prohibition

613 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:16

Instead of inferring from his wife’s sister that all women under incest prohibitions remain prohibited, deduce from his brother’s wife that all women under incest prohibitions become permitted! Rebbi Mana said,one infers two prohibitions from two prohibitions but one does not infer two prohibitions from one prohibition. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun: For anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for anything not induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. What is that? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, e. g., those fifteen categories of women. That you should not say that his daughter is forbidden to him before she is married to his brother; once she is married to his brother she is permitted to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:21

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says that everybody agrees about the co-wife that he is guilty, if somebody from the market gave qiddushin to one of them and then the levir came and performed ḥalîṣah with her or had intercourse with her, did the qiddushin become invalid? If he performed ḥalîṣah with her companion but then had intercourse with her, were qiddushin validated retroactively? Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! But there is one sister-in-law, here are two sisters-in-law. The prohibition of a single sister-in-law is different from that of two sisters-in-law!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:22

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who said, a man is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but he is guilty for the co-wife, ḥalîṣah is freeing; is intercourse freeing? As you say, if he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Similarly, if he had intercourse with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate! Rebbi Yose said, what do you think? That ḥalîṣah is the same as intercourse? Once he performed ḥalîṣah, the claim of the dead is removed from her retroactively. Retroactively fell on her the prohibition of the dead man regarding the brothers. But if he had intercourse with her, she is his wife. On that did Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:25

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: The she-ram and the wife of his brother who did not live in his world were in the paragraph. Why do you see fit to say that the co-wife of the she-ram is permitted but the co-wife of the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is forbidden? He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children. Is it not enough that she cannot be eligible for the levirate but you also want to forbid her co-wife? But the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is under an incest prohibition and any incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Assi said, the co-wife of a she-ram is forbidden. The Mishnah disagrees with Assi: “All of these, if they died, or refused, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Assi follows Rebbi Meїr since Rebbi Meїr said, in any case where you cannot take me in levirate you cannot take my co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:25

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: The she-ram and the wife of his brother who did not live in his world were in the paragraph. Why do you see fit to say that the co-wife of the she-ram is permitted but the co-wife of the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is forbidden? He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children. Is it not enough that she cannot be eligible for the levirate but you also want to forbid her co-wife? But the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is under an incest prohibition and any incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Assi said, the co-wife of a she-ram is forbidden. The Mishnah disagrees with Assi: “All of these, if they died, or refused, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Assi follows Rebbi Meїr since Rebbi Meїr said, in any case where you cannot take me in levirate you cannot take my co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:49

Rebbi Eleazar said, even though the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai disagreed about co-wives, they agree that the child is not a bastard, since a bastard is only from a woman which is forbidden to [a man] by an incest prohibition and one is subject to extirpation for [sinning with] her. Rebbi Tarphon said, I would love to have a daughter’s co-wife to marry her into priesthood. They asked Rebbi Joshua, what are children of a daughter’s co-wife? He said to them, you bring my head between two large mountains, between the words of the House of Shammai and those of the House of Hillel, that they should smash my brain. But I testify about the family ‘Anubai from Bet Ṣeba‘im and the family Neqipai from Bet Meqošeš that they were sons of co-wives and their grandchildren were High Priests officiating on top of the altar.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:11

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:11

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:11

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:12

MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity, she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:12

MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity, she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:15

MISHNAH: Commandment prohibition: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. Holiness prohibiton: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, a bastard or a Gibeoness to an Israel, a Jewish woman to a Gibeonite or a bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:16

HALAKHAH: Commandment prohibition: Incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim; it is a biblical commandment to listen to the words of the Sopherim. And Holiness prohibition: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. “ You should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” But some do switch: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, “you should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. And holiness prohibitions, incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:16

HALAKHAH: Commandment prohibition: Incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim; it is a biblical commandment to listen to the words of the Sopherim. And Holiness prohibition: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. “ You should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” But some do switch: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, “you should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. And holiness prohibitions, incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:21

Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards He gave the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother. What is this about? His father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother. Should not his father’s mother be like his father-in-law’s mother? Should not his mother’s mother be like his mother-in-law’s mother? They forbade his father’s father’s wife because of his father’s mother. They forbade his mother’s father’s wife because of his mother’s mother. Should not his son’s son’s wife be like his wife’s son’s daughter? Should not his daughter’s son’s wife be like his wife’s daughter’s daughter?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:21

Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards He gave the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother. What is this about? His father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother. Should not his father’s mother be like his father-in-law’s mother? Should not his mother’s mother be like his mother-in-law’s mother? They forbade his father’s father’s wife because of his father’s mother. They forbade his mother’s father’s wife because of his mother’s mother. Should not his son’s son’s wife be like his wife’s son’s daughter? Should not his daughter’s son’s wife be like his wife’s daughter’s daughter?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. If there were four brothers, two of whom are married to unrelatedwomen, would they not be subject to levirate? There is a difference, since here there is the prohibition of sisters. In that case, they should not need ḥalîṣah from them! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is because of candidacy and the prohibition of sisters is not clear.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. If there were four brothers, two of whom are married to unrelatedwomen, would they not be subject to levirate? There is a difference, since here there is the prohibition of sisters. In that case, they should not need ḥalîṣah from them! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is because of candidacy and the prohibition of sisters is not clear.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:3

There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:3

There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:4

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:4

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:5

What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:6

It was stated: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:11

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:11

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:11

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:14

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter: These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, but Rebbi Simeon frees them. If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. But Rebbi Simeon frees them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:14

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter: These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, but Rebbi Simeon frees them. If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. But Rebbi Simeon frees them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:14

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter: These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, but Rebbi Simeon frees them. If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. But Rebbi Simeon frees them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:26

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:26

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “Two brothers married to two sisters,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “Two brothers married to two sisters,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:38

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:38

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:38

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:29

So is the Mishnah: “The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden”. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman for whom he performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:33

HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:33

HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:26

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:4

Are sacrifices forbidden for the uncircumcised? One cannot deduce the answer from Passover since they are not subject to [the prohibition of] breaking a bone, neither from heave since that would be inference after inference. At the end, you have to say “from it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover implies that the uncircumcised is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of sacrifices must imply that the uncircumcised is disqualified. Are sacrifices forbidden for the mourner? “From it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of tithe states that the mourner is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover must imply that the mourner is disqualified.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:8

A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in Rhodes was in bad reputation. Rebbi sent Rebbi Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Zeїra said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Zeїra said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity,” which is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. Similarly, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from among his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is under a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for an Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for an Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:15

What does Rebbi Eleazar say about ketubah? If you say that he is entitled to things that come to him in prohibition, then ketubah that came to him in permission certainly!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:32

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:32

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:32

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:4

There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:4

There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:6

Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:6

Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:13

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:13

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:20

What about it? Rebbi Yose said, about any incest prohibition which for a Jewish court is a capital crime, a descendant of Noah is forewarned; and about any incest prohibition which for a court is not a capital crime, a descendant of Noah is not forewarned. They objected: Is not a case involving the sister a capital crime for a Jewish court and the descendants of Noah are not forewarned? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Because of these abominations, the Eternal, your God, uproots them before you.” This teaches that the Holy One, praise to Him, does not punish if He did not warn.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:20

What about it? Rebbi Yose said, about any incest prohibition which for a Jewish court is a capital crime, a descendant of Noah is forewarned; and about any incest prohibition which for a court is not a capital crime, a descendant of Noah is not forewarned. They objected: Is not a case involving the sister a capital crime for a Jewish court and the descendants of Noah are not forewarned? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Because of these abominations, the Eternal, your God, uproots them before you.” This teaches that the Holy One, praise to Him, does not punish if He did not warn.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:12

“ The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: It happened with the wife of the cameldriver Pison that the Sages repudiated for her in her absence. The House of Shammai said to them, is that a proof? Since he measured crookedly, the Sages measured crookedly for him.” This is difficult. Because a man behaves incorrectly, does one permit his incest prohibition? Rab Ḥisda said, that means that, if she transgresses and repudiated after marriage, the House of Shammai recognize her act of repudiation.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:33

What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:33

What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:10

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, she should remarry and collect her ketubah. The House of Hillel say, she should remarry but not collect her ketubah. The House of Shammai said to them, you permitted the stringent incest prohibition, should you not permit the lenient money matters? The House of Hillel said to them, we find that the brothers cannot access the inheritance on her testimony. The House of Shammai said, we can infer that from the text of her ketubah document in which he writes: “If you would be married to another man you shall take the amount I wrote for you.” The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:7

What is the reason of Rebbi Joshua? ““For he found in her a word of nakedness.” “Word”, that is the declaration of jealousy. “For he found”; “finding” has to be validated by witnesses. (“But he can take her to drinkby the testimony of one witness or his own testimony,” “she was untrue to him in untruthfulness”.) How does Rebbi Joshua explain “nakedness”? [A prohibition of] nakedness that came because of a word.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:16

There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:16

There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:16

There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:35

As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:6

“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:6

“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:6

“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:8

Rebbi Yose explained “to forbid”: That should be forbidden to me; there should be a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is on me, it is forbidden, there should be an oath on it, it is forbidden. Rebbi Yudan said, in vows it is forbidden, in oaths it is permitted. There is a prohibition on me, it is forbidden. There is a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is there on me, it is forbidden. There is an oath on (me) [it] is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:8

Rebbi Yose explained “to forbid”: That should be forbidden to me; there should be a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is on me, it is forbidden, there should be an oath on it, it is forbidden. Rebbi Yudan said, in vows it is forbidden, in oaths it is permitted. There is a prohibition on me, it is forbidden. There is a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is there on me, it is forbidden. There is an oath on (me) [it] is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:8

Rebbi Yose explained “to forbid”: That should be forbidden to me; there should be a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is on me, it is forbidden, there should be an oath on it, it is forbidden. Rebbi Yudan said, in vows it is forbidden, in oaths it is permitted. There is a prohibition on me, it is forbidden. There is a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is there on me, it is forbidden. There is an oath on (me) [it] is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:8

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good.” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:25

HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:35

“The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized.” Even if it has white skin disease. How can I confirm: “Beware of skin disease to watch it carefully and to do …”? Also at a circumcision. Then how can I confirm: “The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized”? If there is no white skin disease? The verse says, “the flesh”, even if it has white skin disease. This is simple in the opinion of Rebbi Jonah, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition even if they are not written together. But in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition only if they are written together? Since it is written “the flesh of his prepuce,” it is as if it were written together.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:35

“The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized.” Even if it has white skin disease. How can I confirm: “Beware of skin disease to watch it carefully and to do …”? Also at a circumcision. Then how can I confirm: “The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized”? If there is no white skin disease? The verse says, “the flesh”, even if it has white skin disease. This is simple in the opinion of Rebbi Jonah, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition even if they are not written together. But in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition only if they are written together? Since it is written “the flesh of his prepuce,” it is as if it were written together.