prohibition

613 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:17

“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:19

MISHNAH: If somebody says to his wife, all vows that you might vow from now until I shall return from place X shall be confirmed, he did not say anything; [if he says] they shall be dissolved, Rebbi Eliezer says, they are dissolved, but the Sages say, they are not dissolved. Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows that came under the category of prohibition, should he not be able to dissolve vows that did not yet come under the category of prohibition? They said to him, it says ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them”. What can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:19

MISHNAH: If somebody says to his wife, all vows that you might vow from now until I shall return from place X shall be confirmed, he did not say anything; [if he says] they shall be dissolved, Rebbi Eliezer says, they are dissolved, but the Sages say, they are not dissolved. Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows that came under the category of prohibition, should he not be able to dissolve vows that did not yet come under the category of prohibition? They said to him, it says ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them”. What can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:2

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife.” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:11

It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:25

HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:31

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides. If vow and prohibition came together? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:31

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides. If vow and prohibition came together? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:31

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides. If vow and prohibition came together? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:26

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:7

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:7

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:8

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s method: If somebody dedicated unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple, he violates a positive commandment. Why also a prohibition? The verse says: “The Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר”: a prohibition was pronounced, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi was sitting and studying the rule that “a firstling cannot be substituted” when Bar Pedaiah’s father was passing by. Rebbi saw him, and said, do I know what I should say here, “the Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר,” could one explain the words of Rebbi Jehudah? Is it written thus? It follows what Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from its beginning to its end. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. “You have to pour oil on.” You have to pour oil on a flour offering, to subject all flour offerings to pouring.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:8

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s method: If somebody dedicated unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple, he violates a positive commandment. Why also a prohibition? The verse says: “The Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר”: a prohibition was pronounced, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi was sitting and studying the rule that “a firstling cannot be substituted” when Bar Pedaiah’s father was passing by. Rebbi saw him, and said, do I know what I should say here, “the Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר,” could one explain the words of Rebbi Jehudah? Is it written thus? It follows what Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from its beginning to its end. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. “You have to pour oil on.” You have to pour oil on a flour offering, to subject all flour offerings to pouring.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:3

Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:7

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:7

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:7

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:32

MISHNAH: Three kinds are forbidden for the nazir: Impurity, shaving, and consuming produce of the vine. Impurity and shaving are more severe than the prohibition of produce of the vine since impurity and shaving require him to start again, but produce of the vine does not require him to start again. The prohibition of produce of the vine is more severe than impurity and shaving since produce of the vine is never permitted but impurity and shaving are permitted for a commanded shaving and a corpse of obligation. Impurity is more severe than shaving since for impurity he has to start again from the beginning and is obligated for a sacrifice, but for shaving he has to start again for at most 30 days and is not obligated for a sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:32

MISHNAH: Three kinds are forbidden for the nazir: Impurity, shaving, and consuming produce of the vine. Impurity and shaving are more severe than the prohibition of produce of the vine since impurity and shaving require him to start again, but produce of the vine does not require him to start again. The prohibition of produce of the vine is more severe than impurity and shaving since produce of the vine is never permitted but impurity and shaving are permitted for a commanded shaving and a corpse of obligation. Impurity is more severe than shaving since for impurity he has to start again from the beginning and is obligated for a sacrifice, but for shaving he has to start again for at most 30 days and is not obligated for a sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:53

Rebbi Ḥizqiah stated: All I forbade to you at other places I permitted to you here. Since everywhere 100 is a prohibition, more than 100 is permitted, but here even 100 is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:15

May a (person) [Cohen] defile himself in honor of the public? It is stated: When there are two acceptable roads, one long and pure, the other one short and impure: If the public was walking on the long one, he goes on the long one; otherwise, he goes on the short one in honor of the public. That refers to impurity by their words; also for impurity that is from the words of the Torah? From what Rebbi Zeïra said, so great is the honor of the public that it temporarily pushes aside a prohibition, that means even impurity that is from the words of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:28

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:28

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:115

MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:131

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:131

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:131

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:47

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:47

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:12

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:12

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:61

It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation.” Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.” Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others, but the child is qualified! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben) Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified, lest you injure them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:37

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:22

It is written: “They are impure for you”. Why does it say “they shall be impure for you”? One is for the prohibition of eating, the other for the prohibition of usufruct. Anything forbidden [by the Torah is forbidden for trade, but everything whose prohibition] is rabbinical is permitted for trade. But is there not the donkey? It is raised for work. Is there not the camel? It is raised for work.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:22

It is written: “They are impure for you”. Why does it say “they shall be impure for you”? One is for the prohibition of eating, the other for the prohibition of usufruct. Anything forbidden [by the Torah is forbidden for trade, but everything whose prohibition] is rabbinical is permitted for trade. But is there not the donkey? It is raised for work. Is there not the camel? It is raised for work.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:22

It is written: “They are impure for you”. Why does it say “they shall be impure for you”? One is for the prohibition of eating, the other for the prohibition of usufruct. Anything forbidden [by the Torah is forbidden for trade, but everything whose prohibition] is rabbinical is permitted for trade. But is there not the donkey? It is raised for work. Is there not the camel? It is raised for work.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:32

HALAKHAH: “What is a lost animal,” etc. “If one found it in the cowshed, he has no obligation; in the public domain he is obligated. Between graves, he may not defile himself. If his father told him to defile himself, or told him not to return it, he should not listen to him.” Everywhere you say that a positive commandment has precedence over a prohibition, but here, you say that a positive commandment does not have precedence over a prohibition? There is a difference since both he and his father are required to honor the Omnipresent.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:32

HALAKHAH: “What is a lost animal,” etc. “If one found it in the cowshed, he has no obligation; in the public domain he is obligated. Between graves, he may not defile himself. If his father told him to defile himself, or told him not to return it, he should not listen to him.” Everywhere you say that a positive commandment has precedence over a prohibition, but here, you say that a positive commandment does not have precedence over a prohibition? There is a difference since both he and his father are required to honor the Omnipresent.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 7:15

HALAKHAH: “If somebody hires workers to work,” etc. Anything which is of a kind apt to be under the rules of tithing but another prohibition caused it [to be forbidden to eat], if one hired [a worker] without mentioning it, he has to redeem and feed, tithe and feed. If [the worker] contracted for it, he eats. But if it is of a kind exempt from the rules of tithing but another prohibition caused it [to be forbidden to eat], if one hired [a worker] without mentioning it, that one cannot eat; if he contracted for it, he eats.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 7:15

HALAKHAH: “If somebody hires workers to work,” etc. Anything which is of a kind apt to be under the rules of tithing but another prohibition caused it [to be forbidden to eat], if one hired [a worker] without mentioning it, he has to redeem and feed, tithe and feed. If [the worker] contracted for it, he eats. But if it is of a kind exempt from the rules of tithing but another prohibition caused it [to be forbidden to eat], if one hired [a worker] without mentioning it, that one cannot eat; if he contracted for it, he eats.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 9:32

MISHNAH: One may not take a pledge from a widow, whether poor or rich, since it was said: “And do not take a widow’s garment for a pledge.” One who takes a flour mill as pledge transgresses a prohibition and is guilty for two vessels, as it was said: “Do not take upper and lower millstones as pledge.” They said, not only upper and lower millstones but everything used to make food, as it was said: “For he takes a living person for a pledge.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:19

Rebbi Jehudah has both a positive and a negative commandment concerning its eating, a positive and a negative commandment concerning its removal. A positive commandment concerning its eating, seven days you shall eat unleavened bread for it, not leavened. Any prohibition which is implied by a positive commandment has the status of positive commandment. A negative commandment concerning its eating, do not eat leavened. A positive commandment concerning its removal, seven days … you shall remove sour dough from your houses. A negative commandment concerning its removal, for seven days sour dough shall not be found in your houses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:22

MISHNAH: How does one hang him? One sinks a stake into the ground, wood is sticking out from there. One binds both hands, one on top of the other, and hangs him. Rebbi Yose says, the beam is leaning on the wall; one hangs him in the way butchers do. One hangs him and takes him down immediately; if he were left overnight, one would transgress a prohibition, as it is said: Do not leave his corpse on the wood overnight, but certainly bury him on the same day, for a hanged person is blasphemy. This means, why was he hanged? Because he blasphemed; it turns out that the name of Heaven would be desecrated.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:28

The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Meïr because he said, also for the blasphemer one violates a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:29

MISHNAH: Not only this, but anybody who leaves his dead overnight violates a prohibition. If he left him overnight for his honor, to provide him with a coffin and shrouds, he does not violate a prohibition in his regard. They did not bury them in their family graves, but two graves were prepared, one for those stoned or burned, the other for those beheaded or strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:29

MISHNAH: Not only this, but anybody who leaves his dead overnight violates a prohibition. If he left him overnight for his honor, to provide him with a coffin and shrouds, he does not violate a prohibition in his regard. They did not bury them in their family graves, but two graves were prepared, one for those stoned or burned, the other for those beheaded or strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:25

A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:25

A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:25

A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:25

A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:25

A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:25

A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:36

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked of Rebbi Zeˋira: For what reason did Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba disagree about a male and an animal but did not disagree about any incest prohibition? He told him, because for all incest prohibitions it is written blood relative, and about these it is not written blood relative. They objected: About the menstruating woman it is not written blood relative; did they disagree about her? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: For it is written approach, approach; it is as if all were here and there. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Aba in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: To the wife in the separation of her impurity you shall not come near to uncover her nakedness. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “not to come near” is “not to uncover.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:47

MISHNAH: The worshipper of strange worship whether he worships, or sacrifices, or burns incense, or makes a libation, or prostrates himself; also one who accepts it as a god and says to it: you are my god. But one who embraces, or kisses, or sweeps clean, or sprinkles water; one who washes, rubs with oil, clothes, or puts shoes on it, violates a prohibition. He who makes a vow in its name or keeps one in its name violates a prohibition. One who defecates in front of Baal Pe`or follows its worship. One who throws a stone at a statue of Mercury follows its worship.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:47

MISHNAH: The worshipper of strange worship whether he worships, or sacrifices, or burns incense, or makes a libation, or prostrates himself; also one who accepts it as a god and says to it: you are my god. But one who embraces, or kisses, or sweeps clean, or sprinkles water; one who washes, rubs with oil, clothes, or puts shoes on it, violates a prohibition. He who makes a vow in its name or keeps one in its name violates a prohibition. One who defecates in front of Baal Pe`or follows its worship. One who throws a stone at a statue of Mercury follows its worship.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:62

From where the warning about the necromancer? Do not turn to the necromancers. From where extirpation? A person who would turn to necromancers and mediums, etc. Punishment from where? A man or woman, impersonating a necromancer or a medium, shall be put to death. Why is the medium not mentioned in Keritut? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Because they are taken together in one prohibition, do not turn to the necromancers, etc. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Because it is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa: No person except you thought of stating the medium in this way in Keritut. He told him, because as the verse formulated it so the Mishnah formulates it, a necromancer or a medium.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:62

From where the warning about the necromancer? Do not turn to the necromancers. From where extirpation? A person who would turn to necromancers and mediums, etc. Punishment from where? A man or woman, impersonating a necromancer or a medium, shall be put to death. Why is the medium not mentioned in Keritut? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Because they are taken together in one prohibition, do not turn to the necromancers, etc. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Because it is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa: No person except you thought of stating the medium in this way in Keritut. He told him, because as the verse formulated it so the Mishnah formulates it, a necromancer or a medium.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 8:6

He is guilty only it he ate it rare. If he ate it raw, he is a dog. If he ate it cooked, he is a human. If he ate cartilage, what is the rule? What is the rule about soft sinews? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one subscribes to them; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not subscribe to them. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed about what is stated there: “The following have their hides treated like their flesh.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was only said as prohibition and regarding impurity, but not for flogging. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Rebbi stated a complete Mishnah, not only for prohibition and regarding impurity. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, he treats it as flesh, but here, he does not treat it as meat. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, there is a difference, since there one refers to skin which in the end will become hard. This emphasizes that the reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted! Since there, where in the end it will harden, he treats it as flesh, here where in the end it will not harden, not so much more? Rebbi Abbahu said, the reason of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi is: they shall eat the meat in that night, not sinews.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 8:6

He is guilty only it he ate it rare. If he ate it raw, he is a dog. If he ate it cooked, he is a human. If he ate cartilage, what is the rule? What is the rule about soft sinews? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one subscribes to them; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not subscribe to them. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed about what is stated there: “The following have their hides treated like their flesh.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was only said as prohibition and regarding impurity, but not for flogging. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Rebbi stated a complete Mishnah, not only for prohibition and regarding impurity. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, he treats it as flesh, but here, he does not treat it as meat. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, there is a difference, since there one refers to skin which in the end will become hard. This emphasizes that the reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted! Since there, where in the end it will harden, he treats it as flesh, here where in the end it will not harden, not so much more? Rebbi Abbahu said, the reason of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi is: they shall eat the meat in that night, not sinews.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:5

Rebbi Eleazar said, Symmachos and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be liable because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. It was found stated: it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and (her daughter) [her son’s daughter] and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall the under same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:5

Rebbi Eleazar said, Symmachos and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be liable because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. It was found stated: it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and (her daughter) [her son’s daughter] and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall the under same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:9

Rav Huna understood all of these [rules] from this verse: The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should nor uncover. And it is written, if a man take a woman and her daughter, it is taboo. Taboo-taboo for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, there is a prohibition upwards. Since downwards one requires marriage, so upwards one requires marriage. Since downwards they are burned, so upwards they are burned. Since downwards He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:9

Rav Huna understood all of these [rules] from this verse: The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should nor uncover. And it is written, if a man take a woman and her daughter, it is taboo. Taboo-taboo for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, there is a prohibition upwards. Since downwards one requires marriage, so upwards one requires marriage. Since downwards they are burned, so upwards they are burned. Since downwards He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:16

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:16

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:8

Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy. He told him, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, I shall heal your waywardness. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, to cleanse you. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquity with plagues. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, immediately before he moves from there the Holy One, praise to Him, would forgive him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, I shall heal your waywardness. If one transgresses a prohibition, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement pardon half, and sufferings pardon half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement pardon a third, and suffering a third, and death scours a third. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:27

A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:30

Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:48

MISHNAH: “I put an oath upon you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Benevolent,” and all substitute names, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition. “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rebbi Meїr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:51

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:51

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:51

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?