] today, what is the rule? Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion that when the reason disappeared, the ordinance is void. Rebbi Yose was of the opinion that even if the reason disappeared, the ordinance stands until another court abolishes it. Similarly, how does an owner acquire his own produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put it into his vessel. Rebbi Yose was of the opinion that even if he put it into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that it is his but it is not his.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:65

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:67

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:70

Rebbi Jeremiah had a suit against a certain person. They accepted testimony not in the presence of Rebbi Jeremiah, and decided against Rebbi Jeremiah. He was sitting despondent; is it possible that one accepts witnesses not in the presence of the parties? Rebbi Hina, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah from Ḥuqoq did not go to the lecture on that day, but Rebbi Huna pushed, went in, and found Rebbi Jeremiah despondent; is it possible that one accepts witnesses not in the presence of the parties even if they are present with them in the same city? He told him, this is seen to be the rabbis’ opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:7

If his death should have been a severe one but they warned him about an easy one. He could say that had he known that his death was to be severe, he would not have committed that crime. If his death should have been an easy one but they warned him about a severe one; in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Illai they have to inform him by which kind of death he will be executed.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:15

Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:29

If nobody changes his opinion? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is acquitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is convicted. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is he not acquitted? Why do they have to continue to argue with one another? So the judgment should not be in question.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:35

From where the warning for a person having sexual relations with an animal? Do not give your emission into an animal to defile yourself by it. From where extirpation? For anybody who would commit any of these abominations will be extirpated, etc. Punishment from where? A man who would sleep with a animal shall be put to death. You infer their blood be on them from their blood be on them. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael from his source and Rebbi Aqiba from his source. Extirpation for a male passive partner is not found for Rebbi Ismael. Punishment for a male passive partner is not found for Rebbi Ismael or Rebbi Aqiba, but it is written: One who sacrifices to the forces of nature shall be banned. Since this one is in for stoning and extirpation, also that one is in for stoning and extirpation. What is the difference between them? If one had active homosexual relations followed by passive ones, in Rebbi Ismael’s opinion he is liable only once; in Rebbi Aqiba’s opinion he is liable twice. If one had active relations with an animal followed by passive ones. Both in Rebbi Aqiba’s as in Rebbi Ismael’s opinions he is liable twice. If he had active homosexual relations with both a male and an animal he is liable twice. If he had passive homosexual relations with both a male and an animal he is liable twice. If he had simultaneous active sexual relations with two males, since both of them became guilty because of him, he is liable twice. If he had simultaneous passive sexual relations with two males, since both of them became guilty because of him, he is liable twice. It was stated: For males, an underage boy does not have the status of an adult; a young animal has the status of a fully grown one. Rebbi Eleazar said, he cannot become liable because of it unless it be three years and one day of age.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:35

From where the warning for a person having sexual relations with an animal? Do not give your emission into an animal to defile yourself by it. From where extirpation? For anybody who would commit any of these abominations will be extirpated, etc. Punishment from where? A man who would sleep with a animal shall be put to death. You infer their blood be on them from their blood be on them. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael from his source and Rebbi Aqiba from his source. Extirpation for a male passive partner is not found for Rebbi Ismael. Punishment for a male passive partner is not found for Rebbi Ismael or Rebbi Aqiba, but it is written: One who sacrifices to the forces of nature shall be banned. Since this one is in for stoning and extirpation, also that one is in for stoning and extirpation. What is the difference between them? If one had active homosexual relations followed by passive ones, in Rebbi Ismael’s opinion he is liable only once; in Rebbi Aqiba’s opinion he is liable twice. If one had active relations with an animal followed by passive ones. Both in Rebbi Aqiba’s as in Rebbi Ismael’s opinions he is liable twice. If he had active homosexual relations with both a male and an animal he is liable twice. If he had passive homosexual relations with both a male and an animal he is liable twice. If he had simultaneous active sexual relations with two males, since both of them became guilty because of him, he is liable twice. If he had simultaneous passive sexual relations with two males, since both of them became guilty because of him, he is liable twice. It was stated: For males, an underage boy does not have the status of an adult; a young animal has the status of a fully grown one. Rebbi Eleazar said, he cannot become liable because of it unless it be three years and one day of age.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:5

He who has a preponderance of merit inherits paradise. He who has a preponderance of sins inherits hell. What if he is in equilibrium? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it does not say “He lifts sins” but rather He lifts sin. The Holy One, praise to Him, removes one document from the sins and the merits tilt. Rebbi Eleazar said, kindness is Yours, o Master, because You repay everyone according to his deeds, and if he has none, You give him from Yours. This is the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, because Rebbi Eleazar said, and much kindness, He turns towards kindness.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the words of the Sages are that the sent-away ram pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Zeˋira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanina said, at the end. What is the difference between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a baraita supports Rebbi Zeˋira: There is strength in the ram which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the ram, for the Day of Atonement pardons without a ram, but the ram does not atone except on the Day of Atonement. There is strength in the ram, for it pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another ram but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose ben Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the words of the Sages are that the sent-away ram pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Zeˋira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanina said, at the end. What is the difference between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a baraita supports Rebbi Zeˋira: There is strength in the ram which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the ram, for the Day of Atonement pardons without a ram, but the ram does not atone except on the Day of Atonement. There is strength in the ram, for it pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another ram but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose ben Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:19

They and everything that belonged to them descended alive into the pit. Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥelbo, even their names flew away from their papyrus rolls. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, even one of their needles that was in the hand of an Israel as a loan was swallowed up with them, for it is written: They and everything that belonged to them descended alive into the pit. Who prayed for them? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, Moses prayed for them, Reuben shall live and not die. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Hannah prayed for them. This is Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s opinion, as Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said in the name of Rebbi Yose: Koraḥ’s (opinion) [band] was continuously sinking until Hannah stood up and said, the Eternal kills and brings to life, He sends down into the pit and lifts.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:19

They and everything that belonged to them descended alive into the pit. Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥelbo, even their names flew away from their papyrus rolls. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, even one of their needles that was in the hand of an Israel as a loan was swallowed up with them, for it is written: They and everything that belonged to them descended alive into the pit. Who prayed for them? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, Moses prayed for them, Reuben shall live and not die. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Hannah prayed for them. This is Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s opinion, as Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said in the name of Rebbi Yose: Koraḥ’s (opinion) [band] was continuously sinking until Hannah stood up and said, the Eternal kills and brings to life, He sends down into the pit and lifts.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:71

HALAKHAH: Slaying you shall slay the inhabitants of that town by the sword, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, its domesticated animal, not first born or tithes found there; its booty, not Temple money or Second Tithe found there. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked: What is the status of hair of its just women? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, its domesticated animal, not first born or tithes found there; its booty, not Temple money or Second Tithe found there. The sancta of a seduced town, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one cannot commit larceny with them; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one can commit larceny with them. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: According to your opinion that one can commit larceny with them, should one not state that “six purification offerings are left to die”? He answered, because in this case even an elevation offering dies. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One can commit larceny with them because of sancta of an apostate. Should they not be sacrificed? Because of the sacrifice of an evildoer is an abomination. Rebbi Uqba said, also in the following they disagree: If a bull was led out to be stoned when its witnesses were found to be perjured, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first to come acquires it; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it was false despair. Similarly, if a slave was led out to be executed when its witnesses were found to be perjured, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired himself; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it was false despair.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:31

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:31

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:3

In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, if one became impure but it was for him in doubt, would this be for him like forgetting, which makes him liable? Each of them keeps to his opinion, as they disagreed:

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:3

In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, if one became impure but it was for him in doubt, would this be for him like forgetting, which makes him liable? Each of them keeps to his opinion, as they disagreed:

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:21

In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one said, “an oath that I shall not eat unleavened bread”, he is forbidden to eat unleavened bread in the night of Passover. “That I shall not eat unleavened bread in the night of Passover,” he is flogged and eats unleavened bread. “That I shall not sit in the shadow”, he is forbidden to sit in the shadow of a booth. “That I shall not sit in the shadow of a booth,” he is flogged and sits in the shadow of a booth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:52

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:52

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:23

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:29

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:32

So is the Mishnah: “If one disavowed but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah if the second changed his opinion immediately after the speaking of the first. Because if the first changed his opinion, one would accept him; then the second would become the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:32

So is the Mishnah: “If one disavowed but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah if the second changed his opinion immediately after the speaking of the first. Because if the first changed his opinion, one would accept him; then the second would become the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:50

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:50

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:13

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.