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7915 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate. If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah, the other two should not [both] marry in levirate but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.
MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate. If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah, the other two should not [both] marry in levirate but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.
What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”
MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”
MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”
“If one of them was forbidden,” etc. If one of them raped a woman and she had a daughter, [the woman] in turn was raped by his brother and also had a daughter and both [daughters] married [these]brothers who were paternal but not maternal halfbrothers: Each one of them is forbidden his own daughter but permitted her sister. That exemplifies: The one forbidden for one is permitted to the other and vice-versa.
The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is even in this “his wife with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? He said, the House of Shammai said that only after candidacy and “bespeaking”. But that what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow the House of Shammai.
MISHNAH: Three brothers are married to three unrelated women. If one of them died, his second brother “bespeaks” her and then dies, these perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, as it is said: “Her levir shall come to her,” if on her is the candidacy from one brother but not from two. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he prefers and performs ḥalîṣah with the other.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two sisters. If one of them died and then the wife of the other died, she is eternally forbidden to him since she was forbidden one moment.
MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, in any case where the true fact can be ascertained, one does not have to bring a reparation offering because of doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them and the other is locked up.He says, since I could determine the true fact if I would find the key, does one have to bring a reparation offering in this case of doubt? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant”, as long as it is not known whether the child lives or does not live, does he have to bring a reparation offering because of the doubt? This means that he does not bring.
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother]. If he refuses, one goes to all the other brothers. If they refuse, one returns to the oldest and tells him, the obligation is yours, either give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance and, if there is a father, the property goes to the father. He who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case if there is a father, the property goes to the father.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.
MISHNAH: If four brothers were married to four women and died, if their oldest [brother] wants to marry all of them in levirate, he is permitted to do so. If somebody was married to two women and he died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah with one of them frees the co-wife. If one was acceptable and the other blemished, if he performs ḥalîṣah, he performs it with the blemished; if he takes in levirate, he takes the acceptable one.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
It was stated: If she brought them when they were small, she takes them when they are lads. If she brought him two vessels. If one of them was worth the value of her marriage contract, she takes it for her marriage contract. If one and a half was the value of her marriage contract, [disagreement of] Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob. One of them said, he pays for the second vessel and takes it; the other one says, she pays for the second vessel and takes it. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said before Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Even if one was worth one and a half times the value of her marriage contract, she pays for the second vessel and takes it, because it is unthinkable that others should use her vessels. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: A baraita says so: If she brought them for their monetary value, she takes them for their monetary value.
“The deaf-and-dumb disables.” Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats”? Rebbi Abba Mari and Rebbi Mattaniah, one said, a disqualified deaf-and-dumb, the other said, a deaf-and-dumb levir.
HALAKHAH: “The uncircumcised and any impure persons,” etc. “Every man”, to include the uncircumcised. Or “every man” to include the mourner? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is written, “no outsider shall eat sanctified [food]”. I forbade to you because of outside status, I did not forbid because of prepuce. The reddish Rebbi Tiufa asked before Rebbi Yose: may we not say, I did not forbid because of prepuce and because of mourning? He said to him, since one verse includes and the other excludes, I am including the uncircumcised who is missing some procedure performed on his body and excluding the mourner who is not missing some procedure performed on his body. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It said “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover and “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave. Since “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover implies disabling the uncircumcised, so “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave must imply disabling the uncircumcised. Rebbi Ḥaggai questioned: If “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover is in a group of laws disabling the mourner, also “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave should imply disabling the mourner. Rebbi Hila answered: They inferred from “under, under” only items mentioned in the paragraph. The sexless and the hermaphrodite came under another category. The mourner comes from second tithe.
Rebbi Abun asked: Should not heave be forbidden to the mourner by an inference de minore ad majus? Since tithe, which is permitted to outsiders, is forbidden to the mourner, should not heave, which is forbidden to outsiders, be forbidden to the mourner? No. If you said it about tithe which needs an enclosure, what can you say about heave which does not need an enclosure? Therefore, since each of them has an aspect missing in the other, they cannot teach an inference from one to the other.
Rebbi Abun asked: Should not heave be forbidden to the mourner by an inference de minore ad majus? Since tithe, which is permitted to outsiders, is forbidden to the mourner, should not heave, which is forbidden to outsiders, be forbidden to the mourner? No. If you said it about tithe which needs an enclosure, what can you say about heave which does not need an enclosure? Therefore, since each of them has an aspect missing in the other, they cannot teach an inference from one to the other.
“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.
“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.
“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.
“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.
“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
HALAKHAH: “Who is injured in his lower parts,” etc. “Injured,” I would have said in his eye. The verse says “discharge pipe”, he is injured in the neighborhood of the discharge pipe. If he is injured in the neighborhood of the discharge pipe it might be his eye in the neighborhood of his nose! The verse says, “the lowly”. What comes between his heels. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Mana, a man’s lowest part when he sits down are his testicles. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is correct. You should know that this is so since in all other cases “generations” are written except in this case since he is infertile. And not only if [a testicle] is injured but also if it is gangrenous, or dried up, or missing. It was stated: Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says: I heard in the vineyard at Jabne that nobody [born] with only one testicle can be fertile and he is a “sun eunuch”. Rebbi Yose said, I heard that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa but I do not remember from whom I heard it. Rebbi Immi said, certainly Rebbi Yose did not hear it from a minor personality. Samuel said, if a person with only one testicle will come before me, I shall declare him qualified. Rebbi Ḥuna said, because he thinks like Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Yudan ben Ḥanin said, but only the one of the right hand side. There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, yes, my daughter, you are permitted to him. But you should know that he is infertile. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for making the case clear.
If a Cohen had intercourse with a divorcee and had a daughter, and the daughter a daughter, what is her status? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said she is qualified, the other said she is disqualified. The one who said she is qualified objected to the one who said she is disqualified: The daughter of a desecrated male is desecrated for the priesthood. Is this one not from an Israel? Why do you declare her disqualified?
Is there nobody who disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah? Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Hila, one marries his wife in levirate, that means that nobody disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah. If he betrothed, his betrothal is not problematic. If he was betrothed, his betrothal is problematic. If he was copulated with, he becomes disabled from heave like a woman. That is difficult. Rebbi Niḥa bar Rebbi Sava, Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Even with his own kind in any case. That is difficult, if he is a male, no male disables a male. If she is a female, no female disables a female. The male aspect of one disables the female aspect of the other. He enables his wives to eat but does not enable his slaves. He enables his wives to eat by his male aspect. But he does not enable his slaves because of his double aspect; his female aspect was desecrated.
MISHNAH: Forbidden to both of them: If a High Priest married a widow and has a brother who is a High Priest or a simple priest, or a qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a qualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, or a bastard married an Israel woman and has a bastard brother; these [women] are forbidden to both of them and all other women are permitted to their husbands and their levirs.
HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel,” etc. Rebbi Leontes asked before Rebbi Yose: One understands that a Cohen’s daughter who was married to an Israel returns to eat. But why does the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen not eat when she should be enabled to eat? He said to him, so said Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Anan in the name of Rav: What means “a Cohen’s daughter”, one who is trained by a Cohen. As you say, “Babylon’s ransacked daughter,” was she the daughter of Babylon? But she behaved in Babylon’s way. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: Two daughters are mentioned in the paragraph. One returns and eats, the other returns but does not eat. A Cohen’s daughter who was married to an Israel returns to eat. A daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen returns but does not eat. Say also, if she was married to a qualified person, she returns and eats, to a disqualified person she returns but does not eat. Rav said, practice is that she returns to eat heave but not to eat breast and foreleg. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats breast and foreleg. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated a support for Rav: “of food,” not all the food. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated a support for Rebbi Joḥanan: “of her father’s food she shall eat,” to include the loaves of the thanksgiving sacrifice and the cakes of the nazir.
HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters.
HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.
A convert who converted while married to a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, marries one and separates from the other. When has this been said? If he did not live with either of them. But if he lived with one of them after he converted, the one he lived with is his wife. If he lived with both of them, since he lived with them, he lived with them.
A convert has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. If he married any other incest prohibited woman, he may keep her. It was only said, “if he married”. Therefore, not from the start.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
May they bring one cereal offering together that would be totally burned? It was stated: They may bring one cereal offering conditionally that would be totally burned. May they bring two cereal offerings one of which should be burned totally and the other have a handful taken and the rest eaten? It was stated: They may bring two cereal offerings of one which is burned totally and of the other a handful is taken and the rest eaten. May they testify together that it should be counted as testimony of one witness? That would follow the rule of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Assi: Since if they were to be found perjured they could not be executed, the murderer could not be executed. This applies here also.
May they bring one cereal offering together that would be totally burned? It was stated: They may bring one cereal offering conditionally that would be totally burned. May they bring two cereal offerings one of which should be burned totally and the other have a handful taken and the rest eaten? It was stated: They may bring two cereal offerings of one which is burned totally and of the other a handful is taken and the rest eaten. May they testify together that it should be counted as testimony of one witness? That would follow the rule of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Assi: Since if they were to be found perjured they could not be executed, the murderer could not be executed. This applies here also.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
“If he injured one and then injured the other, or cursed one and then cursed the other, he cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked, does that not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan? Since they disagree about the second day of holidays in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts forwarning in a case of doubt, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept forwarning in a case of doubt. Rebbi Ḥanina said in the name of Rebbi, there is no disagreement. There, it would have been possible to make a determination, here it is impossible to make the determination.
“If he injured one and then injured the other, or cursed one and then cursed the other, he cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked, does that not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan? Since they disagree about the second day of holidays in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts forwarning in a case of doubt, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept forwarning in a case of doubt. Rebbi Ḥanina said in the name of Rebbi, there is no disagreement. There, it would have been possible to make a determination, here it is impossible to make the determination.
“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.
“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.
MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two underage orphan [sisters]. If the husband of one of them dies, the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. And so for two deaf-mute [sisters]. If one is adult and the other underage, if the husband of the underage girl died, she has to leave as wife’s sister. If the husband of the adult one died, Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him. Rabban Gamliel says, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age and the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! He has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two underage orphan [sisters]. If the husband of one of them dies, the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. And so for two deaf-mute [sisters]. If one is adult and the other underage, if the husband of the underage girl died, she has to leave as wife’s sister. If the husband of the adult one died, Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him. Rabban Gamliel says, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age and the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! He has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two underage orphan [sisters]. If the husband of one of them dies, the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. And so for two deaf-mute [sisters]. If one is adult and the other underage, if the husband of the underage girl died, she has to leave as wife’s sister. If the husband of the adult one died, Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him. Rabban Gamliel says, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age and the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! He has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? Did we not state “underage and deaf-mute”? Rebbi Hiyya stated ““underage and deaf-mute”: “If the husband of the underage girl died, the husband of the deaf-mute has to divorce her and the underage girl has to wait until she comes of age and perform ḥalîṣah” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. “If the husband of the deaf-mute died, the husband of the underage girl has to divorce her and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she becomes permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.
MISHNAH: Two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters, or two hearing sisters, or two sisters of whom one is deaf-mute, the other hearing; or two deaf-mute sisters married to two deaf-mute brothers, or two hearing brothers, or two brothers of whom one is deaf-mute, these are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate. If the women are unrelated, they must marry them, and, if they want to, they may send them away. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two hearing sisters. If the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife do? He divorces his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s widow is permanently forbidden.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes.” They objected to Rebbi Jehudah: Think of it, if one came crying, the other did not cry. To this one you forbid, to that one you permit. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Think of it, maybe her son went overseas and died there, she remembers that and cries.
Rebbi Jehudah insists on interpreting the contract text. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: A person brings for his wife any sacrifice she is obligated for, even if she ate suet or desecrated the Sabbath. Also, Rebbi Jehudah says, once he divorces her, he is no longer obligated for her, for she writes to him “any other obligations that come to you from earlier times.”
Does the document prove? Do we not have to believe what she says? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, one does not suspect him to vilify her in the eyes of Heaven; he is suspect to vilify her in the eyes of the court. Since he knows that if he were to come [and object, his objection] would not be accepted, he has [the bill of divorce] signed by witnesses in good standing. And here, since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful.
MISHNAH: One [wife] says, he died, the other one says, he did not die. The one who said that he died can remarry and collect her ketubah; the one who said that he did not die cannot remarry nor collect her ketubah. If one said that he died, while the other one said he was killed; Rebbi Meïr says, since they contradict one another, they cannot remarry. Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.
MISHNAH: One [wife] says, he died, the other one says, he did not die. The one who said that he died can remarry and collect her ketubah; the one who said that he did not die cannot remarry nor collect her ketubah. If one said that he died, while the other one said he was killed; Rebbi Meïr says, since they contradict one another, they cannot remarry. Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.
There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses testified about him, one group testifying that he vowed two periods of nezirut, the other group testifying that he vowed five periods of nezirut.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five.
There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses testified about him, one group testifying that he vowed two periods of nezirut, the other group testifying that he vowed five periods of nezirut.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five.
There, we have stated: “If two groups of witnesses testified about him, one group testifying that he vowed two periods of nezirut, the other group testifying that he vowed five periods of nezirut.” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: She is suspected to cause trouble to herself in order to cause trouble to her co-wife. Then she should not be trustworthy even for herself! Since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful. Then she should be trustworthy even for her co-wife! She is suspected to cause trouble to herself in order to cause trouble to her co-wife.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
HALAKHAH: Two sisters-in-law, of whom one has children and witnesses but the other has neither. The first one is permitted by children, the other one by her witnesses.
HALAKHAH: Two sisters-in-law, of whom one has children and witnesses but the other has neither. The first one is permitted by children, the other one by her witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.
They answered on the words of Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah: If so, there is no end to it. If he is believed, he declares his jealousy (before two) [by himself], brings witnesses that she was in a secluded place and disables her from receiving the ketubah. Rebbi Yose said, what business did she have in a secluded place? But it refers to the statement in the Mishnah. Is he believed to declare formally his jealousy and then say that she was in a secluded place and disable her from receiving her ketubah? Rebbi Mana said, even for that other Tanna it is [a] valid [objection], following him who says that he may declare his jealousy in respect to her father or her son. Is he believed to declare his jealousy with respect to her father and her son, can he then bring witnesses that she was in a secluded place with them and disable her from receiving her ketubah? If you ask, what business did she have in a secluded place? The Torah permitted her to be in a secluded place, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you, etc.,” Your daughter, in secret; your mother, in secret; a man may be alone with his mother and dwell with her, with his daughter and dwell with her, with his sister but may not dwell with her.